THE PHILOLOGICAL-
PRAGMATIC APPROACH
A Study of Language Choice and
Code-Switching in Early Modern
## English School Performances

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"What I shall have to say here is neither difficult nor contentious; the only merit I should like to claim for it is that of being true, at least in parts." – J. L. Austin

ABSTRACT

In this study I set out to account for certain central aspects of language choice and code-switching. My purpose is twofold: to explain why people use multiple languages within a single discourse or choose to use a particular language in a particular setting, and to demonstrate the feasibility and usefulness of combining philosophical and empirical research. Towards these ends, I develop a philological-pragmatic approach and apply it to a collection of multilingual texts. The material consists of the *Orationes* manuscript (Canterbury, Canterbury Cathedral Archives Lit. MS E41), containing speeches and plays in English, Latin, and Greek performed by students at the King's School, Canterbury, in 1665–1684. I conduct a philosophical and methodological analysis of the philological-pragmatic approach, construct a framework on the basis of that analysis, and apply it in the empirical analyses to understand and explain actions.

The philosophical and methodological analyses indicate that a basis for the philological-pragmatic approach can be constructed by reinterpreting philology and pragmatics from the perspective of action analysis and theory of action: philology as the study of concrete action-tokens (interpretation), pragmatics as the study of abstract action-types (explication and classification). The empirical analyses indicate that multilingual language use is an important and characteristic strategy in the *Orationes* texts. Three explanatory entities were central in accounting for multilingual language use: consequences of actions, causal antecedents, and further actions/forms. Consequences were classified into five basic categories: face-related, textual, argumentative, stylistic, and capacitative. These taxonomies sufficiently accounted for the patterns of language use observed in the dataset.

The study constitutes the first book-length investigation of the *Orationes* texts. In addition to advancing our understanding of the roots of multilingual language use in the Early Modern English period, the patterns identified have several parallels both in different periods and in different cultures. Detecting such patterns has the potential to contribute to an integrated account of the phenomenon. Finally, the study offers other researchers a model for combining philology and pragmatics.

KEYWORDS: multilingualism, code-switching, philology, pragmatics, Early Modern English, Neo-Latin, Greek, grammar school

TIIVISTELMÄ

Käsittelen väitöskirjassani kielen valintaa ja koodinvaihtoa. Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on yhtäältä selittää, miksi yhden diskurssin sisällä käytetään useita kieliä tai tietyissä tilanteissa valitaan tietty kieli, ja toisaalta tuoda esiin hyötyjä, joita saadaan yhdistämällä filosofinen ja empiirinen tutkimus. Kehitän tutkimuksessani ns. filologis-pragmaattisen lähestymistavan ja sovellan sitä monikielisen tekstikokoelman analyysiin. Aineistoni koostuu *Orationes*-käsikirjoituksesta (Canterbury, Canterbury Cathedral Archives Lit. MS E41), joka sisältää Canterburyn King's Schoolin oppilaiden vuosina 1665–1684 esittämiä puheita ja näytelmiä. Teksteissä käytettävät kielet ovat englanti, latina ja kreikka. Laadin filosofisen ja menetelmäopillisen kuvauksen filologis-pragmaattisesta lähestymistavasta, kehitän analyysin pohjalta viitekehyksen ja sovellan tätä viitekehystä tutkimuksen empiirisessä osassa tekojen ymmärtämiseen ja selittämiseen.

Filosofisten ja menetelmäopillisten analyysien perusteella filologis-pragmaattinen lähestymistapa voidaan rakentaa määrittelemällä filologia ja pragmatiikka tekojen tutkimisen näkökulmasta: filologia tutkii konkreettisia tekoesiintymiä (menetelmänä tulkinta), pragmatiikka abstrakteja tekotyyppejä (menetelminä eksplikaatio ja luokittelu). Empiirisen analyysin perusteella monikielinen kielenkäyttö on keskeinen osa *Orationes*-tekstejä. Selityksissä viittasin erityisesti tekojen seurauksiin, kausaalisiin tekijöihin sekä muihin tekoihin/rakenteisiin. Luokittelin tekojen seuraukset edelleen kasvoihin liittyviin, tekstuaalisiin, argumentatiivisiin, stilistisiin ja mahdollistaviin. Näiden taksonomioiden avulla pystyin selittämään tutkittavat ilmiöt aineistossani.

Väitöstutkimukseni on ensimmäinen laaja tutkimus *Orationes*-teksteistä. Tutkimuksen tulokset auttavat ymmärtämään monikielisen kielenkäytön juuria 1600-luvun Britanniassa. Vertaamalla tuloksia aiempiin tutkimuksiin löydetään yhtymäkohtia eri aikakausilta ja eri kulttuureista. Näitä yhtymäkohtia tarkastelemalla saavutetaan entistä kattavampi käsitys monikielisen kielenkäytön luonteesta. Tutkimukseni tarjoaa myös yleisen mallin filologian ja pragmatiikan yhdistämiseen.

ASIASANAT: monikielisyys, koodinvaihto, filologia, pragmatiikka, varhaisuusenglanti, uuslatina, kreikka, koulu

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The members of the *Orationes* project have been very important throughout the completion of this thesis. I thank Professor Anthony W. Johnson for bringing me on board the project and for providing me with the primary material of the study. I want to thank Professor Jyri Vaahtera for first introducing me to the *Orationes* manuscript. I am also grateful to the other scholars who have been part of the project, for their assistance and collegiality.

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Abbreviations

S	speaker
H	addressee
PDE	Present-Day English
ME	Middle English
EModE	Early Modern English
CS	code-switching
B	borrowing
L1	language 1 / first language
L2	language 2 / second language
ML	matrix language
EL	embedded language
FFI	foreignness-foregrounded item
MLF model	Matrix Language Frame model
CA	conversation analysis
DR	discourse-related
PR	participant-related
T	transfer
MM	Markedness Model
RO set	rights and obligations set
CP	Cooperative Principle
RC model	rational choice model
FTA	face-threatening act
D	social distance
P	relative power
R	ranking of imposition
W	weightiness of FTA
RE	rational explanation
RP	rationality principle

(For symbols used in formulae, see pp. 155–156 and 164–170.)

1 Introduction

In this study, I set out to describe and account for certain central aspects of multilingual language use. Multilingualism is a very common phenomenon; it is indeed so pervasive that people may be unaware of the extent of its presence in their lives. In everyday usage, the term may refer in a relatively narrow sense to societies where different languages have different official roles, or to individuals who have acquired more than one native language during childhood. However, in the sense of encountering and using several languages in our daily lives – even in limited capacity – multilingualism is a feature of a vast number of societies and individuals. People may acquire competence in several languages through formal education or by more informal means; we encounter various languages for example in signs, packages or clothing; we read texts, listen to audio recordings, or watch video material using languages other than our native one. Even people who do not perhaps consider themselves multilingual in the strict sense may choose to use different languages according to the situation, switch between languages within a single conversation or text, and insert elements from one language into discourse produced primarily in another. This phenomenon, known most commonly as code-switching, is the object of research in the present study.

1.1 Topic and background

Within linguistics, the past few decades have witnessed a rapidly rising interest in multilingualism and related phenomena. *Multilingualism* takes many forms, and it is necessary to distinguish from the outset between *individual multilingualism*, where "an individual uses two or more languages", and *societal multilingualism*, where "a community houses speakers of more than one language" (Myers-Scotton 2002: 30). One manifestation of societal multilingualism is *diglossia*, where two languages serve different functions: for example when one is used in such spheres as religion and education, while the other is reserved for everyday activities (see e.g. Ferguson 1959; Fishman 1967).[1] Present-day UK and Ireland are examples of multilingual

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[1] When the division of labour takes place between more than two languages, we are dealing with *polyglossia*.

societies without society-wide diglossia.[2] Multilingualism itself is the result of *language contact*, defined for example as "interaction between (the users of) different languages" (Winford 2003: 5) or "the use of more than one language in the same place at the same time" (Thomason 2001: 1). In the prototypical case, 'contact' implies physical proximity between groups of speakers of different languages, whether due to conquest, immigration, trade, travel or some other factor. Contact, however, can also take place through other media, such as text and video.[3]

One of the most important manifestations of multilingualism, and hence an outcome of language contact, is *code-switching* (henceforth CS), understood here primarily as the use of several languages within a single discourse or communicative event (e.g. Gumperz 1982: 59; Matras 2009: 101; Schendl & Wright 2011: 23; Poplack 2015: 918). The switched element may be structurally of various kinds, ranging from individual words to several sentences, or even longer units. Depending on how broadly the concept is understood, it may also cover instances where a switch occurs *between* two different discourses or communicative events, for example between separate parts of a book or when a speaker uses one language at home and another at work. Regardless of how broadly one prefers to interpret the concept, all the above-mentioned cases are forms of multilingual language use, falling under the more general phenomenon of *language choice*.

Previous research on code-switching can be seen as falling into roughly three main categories. The first is general research on either multilingualism or language contact phenomena. These studies have addressed such issues as for example the distinction between code-switching and other, related phenomena, such as interference or lexical borrowing, along with questions concerning the role of code-switching in language change. Seminal studies in this category include Weinreich ([1953] 1963), Haugen (1953), and Thomason and Kaufman (1988); in fact, similar questions were also discussed already for example by Whitney (1881) and Paul ([1920] 1975). In the second category we have grammatical research on code-switching, focusing for example on the different structures or forms of switching and

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[2]   Diglossia may nevertheless characterize the lives of individual people or smaller communities within these societies. As for the extent of societal multilingualism in the present-day UK, we can include among its indigenous languages at least English, Scots, French (e.g. Jèrriais on the Channel Islands), Irish Gaelic, Scottish Gaelic, Welsh, Cornish, Manx (which has been revived as an L2), Romani, and several sign languages, such as British Sign Language. Noteworthy immigrant languages, with more than 100 000 speakers according to the *Ethnologue* (Eberhard, Simons & Fennig, eds., 2019), include Hindi, Eastern Punjabi, Bengali, Urdu, Sylheti, Yue Chinese, Greek, Italian, Caribbean Creole English, Gujarati, Kashmiri, and Western Punjabi. Languages with several thousand speakers include Tagalog, Japanese, Yoruba, and Hebrew.

[3]   Today, the limiting effect of geographical boundaries on contacts between various groups of people is greatly diminished by various electronic modes of communication, the Internet, and the relative ease of travel.

on its syntactic properties. Classic studies in this field include Poplack (1980), Gumperz (1982), Di Sciullo, Muysken & Singh (1986), Myers-Scotton (1993a; 2002), and Muysken (2000). The third research category has focused on explaining why switching takes place, for example by analysing the functions of code-switching in particular datasets. Since the present study falls primarily into this last category, I discuss previous research in more detail.

There exists a wide range of approaches to the explanation of CS, but four in particular have been especially influential. The first is the approach developed by Gumperz (e.g. 1982), where CS is divided into *situational* and *metaphorical,* the former taking place when the situation changes, the latter within a single situation. The explanation for situational CS is effectively the same as in the classic domain-based approach espoused by Fishman (1972): certain languages are used in particular settings. The explanation for metaphorical CS is different: Gumperz views it as a *contextualization cue*, which conveys additional information in roughly the same way as Gricean implicatures. One mechanism for creating such meaning is based on situational CS: the idea is that since languages have specific domains of application, their use in other contexts carries implications by indexing the original domain (this idea was first introduced in Blom & Gumperz 1972). The second approach to explaining CS focuses on constructing lists and taxonomies of its functions. Early models were presented for example by Gumperz (1982), Grosjean (1982), Appel and Muysken (1987), Gardner-Chloros (1991), and Zentella (1997). The third approach consists in applying the framework of conversation analysis and its central concepts; an often-referenced seminal study within this field is Auer (1984b). Finally, the fourth approach involves application of the Markedness Model developed by Myers-Scotton (e.g. 1993b); it can be described as a neo-Gricean approach to CS, attempting to explain switches in terms of the adherence to or flouting of a set of maxims.

While all four of the above-mentioned approaches have their own strengths, and in some ways complement each other, they also pose certain problems. For example, the function taxonomies have consisted (for the most part) of fairly informal lists of functions; not proper taxonomies, with categories organized according to a set of clearly defined principles. Furthermore, in many cases the functions themselves are not defined or explicated in detail; the categories are thus unclear and difficult to apply in practice. As for the latter two approaches (i.e. those utilizing conversation analysis or the Markedness Model), the most pertinent problem addressed in this study relates to their philosophical underpinnings: in other words, how the proponents of these models view the nature of explanation itself. In this study I develop a new approach to the analysis of CS, and attempt to resolve the above-mentioned problems: first, by providing an in-depth philosophical and

methodological analysis of this approach, and secondly, by developing a model to account for the occurrence of CS.

Most of the early research on CS focused on spoken data in contemporary settings, but especially since the 1990s there has been growing interest in multilingual texts produced in earlier periods. Many studies within this field of 'historical code-switching research' have focused on the functions of CS. Previous studies have established conclusively that CS has been used throughout history for the same reasons as today: to indicate something about the speaker or writer, to manage social relationships, to organize discourse, and so on (e.g. Wenskus 1998; Swain 2002; Adams 2003; Davidson 2003; Nurmi & Pahta 2010; Schendl 2012). Most of this type of research has been data-driven and philological; few studies have sought to define the functions of CS formally or to construct models to explain CS. Those studies which have applied a particular pragmatic theory or concept(s) have often focused on one particular type of switching, one function, or one explanation (e.g. Davidson 2003; Machan 2011; Putter 2011; Mäkilähde 2018a). The present study proposes to fill this gap by developing a new approach, and by applying it to a collection of multilingual historical texts.

The history of the English language is characterized by a series of language contacts, which have contributed for example to the considerable number of loanwords in the lexicon. David Crystal has called it "the most etymologically multilingual language on earth" ([2004] 2005: 144), while the renowned nineteenth century linguist William Dwight Whitney argued that "[t]here is no known mixed language of developed structure and of high cultivation in which the process of mixture has gone further" (1881: 12). As might be expected, many historical texts produced in Britain also contain code-switching, especially between English and Latin. This is not particularly surprising, considering the role played by Latin in western civilization over the centuries as for example the language of science and religion; a role which continued well into the modern era. A considerable part of earlier research on 'historical CS' within the context of the English language has focused on the medieval period, reflected for example in the coverage of the three most important edited volumes on historical CS in English texts: Trotter (ed., 2000), Schendl and Wright (eds., 2011), and Pahta, Skaffari and Wright (eds., 2018). The present study focuses, instead, on the period of Early Modern English (approximately 1500–1700), which has not been the focal setting in many CS studies.[4]

The period of Early Modern English is particularly interesting due to the major changes in the socio-historical setting, which affected the linguistic configuration of

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[4]   The papers in Trotter (ed., 2000) focus solely on medieval multilingualism. In the other two volumes, only four chapters in total contain extensive analyses of Early Modern English material.

Britain: the status of English rose as it regained ground from French and Latin in many domains, but at the same time Latin maintained its status as the cornerstone of humanist education. People studied Latin and Greek and read Classical texts in the universities; a knowledge of Latin was an essential requirement in certain professions and for people of a certain social standing; and the common language of science was still Latin. This setting was particularly conducive for 'learned multilingualism': for parallels, one may consider the role of Greek in Ancient Rome, or English as the global lingua franca of science and scholarship today. Many CS studies on both Early Modern English texts (e.g. Pahta & Nurmi 2011; Nurmi & Pahta 2012; Tuominen 2018) and texts from other eras (e.g. Wenzel 1994; Pahta & Nurmi 2009; Nurmi & Pahta 2010; Schendl 2018) have focused on the outcome of this type of multilingualism. For many language users in early modern Britain, the basis for this was laid already in the grammar schools, where children not only studied Latin and the Classical authors but in many cases employed Latin as their language of education. This early contact, however, has been almost entirely ignored in previous research. One purpose of the present study is to fill this gap by focusing on texts produced in a grammar school context.

Finally, at a more general level, we can distinguish between different types of function-oriented research from a methodological point of view. Regardless of the linguistic strategies in focus, the approaches can be divided into three main categories according to their location on the pre-theoretical–theoretical continuum. First, there are the more pre-theoretical approaches, which aim at understanding language use in a particular context; the prime example is presented by traditional philology. Second, there are the theoretical approaches, which aim at constructing models to account for language use in general; this covers for example general pragmatics. Third, there is research which combines these two perspectives in some ways (and in various degrees). In the field of historical pragmatics, these studies are often classified under such umbrella terms as *pragmaphilology* (Jacobs & Jucker 1995), *historical socio-pragmatics* (Culpeper 2011a), *historical discourse linguistics* (Carroll et al. 2003), *sociophilology* (Wright 2002), or *historical discourse analysis* (Brinton 2001). In the present study, I argue that by identifying the common core of these approaches and by further refining it, it is possible to develop a more clearly defined approach, combining the two above-mentioned approaches – the philological and the pragmatic – in what I will here call *the philological-pragmatic approach*. In order to develop this new approach, we first need to obtain a clear picture of what this type of research would in fact entail, and what constitutes its philosophical and methodological foundation. The purpose of the present study is to fill this gap by providing a detailed analysis of the philosophical and methodological basis of the philological-pragmatic approach.

1.2   Material and methods

The material of the study consists of the *Orationes* manuscript (Canterbury, Canterbury Cathedral Archives Lit. MS E41), a collection of speeches and plays performed by students at the King's School, Canterbury, in 1665–1684. The main part of the manuscript contains a total of 68 texts amounting to approximately 260 000 words; some of the entries merely record that a play by an established author (such as James Shirley or Leonard Hutten) was performed at the school, but most of them consist of original compositions. The manuscript is multilingual in more than one sense: there are whole texts or parts of texts in English, Latin, and Greek, in addition to which many of the texts contain switching between the three languages (and to a lesser extent other European languages, mainly French). The texts were composed for performance on four different occasions in the course of the year: Guy Fawkes Day (5 November); before the Christmas holiday; Oak Apple Day (May 29, the birthday of King Charles II); and the beginning of Lent. In analysing the data I have made use of digital images and prints of the manuscript pages, but I have also produced transcriptions of a number of individual texts. In addition, I have had access to draft transcriptions of most of the texts; these were prepared as part of a larger project, the purpose of which is to produce a digital edition of the manuscript.[5] Since there is very little previous research on the *Orationes* manuscript and no earlier book-length studies, the present study will fill in an important gap in our understanding of these texts.

My general method, as noted above, is the philological-pragmatic approach, the development of which is one of the main aims of this study. In brief, this approach involves combining the methods of philology and pragmatics, which I conceptualize from an 'actionist' perspective: the former is material-driven, operates more at a pre-theoretical level, and focuses on concrete action-tokens, while the latter is theory-driven, operates more at a theoretical level, and focuses on abstract action-types. In my analysis of the philosophical and methodological underpinnings of this approach, I draw heavily on the following authors in particular: Esa Itkonen on the philosophy of linguistics (e.g. 1983; 2003; 2013/2014), Raimo Anttila on the philosophy of philology (e.g. 1975; 1979; 1989), and Georg Henrik von Wright on the logic and explanation of actions (e.g. 1963; 1971). The model developed as part of the analysis draws on classic theories in pragmatics, but also on other fields, such as sociology. In particular, I make use of concepts drawn from the classic theories of *face* developed by Goffman (1967) as well as Brown and Levinson (1987), modifying them according to more recent research on social interaction. On the basis of the philosophical and methodological analysis, I also develop new tools to be applied and tested in the textual analyses. In the analyses themselves, the data are considered

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[5]   A preview site of the edition is available at http://www.ee.oulu.fi/~ijuuso/orationes/browse.php.

at several levels of analysis: at the macro-level (addressing such issues as domains and the grammar school context in general), the meso-level (focusing on the above-mentioned four occasions for performance more specifically), and the micro-level (focusing on individual texts and actions). The study is primarily qualitative, applying methods of interpretation, explication, formalization, and categorization in explaining actions. I also provide another perspective on CS, by comparing it for example to the use of address forms. Finally, quantitative analyses are provided in the form of descriptive statistics concerning overall patterns of language choice and the distribution of code-switching in the manuscript.

1.3   Aims and research questions

The study has two general aims. The first is *to explain why people use multiple languages within a single discourse, and why they choose to use a particular language in a particular setting*. To fulfil this aim, I answer the following research question: **Why do several languages occur in the *Orationes* texts?** This question is further divided into the following specific questions:

RQ1   How are the different languages distributed in the *Orationes* manuscript and what explains these patterns?

RQ2   Why do the individual switches occur in their particular contexts, and what are the different ways of explaining them?

RQ3   How can the explanations for code-switching be explicated and classified?

RQ4   How do the findings relate to the socio-historical context of the texts?

There is a clear gap in our knowledge of CS at the grammar school level in the early modern period; for our understanding of the phenomenon in general, it is important to consider how people initially acquired their multilingual language use practices. An argument put forward in the present study is that this took place in the grammar schools, where students read and composed texts which contained switching between languages. In order to further our understanding of this phenomenon, I will therefore attempt to explain all occurrences of language choice and CS in a collection of texts composed in a grammar school context in the early modern period. Furthermore, I develop methods and a model for defining, formalizing, and classifying the explanations. This makes it possible to compare for example the different functions of CS, to understand their similarities and differences, and ultimately to construct a well-defined taxonomy of functions.

My second aim is *to demonstrate the feasibility and usefulness of combining philosophical and empirical research.* Towards that end, I answer the following

research question: **What is the philosophical and methodological basis of the philological-pragmatic approach?** This question is further divided into the following specific questions:

> **RQ5**   What are philology and pragmatics, and what is their relation to one another?
>
> **RQ6**   What are the basic methods of philology and pragmatics, and how are they applied in practice?
>
> **RQ7**   How do we explain actions, and how can these explanations be evaluated?
>
> **RQ8**   How can we connect philosophical and methodological analyses to empirical ones?

Many studies have focused on the functions of code-switching, but the problematic concept of *function* is often not defined at all; the functions listed may also be completely different types of explanatory concepts, only some of which would qualify as functions in the strict sense of the word. Untangling these different concepts is an important task in the present study.[6] Another example concerns the 'basic method' of philological research, often described as 'interpretation' or 'close-reading'; individual studies rarely explain what the actual nature of this method is, what it is based on, how it works in practice, or how it should be evaluated. Finally, a central question in the philosophy and methodology of science concerns the nature of *explanation* (e.g. von Wright 1971): what does it mean to 'explain' a linguistic action? How do we do it, and do we use a variety of different types of explanation? Answering these questions is a crucial next step not only for CS research but for philology and pragmatics in general.

1.4   Structure of the work

The bulk of the present work is divided into two chapters on background and two of analysis. In Chapter 2, I focus on socio-historical contextualization: the linguistic, cultural, and textual setting of the material to be analysed. Chapter 3 focuses on theoretical contextualization, in the form of a detailed review of central concepts and theories as well as problems for which solutions are sought in the study. In Chapter 4, I undertake a philosophical and methodological analysis of the philological-

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[6]   While the focus of the present study is primarily conceptual, rather than terminological, it is worth considering that "some terminological choices are more apt than others because they reflect a more nuanced or precise understanding of the relevant concepts and are less likely to lead to (or arise from) confusion and mistakes" (Alvarez, 2018: 3306; cf. Mäkilähde, in press).

pragmatic approach and develop methods and analytical tools for the study. In Chapter 5, the methods and tools are applied in textual analyses of the *Orationes* texts, including explications of the explanations used in the analyses. In Chapter 6, I summarize the findings and answer the research questions outlined above, discuss the implications of the study, and present suggestions for further research. Chapter 7 concludes the study by addressing the two main aims set out for the present work.

2   Socio-historical contextualization

In this chapter I discuss the socio-historical context of the material for the present study. In section 2.1 the focus is on the linguistic context, first outlining the roles of Latin and Greek in the history of English up to the early modern period, and then surveying the early modern period in more detail. Section 2.2 outlines the grammar school context; I focus on the educational system prevalent in Britain in the early modern period, including its intellectual and historical roots, and discuss more specifically the history, practices and traditions of the King's School, Canterbury. Finally, section 2.3 presents the textual context of the study, with a discussion of the *Orationes* manuscript.

2.1   The linguistic setting

The purpose of the next two sections is to provide an account of the linguistic situation in early modern Britain, and how it came about. In light of the topic of the present work, I focus for the most part on the roles of Latin and Greek in relation to English. I first present a very brief survey of the history of these languages in Britain up to the end of the medieval period, focusing on important events which affected their status in particular. I then discuss the linguistic setting of the early modern period in more detail, focusing again on themes and events relevant for these languages in particular.

2.1.1   A brief history of the Classical languages in Britain

In discussing contacts between English and the Classical languages, it is important to bear in mind that the Latin language and Roman culture were themselves greatly indebted to the language and culture of the Greeks, through contacts dating as far back as the eighth century B.C. (Baldi 2002: 189–190; Clackson & Horrocks 2007: 39). Even during the Classical period, the Romans imitated Greek models in literature and science (Baldi 2002: 191), and Greek was long the language for example of philosophy, rhetoric, and medicine (see e.g. Kaimio 1979: 195–207, 239–248, 253–258; Adams 2003: 90–91, 216–217, 340–341). When other peoples came in contact with the Romans, there was thus the potential for contact directly

with both Latin and Greek, as well as indirectly with the latter, due to the presence for example of Greek loanwords in the Latin lexicon. While many of these words belonged to the fields mentioned above, others occurred in the everyday language of people of the lower social strata (e.g. Baldi 2002: 191–193; Adams 2003: 405, 419–422, 462).[7]

The Romans were part of two early contact situations which are particularly relevant for our topic. The first took place with the Germanic tribes who occupied the northern parts of continental Europe. This situation was characterized both by hostilities (since Rome had clashed with various Germanic tribes since the second century B.C.) and by more peaceful interaction through the occupation of the province of Germania. The second was constituted by their occupation of Britain (beginning when Caesar first invaded the island in 55 B.C.), which was inhabited by Celts.[8] From 43 A.D. onwards, the Romans managed to conquer parts of the island and formed the province of Britannia, comprising approximately the area of modern England and Wales.

The implementation of Roman administration in the conquered areas also meant the arrival of Roman culture and learning. Herman (2000: 10–11; cf. Clackson & Horrocks 2007: 230–231) notes that the Romans did not apply a language policy to force the conquered peoples to use Latin, but many of them would learn the language due to its practical usefulness and its prestige, leading to bilingualism and in some cases an eventual language shift to Latin by the natives of the provinces.[9] As long as Latin maintained its status as an administrative (or religious, or commercial) language in any of the conquered areas, we can assume that the situation would have represented a form of diglossia. In addition, many Latin words were borrowed into the indigenous languages. Many of the words which entered both Common Germanic and the Celtic spoken in Britannia were *cultural borrowings* (see 3.1.3 below): they denoted new concepts introduced by the Romans, from domains such as education, administration, warfare, construction, and religion (for examples, see e.g. Serjeantson 1935: 271–277; Jackson [1953] 1971: 78–80; Durkin 2014: 72–75). It is worth pointing out that, in most cases, the language variety in question in these early contacts was not Classical Latin (i.e. the 'high' literary variety of Latin) but

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[7]   Colloquial Greek loanwords are a common feature for example in Plautus's comedies (see e.g. de Melo 2011).

[8]   A concise exposition of the occupation is provided for example by Baugh and Cable (2013: 41–43). For a detailed account, see e.g. Jackson ([1953] 1971: Part I, Ch. III).

[9]   In his commentary on the ethnography and history of Britannia, Tacitus also mentions the adoption of Latin by the Britons and the spread of Roman culture and customs in the province (Tac. *Agr*. 21). References to Classical works in the present study are given using conventional abbreviations. The system for Latin texts is based on that used in *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, with some modifications; Greek references follow for the most part the usage of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*.

Vulgar Latin, which may be defined for the present purpose as the common spoken variety of Latin, in particular that of less educated speakers (cf. Väänänen 1963: 6; Herman 2000: 7).[10]

Although the presence of Latin in Britain presumably diminished when the Romans left the area at the beginning of the fifth century, the details of the situation remain unclear.[11] It is most likely, however, that Latin did not survive as a spoken language for any prolonged period of time (e.g. Herman 2000: 12; but cf. Jackson [1953] 1971: 114–121). It is nevertheless reasonable to suppose that at least some Britons were still bilingual in Celtic and Latin when Germanic tribes began arriving in Britain in the middle of the fifth century. The nature of the ensuing contact situation is a matter of some dispute, since it has left few traces in the English language (for possible loanwords, see e.g. Durkin 2014: Ch. 5; see also Jackson [1953] 1971: 250–256). While the general trend seems to have been that the Britons were pushed out of the area of present-day England into adjoining areas, there must also have been some convergence between the two groups (see e.g. Filppula, Klemola & Paulasto 2008: 15–18). The Romano-Celtic culture seems in any case to have had fairly little influence on the Anglo-Saxons, meaning that the Latin presence in the area was now confined to the Celtic regions (especially in Christian contexts).

The next major contacts with Latin came through Christianity, first with the arrival of missionaries from 597 onwards, spreading the religion to most of England by the beginning of the eighth century. New institutions required new vocabulary, and many Latin words denoting Christian practices and aspects of education were borrowed into Old English.[12] More importantly, English-Latin bilingualism must have become common in clerical circles. This would, however, have been very different from the earlier bilingualism on the continent under Roman occupation, since Latin (in both spoken and written forms) was from now on acquired through formal education, knowledge of the language being confined to the clergy and scholars. Another surge in cultural and linguistic influence arrived in 669, in the form of Archbishop Theodore (of Tarsus) and Abbott Hadrian, who established a school in Canterbury and taught both Latin and Greek (cf. 2.2.2.1 below). At this point the scholarship and linguistic skills of the clergy reached a high level, but the following centuries saw a steady decline. The next turning point came at the end of the ninth century with the cultural renaissance of King Alfred, who lamented the 'decay' of

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[10] On problems with the term 'Vulgar Latin' in general see e.g. Väänänen (1963); Herman (2000); see also Löfstedt (1959 Ch. 2); Halla-aho (2012).

[11] The retreat officially took place in 410; however, Jackson ([1953] 1971: 113 fn.1) argues that "there is reason to think that the final rupture did not come in 410, but that reinforcements were sent to Britain about 417, and that these were not finally withdrawn until some time before 429".

[12] For a discussion of Latin loanwords in Old English and estimates of the time of borrowing, see Durkin (2014, Chs. 6.2 and 6.3).

learning, and commissioned for example translations of important Latin texts into English. His project eventually came to a halt, due at least in part to the increasing numbers of Viking raids. The final significant event was the Benedictine monastic reform in the middle of the tenth century.[13] More specifically, the revitalization of learning was an important factor in the increased influence of Latin. Similarly to King Alfred's cultural renaissance project in the preceding century, the reformers produced many English translations, particularly of Christian texts such as the Benedictine Rule (Clark 2011: 44; see also Gretsch 1999), as well as a large body of literature in both Old English and Latin. It is indicative of the level of scholarship, and of the general interest in such matters, that new Latin grammars and other educational materials were also produced for a vernacular audience; notably Ælfric's Latin grammar, written in Old English (Orme 2006: 42–45; Clark 2011: 205–206).[14] In addition to the increase in text-production, the effects of the reform can also be seen in the number of new Latin loanwords entering English in this period, most of them being either religious or scholarly in character (Durkin 2014: 63, 116–119).[15]

To sum up: the knowledge of Latin during the Old English period was confined primarily to the clergy, and even within this group there were those who had poor skills in Latin. Nevertheless, some individuals occupying the highest clerical offices were clearly proficient bilinguals (Timofeeva 2010: 11–12, 24; Schendl 2018: 39–40, 54; see also Clark 2011: 84). This can be seen for example in the high standard of scholarship, and the ability to produce texts (including translations) in both languages. It is worth noting that although Classical literature was a central part of the Benedictine educational system (Clark 2011: 212–224), it was not unknown in the preceding centuries either – Bede, for example, had read such authors as Vergil and Horace (Love 2010) – and the Latin grammars in general use contained examples drawn from the Classical canon (see 2.2.1 below). Furthermore, code-switching is attested in several Old English texts and text-types, such as charters (Schendl 2004; 2011), religious and scientific writing (Schendl 2018), poetry (Schendl 2004: 53; Timofeeva 2010: 19–21), and Ælfric's grammar (Timofeeva 2010: 18–19). Greek, however, was not widely known until the end of the Middle Ages (see below), although certain authors were read in Latin translation (Clark 2011: 205–206). In some parts of England, the sociolinguistic setting was hence a form of diglossia: English was the majority language, while Latin was reserved for the core of religious

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[13] See Cubitt (1997) and references therein for a discussion of the reform in England. See Clark (2011: 43–48) for an overview, and Gretsch (1999) for an analysis of important Benedictine texts produced in England. A brief discussion of the reform is provided by Baugh and Cable (2013: 83–87).

[14] For an overview of grammar-writing in Europe during this period, see e.g. Itkonen (1991: Ch. 5.3); Law (1997).

[15] For the role of monastic communities in the diffusion of Latin loanwords in Old English, see e.g. Timofeeva (2017).

and scholarly writing. Different settings would be found in parts of the Danelaw (i.e. the part of England occupied by the Scandinavian settlers) and the Celtic areas, where Old Norse or Celtic was used instead of or alongside English as a vernacular.

With regard to the transition between Old and Middle English, the most obvious factor in shaping the linguistic setting was the Norman Conquest of 1066;[16] William the Conqueror brought with him his Norman nobility, administration, and clergy, displacing Anglo-Saxons in the upper social strata. The everyday spoken language of the ruling class was Norman French (later Anglo-Norman), while English remained the spoken language of the lower and middle classes. French was also employed in official documents and literary writing, while Medieval Latin was the language of law and administration (the *Domesday Book*, for example, was written in Latin), as well as the most important language for clergy and scholars. Both English and French, however, were used for example in preaching; it has also been suggested that the opposition may sometimes have been not between the three languages but between Latin and the two vernaculars (see Trotter 2011: 176–181). English-speakers might acquire Norman French for purposes of commerce or social advancement, while Normans might learn English in order to communicate more easily with the local majority population. There were probably many who knew only the rudiments of the other languages and may have used them habitually, although they may have lacked the ability to write in them (see e.g. Wright 2000; Schendl 2002: 54–54). In addition, intermarriages would result in part of the population acquiring both English and French as native languages. As with the contact situations discussed above, many new loanwords entered English during this period, although it is often difficult to be sure whether the immediate source was Latin or Anglo-Norman (see e.g. Durkin 2014: Ch. 11.3 & 11.4).[17]

The latter part of the Middle English period is characterized by a rise in the prestige of English, and its functional expansion at the expense of French after the loss of Normandy in 1204 and the adoption of an 'English' identity by the Anglo-Norman elite. The official status of English was enhanced for example by the Statute of Pleading in 1362,[18] the opening of the Parliament in English in the same year, and the change of the language of elementary school instruction from French to English (see e.g. Strang 1970: 218–219; Baugh & Cable 2013: 141–145). From this point onwards, English continued to spread into almost all contexts of language use, as

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[16] For general overviews of the period, see Baugh and Cable (2013: 104–120), and Strang (1970: 250–254, 282–284). Events from this point onward are obviously relevant to the division of linguistic stages into Early (approximately 1100–1300) and Late Middle English (approximately 1300–1500); the events discussed, however, more properly indicate societal and cultural changes, not linguistic ones.

[17] For French loanwords in the post-Conquest era, see e.g. Skaffari (2009).

[18] The statute made English the language required to be used in courtrooms, replacing French (see e.g. Ormrod 2003).

also reflected in the number of English texts produced during the following centuries. French was still a relevant language, to be acquired at least in the upper social ranks; while Anglo-Norman did not have high international status, Central (or Parisian) French had acquired cultural prestige throughout Europe (see e.g. Strang 1970: 217–218). The traditional view is that Anglo-Norman declined rapidly as a vernacular after 1204; in several recent studies, however, it has been argued that Anglo-Norman continued to be used by bilingual speakers well into the fifteenth century, especially in legal texts (Rothwell 2001; Ingham 2018; see also Durkin 2014: 232–233).[19] As opposed to the vernaculars, the status of Latin remained quite stable, since it was still the lingua franca of clerical and scholarly matters, while competence in Greek became more common only during the Renaissance. It may be noted that one of the most remarkable testimonies to the extensive societal and individual multilingualism of the Middle English period is offered by the very large corpus of multilingual texts, covering many different genres and text-types; these include accounts, legal reports and documents (e.g. Wright 2000; 2011; Davidson 2005; Ingham 2011; Trotter 2011), sermons and other religious texts (e.g. Wenzel 1994; Diller 1997/1998; Fletcher 2009; Pahta & Nurmi 2011), scientific, scholarly and medical texts (e.g. Voigts 1989; Hunt 2000; Schendl 2000; Meecham-Jones 2011), and literary texts (e.g. Diller 1997/1998; Schendl 1997; Mazzon 2009: 183–192; Putter 2011).

To sum up: contact between English and Latin up to 1500 is characterized by a number of separate events or cultural moments, which brought people in Britain in contact with Latin and ensured a high level of competence in it. The relationship was nevertheless fairly stable, as Latin maintained its role in the spheres of religion, scholarship, and – to a degree – administration. This stability is particularly salient if we compare the fortunes of Latin to those of Celtic, Old Norse, or French. It is of particular importance to note here that at the beginning of the early modern period we have in essence a context characterized by extensive and varied multilingualism, at both the individual and the societal levels, as well as a well-established tradition of multilingual text-production and use of code-switching in a variety of genres and text-types.

2.1.2   Language and society in early modern Britain

By the beginning of the early modern period, English had reinforced its status and taken over many new functions.[20] The sixteenth and seventeenth century witnessed an increasing extension of English to new genres and contexts, as well as the

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[19]   For 'law French' in the later Middle English period in general, see also Mellinkoff (1963).

[20]   For problems in establishing the beginning and end points of the period from both linguistic and historical perspectives, see e.g. Görlach (1999: 463); Nevalainen (2017).

elaboration and codification of the language to cope with the needs of these new contexts and with the demands of varied usage. An important cultural movement during this period was the Renaissance, which brought with it a revived interest in Classical antiquity and hence in the Classical authors and their language; the effect of the Renaissance humanist ideals on education is discussed in more detail in 2.2.1. Another important movement was the Reformation, which brought about such changes as for example the replacing of Latin by English as the language of religious worship and primary education. The sixteenth and seventeenth century, however, were also characterized by political and religious turbulence, with constant tension on the one hand between Catholics and Protestants, on the other between different Protestant groups, mainly Anglicans and Puritans (and other 'non-conformists'). These tensions led to the 1605 Gunpowder Plot (a failed attempt to assassinate James I), the Civil War and the execution of Charles I, the Protectorate years, the Restoration of Charles II, and eventually the Glorious Revolution.

Despite the rise in status of English, it was still considered by many to be inferior to Latin. This is reflected for example in the attitude towards the translation of books into English – an activity which caused some controversy, as demonstrated by the comments as to the inferiority of English found in many translator's prefaces. They may be most familiar from the prefaces of William Caxton (the first large-scale printer in England, as well as a translator), but they also appear frequently in texts by other authors throughout the period (see e.g. Jones 1953: Ch. 1; Rhodes 2011; see also Barber 1997: 42–43).[21] Similar comments also appear in other text types as well, and a change in attitudes towards English becomes apparent only in the final quarter of the sixteenth century (Jones 1953: Ch. 6); disagreement nevertheless continued as to which language should be used for a particular function.[22]

One of the domains where English had become the dominant language was literary writing. Due to Renaissance humanist ideals, however, Latin texts were not completely absent from this sphere: both prose and verse were written in it, and Neo-

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[21] It should be noted, however, that both self-debasement and explaining and justifying one's actions are distinctive features of the preface in general (Genette 1997: 198, 207–208); such statements are even found in the prefaces of Anglo-Saxon translations, at a time when English was by no means a low-status language. A well-known example of this is the introductory letter attached to Alfred's translation of Gregory's *Cura Pastoralis*, in which he explains that he translated the book because knowledge of Latin had decayed (see 2.1.1 above).

[22] One reason for using English in writing was that there was for the first time a large audience for English texts: not everyone with literary tastes was able to read Latin, and even if they were, there were bound to be many people who preferred to read in their native language (Barber 1997: 45–47). Some text-types, such as chapbooks and popular pamphlets on sensational topics, were directed specifically at the great number of readers who possessed only basic literacy skills (see e.g. Spufford [1981] 1985; Suhr 2011).

Latin drama flourished in the universities and grammar schools (e.g. Barber 1997: 45).[23] In the domain of religion, the Reformation ushered in English translations of the Bible and more wide-spread preaching in English, especially for lay audiences. In fact, the exclusive use of Latin in religious contexts could have Catholic connotations, which Protestants would have viewed negatively, particularly in the seventeenth century (see e.g. Barber 1997: 47–48). Nevertheless, knowledge of both Latin and Greek (preferably also Hebrew) was essential for those aspiring to high clerical office, due to the role of these languages in theological studies (see 2.2.1 below). The legal context was one where the medieval multilingual legacy persisted for a long time: although English was the language of court proceedings, Latin was used for many official documents and reports, while French survived in limited form in the Inns of Court (Mellinkoff 1963: 132; Prest 1987; Tiersma 1999: 35–36). In science and scholarship, Latin maintained its well-established status. While primary education – consisting of basic literacy skills – was in English, the aim of a grammar school education was for the student to learn Latin (see 2.2 below). Latin was also the international lingua franca of science; even those who advocated the use of English in science wrote in Latin for an international audience (see e.g. Barber 1997: 43).[24] In some fields, however, such as astrology and medicine, the use of English was more wide-spread due to the popular nature of these subjects.

In addition to disagreement over the role of the vernacular in religious contexts, there was also opposition to the use of English in scholarly and scientific writing. One argument put forward was that it would be dangerous to impart information to the common people; proponents of English, on the other hand, complained that scholars were attempting to keep all knowledge to themselves (Barber 1997: 48–51). There was also concern over a possible decline in standards if people did not learn Latin or Greek, and would thus be unable to read ancient texts in their original languages.[25]

One argument in favour of using English in scientific writing was that in antiquity people had written in their own languages: the Romans in Latin and the Greeks in Greek (Barber 1997: 48–50). As pointed out above in 2.1.1, however, the Romans also used Greek for scientific writing. In this context, proponents of English sometimes mention Cicero in particular, probably due to his authority as a Latinist *par excellence* and his patriotic defence of Latin in many of his works. It is important

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[23] See e.g. Boas (1932) for an overview of grammar school and university drama.

[24] Latin was also one of the linguae francae which could be used when travelling in Europe (cf. Schulz 2014).

[25] One notable proponent of this position was Meric Casaubon, who in his treatise *Generall Learning* criticized the standards of many translations (Serjeantson 1999: 132). In Casaubon's scheme, a knowledge of Latin and Greek (as well as philological skills) was important mainly for the 'general scholar', exemplified by the clergy in particular (the requirements are listed in Serjeantson 1999: 117–120).

to note, however, that what could be termed a 'linguistic ambivalence' – a conflict due to simultaneous positive and negative attitudes towards a language – is evident even in Cicero's writings, as he acknowledges the (former) supremacy of Greek and the possible defects of Latin. Nevertheless, he still defends the use of Latin, even going so far as to boast that the Romans have surpassed anything the Greeks had to offer.[26] His eagerness to remove possible 'defects' from Latin provided another point of comparison for the proponents of English, who wanted to develop and extend their own language especially in matters of vocabulary and style.

The question of how the English lexis ought to be expanded was also a topic of some controversy in the sixteenth century. The two opposing groups were the 'neologizers' and the 'purists': the former advocated the introduction of loanwords from Latin in particular, while the latter preferred other strategies (see Barber 1997: 53–70 for discussion).[27] Some purists argued for the use of existing native resources, in the form of compounding, affixation, and semantic loans, while others (such as Edmund Spenser) advocated the resuscitation of archaic and dialectal words. The purist programme was unsuccessful, as demonstrated by the great number of loanwords entering English during this period; however, the neologizers were faced with the problem that not everyone was able to understand the newly coined words if they had no previous knowledge Latin or Greek. The problem could often be solved with the insertion of a paraphrase, translation, or explanation of the coinage, but sometimes writers found it necessary to further justify their choice to use a loanword instead of relying on native resources (Barber 1997: 54–55). For bilinguals it must have been second nature, especially in translating a text, to borrow from Latin rather than attempting to invent a completely novel word.[28] Sometimes, however, Latinate words were used specifically to elevate the style (ibid.). The extravagant use of Latinate words for the sake of eloquence, derogatorily referred to as *inkhorn terms*, was a fiercely debated topic at the end of the sixteenth century, although in this case criticism was directed more at the 'affected' use of loanwords, not at loanwords *per se* (for the controversy, see e.g. Barber 1997: 61).

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[26] An illuminating example of this is the beginning of the *Tusculanae Disputationes*, in which Cicero mentions explicitly that he will write his work in Latin, acknowledges the attainments of the Greeks, boasts of the attainments of the Romans, and mentions that his method (i.e. the dialogue) has been borrowed from Socrates (Cic. *Tusc*. 1,1–8). Relevant comments are also found in many other texts (e.g. Cic. *fin*. 1,10 & 3,5; Cic. *nat. deor*. 1,8; Cic. *Caecin*. 51). I am indebted to Veli-Matti Rissanen for bringing the latter loci to my attention. For attitudes of the Romans towards Greek, see Kaimio (1979: 322–323 and *passim*).

[27] See e.g. Clackson and Horrocks (2007 Ch. 6) for an overview of a similar situation in Rome.

[28] A similar 'residue' effect in translations was also a feature of Middle English texts, particularly in scientific writing (cf. Meecham-Jones 2011).

In the end, the 'purist' position did not enjoy wide-ranging support, as indicated by the striking increase in the number of Latin loanwords in English in the seventeenth century. Barber (1997: 222, 226–227) identifies the period between 1590 and 1660 as the most prominent, with 1651–1660 representing the highest peak, followed by a sharp decline. This general trend is supported by Durkin's (2014: 310–312) findings: although French too remains an important source for borrowings, the absolute numbers are much lower. Both Latin and French words are found in the general vocabulary, but there are also specialized semantic fields for borrowings from both languages: these include for example military terminology, commerce and fashion for French and religion and public affairs for Latin, as well as science and scholarship for both. Greek loanwords (direct or indirect) are found mostly in the fields of religion, science, and Classical culture, including originally Greek arts such as rhetoric and philosophy (for examples, see e.g. Barber 1997: 222–228).

While the 'improvement' of English was mainly the concern of the sixteenth century, the following century saw major steps taken towards standardization, producing for example dictionaries, spelling books, and grammars (see e.g. Barber 1997: 75–86). Due to the expansion of the English lexicon, there was for the first time a need for dictionaries of 'hard words', mostly derived from Latin or Greek (see e.g. Barber 1997: 75–79). Grammars of Latin written in English did exist before the early modern period (cf. section 2.1.1 above), while the first actual grammars of English began to appear at the end of the sixteenth century. Notable early examples include Alexander Gill's *Logonomia Anglica* (1619), Charles Butler's *The English Grammar* (1633), and Ben Jonson's *The English Grammar* (1640). Many of the grammars were written in Latin, since they were aimed at foreign learners of English. The system of grammar-writing was itself based on a long Latin and Greek grammatical tradition, reflected for example in the inclusion of 'superfluous' grammatical categories which had no counterparts in English (such as several cases for the noun); this was, however, also true of Latin, since its description was based on Greek models (in this case, an example of a 'superfluous' category would be the distinction between the conjunctive and the optative).[29]

Finally, as in preceding centuries, we also find CS in many genres and text-types, such as religious writing (e.g. Pahta & Nurmi 2011; Tuominen 2018), letters (e.g. Pahta & Nurmi 2009; Kaislaniemi 2009; Nurmi & Pahta 2012),[30] and drama (e.g. Delabastita & Hoenselaars 2015; Mäkilähde 2018a). The discussion thus far implies

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[29] See Gwosdek (2013) for a brief introduction to the tradition of grammar-writing in Britain. For an overview of the linguistic theories which motivated such descriptions of languages based on the model of Latin, see for example Itkonen (1991: 253–270).

[30] An excellent point of comparison is again Cicero, who frequently uses Greek in his letters. For analyses of some examples, see Dunkel (2000); Swain (2002); Adams (2003: Ch. 1.III); Mäkilähde & Rissanen (2016).

that, at least among the well-educated, linguistic awareness must have been high – a fact which should be taken into account in analysing switching patterns in texts from this period.

To sum up: early modern Britain can justifiably be described as a multilingual and partly polyglossic society. Although English had by now established itself as a language which could be used in practically any domain or context, both Latin and Greek still occupied important positions in certain areas of life, in particular science and scholarship. The idea of a 'linguistic ambivalence' can also be used to characterize the attitude towards Latin at this time: for part of the population, its use might carry either positive or negative connotations, depending on the context. In general, however, this brief survey has demonstrated the presence of noteworthy continuities in the linguistic context of Britain from the time of early contacts onwards. In the following section, I discuss such continuities – and discontinuities – in the context of education.

2.2   The grammar school context

The purpose of this section is to describe the educational setting in which the *Orationes* texts were produced and performed, moving from the general to the specific context. The focus in 2.2.1 is on education and pedagogy in the early modern period in general, describing the different levels of education and different educational paths, as well as the general content of education. In 2.2.2 I move on to discuss the King's School, Canterbury: its history, organization, curricula, and traditions.

2.2.1   Early modern education and pedagogy

The early modern educational system was ultimately based on Roman and Greek educational traditions.[31] The ancient curriculum was constituted by the *artes liberales*, divided into the *trivium* and the *quadrivium*. The former consisted of the arts of grammar, logic and rhetoric, the latter of arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy. This was the basic curriculum which survived in Europe in some form down to the late modern period. After learning to read and write, boys in ancient Rome might proceed to study the art of grammar (*ars grammatica*), consisting of grammar in the sense of morphology and syntax but also the literary study of texts: students read both prose and verse texts and analysed their form and content, and grammarians often illustrated their discussion with examples drawn from the most

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[31]   For education in antiquity in general, see e.g. Bonner (1977). For its relevance to medieval and early modern education, see e.g. Charlton (1965); Orme (2006); see also Mäkilähde, Alho & Johnson (2016: 317–320) and references therein.

important authors.[32] In addition to their native Latin, upper-class Romans also studied Greek language and literature, since, as mentioned in 2.1.1, Greek remained for a long time the language of certain disciplines, such as rhetoric and philosophy. Practical and theoretical training in rhetoric might be acquired by some after the 'grammar school' level. This educational model arrived in Celtic Britain through the expansion of the Roman Empire; after the Anglo-Saxon invasions, however, Classical scholarship was confined to the Celtic majority areas (e.g. Jewell 1998: 162).

The first wave of Classical education in Anglo-Saxon Britain arrived with the Christian missionaries in the sixth century (see above in 2.1.1). At least some locals needed to be trained for religious professions; initially, however, education probably concentrated on practical language skills rather than a knowledge of Classical literature (e.g. Edwards 1957: 16). While it is convenient to refer to places of education from this point onward as *grammar schools*, it should be borne in mind that for a long time education must have been rather irregular and unsystematic. The grammar books still in use at the time were those of Donatus and Priscian, although further reading material was also produced to facilitate learning (see e.g. Orme 2006: 28–30). Although the Norman Conquest brought changes to the organization of the monasteries – which were still the only places of education – the curriculum remained relatively unchanged throughout the Middle Ages. Donatus and Priscian maintained their status (Charlton 1965: 16; Orme 2006: 88), but reading material focused particularly on medieval literature. Greek was not generally studied by scholars or taught in schools until the end of the fifteenth century (Charlton 1965: 48, 51).

The next major changes to the educational system came with Renaissance humanism, which emphasized the centrality of Classical literature and Classical Latin in the curriculum (see e.g. Charlton 1965: 21–40; Adamson 1999: 542–543; Orme 2006: 118–125). The Reformation too had a major effect on education. Until the dissolution of the monasteries by Henry VIII, education had been in the hands of the clergy. Members of the gentry and the nobility as well as rich merchants now made copious donations to schools and established new ones, often endowing university scholarships. This in turn led to an increase in the number of grammar schools (Dent 1982: 4–5; see also Lawson & Silver 1973: 105–107). 'Education', of course, did not always refer to a grammar school: that depended partly on the child's social background, and different professions likewise demanded different educational paths.

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[32]   The third book of Priscian's *Institutiones Grammaticae* (Prisc. *gramm*. II 83–116), for example, contains references to Cicero, Juvenal, Terence, Vergil, and Plautus, among others.

The types of education available in early modern Britain can be conveniently divided into four categories: elementary-level education, basic-level education, advanced education, and education for professions. Elementary education was provided in petty schools, song schools, and parish schools; it was also available for children of lower social ranks (see e.g. Houston 2002: 51–53). The age at entry varied from four to seven and even up to ten years, again depending on multiple social factors. At this stage, education consisted mainly of reading and (sometimes) writing; the reading material included for example the Creed, the Ten Commandments, the Lord's Prayer, and the Catechism (see e.g. Lawson & Silver 1973: 113; Barber 1997: 46; Jewell 1998: 94–99). Vernacular literacy was considered important precisely for its religious applications, although in general it may have been considered less important than a knowledge of Latin (Charlton 1965: 101–104). Girls could also attend elementary level schools, although they would often spend part of their school hours learning more practical skills, such as spinning (Jewell 1998: 97). Education at this level tended to be rather loosely organized, and was heavily based on demand or on the establishment of charity schools.

Basic-level education was acquired in grammar schools, which children would enter approximately between the ages of six and eight (although sometimes considerably later), and where they would spend roughly six or seven years (Charlton 1965: 98; Jewell 1998: 93). Most often these establishments were either cathedral or town schools; some of them were partly or fully boarding schools. Houston (2002: 54) notes that at this level the schools "were very much the preserve of the gentry and the bourgeoisie". Pupils (averaging between 100–150 boys at a school) were usually divided into six or seven forms based on their advancement level (i.e. rather than their age).[33] Since in most cases a school had only two teachers – a master and an usher – all forms were taught in the same room and usually at the same time (Jewell 1998: 100–101).[34] The students would spend most of their time studying Latin grammar and literature; the study of English grammar (as well as reading and writing in English) was to take place prior to this level of education. It seems, however, that school administrators had to accept the fact that some children needed to continue with the basics even after entering a grammar school (Charlton 1965: 98–99, 105).

The students would begin by learning to construe and parse sentences (i.e. to analyse them grammatically and translate them), and by memorising lessons from

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[33] Basic-level education was not exclusive to males, but better-educated women in this period tended to be of noble birth and taught by a private tutor (see Jewell 1998).

[34] Meric Casaubon condemned this practice: "And noe wonder if soe many misscary, in ordinarie schooles, where all (of the same Classis) are tyed to one rule: neither indeed can it be well otherwise, where soe many haue but one Master" (Serjeantson 1999: 169; editorial interpolation removed).

grammar books and reciting them in class. Later on, they would practise their written and spoken Latin by composing 'themes' (i.e. essays), speeches, verses, and letters, and by taking part in disputations and declamations (see e.g. Watson 1908). The focus was thus mainly on grammar and rhetoric (see Charlton 1965: 105–110; Lawson & Silver 1973: 117–118); subjects such as history and philosophy became familiar to the students from reading Classical works on these topics. Rhetoric was also based on Classical models, and was studied mainly through Cicero, Quintilian, and Demosthenes (Charlton 1965: 110–114, 117–118). Greek was studied only in the upper forms and to a lesser extent, while other languages, such as Hebrew, were even rarer at this stage (Charlton 1965: 116–119). Additional material was also available in the form of phrasebooks, collections of dialogues, vocabularies, dictionaries, grammars, and other such sources (for examples, see Charlton 1965: 106–116). Further details of the curriculum will be discussed below in 2.2.2. Finally, it should be noted that not everyone attending a school would stay there long enough to master Latin, let alone Greek; even among those who stayed in school for an extended period of time, the skill levels must have varied considerably. A certain degree of education was considered fashionable and appropriate for a gentleman, but a knowledge of Greek, for example, was only useful to scholars (Lawson & Silver 1973: 132–133; Jewell 1998: 57–58, 104–105, 138).

After finishing grammar school, students could enter one of the two universities for an advanced education. The age of entrance was usually between fourteen and nineteen years; early in the period, it could be even lower (Charlton 1965: 131; Lawson & Silver 1973: 118; Jewell 1998: 110). Everyone would begin in the Faculty of Arts, studying logic, philosophy, and rhetoric for four years, and completing their BA degree with a public disputation. The MA degree consisted of natural and moral philosophy, metaphysics, Greek, Hebrew (when possible), history, geometry, and astronomy, and the students would acquire the degree after three years of study (Jewell 1998: 62, 110–111). After this, it was possible to enter one of the 'upper' Faculties, those of Law, Medicine, and Theology. Law meant the theoretical study of Civil Law texts; its purpose was not to prepare the students for practical legal work (Charlton 1965: 166; Jewell 1998: 73–74). The Faculty of Medicine offered training for the profession of physician; that training consisted of the study of traditional texts – such as Galen and Hippocrates – as well as taking part for example in demonstrations (Charlton 1965: 166–167; Jewell 1998: 75–77), while theology was meant for those who aspired to higher clerical offices.

For Nonconformists there were separate dissenting academies offering both secondary and tertiary education; their emphasis was on ministerial training mainly through discussion rather than lectures. The students studied Latin, Greek, and Hebrew for scripture reading, English for rhetoric and preaching, and theology for general intellect and knowledge (Jewell 1998: 115). The academies reflected the

educational ideals of Puritan thinkers, who in the 1640s and 1650s, building upon Comenius in particular, argued against the prevailing educational system (see Lawson & Silver 1973: 154–156).[35] One consequence of this was that the language of instruction in the academies was usually English, as opposed to the use of Latin in the grammar schools and universities.

In addition to the paths outlined above, children could also qualify for an occupation or profession through apprenticeship; this began between thirteen and eighteen years of age, depending on the geographical area and other circumstances, and lasted for around seven years. Many vocations demanded basic literacy skills, and apprentices could be granted leave to study at a grammar school if they had not acquired the necessary skills in advance (Jewell 1998: 107). Apprenticeships varied greatly according to the craft in question; some vocations were considered appropriate for sons of the gentry as well (e.g. mercer, grocer, draper, merchant-tailor), while others were not (e.g. carpenter, smith, bricklayer, weaver) (Jewell 1998: 43, 108–109. Practical law was studied at the Inns of Court, which students would enter roughly at the same age as they would a university. Education in these institutions was fairly informal and irregular, consisting of lectures as well as discussions or disputations (Charlton 1965: 173–175). Barber-surgeons and apothecaries likewise acquired their craft through apprenticeship. For women, in particular midwifery and general nursing were traditional options (Jewell 1998: 75–78).

In addition to all these formal educational paths, upper-class boys (and sometimes girls) could also be educated at home by a tutor (see e.g. Jewell 1998: 103–106). Finally, there also existed other, less institutional modes of learning, such as adult education through self-help literature.

In conclusion, mention must also be made of the copious educational literature in the period. In addition to earlier humanist writers, such as Erasmus, many writers produced pedagogical treatises in Britain in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. Repeated reference to these works will be made in the present study; here I introduce the most important ones.[36] Roger Ascham's *Scholemaster* (1570) is one of the earliest English treatises on pedagogy, and although the focus is on private education, it is a valuable source for information on teaching methods in general. The first noteworthy writer on a grammar-school education in particular was John Brinsley, a schoolmaster whose *Ludus Literarius* (1612) and *A Consolation for our*

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[35] One manifestation of 'progressive' ideals not limited to the Puritans was the use of performance as a pedagogical tool (see e.g. Mäkilähde, Alho & Johnson 2016).

[36] Cressy (1975) contains a representative selection of excerpts from various sources arranged thematically. Throughout the present study, when multiple editions or printings of books have been available in the *Early English Books Online* database, I have preferred to refer to versions for which full-text versions are available.

Grammar Schooles (1622) both contain abundant information in particular on the recommended reading material. An even more detailed curriculum is found in Charles Hoole's *A New Discovery of the Old Art of Teaching Schoole* (1660), composed during his time as a master in Rotherham School. The book consists of four separate treatises, the most central of which in terms of the present study is the treatise on grammar schools, *Scholastick Discipline or the Way of Ordering a Grammar-Schoole*. Hoole is an especially valuable source, since he provides a detailed report on everyday schoolroom activities in addition to his recommendations regarding teaching methods and curricula.[37]

To sum up: education in early modern Britain could take many different forms, depending on one's social standing, wealth, and preferred profession. Latin grammar and Classical literature formed the core of a grammar school education, while Greek was reserved for more advanced students. In the following sections I discuss the educational system in place at the King's School, Canterbury, and relate this to our knowledge of grammar school education in general.

2.2.2   The King's School, Canterbury

2.2.2.1   Introduction and a brief history

The King's School, Canterbury, also known as Schola Regia Cantuariensis, is one of the most ancient schools in Britain, sometimes even claimed to be the oldest school in Europe (for a discussion of these claims, see Hinde 2005: 1–2). It traces its spiritual roots as far back as the arrival of St. Augustine of Canterbury with the Christian mission in 597; in its early modern form, however, it was re-founded and incorporated into the Cathedral in 1541 by Henry VIII's royal proclamation. The main scholarly sources for the history of the school consist of three book-length accounts. The first, by C. E. Woodruff and H. J. Cape (1908), is the most in-depth study of the school, covering its history from Anglo-Saxon times down to the beginning of the twentieth century. Although Woodruff and Cape include transcriptions of several important documents in their book, some of them contain slight errors and are therefore worth updating. In addition, their exact sources are occasionally difficult to identify. All in all, however, the book is a valuable source, offering a convenient point of departure for an overview of the history of the school. The second book, by D. L. Edwards (1957), is more limited in scope, often containing summaries of the earlier study. Edwards, however, had access to certain

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[37]   Hoole (1660: 298) says that the general teaching method advocated by him and also practised at Rotherham School before him "is the same that most Schoole-Masters yet use".

primary materials not discussed by Woodruff and Cape, most notably a manuscript (Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Gough Kent 3) containing school regulations from 1665. The most recent book-length study, Hinde (2005), does not add significantly to our understanding of the school's early history, and most of the references in this section will therefore be to the two earlier works.

Many primary sources from both the school and the cathedral also survive; I briefly discuss those that are most central for the present study. One of the most important general sources is the collection of Cathedral Statutes, issued originally in 1541 and confirmed again during the reign of Charles I. The statutes survive in multiple manuscripts from different periods; here I refer to the copy of the reconfirmed statutes owned in the eighteenth century by Dean Stanhope, who bequeathed the book to the Cathedral (Canterbury, Canterbury Cathedral Archives DCc-MB 1/3; *Statutes*).[38] A transcription of the original 1541 Statutes can be found in Leach (1911), who – more importantly – provides a transcription and translation of Statute 41, a separate document including information about the curriculum and not found in any form in the above-mentioned copy owned by Stanhope. The statutes contain information on the requirements for grammar school teachers and scholars, and are also a valuable source of information regarding daily life in the cathedral as well as vocabulary relating for example to the titles of officials. Of the more specific sources, a collection of miscellaneous documents (Canterbury, Canterbury Cathedral Archives DCc-KINGS 1/6; *Regulations*) includes a copy of school regulations issued in 1682 at St. Katherine's Audit.[39] This document sets down, *inter alia*, a brief school curriculum.[40] The above-mentioned Bodleian manuscript contains a similar curriculum from 1665 (I have relied on the transcription provided by Edwards 1957: 211–214). Some relevant information concerning school activities can also be gleaned from the Cathedral accounts; in the following sections, I refer to the Treasurer's account books (Canterbury, Canterbury Cathedral Archives DCc-TB/3; TB6; TB7; TB8; TB9; TB11; TB15; TB20; *Treasurer's Book*, each book consisting of the accounts for one fiscal year) as well as a collection of the Treasurer's and Receiver's draft accounts (Canterbury, Canterbury Cathedral Archives DCc-MA/41; *Treasurer's Accounts*).

In addition to these general histories and primary sources, there are some highly detailed unpublished surveys on specific topics related to the school which deserve

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[38] Abbreviated titles are provided for simple reference. The titles are listed in the bibliography together with full references. Unless noted otherwise, all references using an abbreviated title are based on my transcriptions.

[39] The purpose of the November audit was to examine the Cathedral accounts, but it was also customary to examine the school afterwards.

[40] A transcription of the 1682 regulations is provided by Woodruff and Cape (1908), although it contains several errors, apparently caused by the secretary hand in which the document is written.

particular mention.[41] One important source is a register of the pupils at the King's School between 1660 and 1749, edited by Robert Scott and Peter Henderson (*1660– 1749 Register*). This document contains information on scholarships and their durations, together with suggested identifications of the students and overviews of their lives. Another important source, Jeffery (1957), is a collection of references to the school in the Cathedral documents; it has been very useful in locating important primary sources.

I next present a brief overview of the history of the school, up to the period when the *Orationes* texts were originally composed and performed. As already mentioned, historians have posited a connection between the King's School and the educational activities presumably provided by St. Augustine of Canterbury in the sixth and seventh century (e.g. Woodruff & Cape 1908: 4).[42] Edwards, however, notes that there was no actual school founded by St. Augustine, and in any case the earliest education offered by the missionaries most likely did not include grammar in its fullest sense (1957: 15–17; see section 2.2.1 above). Nevertheless, the seventh century saw Canterbury and Kent become a centre of learning, especially under the tutelage of Archbishop Theodore (of Tarsus) and Abbot Hadrian (Woodruff & Cape 1908: 5, 12; Edwards 1957: 17–18; cf. 2.1.1 above); from this time onwards, we can justifiably refer to these educational institutions as grammar schools.

The fate of the local grammar schools after the Norman Conquest is a matter of some controversy. The newly appointed Archbishop Lanfranc issued a set of regulations which make no mention of setting up a grammar school, and from this fact Woodruff and Cape conjecture that there must already have been an Anglo-Saxon archiepiscopal school in the city (1908: 17). Within two decades of the conquest, however, Lanfranc issued a charter granting six canons the right to teach grammar in Canterbury, which Edwards (1957: 26) sees as evidence of Lanfranc essentially founding the first Archbishop's School in Canterbury; the charter transferred education from the parochial clergy to the Archbishop. Of the Archbishop's School (or, perhaps, schools) in medieval Canterbury we know rather little, due to the scarcity of surviving documents.

As noted above, the King's School proper was officially founded in 1541, when Henry VIII issued a charter in effect suppressing the local monasteries and forming the basis for a new collegiate organization. In addition to establishing a 'new' Canterbury Cathedral, the Charter of Incorporation re-founded the archiepiscopal school and incorporated it into the Cathedral both physically and administratively (Woodruff & Cape 1908: 45–47; Edwards 1957: 60–62). The change in

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[41]   I am grateful to Peter Henderson for providing me with copies of the unpublished works.

[42]   A major part of the information regarding the history of Canterbury in these early years is provided by the venerable Bede in his *Ecclesiastical History of the English People*.

administrative organization also meant that documents relating to the King's School (e.g. accounts) were produced and maintained regularly. A major part of our knowledge of the Canterbury educational system in the early modern period depends on the statutes, which laid down rules for the new Cathedral. They were further revised into their final form by Archbishop Laud at the beginning of the seventeenth century (Woodruff & Cape 1908: 103), and in this form they provided the general procedure for years to come.

An important period in the history of the King's School, especially in terms of the topic of the present study, consists of the Protectorate years (following the execution of Charles I) and the Restoration. When Charles II returned from exile in 1660, the Dean and Chapter of Canterbury Cathedral,[43] who had been forced to leave their posts, were also restored, proceeding promptly to remove (with compensation) the teachers and scholars at the school on the grounds that their appointment had been illegitimate (Woodruff & Cape 1908: 121–123; Edwards 1957: 99–100). A new headmaster was appointed, but he left the school in 1665, after which the Dean and Chapter chose Rev. George Lovejoy to be his follower. He remained in the post until 1684, when he retired to the Isle of Thanet. Lovejoy had previously held the headmastership of Islington Grammar School for approximately eleven years (Woodruff & Cape 1908: 124–125). He had also served as Chaplain in the King's Army (ibid.), and his loyalty was praised in his two letters of recommendation – one from John Goad, Headmaster of Merchant Taylors' School, and the other from Samuel Cromleholme of St. Paul's School, both situated in London (Canterbury, Canterbury Cathedral Archives DCc-KINGS 3/1; *Testimonials*).[44] There is little information about Lovejoy's career at the King's School. A surviving report prepared for the Archbishop (Canterbury, Canterbury Cathedral Archives DCc-KINGS 5/1; *Report for Archbishop*) mentions on the one hand that examiners had identified certain 'abuses' at the school and put a stop to them, on the other that the teachers and students were of sufficient quality. Dating the document, however, is problematic; it was probably produced between 1673 and 1706 (as pointed out to me by Peter Henderson).[45] We should thus avoid drawing any strong conclusions from it. It may be noted in any case that Lovejoy's headmastership is marked by the two above-mentioned sets of regulations set forth by the Dean and Chapter: one in 1665 at the beginning of his tenure, the other in 1682 near to the end of his stay. It has been suggested that the latter regulations were a reaction to some deficiencies in

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[43] The Dean and Chapter form the governing body of the Cathedral. The Chapter (lat. *Capitulum*), of which the Dean is the head, consists of the Cathedral canons.

[44] The collection includes surviving letters of recommendation or certificates of good conduct sent by persons applying for the position of master in the King's School. For Lovejoy's possible connections to Royalist writers, see Mäkilähde, Alho & Johnson (2016: 316, 325–326).

[45] I am grateful to Peter Henderson for providing me with a transcription of the document.

Lovejoy's teaching and administration (Woodruff & Cape 1908: 132–133; Edwards 1957: 101), since we find in them for example the following decrees:

> 2   Noe private Schollar who is not of the Schoole to bee taught in either of the houses of the Master or Usher
> 3   Noe exations for teaching saue fiue shillings a quarter for King Schollars, and ten for Commoners
> […]
> 9   None to bee remoued from the Usher to the Masters forms but by the Deane and Prebends: or in the absence of the Deane by the Vicedeane and Prebends after their quarterly examinations or by the Deane and Chapter after their Generall examination at St Katherines
> 10 Noe plaies to bee acted in the Schoole unless first seene and allowed by the Deane, or in his absence by the Vicedeane, or in the absence of them both by the Senior Prebend resident:
>
> (*Regulations*)[46]

The argument seems to be that there would have been no need to issue these orders if these practices had already been followed. In other words, the regulations would indicate, for example, that private scholars were being taught in one of the teachers' houses, that students were being moved from the usher's to the master's forms, and that problematic plays were being performed without permission from the Dean and Chapter. Whether this was in fact the case is impossible to say with certainty, since there seems to be no other evidence of problems in the school. The brief curriculum included in the regulations, however, may shed more light on the matter. If there is evidence that this type of curriculum had not been followed in the preceding decades, it would indicate that the regulations were indeed a reaction to declining standards. If, however, no such evidence is found, we need to reassess the implications of the other orders as well. It may also be noted that while the above-mentioned report may of course be referring to the types of problems listed here, the report nevertheless evaluated the skills of the teachers and students quite positively.

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[46]   Woodruff and Cape (1908: 134) have "the Senior Prebend present", but this is clearly an error. The reading preferred here is a formula also found in the Cathedral Statutes referring to the said prebendary, e.g. "vel utroq[ue] absente, senioris Residentis" and "per Decanum & Præbendarios residentes" (*Statutes*, ff. 10v & 15v), although the other formula does appear in conjunction with other offices, e.g. "una cum omnibus Canonicis domi præsentibus" (*Statutes*, f. 15r).

2.2.2.2   Educational system, staff, and students

We are able to form a reasonably accurate picture of the educational system in use at the King's School, based on the surviving documentary evidence as well as information about practices at other grammar schools. The Cathedral Statutes state that there should at all times be two teachers in the school,[47] a master (*praeceptor*) and an usher (*subpraeceptor*) (*Statutes*, ff. 3r–3v).[48] In some contexts the headmaster is called either *archididascalus* or *praecipuus informator*, while the usher is also known as *hypodidascalus* or *secundarius informator*.[49] The headmaster was to be a Master of Arts and to be well versed in both Latin and Greek, while the usher was to be a Bachelor of Arts and to have been instructed in Latin, since it was his duty to teach *prima Grammatices rudimenta*, 'the basics of grammar' (*Statutes*, ff. 15r–15v). This two-teacher system corresponds to those used at other grammar schools at the time (see e.g. Watson 1908; cf. however Hoole 1660: 307).[50]

The students were at all times to include fifty boys studying grammar at the school (*quinquaginta pueri in Grammaticâ erudiendi*; *Statutes*, f. 3v), called King's Scholars. These boys were to be financially disadvantaged and apt to learn, having already acquired the basic rudiments of grammar as well as reading and writing skills (*Statutes*, f. 14v).[51] The school register compiled by Scott and Henderson (*1660–*

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[47]   The most relevant parts in the statutes are in Chapter XXVIII. *De Pueris Grammaticis, & eorum Informatoribus* (*Statutes*, ff. 14v–15v), but there are many fleeting mentions of the boys and their teachers in several other chapters as well. Woodruff and Cape (1908: 47–48) refer to the above-mentioned chapter as number XXVII, indicating that they consulted an earlier copy. This was probably the version which had not yet been modified by Archbishop Laud in the first half of the 17th century.

[48]   "Statuimus igitur, & ordinamus, ut sint perpetuò in dictâ Ecclesiâ [...] duo Informatores puerorum in Grammaticâ, quorum unus sit Præceptor, alter Subpræceptor;" (*Statutes*, ff. 3r–3v).

[49]   "Statuimus etiam ut [...] unus eligatur [...] qui [...] illos Ecclesiæ nostræ pueros [...] pietate excolat, & bonis litteris exornet. Hic in Scholâ nostrâ primas obtineat; & Archididascalus, sive præcipuus esto Informator: Rursum [...] Volumus virum alterum eligi [...] qui sub Archididascalo pueros docebit, prima scilicet Grammatices rudimenta & perinde Hypodidascalus, sive secundarius Informator appellabitur." (*Statutes*, ff. 15r–15v). John Ray's contemporary trilingual dictionary (1675: 71) contains the following terms and their translations: *school-master* (*ludimagister,* γραμματοδιδάσκαλος), *usher* (*hypodidascalus*, ὑποδιδάσκαλος), and *master* (*praeceptor*, παιδευτής). Of these at least *ludimagister* may have been used in the Canterbury context, since in one of the *Orationes* plays we find this word denoting the headmaster (*Discipuli et Rustici*, f. 279v).

[50]   At the Merchant Taylors' School in London, there was a master and three ushers (see *Merchant Taylors' School Rules*, 1661: 19).

[51]   "Statuimus & Ordinamus, ut [...] sint perpetuò in Ecclesiâ nostrâ Cant. quinquaginta pueri pauperes, & amicorum ope destituti, de bonis Ecclesiæ nostræ alendi; ingenijs, quoad fieri potest, ad discendum natis et aptis; quos tamen admitti nolumus in pauperes

1749 Register), however, indicates that many of the Scholars were sons of gentlemen. The fifty boys were appointed for a period of four years (with the possibility of a grace period of one year), and they were to be between the ages of nine and fourteen, unless they had previously been choristers (ibid.).[52] Since the King's Scholars were part of the Cathedral personnel, they were supported financially and had certain minor duties.[53] For this reason, numerous references to them appear in the Cathedral documents, including complete lists of Scholars. In addition, there were a number of Commoners, or Oppidans, as they were known at other schools which had foundation scholars, such as Eton and Winchester.[54] These students paid tuition fees, but since they were not part of the Cathedral roster, no lists of students were kept. Their numbers are therefore not known with certainty, although Edwards estimates that they were around the same as those of the King's Scholars (1957: 104; cf. Woodruff & Cape 1908: 136). At the beginning of the seventeenth century there were reported to be altogether over two hundred boys at the school, although according to Woodruff and Cape "[t]his estimate is probably an exaggeration" (1908: 93). Remarks by contemporaries regarding the number of boys (e.g. by the Lieutenant of Norwich, quoted in Woodruff & Cape 1908: 106) are equally problematic to interpret.

Whatever the precise number of students may have been at various times, the number of teachers was quite low in proportion. For this reason, monitors were selected from among the older students to act as tutors and to keep an eye on the younger boys during school hours, both on school premises and in the Cathedral

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pueros Ecclesiæ nostræ antequam noverint legere, scribere, & mediocritèr calluerint prima Grammaticæ rudimenta" (*Statutes*, f. 14v).

[52] "Volumus prætereà ut nullus, nisi Sacellæ nostræ Regiæ, aut Ecclesiæ nostræ Cant. Chorista fuerit, in pauperem discipulum Ecclesiæ nostræ eligatur, qui nonum ætatis suæ annum non compleverit, vel qui quantum decimum ætatis suæ annum excesserit" (*Statutes*, f. 14v).

[53] Whether all of the King's Scholars were boarders is unclear. During Elizabeth's reign approximately 40% of the Queen's Scholars were boarders (Woodruff & Cape 1908: 86); Edwards (1957: 81) estimates that the number was around 50%. Some of the boarders were housed in the lodgings of the headmaster and the usher (Woodruff & Cape 1908: 136). Some additional information can be gleaned from a later source, a 19th century proposal for the establishment of scholarships for the sons of clergymen, included in the *Regulations* collection. The document proposes "[t]hat no Scholar be appointed who is under nine years of age or above fourteen", "no Scholar be appointed who cannot read and write decently", and "the first term of Scholarship be four years and that their being allowed to continue Scholars after that period depend upon the progress that they make", echoing the rules set for the election of the King's Scholars. It is also proposed "[t]hat they be boarded including Washing at £23 per annum", which might indicate similar treatment for the King's Scholars during this time.

[54] The term 'Commoner' occurs for example in the 1665 orders (Edwards 1957: 212).

(*Statutes*, f. 15v).[55] Since monitors also appear as characters in some of the *Orationes* texts, I discuss this system briefly. Some of the duties of monitors were laid down in the 1665 orders:

> 23. That the Master appoint monitors both for the Church and City and they if found negligent, or remiss to be corrected; and such of their ffelows as shall abuse y^m for doing their duty to be corrected (and if occasion be expelled the schoole). Which Monitors shall weekly (or otherwise if need be) give an account both of the absent Kingscholars, and of those also that come late, and likewise of such as misbehave themselves in the time either of prayers, sermon or otherwise.
>
> (Edwards 1957: 213–214)

These are the only mentions of the monitors in the Cathedral or King's School documents, but some information may be gleaned from reports of the systems in use at other grammar schools. For example, Hoole recommended the following: "That no disorder or vice committed either at Schoole, Church, or elsewhere, may passe un-noticed by the Master; he may cause his Scholars in the two upper Forms, to play the Monitors in their weekly turns, from Friday to Friday" (1660: 272), adding that "He that is publick Monitor in one of the two highest Forms may appoint two private Monitors to himself in every other Form, which may give him secret information of every mismedeanour [sic] committed in any place" (1660: 275–276).[56] Since the King's School monitors were required to submit a weekly report, it is not clear whether the system was the same as in Hoole's school, where there was a weekly rotation of monitors. In addition to acting as guardians of orderly behaviour, Hoole also recommended the use of the older students as assistant teachers:

> After parts said,[57] the Master or his Ushers should immediately give Lessons to every Form, or appoint a boy out of an upper Form to give Lessons to that which is next below him, in his hearing; which he should distinctly construe once or twice over, and note out all the Words, wherein the most difficulty of parsing seems to lye, and name the Tropes and Figures, the Phrases, and other elegancies that are to be found (especially) in higher Authors.
>
> (Hoole 1660: 255–256)

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[55]   "Informatores etiam Monitores varios e gravioribus discipulis propterea constituant, qui reliquorum mores ubiq[ue] inspiciant, ac notent; tam in templo, et Scholâ, quam alibi; nequid uspiam indecori aut sordidi perpetretur" (*Statutues I*, f. 15v). Woodruff and Cape note that this was one of Archbishop Laud's innovations (1908: 104).

[56]   Similar instructions are found in Hoole's treatise on the ordering of a petty school (1660: 48).

[57]   I.e. after the repetition of lessons on morphology.

The manner of giving Lectures before I came [in Rotherham] was,

1. For the two highest boyes in the eighth forme, to give Lectures to all the lower forms, each his week by turns.

2. The highest Scholar in the Schoole, gave Lectures to the second form.

3. Those in the highest form were commonly left to shift for themselves.

(Hoole 1660: 303)

There is no mention of this lecturing practice in any of the Cathedral documents, but there is indirect evidence that this system was in place in King's School as well. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 (see in particular 5.2.3.1, 5.2.3.3, and 5.2.3.4).

2.2.2.3   Curriculum and traditions

Unlike information on the school staff, which is included in the statutes, the curriculum of the King's School in 1665–1684 has to be reconstructed on the basis of four types of primary sources.[58] First, we have the official documents, containing more or less detailed information on the recommended curriculum. Second, we have similar documents from earlier or later years, as well as from other schools in Britain and elsewhere in Europe. Third, there are pedagogical treatises, such as the ones mentioned above in 2.2.1. Fourth, indirect evidence may be gleaned from sources such as the *Orationes* manuscript, as well as from texts composed, read, or performed in other schools. Understanding the form and content of the curriculum is particularly important in analysing the *Orationes* texts, since they contain frequent quotations from school-books and from Classical authors in particular (see Chapter 5).

To begin with the two sets of regulations containing a brief curriculum, the first (from 1665) and the second (from 1682) state the following:

15. That yᵉ mʳ and Usʳ: shall read with and teach the boyes no other but Classical Authors such as Terence, Tully, Ovid, Virgil, Hor: Homer Isoc: and what other yᵉ D & Chap: shall approve.

(Edwards 1957: 212)[59]

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[58]   The method for this type of reconstruction was demonstrated briefly in Mäkilähde (2018b: 462–464).

[59]   In the early modern period it was usual to refer to Cicero by his nomen gentilicium, the English form being *Tully*.

> 5   The Usher to teach the Accidence, Lillyes Grammer, Cato, Puerilis, Corderius, Esops fables, Erasmus colloquies
> 6   The Master to teach in his second form·the lower classis Ouid de Tristibus[,] Terence, Latine Testament, Erasmus, Tullys Offices, The Upper Classis Ouids Metamorphosis, Tullys Orations, Quintus Curtius, Greek<e> Gramm<er>, Posselius colloquies. Here to make latine Theams and verses.
> 7   The lower Classis of the upper form Virgill, Horace, Isocrat<i>s, Greeke Testament. In the upper Homer Hesiod, Minores poetæ, Florus &c Here to make Declamations, verses Greeke and Latine ex tempore
>
> (*Regulations*)[60]

According to this document, the division of students amounted basically to a system of five forms. Elsewhere, a system of three lower forms (taught by the usher) and three upper forms (taught by the master) was common.[61] The 1665 orders are quite succinct, apparently aiming only at prescribing a general humanist curriculum. As for the 1682 regulations, I first discuss the curriculum in the usher's form. 'Accidence' refers to the elementary, morphological part of grammar, while William Lily's Grammar was the standard Latin school grammar of early modern Britain, and long the only officially authorized one in England (Gwosdek 2013: 1–14; see also e.g. Barber 1997: 81). This does not refer to any specific version of the grammar; various versions were printed at different times, and there were also abridged and English versions of the book, as well as other works more or less based on Lily's original (see Gwosdek 2013 for an introduction to the history of Lily's Grammar). The Cato mentioned in the curriculum refers to Dionysius Cato (third or fourth century A.D.), more precisely the work attributed to him, the *Distichs* or *Disticha Catonis*, a collection of moral advice in double-line hexameter read also for moral education. *Puerilis* is ambiguous: it may refer to Leonhard Culmann's *Sententiae Pueriles* (1639), also known as *Sententiae Puerilis*, a collection of simple Latin sentences mentioned as elementary reading material by Brinsley (1622: 55) and Hoole (1660: 62, 299).[62] Another possibility is *Confabulationes Pueriles*, a

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[60]   Woodruff and Cape (1908: 133–134) mistakenly read "Cordorius" and "Possonius". They do not discuss the list of specific authors, noting only that "Greek is very poorly represented, and the preponderance of poets over prose authors is very marked throughout" (1908: 134). Angle brackets here indicate uncertain readings, square brackets my editorial addition.

[61]   Examples include the Merchant Taylors' School in London (see *Merchant Taylors' School Rules*, 1661) and Richard Hale's School in Hertford (London, British Library Add MS 33578; *Hale School Papers*, f. 127v). The same system is also laid down in Statute 41of the 1541 statutes (see Leach 1911: 464–468).

[62]   Woodruff & Cape (1908: 133) read "Cato puerilis"; there are also other differences in interpreting the punctuation.

collection of dialogues also used at this level (Hoole 1660: 54; for this work, see also Adamson [1919] 2013: 167–168). *Corderius* stands for Mathurin Cordier, more specifically his *Colloquiorum Scholasticorum libri quatuor* (originally published in 1563), a collection of simple Latin dialogues.[63] Finally, Aesop's fables (in Latin) and Erasmus's *Colloquies*, a collection of Latin dialogues, were read not only for their language but also for their moral content (Hoole 1660: 63).

In the master's forms, we find Ovid's *Tristia* and *Metamorphoses*, Vergil, and Horace covering Latin verse. Cicero's *de Officiis* was read especially for its language and style, the speeches also for rhetorical practice, while *Erasmus* may here refer for example to the *de Copia* (a work on style and rhetoric), the *Adagia* (a collection of proverbs, with commentary, recommended as suitable reading for example by Brinsley 1622: 182, 188), or his manual on letter-writing. *Curtius* refers to the *Historiae Alexandri Magni* of Quintus Curtius Rufus, a description of the life and deeds of Alexander, which Hoole (1660: 173) mentions in connection with Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus. Among other works belonging to the same genre we find *Florus*, referring to the history of Rome by Lucius Annaeus Florus, recommended by both Hoole (1660: 122 and *passim*) and Brinsley (1622: 65). The *Colloquia* of Johannes Posselius, also known as *Familiarium Colloquiorum Libellus* or Οἰκείων Διαλόγων Βιβλιόν, is a collection of everyday dialogues and formulae in parallel Greek and Latin; Hoole (1660: 137) recommends it for the teaching of spoken Greek. Terence's plays were similarly read for their everyday language, but Hoole (1660: 137–138) also recommends them for their eloquence and content. No particular Greek grammar is prescribed in the regulations, but Hoole (1660: 134, 205), for example, recommended Camden's *Institutio Graecae Grammatices Compendiaria*. Greek verse is represented by Homer and Hesiod, while *Minores poetæ* probably refers to *Poetae minores Graeci*, compiled by Ralph Winterton, containing (in addition to Hesiod) texts by such writers as Theocritus, Bion of Smyrna, Theognis of Megara, Pythagoras (the short poem traditionally ascribed to him, Χρύσεα Ἔπη), Solon, and Callimachus. Hoole does not use the phrase *minores poetae* and neither does Brinsley, although the latter refers to a collection of this sort (1622: 73).[64] Finally, the Bible was read in both Latin and Greek.

Both sets of regulations probably served only as general guidelines, as also implied by the *such as* in the 1665 orders and the etcetera (*&c*) at the end of the 1682

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[63] The *Colloquia* were also translated into English by John Brinsley to aid the young students of Latin.

[64] "The fittest for young scholars (so farre as I can iudge) after they haue runne through their *Clauis*, if you will begin with Poetry, that they may learne to make a verse in Greek, is *Theognis* his sentences with the other Poets ioyned with him; as namely *Phocilides*, *Pythagoras*, *&c*. with the Latine translation and annotations thereof, set forth by *Silburgius*" (Brinsley 1622: 73).

list.[65] Elsewhere (Mäkilähde 2018b: 463–464), I have discussed for example evidence that Cicero's correspondence was also used as reading material in the school. Hoole recommends its use (1660: 145–151, 155), as does Ascham (1570: 31r), and Brinsley (1622: 55) mentions it in connection with certain elementary texts. It is also found in the curricula of other schools in Britain (see e.g. *Hale School Papers*, f. 127v) and elsewhere in Europe (see e.g. Lagus 1890: 13, 21, 28, 41, 56 and 67–68; Merisalo 2009: 192 for curricula in Finland).[66] There are also references to the letters and their employment as school texts in the *Orationes* manuscript (e.g. ff. 199v, 325v).

The 1682 regulations also mention that the students should produce themes, verses, and declamations. Hoole (1660: 181–188) provides a full discussion on the writing of themes: the students were to extract material from various texts and to collect useful phrases on several different topics in a commonplace book. The boys could then employ these phrases in their own compositions. As the regulations testify, the ultimate goal was to be able to produce speeches and verses extempore, something also mentioned by Hoole (1660: 200).[67] It needs to be stressed that this type of composition was not 'mere copying', but the analysis and creative reuse of existing materials (see e.g. Watson 1908; Mäkilähde, Alho & Johnson 2016). It is to be expected that many boys who stayed in the school for a long time were able to acquire a high competence in Latin, as it took up most of the curriculum. Furthermore, in Statute 41 of the 1541 statutes, the students were also required to use Latin (or Greek) on the school premises (Leach 1911: 468; Edwards 1957: 66–67). Barber (1997: 44) notes that this language policy was gradually disappearing towards the end of the seventeenth century, but at least in Canterbury it seems to have been well in place during Lovejoy's headmastership, as will become evident from the analyses in Chapter 5 (for a general discussion, see Charlton 1965: 119–123).[68]

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[65] The statutes of certain other grammar schools were even more explicit in stating this, such as those of the Dorchester Free School (London, British Library Add MS 25426; *Dorchester Statutes*, f. 7v) and the Free Grammar School of Edmund Grindall (Carlisle 1818: 158). The 1541 statutes focus more on the general aims for each form rather than on particular reading; mention is made specifically of Dionysius Cato, Aesop, and the *Familiaria Colloquia* (i.e. Posselius) for the lower forms, Erasmus's *de Copia*, Horace, and Cicero for the upper forms (see Leach 1911: 466–468).

[66] A catalogue of books in the Bristol Grammar School library from 1725 includes a collection of letters by Cicero, Pliny, and three others (Sampson 1912: 110).

[67] "In the meane time this Forme should continue to make *Themes* and *Verses*, one week in Greek, and another in Latine; and ever and anon they may contend in making *Orations & Declamations* […] *Tesmarus*, and *Orator extemporaneus*, will shew them how to dispose their matter so, as to make an Oration of any subject in Latine, *ex tempore*;" (Hoole 1660: 200). Cf. also Brinsley (1622: 55).

[68] In Jesuit-run schools around the world, pupils were not allowed to use the vernacular until well into the 18th century (Loach 2013: 130).

The final aspect to be discussed here concerns the King's School tradition of performances. Public drama performances, speeches, and disputations were a central part of the early modern system of education in Europe, at both grammar school and university level (Woodruff & Cape 1908: 80, 119; Charlton 1965: 143; Oberparleiter 2013: 192; Ryan 2013: 172). There is little information as to possible performances in Canterbury in the Middle Ages, but at least in the fifteenth century there was a tradition of selecting one of the students to be a 'boy bishop' on 6 December (Woodruff & Cape 1908: 34–36; Edwards 1957: 42). The student, accompanied by others as his clergy, would preach a sermon and parody the duties of the church officials. In 1464, the tradition was discontinued at least temporarily by the masters of the school; Woodruff and Cape suggest (1908: 36 & 79–80) that from then onwards the parodies were replaced by miracle or morality plays. The Treasurer's books indicate that in the latter half of the sixteenth century a certain amount of money was allocated for drama performed by the boys in December (ibid.). In 1613, a small reward was distributed to scholars who performed speeches on 5 November to commemorate the failed Gunpowder Plot which had taken place eight years earlier (Woodruff & Cape 1908: 94). There are several other examples of such events in the Cathedral documents (*Treasurer's Accounts* ff. 366v, 426v, 490v & 554r), until the Puritans brought the tradition to an end (Woodruff & Cape 1908: 119).[69] The performances were revived after the Restoration, and we find mentions of money being awarded to students who gave speeches on the King's birthday (*Treasurer's Book 1662–1663*, f. 39r/p. 55; for the sake of clarity, I use the folio or page numbers found in these books; see also Woodruff & Cape 1908: 128; Edwards 1957: 100). This indicates that the performances recorded in the *Orationes* manuscript during 1665–1684 were not an invention of Lovejoy's, but the continuation of a well-established tradition.

Under George Lovejoy's headmastership the Chapter continued to fund the performances, and we again find entries in the Treasurer's books for money being transferred to the Master, either to be given to the students or to cover expenses (*Treasurer's Book 1669–1670*, f. 37r; *Treasurer's Book 1670–1671*, p. 58; *Treasurer's Book 1671–1672*, f. 35r; *Treasurer's Book 1672–1673*, p. 68; *Treasurer's Book 1674–1675*, f. 37r; *Treasurer's Book 1678–1679*, f. 29r; Treasurer's *Book 1683–1684*, f. 37r; see also Woodruff & Cape 1908: 126; two of these entries simply record money being given to the students, with no mention of the master). These performances were clearly a practice both accepted and

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[69] Woodruff and Cape (1908: 119) report that between 1626 and 1635 we find money distributed to the teacher or scholars for arranging debates or disputations, for giving speeches, for acting drama and exercises, and for building scenery props. Similar payments occur between 1640 and 1642.

encouraged by the Cathedral officials. Our understanding of them is based above all on the *Orationes* manuscript, which is the topic of the next section.

2.3 The *Orationes* manuscript

In this section, I present the texts used as material in the present work. I begin in 2.3.1 with a discussion of the *Orationes* manuscript in general: its content, languages, material form, and authorship. In 2.3.2 I discuss the texts in the manuscript in more detail, focusing on their division into four subgenres, the general structure of the texts, and common themes. Finally, in 2.3.3, I provide a brief discussion of previous research on the *Orationes* texts.

2.3.1 Introduction to the manuscript, its languages, and content

The *Orationes* manuscript (Canterbury, Canterbury Cathedral Archives Lit. MS E41) is a folio-sized paper book of almost five hundred leaves and around 260 000 words compiled in or after 1684, possibly by commission of George Lovejoy himself.[70] The manuscript is multilingual, containing texts in Latin, English, and Greek, as well as fairly frequent switching between languages. The title-page of the book reads: *Orationes, & Carmina, aliaq[ue] Exercitia, Quæ composita fuerunt In nativitatem, et reditum regis Caroli secundi. In sulphuream Papistarum conspirationem. In hyemalem Scholarium missionem. In Quadragesimalis Victoriæ gratiam. et publicè habita Coram Decano, & Canonicis, aliisq[ue] Auditoribus, à Scholasticis in regia Schola Cantuariæ. Georgio Lovejoy AM. archididascalo*. This translates as 'Speeches, poems, and other exercises, which were composed on the occasion of the birthday and restoration of King Charles II, in remembrance of the Papists' Gunpowder Plot, on the occasion of scholars' winter holiday, and for the sake of Lenten victory, and which were publicly performed in the presence of the Dean and Canons, and other listeners, by the students in the King's School, Canterbury, during the headmastership of George Lovejoy, M.A.'. The foliated

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[70] In reporting passages from the manuscript, the original spelling (including diacritics, even when incorrect) has been retained as far as possible. Layout, however, has only in certain cases been reproduced as in the original. Abbreviations and the brevigraph for *que* have been expanded within square brackets, while Greek ligatures have been silently expanded. Square brackets are also used for other editorial notes, as well as to indicate omissions. The use of thicker letters in the manuscript has been represented by boldface, as has the use of a script resembling roman type. In dialogues, the *nomina actorum* have also been marked with boldface, although this is not always how they appear in the manuscript. The symbols following *nomina actorum* (colons, full stops, etc.) have been normalized as colons. All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are by the present author. Italics in the translations indicate CS in the translated passages.

pages have margins ruled in red ink, and the text is in a neat and clear italic hand, presumably by a single scribe. In addition to the texts mentioned in the title, the manuscript contains a list of Victors (ff. 478r–479v; see below),[71] and nine speeches performed on other occasions, mainly when an eminent person visited the school (ff. 480v–484r).[72] A separate sheet containing verse has been inserted between the leaves, and there is also a sheet in the middle of the manuscript with an illustration of the personified forms of grammar and its four parts: orthography, prosody, etymology, and syntax (reproduced in Mäkilähde, Alho & Johnson 2016: 323).

The texts in the manuscript have been arranged in yearly cycles of four performances, reflecting the four different occasions mentioned on the title-page (see e.g. Mäkilähde, Alho & Johnson 2016): on Guy Fawkes Day (5 November), the students reminisced about the Gunpowder Plot of 1605 and rejoiced at its failure; in December, they used their performances to plead with the Dean for a holiday; at the beginning of Lent, they staged rhetorical battles; and on Oak Apple Day (29 May), they celebrated the birthday and restoration of Charles II. According to this arrangement, the texts can be grouped into four subgenres: Gunpowder Plot performances, Christmas performances, Lenten performances, and Oak Apple Day performances. The decision to call these 'subgenres' may need further justification. To begin with, Wellek and Warren (1963: 231) define *genre* as "a grouping of literary works based […] upon both outer form (specific metre or structure) and also upon inner form (attitude, tone, purpose – more crudely, subject and audience)", while Carroll et al. (2003: 8) note that "[t]he general consensus of historical pragmaticians […] seems to be that genre is a functional category (defined on text-external and perhaps contextual grounds), while text-types are linguistically (text-internally) determined". My rationale for using the term 'subgenre' in reference to the four types of texts in the *Orationes* manuscript is based on a preliminary consideration of both functional and formal factors (discussed in the following subsection); the justifiability of this choice is evaluated more fully in Chapter 5.

The manuscript contains seventeen texts for each speech day, 68 texts in total. Since we can be certain that the first Guy Fawkes Day performance recorded in the

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[71] *Nomina Scholasticorum qui Georgio Lovejoy archididascalo Regiæ Scholæ Cantuariensis fuerunt Victores* (f. 479r), 'Names of scholars who were Victors of the King's School, Canterbury, during the headmastership of George Lovejoy'.

[72] The visitors were the Earl of Middleton, the Bishop of Ely (although the visit was cancelled, the speech was nevertheless recorded in the manuscript), and the Bishop of Peterborough. The other speeches were delivered in the presence of the Dean and the school examiners (i.e. on the occasion of St. Katherine's audit). Most of these short speeches record the name of the speaker (which is not a feature of most of the other texts), revealing that many of them were delivered by Victors.

manuscript is from 1665 and the final Oak Apple Day performance from 1684,[73] there are two complete cycles missing. This makes it difficult to estimate the years of performance with absolute certainty. Whenever this has been relevant to the textual analyses, I have indicated the approximate year (based on the ordering of the texts, although the ordering may of course also be partly incorrect), or for example the *terminus post quem*, based on text-internal evidence; establishing the precise date of performance for each text, however, is beyond the scope of the present study. In terms of the structure of the texts, individual performances may contain prose, verse, and dialogue. In the textual analyses, I have analysed the texts in terms of the following sections: prologues, epilogues, prose orations, verse orations, other verse sections, and dialogues. These are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. There is in any case variation in the structure of the performances. Some consist of a few speeches together with a prologue and an epilogue; some combine a set of orations with a short dialogue; yet others take the form of a fairly long play, complete with several characters, props, and a more developed plot. Most of the texts in the manuscript seem to be 'original' compositions, but some entries in fact record the performance of a play by a major author (see below). In most of these cases, only the fact of the performance has been recorded in the manuscript in the form of a title-page – possibly with an added prologue and/or epilogue – but in two cases the text has been copied into the manuscript in full.[74]

As the title-page of the manuscript indicates, the audience consisted of at least the Dean and the Canons, but it is unclear who the "other listeners" were. Presumably the teachers and non-performing students were always present, but little else can be said about possible other members of the audience. The venue for the performance was probably the school-room – referenced a number of times in the manuscript – but possibly a play may sometimes have been performed in another location (for a discussion of the venue, see e.g. Johnson 2017a).

Although the title of the manuscript is written in Latin, the book, as noted above, is multilingual. Focusing on those performances which contain more elements than just the title-page: while a few are almost fully monolingual in Latin, all of them contain either separate sections in other languages or code-switching within a single section (or both). The distribution of languages in the manuscript and the frequencies of CS are analysed in Chapter 5, together with the possible effect of the subgenre on language choice and the occurrence of switching.

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[73] The year has been written down at the beginning of the first Gunpowder Plot performance (*Shrawley*, f. 1r), while the epilogue of the final Oak Apple Day performance in effect constitutes a farewell to the teacher: it is mentioned that this is the last performance which the audience will experience during his headmastership (*Friends to the Cause*, f. 476v).

[74] Woodruff and Cape mistakenly state that "Lovejoy did not transcribe the text of these [plays by known dramatists] into his book" (1908: 132).

Regarding the languages themselves, the type of Latin used in these texts is a form of Neo-Latin, a variety introduced by the Renaissance humanists and used in the early modern period in general. Although the humanists based their language use on the Classical form, Neo-Latin sometimes exhibits features from other varieties, in particular Medieval Latin (for Neo-Latin in general, see e.g. Butterfield 2011; for a concise overview of features distinguishing it from Classical Latin, see e.g. Sarasti-Wilenius 2015: 26–39). One notable concern is that we have to be careful in applying readings to specific words, since the intended meaning may be either the Classical or a later variant (see e.g. Dinkova-Bruun 2011: 287–292). Here I briefly mention those features of Neo-Latin that are particularly salient in the textual examples discussed in the following chapters, since these may be unfamiliar to readers not accustomed to later varieties of Latin. To begin with, there are two obvious non-Classical phonological features which are reflected in the spelling. The first is palatalization: the development of /kj/ and /tj/ (from original /ki, ke/ and /ti, te/) to /ts/, originally in Vulgar Latin (Väänänen 1963: 55–56; Herman 2000: 42–45; cf. Dinkova-Bruun 2011: 295). This change is also present in Neo-Latin, reflected in such spellings as *ocium* (pro *otium*) and *pronunciat* (pro *pronuntiat*), which indicate a pronunciation approximately as /tsi/ or /si/ rather than /ti/ or /ki/. The second feature is the restructuring of the vowel system, which contributed to the confusion between the spellings *ae* (or *æ*) and *e* (as well as *oe* or *œ*). This is related to the monophthongization of the /ai/ diphthong and its convergence with /e/ or /ɛ/, depending on the dialect (Väänänen 1963: 29–30; Herman 2000: 31–33; see also Palmer 1954: 157).[75] Accordingly, we find in the *Orationes* texts words whose spellings differ from the norms of Classical Latin, such as *Mecænates* (pro *Maecenates*) and *fælix* (pro *felix*). It should be noted, however, that this usage is fairly regular.[76] Finally, certain lexical as well as morphological and syntactic features of the examples are explained in the footnotes when necessary; one example of such a feature is the reanalysed periphrastic form of the passive (Väänänen 1963: 137–138; Dinkova-Bruun 2011: 300), which appears for example on the title page: *composita fuerunt* (pro *composita sunt*).

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[75] Another school play from this period, *Basileia seu Bellum Grammaticale Tagico-Comoedia* (London, British Library Add MS 22725; *Basileia*; see also Alho, Mäkilähde & Sandis in review), contains a scene where a student explains that 'c' is pronounced like 's' before 'i, e, y' and in other places like 'k' (f. 19r), and that 'æ' and 'œ' are pronounced 'e' (ff. 18v–19r).

[76] Exceptions include for example *felicissimè* (e.g. ff. 4v & 146r) and *infeliciter* (e.g. f. 276v); the forms with *e* may also appear with the *ae* forms within a single text. For similar variation in private letters written in Finland and Sweden during roughly the same period as that of the *Orationes* performances, see the glossary in Sarasti-Wilenius (2015: 433–435).

Another salient feature in the Latin texts is the use of accent marks similar to the Greek ones. This was a common practice in Neo-Latin writing; since the system has been described in detail by Steenbakkers (1994a; 1994b: Ch. 2), I present only a brief summary here, using examples from the *Orationes* manuscript. The grave accent is used with certain indeclinable forms, including the monosyllabic prepositions *è* and *à*, as well as adverbs ending in *-e*, *-o*, *-a* and *-um*, such as *liberè* (and all other adverbs formed with the productive suffix), *immò*, *unà*, and *primùm*. It also appears in *quòd* and *quàm* when used as conjunctions. The acute is quite rare in the *Orationes* texts, appearing before certain suffixes, as in *túne* (f. 145v). It has an unrelated function in one Christmas play, where it is used to mark a stressed syllable in a discussion of Latin phonology (*Grammaticae Partes I*, f. 323v). Finally, the circumflex is used to distinguish two homographic forms from each other by marking the long vowel, as in *pace tuâ*, but this may be omitted if other cues in the context clearly indicate that the vowel is long, such as in the case of an immediately preceding preposition. The somewhat confusing usage of marking the vowel in the archaic genitive plural *deûm* is also present; it is uncertain whether the vowel was actually pronounced as long. The form does occur in one verse section (f. 281v), but unfortunately it is also *positione* long in the context. Similarly to the acute, the circumflex also appears in the above-mentioned section on pronunciation rules, as the mark of a long vowel in general (f. 324r).

In addition to spelling and diacritics, certain other visual features of the manuscript should also be noted, since they may be connected to switching practices in the texts (see 5.1.4).[77] Although the majority of the writing is in the aforementioned clear italic script, in some contexts the scribe has used a variant form resembling roman type, in most cases distinguishable from the main text both by the upright letter-forms and by their thickness (i.e. the amount of ink used). This script is found in some metatextual units (e.g. stage directions) and to highlight specific words. Otherwise visual cues usually consist of a larger letter size or of the marked positioning of the text on the page (e.g. centred and surrounded by empty space). There are also sporadic instances of secretary script, although these seem to be slips of the pen, since they most often appear in word-final position; they also seem to cluster together. In the case of certain letter forms, it is unclear whether they should be counted as secretary forms or not, but it should be rather straightforward at least for *s*, *r* and *e*. Finally, there is of course a completely different script used for the Greek text. As for scribal emendations, they have been silently included in the transcriptions; a discussion of their form is beyond the scope of the present study.

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[77] Recent research has emphasized the importance of examining the visual and material forms of early texts in addition to their linguistic features (see e.g. Peikola et al., eds., 2017). See e.g. Machan (2011) on 'visual pragmatics', Carroll et al. (2013) on 'pragmatics on the page', and Meurman-Solin (2013) on 'visual prosody'.

Finally, the question of who actually composed the texts remains to be discussed. Woodruff and Cape imply that Lovejoy may have been the author, as they "suspect that these lucubrations were to some extent "faked" by the Head-master, and that they cannot be taken as exact samples of the attainments of the boys" (1908: 127); the same idea is also implied in their comment that, in one of the performances, "Lovejoy […] put into the mouth of the orator some sarcastic remarks" (ibid.; but cf. 1908: 128). Neither Edwards (1957: 102–103) nor Hinde (2005: 37–39) take any firm stand on the matter, although both of them seem to allocate at least the scribal duty to Lovejoy. Lovejoy may indeed have commissioned the writing of the manuscript, but it is impossible to say who acted as the scribe. There are for example no extant texts which could be used as comparative material to analyse his handwriting (although his signature occurs several times in the Cathedral documents); we would also not expect to find him using an italic hand for example in personal letters. In other words, the scribe may have been Lovejoy himself, one of his senior students, another member of the Cathedral, or a professional scribe.

In the present study, I am assuming that the boys themselves were responsible for composing the texts, with the assistance of their teachers. There are several reasons for this assumption. First, considering that for example the Christmas performances had a practical function for the boys, namely to procure a holiday for them, one would not expect the teacher to perform what were in effect the boys' task, even if pleading by way of performance was merely a formality. Second, the students were certainly capable of composing the texts, as they had to produce speeches and other texts constantly as part of their studies – even ex tempore (as discussed above in 2.2.2.3). Third, any assumed or demonstrable homogeneity in the texts (especially in the language used) does not prove anything one way or the other, since a major part of early modern learning was based on emulation and replication (see above).[78] We should also be wary of the fact that many of the themes, references, and ideas encountered in the performances also appear in other dramatic texts from this period, for example in other school and university plays (see Chapter 5 for a few examples). Fourth, many of the *Orationes* texts contain commentary on everyday school life, sometimes even in the form of criticism of the teachers. Finally, the title page marks the students as the semantic agents at least for the performance, but most probably for the composition as well (*quæ composita fuerunt […] et habita […] à Scholasticis*). These arguments will be re-evaluated in connection with the philosophical and methodological analyses in 4.2.6, and again in summarizing the results of the textual analyses in 6.1.

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[78] Any early modern texts dealing with topics related to education and rhetoric in particular would traditionally be full of imitation and emulation (cf. Sarasti-Wilenius 2000).

2.3.2   An overview of the texts and the subgenres

The majority of the texts in the manuscript do not include a unique title, often merely identifying the occasion for performance (e.g. *In sulphuream Papistarum conspirationem Exercitia*). In addition to the plays by major authors, there are only a handful of texts which have a more specific title. Referring to the texts by their subgenre and placement in the manuscript would arguably be preferable over a system which uses the year of performance, due to the above-mentioned problems in dating the texts; however, in order to avoid ambiguity and the possible confusion which might arise from using such a system, I have devised short titles which reflect (part of) the content of each performance.[79] A full list of the texts, with their titles, structure, and main languages, is included in the Appendix.

While all four subgenres contain an equal number of texts, the performances of plays by major authors are not distributed evenly among them. None of them were performed on Guy Fawkes Day. Of the Christmas performances, two include a play which has been copied into the manuscript in full; in both cases, the play was only one part of the performance. One is *Wine, Beer and Ale* (Mercurius Anglicus),[80] the other *A Contention for Honour and Riches* (James Shirley). The performance of *Captivi* (Plautus) contains an additional prologue and epilogue, while the performances of *The Cheats* (John Wilson, published anonymously), *Amor in Labyrintho* (anon., most probably a version of James Shirley's *Love in a Maze*), and *The Female Prelate & The Spanish Friar* (based on contemporary plays by the same names by Elkanah Settle and John Dryden) are recorded only by mentioning the performance. Eight performances of plays by major authors took place before Lent: *The Example* (James Shirley), *Bellum Grammaticale* (Leonard Hutten), *Priscianus Vapulans* (Nicodemus Frischlin), *Senile Odium* (Peter Hausted; also performed later as an English translation), *Valetudinarium* (William Johnson; also performed later as an English translation), and *Fraus Honesta* (Edmund Stubbe).[81] In each case, only a record of the performance is included in the manuscript. Finally, only one of the Oak Apple Day performances consisted of a published play: *The Royalist* (Thomas Durfey, or D'Urfey), published in 1682, which incidentally is also the assumed year of performance at the King's School (and in any case it gives us an approximate

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[79]   Working titles for the Christmas plays were first proposed in Mäkilähde (2012). Most of them have been retained in the present study without modification.

[80]   The name of the author is a pseudonym (see Hanford 1915: 6; see also Harjunpää & Mäkilähde 2016: 192).

[81]   The latter three plays are all 17th century university comedies. In the manuscript, the translator for *Senile Odium* has been marked as *T.B.* (f. 328v), while the one for *Valetudinarium* is *R.C* (f. 469r). The author of *Bellum Grammaticale* has mistakenly been marked down as John Spencer (see Mäkilähde, Alho & Johnson 2016: 326 fn. 19). *Priscianus Vapulans* is a 16th century German university play.

terminus post quem). The text consists only of the title and information on the date of performance.

In addition to the occasion for performance, the four subgenres are distinguished to an extent by their topics, themes, and format. The Gunpowder Plot performances are thematically very homogeneous: they focus specifically on recounting the events surrounding the Plot, taking the form either of orations on the topic or of dialogues which sometimes depict the events in detail. The recurring characters in the dialogues include the main perpetrators of the Plot, in particular Guy Fawkes, Robert Catesby, and Henry Garnet. The aim of the orations is to condemn the Plot (and often Papists in general) and to rejoice at its failure, thus demonstrating the school's loyalist sentiments.

The Christmas plays are in general fairly light-hearted. Due to the practical aim of the performances – the procuring of a holiday – school life and education are central themes in many of them. Several of the dialogues are humorous, while many of the orations take the form of a debate; in most cases the individual speeches deal with particular topics, indicated with titles. One set of orations in *A World of Options*, for example, focuses on the parts of speech, another on various professions. In *Certamen Doctrinale* the topic is rhetoric, with its three parts, while in *Grammaticae Partes I* the orations address the four parts of grammar. In most performances, some of the orations (or the prologue/epilogue) contain explicit pleading with the Dean for a holiday, together with explaining why it should be granted.

The Oak Apple Day performances are also quite uniform thematically: the orations focus on lamenting the troubled years of civil war, the execution of Charles I and the exile of Charles II, and rejoicing at his restoration. They are thus fairly clear demonstrations of Royalist sentiments. As opposed to the Papists, in these texts the Puritans – Cromwell in particular – are more often the object of attacks. There are thus some similarities to the Gunpowder Plot performances; one text in the latter subgenre (*Declamationes de Fauxio et Cromwello*) in fact attempts to determine which of the two was the worse person, Fawkes or Cromwell. Several of the dialogues consist of disputations or debates between people of opposing political or religious views. In *Misomonarchus et Philomonarchus*, for example, the dialogue takes place between a Royalist and an anti-Royalist.

Finally, the Lenten performances differ in their structure from texts in the other subgenres, in that they are in effect rhetorical 'mock-battles' between two groups of students: King's Scholars and Oppidans. The battles take the form of vituperative speeches directed at the opposing group or at one boy in particular; after the orations, the boys presented riddles to each other in verse (for the origins of some of these, see Mäkilähde, Alho & Johnson 2016: 331–333). Of all the performances in the manuscript, the Lenten ones are the easiest to date approximately, since the names of the speakers often occur in the texts. If we compare the names to the list of Victors

included at the end of the manuscript, it becomes clear that there is a great deal of overlap. While an in-depth discussion of the system of Victors is beyond the scope of the present study, the list of Victors is relevant to the way in which I have devised titles for the Lenten performances; I thus comment on this briefly.

There is some uncertainty both as to how the list of Victors should be interpreted and as to the relationship between the Lenten performances recorded in the manuscript and the election of Victors. For example: the Victors for 1665 were John Shrawley and Matthew Burnley (f. 478v). If the record follows the Old Date system (when the new year fell on Lady Day, 25 March), and if the record indicates when the boys were chosen as Victors, it would follow that the boys were elected in 1666 according to the modern calendar, since Lent that year began in February. Shrawley and Burnley, however, are presented as the leaders of the two groups of boys in the first Lenten performance recorded in the manuscript, probably performed in 1666. Shrawley also seems to be treated as a 'head boy' of sorts already in the first Gunpowder Plot performance, performed in 1665. In devising titles for the performances, I have chosen to use the names of the Victors coinciding – as far as I can tell – with the relative order of the performance. In other words, the first Lenten performance is named after the first pair of Victors, Shrawley and Burnley. While the missing cycles obviously add to the uncertainty of this system, it is in fact a very practical way of identifying the performances. In most cases, the names of the Victors I have used to refer to the performance appear in the verse section in prominent position, for example in the first or second pair (though not always *as* a pair). In several texts it is also possible to identify their speeches in the oration section. In each case, the name of at least one of the Victors appears in the performance. In other words, whatever the system may have been for electing Victors, and whatever the relationships between the performances and the list of Victors, the system used here should be applicable without modification.

2.3.3   Earlier research on the *Orationes* texts

There is very little previous research on the *Orationes* texts, and many general studies make no mention of it (but see Boas 1932: 102–103). In addition to unpublished work (including MA theses) and for example the above-mentioned histories of the King's School, there seems to be only a handful of papers which address the texts. To begin with, Johnson (2007: 158, 162) has on the one hand commented on allusions to Ben Jonson in two of the texts, on the other discussed the performance of James Shirley's plays in the school (2017a: 377–388). He has also briefly commented on the relevance of the above-mentioned illustration of grammar and its four parts (2017b: 124–126). Aspects of code-switching in a number of the Christmas performances have been discussed by the present author, particularly in

Mäkilähde (2018a), but also as part of Skaffari and Mäkilähde (2014: 268–272) as well as of Harjunpää and Mäkilähde (2016: 184–193).[82] Mäkilähde, Alho and Johnson (2016) discuss various types of grammatical allusion in the Christmas and Lenten subgenres, also addressing a number of general issues concerning the texts and the manuscript, while Mäkilähde (2018b) suggests various reasons for studying such allusions. In addition, McEvilla (2016) shows that several extracts in the English dialogue of *Pueri Captivi* were copied from John Cotgrave's drama anthology (1655). Finally, Alho, in one study (in press) discusses certain aspects of school-exercise composition in general (including some of the same issues covered here in 2.2.2.3), with a particular focus on rhetoric; in another (forthcoming), he deals with the content of the non-dialogue parts of a particular Gunpowder Plot performance (*Declamationes de Fauxio et Cromwello*), setting them in the context of the broader Gunpowder genre in early modern Britain. But there has been no book-length study of the *Orationes* texts in particular, and the present study thus fills an important gap. Hopefully, a more comprehensive analysis will be able to shed new light even on questions which have been addressed in earlier studies.

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[82]   One of my first studies on the phenomenon was the unpublished MA thesis Mäkilähde (2012), where I analysed a limited number of switches from four of the Christmas performances. When I started working on the manuscript, I had access to draft commentaries of five Christmas performances, which were useful in providing a starting point in, for example, locating possible sources for the quotations found in the texts.

3 Theoretical contextualization

In this chapter, I outline the theoretical context and the preliminary conceptual apparatus of the present study in two main parts. Section 3.1 focuses on the linguistic phenomenon which is the main focus of the present work, namely multilingual language use, while section 3.2 focuses on the concept of 'face' and its role in interpersonal communication. In both sections I provide a critical overview of relevant theories and suggest ways of tackling potential challenges. The problems raised and solutions suggested will be discussed further in chapters 4 and 5, in conjunction with the philosophical/methodological and textual analyses. The considerable length of Chapter 3 reflects the broad scope of the theoretical and philosophical/methodological focus of the study.

3.1 Multilingualism and code-switching

Section 3.1 consists of four subsections, each of which deals with a particular area of research on multilingualism in general or code-switching in particular. I begin in section 3.1.1 by providing a brief survey of the field and discussing certain central concepts and terms. The following three sections are devoted to three important aspects of code-switching, in the following order: forms of code-switching, the distinction between code-switching and borrowing, and the functions of code-switching.

3.1.1 An overview of the field and basic concepts

Multilingualism and related phenomena occupy an important place within linguistics. Especially since the 1960s, with the establishment of sociolinguistics as a field of research and the publication of such core investigations as Weinreich ([1953] 1963) and Haugen (1953), researchers have shown increasing interest in this aspect of language. As part of other broader topics, these questions have of course been discussed for a very long time, especially within historical linguistics (see e.g. Whitney 1881; Paul [1920] 1975: 390–403;[83] Sapir 1921: 205–220). Moreover, as

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[83]   The first edition of Paul's *Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte* was published in 1880.

noted in Chapter 2, language choice and language 'mixing' have been topics of societal discussion for millennia. Code-switching and other multilingual phenomena are studied by researchers within a wide range of fields, including contact linguistics, sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, grammatical theory, pragmatics, discourse analysis, conversation analysis, applied linguistics, literary criticism, and translation studies. Each field views the relevant phenomena from a different perspective, which also contributes to variation in terminology.

A logical point of departure for this discussion is the concept of *multilingualism*, often defined in terms of competence in two or more languages (see Romaine 1995: 11–19). The number of languages a person knows can be foregrounded by referring for example to *bilingualism* or *trilingualism*; the contrast between bilingualism and multilingualism, however, is not relevant to the present study, and I will therefore use almost exclusively the latter term. Different subtypes of multilingualism may be distinguished in terms of the mode of acquisition (e.g. acquired in childhood vs. learned through formal education) and the degree of competence.[84] Stavans and Hoffmann (2015: 141), for example, distinguish as a separate category the group consisting of "either monolinguals who learn two languages in a school or other study context, or bilinguals who learn a third language primarily in an academic context". The King's School boys belong to this category; it is sometimes referred to as *learned* (or *academic*, *elite*) *multilingualism* (e.g. Bullock & Toribio 2009: 9; cf. Thomason 2001: 20–21; Myers-Scotton 2002: 35; Adams 2003: 9; Skaffari & Mäkilähde 2014: 261). In the present study I adopt a broad definition of multilingualism, in the spirit for example of Haugen (1953: 6–7; see also e.g. Diebold 1961: 99): a person is multilingual if he or she has competence in more than one language, and an utterance is multilingual if it contains components from more than one language. These loose definitions imply that a speaker's competence in other languages may be extremely limited. It is enough if the speaker is able to make use of the language, at however elementary a level: to produce a few sentences, to understand it passively to some degree, to be able to analyse its structures but not participate in everyday conversations, and so on.

The central concept for the present study is *code-switching* (CS).[85] It has been defined for example as "the juxtaposition within the same speech exchange of

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[84] Dabène and Moore distinguish between *complementary bilingualism*, where speakers "use elements from two languages […] in order to compensate for the insufficient mastery of either code", and *functional bilingualism*, where the speakers "use elements from both languages as a discourse strategy that allows stylistic or pragmatic differences" (1995: 37). These could more appropriately be described as two different ways of accounting for a speaker's use of multiple languages (cf. 3.1.4 below).

[85] Both forms are used in the present study for the sake of variety. Using only the abbreviation hides distinctions such as the one between *code-switching* (i.e. a process or a strategy) and *a code-switch* (i.e. a form or the product of that process).

passages belonging to two different grammatical systems or subsystems" (Gumperz 1982: 59), "the use of more than one language in the course of a single communicative episode" (Heller 1988: 1), "the alternation of languages within a conversation" (Matras 2009: 101; cf. Myers-Scotton 2002: 44), "the ability on the part of bilinguals to alternate effortlessly between their two languages" (Bullock & Toribio 2009: 1), "[t]he mixing of languages within one communicative event (or stretch of discourse/text), be it spoken or written" (Schendl & Wright 2011: 23), and "the mixing of two or more languages in discourse" (Poplack 2015: 918). I first discuss some aspects of these definitions, and the connotations of the term itself.

First, there is the notion of *code*.[86] Gumperz's definition, as cited above, also covers switching between different varieties of the same language, such as dialects or registers (cf. e.g. Blom & Gumperz 1972; Ramat 1995; Romaine 1995: 121), while the other definitions cited do not mention this explicitly. Switching between varieties of a single language is sometimes also referred to as *style-switching* or *style-shifting* (see e.g. Labov 1972: 208; cf. Ramat 1995: 46; Auer 1995: 117). In the present context, *code* may be defined broadly as a linguistic system, covering at least languages and dialects, probably also registers.[87] Especially from the point of view of pragmatics, this seems to be the desired definition, since it is evident that switching for example from one dialect to another can be used for many of the same functions as switching from one language to another (on the same question from a broader perspective, cf. Weinreich [1953] 1963: 1). Although Milroy and Muysken (1995: 4) argue that "switching between languages is much more visible than the style-shifting characteristic of the monolingual speaker", this does not entail that the phenomena are pragmatically different (cf. Romaine 1995: 143). In fact, even switches at a level below full linguistic systems can be pragmatically similar to code-switching, such as switching between two different 'communicative modes';[88] an example might be speaking English with a fake French accent.[89] From a pragmatic point of view, code-switching can therefore be described as the use of two

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[86] For the metaphor of language as a code in general, see e.g. Leech & Short (2007: 95–100).

[87] All of these terms refer to non-discrete entities, in the sense that the difference between a language and a dialect is vague, as is the difference between two dialects or two languages, and so on (cf. Paul [1920] 1975: 37–38). This vagueness, however, does not mean that there is no distinction at all (see 3.1.3. below).

[88] This term should not be understood as coterminous with *discourse mode*, which may be used in a quite different sense (see e.g. Smith 2003: 8).

[89] Cf. Gumperz (1982: 68; final emphasis added): "There are some marginal cases where phonologically unassimilated items from a high prestige foreign language are inserted as marked expressions into an otherwise monolingual passage. […] Here speakers may pronounce *grande* with French-like nasalization or emphasize the fricative *r* in *savoir* and thus by conscious use of foreign sounds suggest refinement or ridicule. *The semantic effect here is similar to that of code switching*".

discernible linguistic systems, each of which has some kind of 'indexing potential' as a choice (cf. e.g. Myers-Scotton 2002: 23).[90] Choices between such systems can be indices for example of social group, region, or social class (see e.g. Anttila 1989: xii, xv). This presupposes that the addressee is aware that the speaker has made a *choice* between several options, and that the different choices can convey pragmatic meaning. It should be noted that an action may have 'indexing potential' without there being several choices available to the speaker, as in the case of a learner who has a strong non-native accent and is unable to suppress it consistently. His accent is certainly an index of his non-native status, but since there is no meaningful choice involved, it would probably be misleading to characterize the accent itself as an example of CS. From the point of view of the addressee or a bystander, however, both CS and a non-native accent may convey information about the speaker. This point will be discussed further in 3.1.3.

Second, the idea of 'switching' has also been interpreted in various ways (see e.g. Gardner-Chloros 2009: 11–12). One pertinent question concerns where the switch has to occur to count as CS, a question which is relevant for determining the possible scope of the 'maximal unit' of switching (e.g. phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph, text). Many of the definitions mentioned above contain a reference to a *communicative event* (or something similar), during which the alternation between languages or varieties has to occur in order to count as CS; they do not, however, always clarify what counts as a single communicative event. When we move to written discourse, the matter becomes even more complicated. Schendl and Wright (2011: 23–24) equate the event with "a stretch of discourse/text", adding that when the language switches between two texts within a single manuscript, it does not count as CS. In some genres or text-types, such as letters, it may be fairly simple to identify instances of CS, since each letter constitutes one communicative event. It is, however, unclear how we ought to view a situation where person A sends a letter to person B in one language and later in another; Pahta and Nurmi (2009: 29), for example, treat this as an instance of CS. Similarly problematic cases are those involving the use of different languages in different parts of a single text: using a different language in footnotes or titles, in comments written by a reader, or in marginal additions (see e.g. Skaffari 2018), books with parallel texts in different languages, bilingual inscriptions, or the use of several languages on a map (see e.g. Mäkilähde 2016). In some of these cases, the different languages are not 'in contact with' each other, and different people may even have produced the parts in different languages (for *bilingual texts*, see Adams & Swain 2002: 7). The situation is in some

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[90]   A similar idea seems to be suggested in Gumperz's variant definition of switching as a "pragmatic or perhaps stylistic phenomenon in which verbal sequences are chunked into contrastable units" (1982: 90).

ways similar for example to a conversation in which different people use different languages.

As the discussion thus far indicates, the term *code-switching* is in some ways problematic; it has therefore been proposed from time to time that the term should be abandoned and replaced by something else (see e.g. Gardner-Chloros 1995). One of the main reasons for the multiplicity of incompatible definitions may be that different areas of research are trying to operate with the same conceptual and terminological apparatus. A solution to this problem would be to operate with explicitly different definitions depending on the field in question, or to use different terminology; for example, the concept of CS may be understood differently in syntactic and pragmatic studies (cf. e.g. the difference between an imperative and a command, or an interrogative and a question); however, since almost all previous research refers to code-switching, I will use the term in the present study, even though I am not interested merely in CS in its narrowest sense. One of the main aims of the study is to determine why people use more than one language in a single act of communication, or choose to use a particular language depending on the situation; the object of research is therefore more properly understood as the *choices* made by language users (whether 'consciously' or 'unconsciously') and the *consequences* of those choices. Despite the central role of choice, *language choice* and *language selection* are marginal terms in the literature, while other terms such as *code-switching*, *language alternation*, and *code-mixing* are common.[91] This reflects the fact that under the general concept of *language choice*, we are dealing with related but different and distinguishable phenomena. It may also be noted that many models of CS are applicable to these related phenomena as well; they are not exclusively theories of code-switching. In sum: although in the following section reference is made most of the time to CS, the focus of the study is on the broader concept of language choice, and a distinction between these two types of actions will be maintained whenever relevant.

Finally, I add a note on researching CS in historical texts in particular. On the one hand, some researchers claim that CS is essentially a phenomenon belonging to spoken language (see e.g. Sankoff 1998a: 40).[92] On the other hand, it has been suggested that existing theories and methods, developed primarily for the analysis of spoken discourse, are insufficient for the analysis of written CS, and that new theories, models and methods therefore need to be developed specifically for this

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[91] For a general discussion of the choice vs. switching dichotomy, see e.g. Gardner-Chloros (1991: 36–44).

[92] If CS is seen only as a spoken phenomenon, one may ask what to make of the abundance of written multilingual discourse. There is no denying that from a psycholinguistic point of view there are differences in the way the two types of discourse are produced, but this of course does not apply to CS exclusively but to language use in general.

purpose (see e.g. Schendl & Wright 2011: 29; Sebba 2012; Schendl 2012: 40). Clearly, specific features of written language in particular, such as the use of language-independent symbols (see e.g. Voigts 1989), visual features, and layout (see e.g. Pahta 2012), need to be taken into account. A desideratum for the whole field would nevertheless be the construction of theories and models able to account for both written and spoken CS (cf. Mäkilähde 2013). The same argument applies to the use of data from earlier time periods. Over the past few decades, researchers have shown growing interest in the multilingualism of the past and in multilingual texts produced in earlier societies.[93] Sometimes the use of multiple languages is approached in terms of a different concept, such as *macaronic text* (e.g. Wenzel 1994; Fletcher 2009). Settings analysed in earlier research have been in particular the ancient world (see e.g. Wenskus 1998; Adams 2003; and the papers in Adams, Janse & Swain, eds., 2002) and earlier stages of English (see e.g. the papers in Trotter, eds., 2000; Schendl & Wright, eds., 2011; Pahta, Skaffari & Wright, eds., 2018). As with spoken and written CS, an adequate framework for the analysis of multilingual language use should be able to accommodate both contemporary and historical data. In order to emphasize the similarities of written and spoken CS as well as historical and present-day CS, I do not for the most part treat them separately in the present work. For example, although most of the existing theories and models of CS are based on modern (spoken) data, I illustrate the following discussion at various points with examples drawn from the dataset of the present study.

3.1.2   Describing the forms of code-switching

Research on the syntax of CS seeks to understand how languages may be combined to form structural wholes. This can consist of the classification of switching into different structural and formal categories, or the identification of constraints on permitted switch-sites (i.e. determining which switches are grammatical or ungrammatical etc.). Although the latter is arguably the main concern in syntactic research on CS, the focus in the present study is on the reasons for CS; I therefore do not attempt to test the predictions of various syntactic models of CS.[94] Instead, I focus on a selection of different ways to describe the forms of CS, since the conceptual and terminological apparatus is needed in the textual analyses.

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[93]   An early example of a study addressing CS in particular is Stolt's (1965) work on Luther's *Tischreden*.

[94]   I discuss the methodological basis of syntactic research on CS in Mäkilähde (in press).

One of the main formal distinctions drawn in previous research is between *intrasentential* and *intersentential* code-switching.[95] The former refers to switching within a single clause or sentence, including switching between the morphemes of a single lexical item, while the latter refers to switching between two clauses or sentences (see e.g. Myers-Scotton 1993a: 3–4; Romaine 1995: 122–123). Sometimes these main categories are further subdivided, or the main division may be made in some other manner. Poplack (1980; 2015), for example, distinguishes between intrasentential and *extrasentential* CS; the latter includes on the one hand elements which are full clauses or other major constituents (for example quotations), on the other *tags*, "freely moveable constituents which may be inserted almost anywhere in the sentence without fear of violating any grammatical rules" (Poplack 1980: 589). Examples include discourse particles such as *you know* and *or whatever* in English.[96] Tag switching falls somewhere between inter- and intrasentential CS, since it may occur outside a full clause (*Je suis anglais*, *you know*) or within it (*Je suis, you know, anglais*). Poplack (1980: 589–590, 605) also provides a functional characterization of two switching patterns in terms of these categories: *intimate* code-switching consists of intrasentential switching, and is claimed to be more complex and favoured by more fluent bilinguals, while *emblematic* code-switching consists of tag-switching and single-noun switching, and is claimed to be simpler and favoured by less fluent bilinguals; intersentential switching falls somewhere in the middle (see also e.g. Romaine 1995: 123; for a contrary view, see Myers-Scotton 1993a: 71 fn. 6).[97]

The most basic way of describing the structure of intrasentential switching patterns is to note which units or constituents are switched, and at what point in a larger unit the switch appears. The following example from the *Orationes* manuscript may be used for illustration (spelling and diacritical marks as in the original):

(1)   Aut etiam similis ijs, qui cum οὐδε γράμματα sciunt, οὐδε νεῖν, nec summo aquam pede tetigerunt: tamen […]

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[95] A distinction is sometimes maintained between CS and *code-mixing*, where the former refers to intersentential and the latter to intrasentential CS (for discussion see e.g. Gardner-Chloros 2009: 12–13; Stavans & Hoffmann 2015: 177–181).

[96] Matras (2009: 136–144) uses the term *utterance modifier* in reference to a more general group of items, including discourse markers, interjections, tags, and phasal adverbs (i.e. adverbs meaning for example 'already' or 'still').

[97] Although Milroy and Muysken (1995: 8) note that the terms *tag switching*, *extrasentential switching* and *emblematic switching* are used in reference to the same concept, they are not in fact completely synonymous.

> 'Or they are similar to those who know *neither the letters nor how to swim and have not touched water with the tip of their foot, and yet [...]*'
>
> (*Certamen Doctrinale*, f. 89v)

The relevant part of the example consists of the two coordinated clauses where the subject (*qui*) and both verbs (*sciunt*, *tetigerunt*) are in Latin, while the object in the first clause is in Greek (οὐδὲ γράμματα, οὐδὲ νεῖν). At one level of analysis, then, the switching takes place between the verb and the object. At another level, the switched part consists of the conjunction (particle) οὐδέ repeated, the noun γράμματα (pl.acc.), and the verb νεῖν (act.inf.pres.). Finally, switch-sites can be described according to their 'surface' position. One informal way to describe this level would be $Pro_L + Conj_L + Conj_G + N_G + V_L + Conj_G + V_G + Conj_L + Clause_L$. According to this analysis, there are two separate switches from Latin to Greek and back. The relevance of any of these levels depends on the purpose of the description, and they are also present to varying degrees in different models of CS syntax. In addition to the ordering of units, it is also relevant to consider their other properties, such as agreement and government (in the traditional school-grammar sense of these terms); in example (1), this is relevant for the relationship between the verb and the object NP, whose case is governed by the verb.

Although both constituent ordering and grammatical relations are relevant for any model of CS syntax, they have been emphasized in various ways in different approaches. For example, most of the informal constraints proposed by Gumperz (1976; 1982: 86–91) focus on establishing which constituents may be switched and at what points. Similarly, the two constraints proposed by Poplack (1980) focus on the surface form. According to *the free morpheme constraint*, "[c]odes may be switched after any constituent in discourse provided that constituent is not a bound morpheme" (Poplack 1980: 585–586). In effect, this constraint implies that if an L2 bound morpheme occurs with an L1 bound morpheme, the whole word is produced phonologically as an L1 or L2 item.[98] *The equivalence constraint* states that "[c]ode-switches will tend to occur at points in discourse where juxtaposition of L1 and L2 elements does not violate a syntactic rule of either language" (Poplack 1980: 586). For example, if the word order in L1 is 'modifier-head' and in L2 'head-modifier', then switching between these two constituents tends not to occur.[99] Since the marking of a function differs in the grammars of the two languages, this particular context would constitute a *conflict site* (see Poplack & Meechan 1998: 132).

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[98]   A similar claim is made by MacSwan (e.g. 1999; 2005) in the formulation of the PF Disjunction Theorem.

[99]   For formalizations of the equivalence constraint, see Sankoff & Poplack (1981); Sankoff (1998a; 1998b).

Grammatical relations are prominent in many other models of CS syntax, in particular those which rely on different versions of Generative Grammar, such as Government and Binding (e.g. Di Sciullo, Muysken & Singh 1986; Halmari 1997) or Minimalism (e.g. MacSwan 1999; 2014). Perhaps the best-known model developed specifically to account for the syntax of CS is Myers-Scotton's (1993a; 2002) Matrix Language Frame (MLF) model. The model proposes a distinction between the *matrix language* (ML), or 'main' language, and the *embedded language* (EL), which is the other language participating in CS (Myers-Scotton 1993a: 3; 2002: 66). The ML sets the abstract morphosyntactic frame for the clause; there can thus be multiple ELs but only one ML within a single clause.[100] The MLF model classifies CS data in terms of three constituent types: (i) *ML islands* and (ii) *EL islands* consist of morphemes exclusively from one language, are "well-formed in their language", and "show structural dependency relations", while (iii) *mixed constituents* consist of morphemes from more than one language (Myers-Scotton 2002: 57–58). An island may be a single lexeme, but it must consist of at least two morphemes in order to exhibit internal dependency relations. In example (1), there are Greek EL islands within a larger mixed constituent (which contains the Latin subject pronoun, verb, and conjunction); notably, the Greek nouns in themselves would be analysed as EL islands, since they consist of multiple morphemes and show internal dependency relations (e.g. the form of the suffix is determined by features of the noun).

Finally, another way to describe the forms of CS is presented by Muysken (2000) in terms of three different processes: *insertion*, *alternation*, and *congruent lexicalization*. In *insertion* an element from one language is embedded within the structure of another, while in *alternation* two separate structures from different languages are juxtaposed, without one of them being set within the frame of the other; the former is seen as characteristic of the mixed constituents in the MLF model, the latter in how Poplack's constraints operate (Muysken 2000: 3–4). Congruent lexicalization "refers to a situation where the two languages share a grammatical structure which can be filled with elements from either language" (Muysken 2000: 6). If we were to describe example (1) as a case of congruent lexicalization, we would probably justify this interpretation by arguing that Latin and Greek share a structure, since they mark the direct object of a verb the same way; further support for this could presumably be offered by noting that *sciunt* could be replaced with ἐπιστώνται without affecting the correctness of the structure.

To sum up: there are various ways to describe CS structures even at a fairly informal or pre-theoretical level. While the focus in the present study is not on the

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[100] In updated versions of the model, the basic unit of analysis has been changed from clause/sentence to CP (projection of Complementizer) (see Myers-Scotton 2002: 54–57 for discussion). A CP is "a complementizer or an element in Specifier (Spec) position followed by an IP" (Myers-Scotton 2002: 55).

morpho-syntactic dimension, these categories are relevant for example in identifying individual instances of CS for statistical purposes.

3.1.3   Code-switching vs. borrowing

In this section, I discuss the relationship between code-switching and borrowing. The distinction between these two phenomena is not only relevant from a theoretical point of view, but there is a practical aspect as well: in order to analyse how and why a particular strategy is used, we must first be able to identify what that strategy is, and to distinguish it from related phenomena.[101] In research on code-switching, the most problematic cases are those involving single insertional lexemes: in brief, depending on the level of integration in a particular context, a form may be analysed as either a switch (less integrated) or a borrowing (more integrated). My main arguments in this section are as follows:

1. CS and borrowing may be analysed as being situated on two separate continua, a synchronic one and a diachronic one.

2. The distinction between CS and borrowing should be maintained because in addition to unclear or 'fuzzy' instances, there are also clear cases of both phenomena.

3. From the perspective of pragmatics, more important than the distinction between switching and borrowing can be whether a given form indicates 'foreignness' or not, and both CS and borrowing can be employed for this purpose.

The section proceeds as follows: I first discuss earlier views on the problem and illustrate it by introducing the notion of two related continua. I then discuss criteria which have been proposed for distinguishing CS from borrowing, and test the applicability of a set of general criteria by applying them to 'grey area' cases drawn from the dataset of the present study to illustrate the problems they pose. Finally, I

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[101]   Weinreich ([1953] 1963) presents a similar argument from a more general contact-linguistic perspective. Poplack, Sankoff and Miller (1988: 52–53) maintain that "[m]ethodological difficulties in distinguishing single borrowed words in context from single code-switched items further complicate the description of patterns of bilingual behavior. The consequences for a theory of bilingualism of systematically mistaking code-switching for borrowing or vice-versa are even more serious". Similarly, Sankoff (1998a: 41) notes that "attempts to understand code-switching based on a mixture of borrowing and true switching data […] are doomed to be unwieldy at best and descriptively inadequate". According to Myers-Scotton (1993a: 165), "before attempting to deal with CS, the researcher needs to have resolved the issue of whether and how to distinguish CS and B forms". Cf. also Poplack & Dion (2012); Poplack (2015).

argue that, from the point of view of function-oriented approaches in general, more important than the distinction between CS and borrowing can be whether a given form indicates for example *foreignness*. Accordingly, I introduce the concept of *foreignness-foregrounded items* and propose additional criteria for their identification. I conclude with a brief discussion of the methodological implications of my argument.

3.1.3.1   Identifying the continua

Borrowing can be defined as transferring a form, typically a lexical item, from one linguistic system to another (cf. Haugen 1953: 362–363; Anttila 1989: 104, 154); the outcome of this process is a *borrowing* or a *loan*. A distinction is often drawn between *cultural borrowings* and *core borrowings*: the former are "words for objects and concepts new to the culture", the latter "words that more or less duplicate already existing words in the L1" (Myers-Scotton 2002: 41; cf. Anttila 1989: 155; Myers-Scotton 1993a: 169). The main difference here is the reason for borrowing: in the former case the need to refer to novel concepts, in the latter the wish to produce a particular effect (e.g. an air of prestige). In addition to lexical items, borrowed items may be for example sounds, or even spelling (e.g. EModE *debt* vs. ME *dette*; the source of the pronunciation is Old French *dette*, the source of the spelling Latin *debitum*; see e.g. Anttila 1989: 42). Semantic borrowing may take the form of loan translations or calques (e.g. Finnish *kuppikakku* from English *cupcake*; here both parts of the Finnish compound are themselves borrowings). The source of the borrowed item is typically another language, but the process is essentially the same when the source is a dialect or an earlier stage of the same language (cf. Paul [1920] 1975: 403). Anttila also notes that "[t]he spread of any feature is borrowing as long as it happens" (1989: 154), which highlights a crucial terminological problem: according to the traditional view, a word has been borrowed into a language when it has become sufficiently widespread; since the spread of a word, however, is essentially borrowing as well, a distinction needs to be maintained between borrowing *from the point of view of the linguistic system* and *from the point of view of the individual*. This matter will be explored further below.

   It is clear that borrowing and code-switching are related and partly overlapping phenomena. It has often been suggested that they are situated on a continuum, or as I would rather argue, on two separate but related continua: a *synchronic continuum* and a *diachronic* one. To focus first on the former: it refers to seeing code-switching and borrowing as related activities, and their end-products (i.e. switches and borrowings, or CS and B forms) as related elements (e.g. Myers-Scotton 1993a: 163

and *passim*; Kalliokoski 1995: 4; Haspelmath 2009: 40–42; Matras 2009: 110–114). The synchronic continuum is illustrated schematically in Figure 1.

Figure 1.   Synchronic continuum between CS and B forms.

One way to understand this continuum is in terms of the degree of integration of a particular form, regardless of its level of diffusion in the speech community. For example, in a present-day scholarly paper discussing the concept of *techne*, the form could be produced as more clearly Greek (i.e. towards the CS end of the continuum) as τέχνη and inflected accordingly – in particular by using τέχναι as the plural form – or it could be integrated into English by using the Latin alphabet and for example an English determiner (and at least in theory one might use *technes* as the plural form). Variant forms with vowel-length indicated by an accent (e.g. *technê*) would fall towards the middle of the continuum.

On the basis of the synchronic continuum, some researchers have reached the conclusion that both CS and borrowing should be subsumed under some more general category. For example, Winford (2010: 182) suggests that "the distinction between a switch and a borrowing is not transparent to bilinguals", and that "[i]t seems best […] to treat lexical switches and lexical borrowing under [recipient language] agentivity".[102] In a similar vein, Gardner-Chloros (2010: 195) has argued that "[t]here is no failsafe method of distinguishing, at a *synchronic* level, between loans and code-switches" (cf. e.g. Stroud 1992: 149; Myers-Scotton 2002: 153). Even more dramatically, Eastman (1992: 1) maintains that "efforts to distinguish codeswitching, codemixing and borrowing are doomed".

The opposite conclusion, namely that these different strategies are related but clearly separate and distinguishable, has also been reached by several researchers (see e.g. Myers-Scotton 1993a; Poplack & Meechan 1998; Poplack & Dion 2012; Poplack 2015). Sankoff, Poplack and Vanniarajan (1990: 72), for example, propose that CS and borrowing are different processes, although they may have similar outcomes (cf. e.g. Grosjean 1995). Similarly, Poplack and Dion (2012: 296) claim on the basis of an extensive corpus investigation that "when speakers access a lone other-language item, they make an instantaneous decision about whether to treat it as a borrowing or a code-switch". This question will be discussed further in conjunction with the concept of *nonce borrowings* and the criteria for distinguishing

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[102]   For an in-depth argument see Winford (2005). His approach is based on a distinction introduced by van Coetsem (1988).

between CS and borrowing. The point of view presented by researchers in this second group is thus that the synchronic continuum reflects only the surface manifestation of CS and B forms, not necessarily the processes which produce them.

I next focus on the *diachronic continuum*. Myers-Scotton (1993a: 163), *inter alia*, argues that code-switching and borrowing "are part of the same developmental continuum"; similar views have also been put forward by many others (e.g. Weinreich [1953] 1963: 11, Romaine 1995: 124; Haspelmath 2009: 40–42; Schendl 2018: 47; cf. also Paul [1920] 1975: 393–394).[103] The idea is that a form may be used first as an L2 item in L1 contexts (CS form), but that at some point people begin to use it in L1 contexts as an L1 item (B form), probably with at least partial integration (see below); eventually, the form becomes part of the L1 system. The process is illustrated schematically in Figure 2.

Figure 2.   Diachronic continuum between CS and B forms.

Accordingly, we might say for example that when the word *pork* first appeared in English contexts, it may have been used as a switch (i.e. a French word), while in Present-Day English (PDE), the word is clearly a borrowing (i.e. an English word). For the historical linguist interested in language change, this is a sufficient starting point, since it is only after we have clearly left the 'grey area' that it is justifiable to speak of borrowing in the sense of change in the *language system shared by the speakers* (i.e. *langue*).[104] However, for the synchronic linguist, as well as the philologist or pragmatician, the most problematic cases are in fact those where the 'grey areas' of these two continua overlap. In those cases it is unclear in particular, which language is the one according to whose norms a particular item has been formed/used (see Mäkilähde in press). Problems are also caused by forms occupying a position towards one end on the synchronic continuum and towards the other on the diachronic continuum (i.e. novel and integrated vs. established and unintegrated). These will be discussed in the following subsection.

It seems clear, then, that code-switching and borrowing are indeed analysable in terms of these two continua. Before demonstrating their applicability in practice, it is worth first considering very briefly the concept of a *continuum* in general. In

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[103]   Poplack, Sankoff and Miller (1988: 50) argue for a similar continuum between momentary loans and established loans (see the discussion of nonce borrowing below).

[104]   The claim that "all loans must start as code-switches" (Gardner-Chloros 1991: 64) similarly emphasizes the perspective of the language system, not the individual language user. For language change as change in the norms of a language, see e.g. Itkonen (2008a: 295–297); Leppänen (in press).

particular, the application of a continuum entails the existence of both *clear cases* and *unclear cases*. The following discussion by Itkonen (2006) illustrates this point:

> [One fallacy in linguistic argumentation] consists in *misunderstanding* the nature of a *continuum*, in the sense of not heeding Pap's (1958: 401) admonition that "to deny a distinction because of its vagueness is, of course, a semantic naiveté of the first order". Because A and B are situated on a continuum, it is impossible to state with precision where A ends and B begins. This is now taken to mean that there is no real distinction between A and B. Here we have the origin of the following misguided opinions: "there is no difference between clear cases and less-than-clear cases" […] This is the first step of the second fallacy […] Therefore it is further inferred that 'in reality' there is just B and *no A at all*. […] [This] underlies the following misguided opinions: "there are no clear cases but only less-than-clear cases" […].
>
> (Itkonen 2006: 123–124, boldface changed to italics)

In the context of the present topic, we could say, first, that although there is indeed a considerable 'grey area' of *unclear cases*, this does not mean that we are unable to distinguish between code-switching and borrowing in *clear cases*. Second, if one argues that it is always possible to decide mechanically whether a particular form is a B or a CS form, we are not in fact dealing with a continuum but a dichotomy.

The manner in which the concept of the continuum should be applied is best illustrated through examples. The following short excerpts are again derived from the *Orationes* texts. Examples (2) and (3) contain clear cases from opposite ends of the continua (i.e. clear cases of B and CS forms), while example (4) contains unclear cases from somewhere in the middle:

(2)   Give me pen and ink. I'll subscribe my name to it instantly.

(*Discipuli et Rustici*, f. 280v)

(3)   With whom I hope Art will haue soe much power, if our Natures cannot prevail, as to grant us a relief from our hard taskmaster, or as they call him in greek Ἐργοδιώκτης.

(*Certamen Doctrinale*, f. 93r)

(4)   Nay the Virtuosi, notwithstanding all their miracles, haue not yet alotted to them ten thousand pounds per Annum

(*Pueri Captivi*, f. 148v)

In example (2), the words *subscribe* and *instantly* could be given as clear-case examples of borrowing (the 'Englishness' of the originally French *instant* is perhaps even more evident due to the native suffix *-ly* attached to the root). The point is that these are English words with a Latin/French background, not merely anglicized Latin/French words or something intermediary: the norms which govern both the meanings of these forms and their behaviour in a sentence are part of the English language. It is irrelevant whether the speakers themselves knew that the words were borrowings, but those who had received an extensive education were presumably aware of this (especially in the case of *subscribe*). In example (3) we have a clear case of single-word code-switching from English to Greek in Ἐργοδιώκτης ('taskmaster'). Finally, in example (4) we have two unclear cases, namely *the Virtuosi* and *per Annum*. To clarify, the expressions discussed here are clear or unclear cases *with regard to the language of the expression*: for example, *subscribe* is clearly English, Ἐργοδιώκτης clearly Greek, and it is unclear whether *per Annum* is in this context Latin or English (or both at the same time). Similarly, *Virtuosi* might be considered either Italian or English (or both). Identifying an expression (as used in a particular context) as part of a particular linguistic system therefore *implies* that the expression is a clear case of either code-switching or borrowing. As the unclear cases demonstrate, not only individual lexemes but also larger units can cause problems; further examples include *Deus ex machina* in PDE and in earlier stages of the language, as well as such expressions as *mutatis mutandis*, *per se*, *an sich*, *à la*, *et cetera*, and so on (see below). The aim here has merely been to demonstrate that even from a synchronic perspective there are both clear and unclear cases; in fact, in such fields of research as philology, unclear cases simply have to be tolerated. The criteria for distinguishing between clear cases at opposite ends of the continua form the topic of the next subsection.

3.1.3.2   Criteria for distinguishing between code-switching and borrowing

Several different criteria for distinguishing between CS and B forms have been proposed in previous research. Since many linguistic items are modified in some way when they become loanwords (see e.g. Paul [1920] 1975: 393ff; Haugen 1953: 392ff; Anttila 1989: 156–158; cf. Myers-Scotton 2002: 42–43),[105] criteria have been

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[105]   Through integration, words gradually lose their 'foreign' status. For example, Paul ([1920] 1975: 393–394) describes this process as follows: "In dieser beschränkten Geltung bleiben viele Wörter, während andere sich auf alle Schichten der Bevölkerung verbreiten. Sind sie ganz allgemein üblich geworden und haben sie nicht etwa in ihrer Lautgestalt etwas Abnormes, so verhält sich das Sprachgefühl zu ihnen nicht anders als zu dem einheimischen Sprachgut. Vom Standpunkt des Sprachgefühls aus sind sie keine Fremdwörter mehr". Similarly, Whitney (1881: 16) remarks: "Whenever crude material of foreign origin is introduced by borrowing into the full vernacular use of a

proposed based on syntactic, morphological, and phonological integration (for discussion, see e.g. Poplack, Sankoff & Miller 1988; Sankoff, Poplack & Vanniarajan 1990; Poplack & Meechan 1998; cf. Gumperz 1982: 66). Semantic criteria may also be considered; they refer to the link between the corresponding items in the recipient and source language. The idea is basically that when a linguistic item has undergone semantic change or developed new meanings in recipient-language contexts, one could classify it as a loanword. If we consider the examples discussed above, EModE *subscribe* had gone through phonological and morphological integration, but its semantic meaning was still more or less the same as in Latin. An example of phonological integration and semantic change would be PDE *genius*, which acquired the meaning 'an exceptionally intelligent person' in the eighteenth century (*OED* 3, s.v. *genius*), probably according to the model provided by other languages, such as French. Note that although there is no overt morphological integration discernible in the form of the word itself, it has nevertheless been integrated into English since the word does not systematically take Latin inflections (cf. *millennium*, *millennia*; although the plural form has been borrowed as such into English, the singular genitive form is nevertheless not **millennii*). In addition to these grammar-focused factors, psycholinguistic criteria have also been proposed; they consist of determining whether a given form has become part of the mental lexicon of speakers of the recipient language (see Myers-Scotton 1993a: 163). Finally, a criterion of frequency has also been proposed, according to which a certain threshold needs to be reached before an element is considered part of a particular language (since this presumably indicates diffusion). It is easy to see that frequency and degree of integration are independent criteria, since a form may be integrated but appear only once (see especially Poplack & Dion 2012), while a frequently attested form may be completely unintegrated (cf. above). In the ideal case, a loanword would satisfy all of these criteria (cf. Poplack, Sankoff & Miller 1988: 52; Sankoff, Poplack & Vanniarajan 1990: 73).

Integration of borrowings brings us back to the issue mentioned above, namely borrowing from the point of view of the system and of the individual. Weinreich ([1953] 1963), for example, draws a distinction between interference in language and interference in speech,[106] corresponding roughly to the *langue* vs. *parole* distinction:

language, it becomes an integral part of that language, undistinguished, except to reflective and learned study, from the native material".

[106]   Weinreich ([1953] 1963: 1) defines interference as "[t]hose instances of deviation from the norms of either language which occur in the speech of bilinguals as a result of their familiarity with more than one language".

> In speech, it [i.e. interference] occurs anew in the utterances of the bilingual speaker as a result of his personal knowledge of the other tongue. In language, we find interference phenomena which, having frequently occurred in the speech of bilinguals, have become habitualized and established. Their use is no longer dependent on bilingualism. When a speaker of language *X* uses a form of foreign origin not as an on-the-spot borrowing from language *Y*, but because he has heard it used by others in *X*-utterances, then this borrowed element can be considered, from the descriptive viewpoint, to have become a part of *language X*.[107]
>
> (Weinreich [1953] 1963: 11; small caps changed to italics)

Interferences which occur in the bilingual's language use as 'on-the-spot borrowings' Weinreich calls *nonce borrowings*. This concept was later developed by Poplack and others in a number of publications. In an influential early study (Poplack 1980), she distinguished between code-switching and borrowing in terms of the degree of integration of the item into the recipient language: if a segment was integrated phonologically, morphologically, and syntactically, it was not analysed as a switch, while a lack of integration in any of these categories meant that the segment was analysed as CS (Poplack 1980: 584; see below on the irrelevance of phonological integration in later versions of the model).[108] The term *nonce borrowing* (or *momentary borrowing*) was later used to refer to those single lexemes which are drawn from L2 and are integrated at least partly into L1 without having become established (Poplack, Sankoff & Miller 1988).[109] In terms of the two continua introduced above, these forms would be synchronically close to the B end of the continuum, but diachronically close to the CS end.

The concept of nonce borrowing has attracted a considerable amount of discussion and criticism in previous research, and its status with regard to the criteria used to distinguish between CS and B forms is indeed important. The central argument (also known as the *nonce borrowing hypothesis*) is that nonce borrowings and established borrowings behave similarly and undergo similar integration,

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[107] Habitualization and establishment could also be described as conventionalization.

[108] In addition, certain borderline cases were excluded regardless of the degree of integration, including "segments which are repeated often enough in a certain language to be regarded as habitualized", items "designating food names, proper names and place names", "translations in response to requests for information", "segments [in one language] followed by an explanation [in the other language]", "switches accompanied by metalinguistic comments" and cases where "the interlocutor switches languages within the same discourse and the informant followed suit" (Poplack 1980: 598).

[109] The distinction between established and momentary borrowings is somewhat similar to that between *Lehnwörter* and *Fremdwörter* (see e.g. Haspelmath 2009: 43). Cf. also the notion of inkhorn terms in 2.1.2 above.

differing only in the frequency and acceptability of the forms and the degree of phonological integration (Poplack, Sankoff & Miller 1988: 93–96; cf. Gumperz 1982: 67).[110] Since there is considerable variation in the phonological integration of both established and novel borrowings (see Poplack 1988: 236; Poplack & Dion 2012), morphological and syntactic criteria are seen in most cases as the only reliable ones (Sankoff, Poplack & Vanniarajan 1990: 73; Poplack 2015). These arguments are production-based, in the sense that they aim at demonstrating that from the point of view of the mode of production, nonce borrowing is closer to the use of established borrowings than to CS; in other words, nonce borrowings are produced as L1 items, with possible phonological deviation (Poplack, Sankoff & Miller 1988: 93). Further evidence for this was provided in a study (Poplack & Dion 2012) which demonstrated that the morphological and syntactic integration of nonce borrowings did not increase with frequency (i.e. when they became more established); instead, they were integrated into the L1 from the first attestation onwards.

The concept of nonce borrowings has been criticized as being an *ad hoc* method for explaining away violations of the free morpheme constraint (discussed in 3.1.2 above), in other words for being an immunization strategy (e.g. Eliasson 1990: 44; Gardner-Chloros 1991: 63–64). Criticism has also been directed at its possible lack of explanatory value (e.g. Myers-Scotton 1993a: 181–182; see also Haspelmath 2009: 41; for replies to both types of criticism, see e.g. Poplack & Dion 2012; Poplack 2012). As for the nonce borrowing hypothesis, one noteworthy problem is that it remains unclear what kind of data would falsify it (see e.g. the counterexamples proposed in Stammers & Deuchar 2012, and the following discussion by Poplack 2012 and Deuchar & Stammers 2012). The challenge is that testing the hypothesis requires large diachronic corpora; this does not of course mean that the concept itself is unsuitable for analysing small datasets, as some forms can still be found to be more established than others.

Another type of approach is offered by Matras (2009: 111–113), who proposes a set of criteria on several separate continua. The seven criteria are the following, with the two ends of each continuum indicated in brackets: *bilinguality* (used by bilinguals vs. used by monolinguals), *composition* (complex structure vs. single lexeme), *functionality* (special effect vs. default form), *specificity* (generic referent vs. unique referent), *operationality* (core lexicon item vs. grammatical operation), *regularity* (hapax vs. regular), and *structural integration* (non-integrated vs. integrated). Matras sums up the idea behind these continua (and the 'clear cases' they give rise to) as follows:

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[110] Orthographic integration of borrowings may similarly be variable (cf. e.g. Dahlgren 2017).

> The prototypical, least controversial kind of borrowing thus involves the regular occurrence of a structurally integrated, single lexical item that is used as a default expression, often a designation for a unique referent or a grammatical marker, in a monolingual context. The least controversial codeswitch is an alternational switch at the utterance level, produced by a bilingual consciously and by choice, as a single occurrence, for special stylistic effects. In-between the two we encounter fuzzy ground. Note, however, that the potential for fuzziness is largely limited to bilinguals.
>
> (Matras 2009: 113–114)

Using several different criteria, each of which forms a separate continuum, is a considerable improvement over previous methods, although there are some problems with this approach as well. First, as the above quotation indicates, not all the continua are applicable to the same extent in every case; for example, the regularity and functionality criteria are connected to a certain extent, since a hapax presumably cannot be the default form, and so on. Second, some of the parameters, particularly regularity and structural integration, may be difficult to determine in dealing with historical material and dead languages (see below; cf. Meecham-Jones 2011: 260). Nevertheless, the bundle of criteria aptly describes the types of items which would fall at the two opposite ends of the CS-borrowing continuum (see also Schendl 2018: 49–50).

Finally, I mention strategies adopted in individual studies where a distinction needed to be made one way or another, particularly to quantify CS. For example, in her study on the use of Alsatian and French in Strasbourg, Gardner-Chloros (1991) applied the following method:

> In this analysis single words originating in [variety] A but commonly and widely used, even by monolinguals in [variety] B, were classed as loans and left out of the subsequent analysis of switching. In order to determine which these were, all single lexical items which stood out as switches in the transcriptions were listed, and three bilingual Strasbourgeois judges were asked to assign these items to one of three categories: loans, switches, or in-between (loans in some speakers' repertoires but code-switches in others'). […] In order not to overestimate the amount of code-switching, only words which were classed as switches by two out of the three judges were counted as such.
>
> (Gardner-Chloros 1991: 162–163)

From a theoretical point of view, the criteria applied here amount to Matras's bilinguality and regularity criteria. It should be noted, however, that external judges cannot necessarily know whether the *interactants themselves* regarded the relevant

items as instances of CS or borrowing *in the particular contexts* where they were used.

Myers-Scotton's (1993a: 204–205) proposed method for identifying code-switches is quite similar. First, those items which occurred in at least three different conversations were counted as clear cases of borrowing (1993a: 204; she admits that "three is an arbitrary number").[111] Second, all items which could be analysed as cultural borrowings were excluded; the remaining items were then counted as code-switches. In terms of Matras's model, these represent the regularity and functionality criteria. According to these criteria, the above-mentioned *per annum* would be a clear case of borrowing, which I suggest it is not. The rationale for using relative frequency to distinguish between CS and B forms was that, according to Myers-Scotton (1993a: 163), "B forms become part of the mental lexicon of the ML, while CS forms do not". It is not clear, however, how one might ascertain that a particular form has entered the ML mental lexicon of every speaker who uses a particular form. Furthermore, since Myers-Scotton argues that "*some* cultural B forms may enter the ML first as CS forms […] and *some* core B forms may enter abruptly" (1993a: 176; emphasis in the original), the reliability of frequency as an independent criterion is diminished; it should be considered in combination with other heuristics, such as the ones discussed above.

To better illustrate the problems that arise with all the above-mentioned general criteria (phonological, morphological, semantic, psycholinguistic, frequency-based) I briefly discuss two 'grey area' cases encountered in the *Orationes* manuscript, the words *imprimis* and *item*. Both are quite problematic, and it is not at all clear whether they should be analysed as B or CS forms. Example (5) occurs in the dialogue section of a Christmas performance, *Discipuli et Rustici*, during a scene where three country bumpkins (Blunt, Knobbs, and Trunks) take part in performing a play (i.e. a 'play within a play', similar for example to *A Midsummer Night's Dream*). Blunt plays the part of a Justice of the Peace, Knobbs that of his assistant. Trunks, who plays the part of a man who had failed to raise his cap when passing by the Justice of the Peace, has been called to appear before Blunt, and now Knobbs is reading out his sentence:

(5)   **Kn[obbs]:** Imprimis for contempt of authority, You are adjudged by the Statute De scandalo Magnatum equorum ['concerning slander against magnates' horses] made anno domini Guilielmi imperatoris octavo, vigesimo quarto die Novembris Quadragintesimoq[ue] ['in the eighth year of Emperor William, on the twenty-fourth day of November and the four-hundreth'] to sit in the Town pidgeon holes like a Stock dove until you hatch a brood of better manners – Item for being overtaken with a cup of

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[111]   This method has also been applied for example by Jones (2005).

> Nimis ['excess'], your penance is to drink nothing but, fair water as long as the discretion of your Magistrate shall think fitting. Lastly for being a Swearer.
>
> (*Discipuli et Rustici*, f. 291v)

In addition to *imprimis* and *item*, the example contains the single Latin lexeme *nimis* as well as the prepositional phrase *de scandalo Magnatum equorum* and the temporal adverbial phrase *anno domini Guilielmi imperatoris octavo, vigesimo quarto die Novembris Quadragintesimoque*. At least these two longer phrases are clear cases of Latin.

To begin with, morphological and phonological criteria seem inconclusive.[112] First, while the more transparent form for *imprimis* would be *in primis*, the form with regressive assimilation of the nasal and the reduction of the form to a single lexeme was regular already in Classical Latin. Second, English-Latin bilinguals were undoubtedly able to analyse the lexeme into its components, and the fact that it is used as a single lexeme in English contexts thus does not prove anything one way or the other. Concerning *item* there is little to be said, since nothing in the spelling indicates whether the form had been integrated or not. Semantically, as a listing item with the meaning 'first' (as opposed to 'second' or 'third'), *imprimis* is somewhat different from its Classical Latin counterpart, which had the meanings 'among the first, principally, especially, in the first place'; it only acquired the listing function in Late and Medieval Latin (Löfstedt 1959: 111–112). The listing function is nevertheless not an English innovation. Although *item* as a marker of enumeration (in Classical Latin in the meaning 'secondly') is presumably derived from its original meaning 'likewise', the later meaning is basically identical with this, as every new item in a list marks an addition; in other words, no clear semantic change is detectable here either.

As far as frequency and attestation are concerned, both items had been used in English contexts for a considerable time before the seventeenth century. The first attestation of *imprimis* in the *Oxford English Dictionary* (*OED* 2, s.v. *imprimis*, adv.) is from 1465, the final from 1860 (although the two earliest attestations are in the form *in primis*); if it was a borrowing at any point during this time, it has ceased to be one, since it is not part of PDE. *Item* is attested slightly earlier (*OED* 2, s.v. *item*, adv. and n.), the first instance of the adverb dating from 1398, the latest from 1806; the noun *item*, of course, survives in PDE.[113] A search of the *Helsinki Corpus of English Texts* yields only a single instance of *imprimis* (used there in an English

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112   There are of course obvious problems in analysing the degree of phonological integration of forms in written texts (see further below).

113   On some of the problems in using dictionaries as evidence for CS/B status, see e.g. Kopaczyk (2013); Barros (2018).

context) in the EModE period, while *item* yields 19 hits in four texts, all in English contexts.[114] A keyword search of *EEBO*, limiting the results to English texts, resulted in 1844 hits in 1108 records for *imprimis* and 40457 hits in 4332 records for *item*.[115] Notwithstanding the crudeness of such a search method – for example, possible nouns cannot be automatically eliminated from the results, many of the hits are bound to occur in Latin contexts within mainly English texts, and many of the English texts are actually duplicates – both forms seem to have been common. In other words, they are not nonce borrowings in the *Orationes* texts.

Finally, psycholinguistic criteria are impossible to apply reliably, since we cannot perform genuine tests – although we might rely on indirect evidence, such as the treatment of the particular words in contemporary dictionaries.[116] In Elisha Coles's (1677) dictionary of 'hard words', *imprimis* is derived from Latin, with the English translation "first of all". Phillips (1658) does not include either word, but the lemma *imprimings* (i.e. 'beginnings') is explained thus: "from the Latin *Imprimis*, i.e. first of all, a word used in the beginnings of Inventories, or Catalogues of goods". The same lemma is mentioned by Blount (1661). In Sir Thomas Elyot's Latin dictionary (1538), English translations are provided for both *in primis* ("chiefly, specially, aboue al other thinges") and *item* ("in lyke maner, so, also, euen as, afterward"); he does not mention their listing functions. This type of evidence is fairly complicated and difficult to interpret, but in this case it points more towards the 'grey area' status of both items.

To sum up: we can conclude that, in the *Orationes* texts, *imprimis* and *item* lie in the 'grey area' on both the diachronic and the synchronic continua. Since, however, the focus in the present study is on the reasons for using these forms and on their consequences, another way to interpret the situation presents itself. As discussed above in 2.1, Latin was for a long time one of the languages of law in Britain; in particular, collections of statutes would have been in Latin at least up to the early modern period. Latin formulae are also used in various related text-types, such as proclamations and legal treatises. In fact, *de scandalis magnatum* was an actual statute, covering cases of libel towards people of high status (see e.g. Coventry & Hughes 1832, s.v. *scandalum magnatum*; Lassiter 1978).[117] The humorous

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114   The annotation conventions used in the *Helsinki Corpus* and the *Corpus of Early English Correspondence* left frequently occurring items such as *item* and *anno* unannotated for foreignness (see e.g. Pahta & Nurmi 2011: 226 fn. 6). The conventions are quite similar to the principles adopted by Poplack (1980).

115   The searches were conducted on 11 June 2019.

116   For the use of dictionaries for a similar purpose in analyses of modern data, cf. e.g. Poplack, Sankoff and Miller (1988).

117   The dating in the *Orationes* example, however, does not seem to relate to any actual statute. There is a libel clause in the 1275 *Statute of Westminster* (chapter 34), but the

version, with *equorum* added, was adapted from George Ruggle's play *Ignoramus* (*prologus posterior*), and it is clear that in *Discipuli et Rustici* the whole scene depicted in example (5) aims at a similar mockery of legal Latin. Crucially, the 'grey area' forms contribute towards this aim in the same manner as the clear CS forms. From a function-oriented point of view, the distinction between a CS form and a B form may be irrelevant in certain contexts, not in terms of *langue* but *parole*.[118]

3.1.3.3   Foreignness-foregrounded items

From a pragmatic point of view, more important than the status of a form in the linguistic system may be that the form indicates for example *foreignness* (cf. e.g. Auer 1984b: 9; 1995: 124; Meecham-Jones 2011).[119] It would be more accurate to say that a certain form indicates for example Latinity (or Englishness, Frenchness, and so on), but interactants may also use a specific form precisely because it is foreign in general, in other words exotic, strange, alien, and so forth. The villain in a 1980s American action film, for example, might have a foreign accent, but it may not be that important which particular language provides the distinctive features of the accent.[120] I propose to call such forms *foreignness-foregrounded items* or *FFIs*.[121]

What I am proposing here is in essence a methodological flexibility; the concept of an FFI does not replace our terminological apparatus but enhances it. In the identification of FFIs, the criteria discussed above are similarly of key importance: for example, a fully integrated form is probably less likely to function as an FFI than an unintegrated one. It is important to note, however, that even a form which is a clear case of borrowing can be used as an FFI, although one would expect this to be more difficult to achieve. Another approach could be to argue that B forms which undergo subsequent estrangement procedures in discourse (e.g. phonetic or visual marking; cf. Gumperz 1982: 68) are in fact instances of CS. This, however, would once more obliterate the continuum between CS and borrowing, leaving us with a dichotomy. Furthermore, it would obscure the fact that an FFI is a matter of the *use*

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     actual *de scandalo magnatum* which was in effect in the 17th century was established in 1378 (2. Ric. II) (see e.g. Starkie 1826: 146ff.; Lassiter 1978).

[118]   Regarding these particular examples, one way to approach them would be to treat them as closer to language-independent symbols than to words (cf. Voigts 1989). This is a satisfactory method when we are dealing with a documentary text, but in the context of drama it may be insufficient.

[119]   This could be described as one type of *social deixis* (see e.g. Levinson 1983: 89–94).

[120]   Undoubtedly some accents are usually recognized as belonging to a certain nationality, and there are standard techniques for achieving particular 'stage accents' (e.g. replacing dental fricatives with sibilants in French and German accents, or schwa-insertion in an Italian accent).

[121]   I use the word *foreign* here roughly in the sense it has in *foreign object* (but without any negative implications), that is, similar to the Latin *alienus*.

of an item, not of its formal properties or its status within the linguistic system. The concept of the FFI does not change the fact that some forms are still analysed as borrowings, others as CS, and yet others as unclear cases.

In addition to the criteria discussed above, there are also other strategies for marking foreignness. Although it is unclear whether previous models would count changes in spelling as structural integration, such changes are important in marking both foreignness and nativity (compare e.g. *Zürich* vs. *Zurich*). In addition, the choice of different scripts and/or writing systems may affect the status of an item (cf. Adams & Swain 2002: 5–6).[122] Most Greek words, for example, can be Latinized systematically (nouns in particular), and it seems reasonable to suggest that the use of the Latin alphabet (with or without phonological and/or morphological integration) is less foregrounded than the use of the Greek alphabet in a Latin context (e.g. Socrates vs. Σωκράτης). An illuminating situation is found in the treatment of loanwords in Japanese (for a detailed account see e.g. Daulton 2008; Schmidt 2009: 556–561): the writing system consists of logographic symbols, *kanji*, and two syllabaries (*kana*), *hiragana* and *katakana*. Kanji are used for lexical roots, while hiragana are used for inflectional suffixes, particles, and other grammatical operators (they can also be used instead of kanji when the writer does not know the correct symbol). Katakana symbols are reserved for recent loanwords, though with some exceptions. Since the writing system is a syllabary designed specifically for Japanese phonology, written loanwords reflect phonological integration 'automatically' (e.g. *aisukurīmu* 'ice cream', *hanbāgā* 'hamburger', *takushī* 'taxi', *fainaru fantajī* 'Final Fantasy').[123] In the written form such words are nevertheless always FFIs, since katakana stand out from the text; it is easy even for someone with only basic knowledge of Japanese but familiar with the writing system to scan a text and pick out words written in katakana. The same is true of Greek in a context where the Latin alphabet is otherwise employed, as in our example (3) above, where Ἐργοδιώκτης stands out from the surrounding text. The Japanese case also serves to demonstrate

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[122] Some researchers have studied the choice of and switching between different scripts in the sense of different writing systems such as Latin vs. Cyrillic alphabet (e.g. Angermeyer 2005; 2012); others have focused on the use of different writing styles or scripts, such as secretary vs. italic (e.g. Kaislaniemi 2017).

[123] In these examples I use the Revised Hepburn transliteration system, which, to be sure, conceals assimilation phenomena and the fact that some of the vowels are produced with reduced values. It is also noteworthy that many loanwords are modified by clipping or blending, making them even less similar to their source language counterparts, for example *pasokon* 'personal computer' (see e.g. Kay 1995: 70–71; Daulton 2008: 18). One may compare the situation to the treatment of English loanwords in Yoruba, where "vowels are added and consonants dropped to make them conform to the system", producing e.g. *Kérésìmesì* 'Christmas' and *títì* 'street' (Rowlands 1969: 6). Since the writing system uses only the Latin alphabet, loanwords do not stand out in the same way as they do in Japanese.

that the concept of an FFI is not identical with the concept of *markedness* (see 3.1.4.4 below): using katakana for recent loanwords is the unmarked strategy, but such forms still function as FFIs.

To changes in script we may add other forms of visual foregrounding, such as underlining, the use of red ink in manuscripts, bolding, italicization in printed books, and the use of quotation marks. In present-day scholarly texts, for example, one might italicize even fairly well established and possibly partly integrated phrases such as *per se*, *an sich*, *qua*, *mutatis mutandis*, and *de facto*, which, again, foregrounds them. In example (3) above, the Greek word is also marked with *or as they call him in greek*; we may therefore add *metalinguistic marking* as one way of foregrounding the foreignness of an item (the use of these strategies in the *Orationes* texts is analysed in detail in 5.1.4).[124] In the same category (or as a separate one), we could include *prosodic marking*, for example when an item is separated from the rest of the utterance with pauses to highlight that it is situated at another 'level' of discourse. Finally, as example (5) suggests, *proximity of other FFIs* is yet another way of foregrounding; for example, the unclear cases in example (4) above, *the Virtuosi* and *per Annum*, occur in close proximity to a cluster of clear CS forms not reproduced in the example (see 5.2.3.2).[125] To repeat, however: a maximally foregrounded established borrowing does not 'lose its status' as a borrowing from the point of view of the linguistic system, nor does the complete absence of foregrounding endow an item with the status of a borrowing in the system (it may instead be a nonce borrowing). One could also say that in discourse a linguistic item may be *used as* a borrowing or switch (or, more precisely, as Latin, English, Greek, and so forth), regardless of its status in the linguistic system.[126] Yet it is clear that the more CS-like a form is according to the criteria discussed above, and the additional criteria/foregrounding strategies introduced here, the more obvious candidate for an FFI it would be.

To sum up: I propose that in function-oriented approaches it is fruitful to go beyond the clear cases of CS, by including in the analyses at least those 'grey area'

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[124] As mentioned above, Poplack (1980) did not count metalinguistically marked forms as instances of CS, while Poplack, Sankoff and Miller (1988: 54) excluded such forms from their loanword database.

[125] The degree of foreignness may also be genre- and context-specific. In the case of *imprimis* and *item*, they would probably not be used as FFIs in the courtroom, but when courtroom interactions are staged (as in the example above), their FFI status is enhanced.

[126] An apt analogy is provided by the use of tools in general (cf. Itkonen 1983: 154–155). For example, an axe has certain formal properties, including its shape, size and material, and certain functional properties, namely that it is used to chop wood. From the point of view of pragmatics, we might ask how an axe is used, either in general or in a specific context. A lumberjack may have used it to fell a tree, while a murderer may have used it to kill someone.

cases which can be deemed to be FFIs, and possibly even other forms. What this means in practice is that each occurrence of a potentially relevant item, even within a single text or conversation, needs to be considered separately. In (diachronic) corpus studies the same method is impracticable, but definitely not impossible in principle. It is worth stressing that the notions of CS and borrowing cannot (and should not) be dispensed with, since we are able to identify clear cases of both (cf. also the Pap quotation above); it is the 'grey area' in particular which needs special treatment. Although other phenomena, such as loan translations/calques, style-switching, non-bilingual switching, and translation, may also constitute FFIs, it may be practical to limit the focus of research in one way or another. A general methodological principle worth adopting would be to combine form-to-function (i.e. identifying the functions of a particular form) and function-to-form (i.e. identifying the forms used for a particular function) approaches; this will ensure that even if some linguistic strategies are excluded from the study, their relationship to the strategies scrutinized is taken into account, and the 'grey area' is not excluded merely because of the difficulties it poses.

3.1.4   The functions of language choice and code-switching

A central aim in research on language choice and CS is to explain the use of multiple languages in particular contexts, more specifically the reason(s) why a switch occurs. One way to answer these questions is to propose that something *caused* the action in question: for example, a switch may be 'triggered' by a psychological process or a feature of the external environment. Another way is to propose that these acts have certain *functions*: in other words, accounting for the intention behind these acts and/or describing their effect in interaction.[127] In some cases, it is a matter of perspective whether one argues that a particular situation prompted the speaker to make a certain choice or that the speaker made a certain choice for a particular reason (or that it had a particular effect). Moreover, several explanations can be combined simultaneously (e.g. by explaining a switch as being caused by limited competence, and the switch then being interpreted in some way by the other interactants). The approach in the present study, and its position vis-à-vis these questions, including the notion of 'function' in general, are outlined in Chapter 4 and further discussed at the end of Chapter 5. In the present section, I concentrate on earlier approaches and models which have been proposed to explain language choice and CS, especially in terms of their functions. Some general philosophical and methodological issues are

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[127]   See Clyne (1987) for the distinction between psycholinguistically and sociolinguistically conditioned switching. Austin (1975: 129) makes effectively the same point when he notes that "[t]he question 'How come?' is not confined to questions of means and ends".

also briefly introduced, to illuminate particular problems and possible solutions. This discussion will be used as a basis for developing the approach for the present study.

Previous approaches to the functions of CS have taken many forms, but three in particular occupy a central place in the field: function lists/taxonomies, the conversation analysis (CA) approach, and the 'rational choice' (RC) approach.[128] 'Function lists/taxonomies' here refers to a broad category of approaches; their common core consists of an enumeration of the functions of CS, often in a particular dataset. The aim may be to provide an open-ended and unsystematized list, or to provide a stricter taxonomy (perhaps based on a particular theory or set of concepts). The other two approaches, CA and RC, can be characterized as opposing frameworks for approaching the functions of CS. All three approaches offer useful insights and applicable concepts, many of which will also be utilized in the approach developed in the present study.

I begin with a discussion of Gumperz's classic treatment of the functions of CS, and of two general approaches indebted to his ideas: the creation of (informal) function taxonomies, and CA in its various forms (including interaction analysis and interactional linguistics). A more pragmatics-oriented theoretical model is presented in the form of Myers-Scotton's Markedness Model, representing the main RC approach.

3.1.4.1   The Gumperzian approach to code-switching

Gumperz (1982: vii) calls his own approach to language in interaction *interpretive sociolinguistics*; it can be characterized as a combination of various aspects of (qualitative) sociolinguistics, sociology, pragmatics, conversation analysis, and linguistic ethnography.[129] The inclusion of several different research traditions is explicit for example in his aim "to illustrate the limitations of the three traditions discussed – ethnography of communication, discourse and conversation analysis – and to suggest a way of utilizing the insights provided by these three traditions to build a more comprehensive theory of conversational inference" (Gumperz 1982: 161). For Gumperz, discourse analysis seems to have an obvious basis in pragmatics (see e.g. 1982: 156), and his approach in general is pragmatics-oriented. For example, one of his key concepts is *conversational inference*, "the situated or context-bound process of interpretation, by means of which participants in an

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[128]   Other broad approaches within which CS has been addressed include for example communication accommodation theory (CAT) (see e.g. Giles, Coupland & Coupland 1991; Giles, ed., 2016).

[129]   My main source for the Gumperzian approach to CS is Gumperz (1982), which consists mainly of papers originally published in the 1970s. The most important of these for the present discussion is his 1976 paper on CS. Other important sources include Gumperz (1984; 1992a; 1992b) and Blom and Gumperz (1972).

exchange assess others' intentions, and on which they base their responses" (Gumperz 1982: 153). These overlap to some extent for example with Grice's (1975) implicatures.[130]

Gumperz's basic method in his best-known CS studies was to collect data through both elicitation and the recording of naturally occurring conversations (for brief overviews, see e.g. Gumperz 1982: 43, 136–137; see also Gumperz 1984: 111–112). The recordings were subjected to scrutiny with the aid of the elicitation data, and noteworthy passages were played back to informants. Depending on the study, the judges might be members of the same linguistic group in which the recordings were made, or might include both insiders and outsiders. In some cases, relevant parts were extracted from the recordings and embedded in new contexts; a passage might also be re-recorded with slight variations in order to ascertain which particular features led to a certain effect. The languages and communities studied in Gumperz (1976; 1982) were the following: Slovenian-German switching among farmers and labourers in a small Austrian village, Hindi-English among college students in Delhi, and Spanish-English among Chicano college students and urban professionals in the US (for detailed descriptions, see Gumperz 1982: 44–51, 73–75). In Blom and Gumperz (1972), the focus was on switching between standard Norwegian (a regional variant of Bokmål) and a local dialect (Ranamål) in a small Norwegian town.

Gumperz's approach to CS (and to some extent interaction in general) can be summarized in terms of four central concepts or dichotomies: *contextualization*, *contextualization cue*, *situational vs. metaphorical CS*, and *'we' vs. 'they' codes*. I discuss each in turn briefly. A *contextualization cue* is defined as "any feature of linguistic form that contributes to the signalling of contextual presuppositions" (1982: 131), while *contextualization* itself is defined as "speakers' and listeners' use of verbal and nonverbal signs to relate what is said at any one time and in any one place to knowledge acquired through past experience, in order to retrieve the presuppositions they must rely on to maintain conversational involvement and assess what is intended" (Gumperz 1992a: 230). Gumperz further states that "constellations of surface features of message form [i.e. contextualization cues] are the means by which speakers signal and listeners interpret what the activity is, how semantic content is to be understood and how each sentence relates to what precedes or follows" (ibid.; original emphasis removed). In other words, interactants rely on these features to both indicate and interpret each other's goals. Gumperz also notes that "[t]he notion of contextualization convention enables us to treat what on the surface look like quite separate linguistic phenomena – code and style switching, prosody, phonetic and morphological variation, choice of syntactic or lexical option

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[130] Gumperz comments on the similarities between his and Grice's views at several junctures. See also Gumperz (1992b).

– under the same heading by showing that they have similar relational signalling functions" (1982: 208; cf. e.g. Gumperz & Cook-Gumperz 2005).[131] This is an important insight, since it situates CS on a par with other 'discourse strategies' (cf. e.g. Heller 1988: 2; Auer 1995: 123).

Gumperz distinguishes between two types of CS: *situational* and *metaphorical* (1982: 60–61). The former refers to the choice of a certain code according to the setting, type of activity, or addressee.[132] He suggests that, in such cases, "[t]here is a simple, almost one to one, relationship between language usage and social context" (1982: 61), which is similar to the idea of *domains* of linguistic behaviour (see e.g. Fishman 1972). In metaphorical (or *conversational*) CS, "the items in question form part of the same minimal speech act" (ibid.). In addition, metaphorical CS "occurs demonstrably below the level of consciousness", while situational CS "is […] much more planned" (Gumperz 1984: 110). Gumperz further likens the norms which govern situational switching to rules of etiquette, and those norms which govern metaphorical switching to grammatical rules, although this analogy is somewhat unsatisfactory (cf. the discussion below). The basic distinction between the two types, however, is intuitively sound. For example, if we apply these concepts to the linguistic setting of early modern Britain discussed above in 2.1.2, the use of Latin as the international scholarly lingua franca would count as situational, the use of Latin for 'splendour' as metaphorical.

The fourth main concept is the dichotomy between *'we'* and *'they' codes*. At a general level, Gumperz argues that "[t]he tendency is for the ethnically specific, minority language to be regarded as the 'we code' and become associated with in-group and informal activities, and for the majority language to serve as the 'they code' associated with the more formal, stiffer and less personal out-group relations" (1982: 66).[133] The societies studied by Gumperz are not the only ones where such a situation can be detected. In the early modern period, for example, at a very general level English would have been the 'we' code for English speakers, while Latin would have been a 'they' code. For the educated elite (including the King's School boys and their audience), on the other hand, Latin was in fact a 'we code', since it distinguished this group from the uneducated. The distinction between the two types of code is furthermore not absolute but depends on an explicit comparison between

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[131]   Although *contextualization cues* and *contextualization conventions* have sometimes been treated as synonymous (e.g. Li 2002: 165), this interpretation is incorrect; the former refers to forms, the latter to community-specific expectations concerning the use of these forms (cf. Gumperz 1992b).

[132]   Cf. Weinreich's ([1953] 1963: 73) definition of the 'ideal bilingual', who switches languages in precisely such situations.

[133]   Gumperz also notes that "[w]hen interviewed about their language usage, speakers in all three situations readily identify Slovenian, Hindi and Spanish respectively as the 'we' code, suitable with kin and close friends" (1982: 73).

two codes; for one set of speakers the 'we' code may sometimes be a local dialect, at others it may be a language. In other words, while this distinction arguably exists, it needs to be added that the status of a 'we' code is context-dependent (see e.g. Singh 1983). Indeed, Gumperz does not claim that the distinction applies to all possible situations or that it explains or predicts the occurrence of CS as such.

In addition to these concepts, Gumperz (1982: 75–84) proposed a preliminary 'typology' (i.e. a list or taxonomy; see the following section) of CS functions, with the following six categories: *quotations*, *interjections*, *addressee specification*, *reiteration*, *message qualification*, and *personalization versus objectivization*. *Quotations* and *interjections* are self-explanatory: CS is often used in reporting what someone has said, or in using fillers, interjections, or tags. *Addressee specification* refers to a switch in addressing a particular interlocutor. In *reiteration*, "a message in one code is repeated in the other code, either literally or in somewhat modified form" (Gumperz 1982: 78).[134] *Message qualification* is only illustrated by way of examples, but seems to include, *inter alia*, switches within a topic-comment construction and between the 'main message' and an additional comment.[135] In *personalization vs. objectivization*, the switch is related for example to "the distinction between talk about action and talk as action, the degree of speaker involvement in, or distance from, a message, whether a statement reflects personal opinion or knowledge, whether it refers to specific instances or has the authority of generally known fact" (Gumperz 1982: 80). The most straightforward examples of this are switching to the 'they' code to indicate (or claim, imply) authority on the one hand, and to the 'we' code to indicate social closeness on the other. Personalization vs. objectivization is nevertheless not identical with the 'we' vs. 'they' code contrast, and the two do not always correlate (Gumperz 1982: 83).

Gumperz notes that at least in some cases, such as reiteration, the directionality of the switch affects interpretation of the function. When the reiterated passage consisted of a command, for example, "[t]he shift to the 'we' code was seen as signifying more of a personal appeal, […] whereas the reverse shift suggests more of a warning or mild threat" (Gumperz 1982: 92). In such cases, meaning is not created only through juxtaposition of codes, but through a switch which implies a change in the social context, such as in the roles of the interactants. At least this type of switching, where the distinction between 'we' and 'they' codes is relevant, can according to Gumperz (1982: 94–96) be analysed in terms of Grice's (1975) concept of conversational implicature. As a general principle, Gumperz denies that "a switch can be assigned a single meaning in any one case", arguing instead that switches signal "guidelines to suggest lines of reasoning for retrieving other knowledge" (Gumperz 1982: 96). Finally, he recognizes that CS *as a pattern* may be meaningful

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[134] In Gumperz (1976: 22), this function was called *repetition*.
[135] E.g. "The oldest one, *la grande la de once años*" (Gumperz 1982: 79).

even if the individual switches cannot be analysed according to the functional typology he proposes (Gumperz 1982: 97); this idea is similar for example to the notion of a 'CS mode' (e.g. Poplack 1980: 614–615) and 'CS as an unmarked code' (Myers-Scotton 1993b: 117–131; see 3.1.4.2 and 3.1.4.4 below).

Both the concepts introduced by Gumperz and the typology of functions have received extensive criticism and discussion.[136] Auer (1984a: 90–91), for example, criticizes two aspects of the situational vs. metaphorical distinction: he argues, first, that social situations do not remain static and thereby define interaction; rather, the participants are continuously creating and renegotiating the situation. Second, it is impossible to distinguish between those features which define (and thereby bring about a change in) a situation and those which do not. He concludes that "there is no reason then to draw a line between two categories of code-switching. […] The distinction [between situational and metaphorical CS] collapses and should be replaced by a continuum" (Auer 1984a: 91; cf. Gumperz 1984: 109–110). Similar criticism has been presented for example by Gardner-Chloros, who nevertheless interprets Gumperz's model somewhat differently. In her interpretation (1991: 44–45), the primary distinction is between situational and conversational CS, while "[c]onversational code-switching is at times 'metaphorical' when the purpose of using variety B in a conversation which began in a variety A is to introduce new connotations linked to variety B" (Gardner-Chloros 1991: 45; cf. 2009: 59). This additional distinction probably refers to the one between for example using a language with 'we' or 'they' connotations (metaphorical) and using CS in a quotation (what might be termed 'non-metaphorical'). This latter distinction, however, is not fully evident in any of Gumperz's discussions (see also Myers-Scotton 1993b: 53); it seems likely that 'conversational' and 'metaphorical' were intended to be treated as synonymous (but see below). Furthermore, although Gardner-Chloros claims that "[s]ituational switching […] can easily be distinguished from conversational switching" (1991: 45), she also argues that "it is more of a theoretical distinction than one which can be used in practice when analysing bilingual conversations; for in practice how is one to distinguish between switches brought about by diglossic parameters and others?" (1991: 60). In addition, she has argued that situational CS is "rarely found in practice" (2009: 59).

As noted above, the distinction between situational and metaphorical switching has a certain obvious intuitive appeal. However, it is certainly true that Gumperz does not make it quite clear what exactly counts as a *situation* (and hence situational CS) and what does not. An additional source of confusion is the use of different terminology in different publications, as well as the fact that Gumperz's ideas have

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[136]   It seems therefore to be an exaggeration to claim that "[o]ne has to search far and wide to find any negative reactions to Gumperz's approach to CS" (Myers-Scotton 1993b: 54).

evolved and changed over time, without explicit acknowledgement of this fact. It is illustrative to consider here in particular the hierarchy of situational types discussed by Blom and Gumperz (1972: 422–423), where *settings* are seen as specific locales in the society, such as home, school, church, and workplace. Within these settings various *social situations* occur, covering specific types of activities and social roles – as well as rights and duties – connected to those activities, as enacted in some particular setting at some particular time. One of Blom and Gumperz's examples is the town square (setting), where social situations, such as meetings, shopping, and children's games, may take place. Finally, *social events* "center around one or at the most a limited range of topics and are distinguishable because of their sequential structure" (Blom and Gumperz 1972: 423). Situational switching, then, is connected to changes in the social situation, while metaphorical switching "relates to particular kinds of topics or subject matters" (Blom and Gumperz 1972: 425). It is, however, not clear from their discussion what counts as a separate event and what as a separate situation. As an example of situational switching, they present a case where a teacher switches from variety A, used for lecturing, to variety B, to encourage open discussion. A case where at the community office official business is discussed in variety A and private matters in variety B is presented as an example of metaphorical switching. The difference between the two cases, however, is not immediately obvious. Furthermore, Blom and Gumperz once employ the term *role switching* instead of situational switching,[137] which – according to the above hierarchy – would indeed imply a change in the social situation. However, we are arguably dealing with such a change (of roles and situation) specifically in the case of the community office, not in that of the classroom. In the former the roles switch from clerk/customer to acquaintance/acquaintance; in the latter they seem to remain teacher/students. As a further complication, in Gumperz (1982: 60), as mentioned above, situational switching covers changes in settings, activities, and interlocutors; the two preceding examples would thus both count as instances of situational switching, since there is a change in activity.[138]

I next propose a reinterpretation of the situational vs. metaphorical distinction. To begin with, we can apply the 'clear case principle' to identify intuitively different cases of language choice which seem to be captured by these two notions. At the situational end of the purported continuum would be for example the use of Latin in celebrating the Tridentine Mass, or of English in a lecture at the English department

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[137] The single occurrence of this term is probably an error, but it nevertheless illuminates the intended coverage of situational switching.

[138] In yet another context, Gumperz (1992b: 43–44; cf. 1982: 47) distinguishes between *activity types* and *events*; the former is apparently co-extensive with his earlier notion of social situations, while the latter is the same as the above-mentioned social event. Auer (2013: Ch. 3.1) – following Goffman – makes a presumably similar distinction between *situation* and *encounter*.

of a Finnish university. It would in fact be more accurate to speak (at least in most cases) of situational *choice* rather than switching (cf. *code selection* in Gumperz 1982: 61). At the metaphorical end would be for example switching to a particular language in order to indicate authority, to create humour, or to indicate social closeness with the interlocutor. What distinguishes these two cases from each other is that they are governed by different kinds of norms: using English in the lecture or Latin when celebrating the Tridentine Mass is *correct*, while using Latin to produce a special effect is neither correct nor incorrect but *rational* (for the corresponding norm types, see 4.2.4). Situational language choice is explained by reference to the relevant norms to which the action conforms, but it may not be necessary to explain further why a person follows the norms (cf. e.g. Brennan et al 2013: 215–217).

I suggest that the situational vs. metaphorical dichotomy is not necessarily best understood as a continuum, but simply as two fuzzy concepts which are connected in a non-straightforward manner (but cf. 3.1.3 for a caveat as to the vagueness of distinctions).[139] It may also be more illuminating to consider the situational vs. metaphorical dichotomy in terms of two different types of explanation: from this perspective, they are situated at two different 'levels', which are not mutually exclusive. Hence, the choice of language and switching between languages for example during a lecture may be explained simultaneously by reference to the norms which govern language choice in such situations and the 'strategic' use of various languages within the situation. A useful analogy is offered by *dress* (cf. the etiquette analogy above): we apply different types of explanation to situations where one wears white tie on the one hand for a very formal event, on the other for a hiking trip; in many cases, we might rely on both types of explanation. Dress etiquette also elucidates a further useful concept, namely *default choice*, by which I refer to a choice which is made regularly, but not because of any norms which dictate that this ought to be so: a person may use a particular language in interactions with certain individuals simply because this is what he or she usually does, and one may similarly wear particular clothes merely out of habit. In these instances, something along the lines of the 'principle of least effort' might be evoked to explain the choices.

In Blom and Gumperz (1972: 409), situational switching is said to occur "where alternation between varieties redefines a situation, being a change in governing norms". In effect, this refers to instances where switching from language A to B is an attempt by the speaker to redefine certain aspects of the situation, such as the roles assumed by the interactants. This definition, however, does not accord well with the

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[139] Note that this is very different from the CS vs. borrowing distinction discussed in 3.1.3, which is indeed a continuum. In that case, it was possible to distinguish clear cases not only at both ends of the continuum but within the 'grey area' as well, and moving along the continuum also meant 'increasing' or 'decreasing' certain feature, such as structural integration or status in the language system.

way situational switching is characterized in Gumperz (1982) – nor does it fit all the analyses presented by Blom and Gumperz. It may be applicable to the classroom example mentioned above (not the university lecture example): the teacher's purpose is presumably to communicate that the norm which prohibits the students from talking freely is now temporarily suspended. In the same context, Blom and Gumperz (1972: 424) mention how locals chatting together in dialect would modify their behaviour when they were approached by the researchers, switching to the standard variety and changing for example their posture. In terms of the reinterpretation presented here, this would in fact be much closer to situational choice, not a switch made *in order to* alter the situation.

The implication of this reinterpretation is that there is no need to analyse individual instances of language choice or CS exclusively in terms of either concept: situational and metaphorical may well co-occur. Making a language choice required by the activity type or situation may have other functions as well (e.g. indicating social distance, authority etc.), while a switch from one language to another may signal on the one hand that the speaker wishes to renegotiate (some aspects of) the situation; on the other hand, explaining the effect of such a switch may also require reference to norms which govern particular domains or situations (cf. Gumperz 1992b: 42–43).[140] Similarly, a particular topic may prompt a switch because a particular language is connected to a specific activity type or situation; the activity type or situation itself may not in fact have changed (cf. e.g. inserting Latin passages into an Early Modern English religious or scholarly text). In sum: situational and metaphorical CS present two different viewpoints, where the former focuses on the relation of language choice to the norms governing certain activities or situations, the latter on the more properly pragmatic meaning of language choice.

The reinterpretation offered here may also shed some new light on the criticism discussed above. First, Auer is certainly right to argue that situations can be re-defined by the interactants in some ways (cf. Gumperz 1984: 110), but the argument that situations change constantly at least to a minor degree (e.g. Auer 2013: Ch. 3.3) would more properly apply to the overall *context* of interaction, especially if context is understood to contain the *common ground* between the interactants, including the presuppositions they entertain (e.g. Clark 1996: 92–93).[141] If situational code choice is norm-governed in the sense suggested above, then these norms refer to situation *types*. Whether the interactants consider their current situation to fall under one or

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[140] Gumperz's analysis of reiteration together with a switch to the 'we' or 'they' code involves explanation of this latter type.

[141] The hypothetical claim that situations are constantly changing is somewhat analogous to the idea (attributed to Heraclitus) that you cannot step twice into the same river (see Pl. *Cra*. 402a). Cratylus famously took the idea to an extreme conclusion by claiming that you cannot step into it even once (see Arist. *Metaph.* 1010a).

the other (or indeed any) *type* surely does not change after every single utterance. Furthermore, even if it is impossible to define exactly when one situation has changed into another, this is true of all cases where change is gradual; it does not follow from this that interactants are unable to realize that a situation has changed. Second, considering the situational vs. metaphorical distinction in terms of two different explanation types may also answer the critique brought forth by Gardner-Chloros, since there is no need to allocate an individual switch exclusively to one category or the other.

The notion of 'we' and 'they' codes has also been criticized, for example because "the relationship between code and identity is far from being one-to-one" (Gardner-Chloros 2009: 57). In fact, this was already argued by Blom and Gumperz (1972: 421; emphasis added): "It is, however, evident from our discussion that *there is by no means a simple one-to-one relationship* between specific speech varieties and specific social identities. Apart from the fact that values attached to language usage vary with social background, the same individual need not be absolutely consistent in all his actions". Related to this, Auer has criticized what he calls Gumperz's 'semantic' approach, where situational CS 'generates' the meaning potential for each language, this meaning potential then serving as the basis for interpretations of metaphorical CS (1984a: 91–93; 2013: Ch. 3.3). In particular, Auer interprets the model as claiming that "[m]etaphorical code-switching can be meaningful only because the juxtaposed languages themselves have meanings which in turn are built up by situational code-switching" (Auer 1984a: 91; cf. Myers-Scotton 1993b: 55). Gumperz, however, was not necessarily proposing that situational CS simply 'generates' the meaning potential of metaphorical CS, although such an interpretation would indeed fit the version of the model presented by Blom and Gumperz (1972);[142] nor was he claiming that the 'we' vs. 'they' distinction explains all instances of metaphorical CS (but cf. e.g. Myers-Scotton 1993b: 54; Bailey 2000: 171). When he notes, for example, that CS can be used in "distinguishing new from old information, marking the degrees of emphasis or contrastiveness, [and] separating topic from subject" (1982: 48), it is obvious that such uses are not meant to be explained in terms of the 'we' vs. 'they' distinction. In fact, on some of these points Gumperz's and Auer's views are quite compatible. As Auer (1984a) argues:

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[142] The way that metaphorical/conversational CS relates to situational CS is less than clear already in Gumperz's 1976 paper. It should be noted that the type of metaphorical switches where meaning is created through properties associated with the languages in question is not simply equivalent to the concept of FFI introduced in the previous section. In the case of FFIs, the form in question is foregrounded in terms of its language (e.g. Latin), not of the connotations of the language (e.g. prestige, religious or scholarly activities, etc.).

It would be absurd to deny that the interpretation of particular conversational activities is or can be influenced by comparing them with 'similar cases' or 'precedents'. Thus, the use of one language in a given situation may refer to other situations in the past in which the same language was used. […] What is important, however, is the fact that the 'new case' itself becomes a 'precedent' for future occurrences, and therefore actively contributes to the construction of the 'meaning of the language'.

(Auer 1984a: 92)

Another way to state this would be to say that situational code-choices influence the interpretation of metaphorical CS insofar as interactants are able to perceive *analogies* between them. This seems to be the basis for the meaning potential of 'we' and 'they' codes. However, it is clear that these meaning potentials are not always exploited in specific contexts, and the situational thus does not restrict or determine the metaphorical in all possible cases – at least not according to my reinterpretation.

The function typology and the functional categories proposed by Gumperz have also been criticized for various reasons. One obvious problem is that some categories are based on function, others on form. Addressee specification and personalization/objectivization are function categories, while quotation, interjection, reiteration, and (perhaps) message qualification are form categories (see e.g. Auer 1995: 120–121; Myers-Scotton 1993b: 54; Bailey 2000: 171 fn. 5).[143] One could of course argue that the function of CS is to mark the relevant passages as quotation and so on, but this would still not place them at the same level as the two function-based categories. Sometimes more specific pragmatic explanations are also provided; for example, reiteration can be used for clarification or emphasis (Gumperz 1982: 78; for discussion, see e.g. Harjunpää & Mäkilähde 2016). Often, however, these more specific functions are not made explicit (but see Gumperz 1982: 48–49, 94–95).

I consider the main problem with Gumperz's function typology to be that it is a 'distraction' from his main point, namely that CS functions as a contextualization cue. It is undeniable that reiterative CS may be used for such functions as clarification and emphasis, but this leads to the following important question: are these functions achieved through CS, reiteration, or both at the same time? Reiteration (or repetition), interjections, and quotations are discourse strategies just as CS is, and they all function together to create pragmatic meanings. As Gumperz argues, "[i]f participants agree on an interpretation of a code switched passage, one

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[143] Gumperz himself notes that "whereas our other functional categories refer to observable sequential or syntactic features of the interaction, personalization and objectification [sic] are merely rough labels for a large class of stylistic and semantic phenomena" (1982: 82).

can assume that this agreement is based on similar linguistic perceptions and then proceed to investigate code switching *as part of the contextualization cues* which give rise to these perceptions" (1982: 82, emphasis added; cf. Gumperz 1992a: 232). Similarly, Auer notes that "[c]ontextualisation cues often bundle together" (1995: 124). In order to make sense of code-switching, we need to understand how it functions jointly with or alongside other discourse strategies.

To sum up: the main problem in Gumperz's model is the ambiguity of some of his central concepts, in particular the distinction between situational and metaphorical CS. I propose a reinterpretation of these concepts in terms of different types of norms as well as of explanation, situated at different 'levels', noting that they are not mutually exclusive. Understood in this revised form, these concepts, together with those of contextualization cue and the 'we' vs. 'they' code distinction, are also applicable in the present study. Furthermore, although Gumperz's function 'typology' lacks structure and the functions themselves are not well-defined, it can nevertheless serve as a useful starting point for a more rigorous analysis. In the following section, I compare Gumperz's typology to other proposed taxonomies.

3.1.4.2   Function lists and function taxonomies

Many previous studies have attempted to produce a list of the functions of CS; here I refer to them as either *function lists* or *function taxonomies*, since their purpose is to classify CS functions into a set of categories. The different approaches falling under this general rubric vary in terms of many aspects. Some aim at providing an open-ended list of functions, others at accounting for all possible functions of CS. Some are unsystematized and 'unstructured' lists, others are structured taxonomies with super- and subcategories. Sometimes the functions or categories are described informally, at other times in terms of theoretical concepts. The method for constructing function taxonomies has not been discussed extensively in previous studies; here I briefly outline some such approaches and their general form. I first illustrate the approach by analysing and comparing three important early lists of functions; I then discuss in more cursory fashion two other lists, comment on certain individual functions, and outline problems and challenges. I conclude the section by discussing some of the criticism directed at function lists in previous research, and by proposing ways to further improve upon earlier approaches.

I first present a comparison of three function lists, or rather of my interpretation of them (see Table 1 below). The first is the 'typology' of Gumperz (1982), discussed in detail above in 3.1.4.1. Although it is basically a list, some structure is potentially provided by the category entitled 'personalization/objectivization'; this includes further distinctions, such as personal opinion vs. objective fact and personal appeal vs. mild threat. These are not listed separately in Table 1, nor has the 'we'/'they'

opposition been included as a separate category. Reiteration, however, has been divided into clarification and emphasis, while message qualification is understood to include not only topic/comment marking but also other types of discourse organization. The second list is the one presented by Grosjean (1982: 152), who refers to *reasons* rather than functions. His list contains no super- or subcategories; it was intended primarily as an open-ended illustration of reasons for using CS. The reasons he lists are the following: *fill a need (lexical item, phrase, discourse marker, filler), triggering (continue the last language used), quote someone, specify addressee, qualify message (amplify or emphasize), specify speaker involvement, mark/emphasize group identity (solidarity), convey confidentiality/anger/ annoyance, exclude someone from conversation, change role of speaker (raise status, add authority, show expertise).* Most of these labels are self-explanatory. I have interpreted the need-filling function here as subsuming (at least) gaps in competence (i.e. the speaker does not know or cannot recall a particular word in one language) and semantic gaps (i.e. the language lacks an expression for that particular meaning). Specifying speaker involvement is equivalent to one type of personalization/objectivization, but message qualification does not correspond to Gumperz's function by the same name; rather, it covers the category of emphasis.

The third list is the one presented by Appel and Muysken (1987: 118–120). Compared to the other two lists, theirs should more properly be termed a taxonomy, since the functions have been organized according to a two-level hierarchy. The functions are divided into six categories according to Jakobson's (1960) six functions of language: *referential, directive, expressive, phatic, metalinguistic,* and *poetic*.[144] The referential group includes gaps in competence, semantic gaps, and topic-related switching in general. I have interpreted the last item as referring to the choice of a language appropriate to a given situation, which corresponds to Gumperz's situational CS. The directive group includes "all participant-related switching" (Appel & Muysken 1987: 119), such as the inclusion or exclusion of participants. The use of a 'CS mode' (i.e. frequent switching within one conversation, where the pattern itself is functional; see e.g. Poplack 1980: 614–615) to express a mixed identity is the only function mentioned by Appel and Muysken in connection with the expressive group. The phatic group remains somewhat vague, since Appel and Muysken equate it with Gumperz's metaphorical CS, mentioning side-comments and 'highlighting' as more specific examples. It is not quite clear how highlighting is to be understood here, but since the only example provided illustrates how switching marks the 'main point' of the speaker's message, I have interpreted it as analogous both to Gumperz's emphasis category and to one type of message qualification. In the case of the metalinguistic function, the only specific example

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[144] In Jakobson's model, *emotive* corresponds to expressive, *conative* to directive, and *metalingual* to metalinguistic.

provided is 'showing off' one's linguistic skills – which is comparable to Grosjean's role changes and Gumperz's personalization/objectivization; since this category includes both indirect and direct comments, I have also interpreted it as partly equivalent to one type of message qualification.[145] Finally, the poetic function covers at least jokes and CS as an evocative or poetic device in general; there is nothing quite comparable to this group in the two other lists.

Table 1. An interpretation and comparison of CS functions in Gumperz (1982), Grosjean (1982) and Appel & Muysken (1987).

Gumperz 1982	Grosjean 1982	Appel & Muysken 1987
situational		REFERENTIAL: appropriateness
	fill a need	REFERENTIAL: competence
		REFERENTIAL: semantic
interjection/filler		
quotation	quote someone	
addressee specification	specify addressee	
reiteration (clarification)		
reiteration (emphasis)	qualify message (amplify/emphasize)	PHATIC: highlighting
message qualification		PHATIC: side-comments
		METALINGUISTIC: direct comment
personalization/ objectivization	specify speaker involvement	
	mark group identity	EXPRESSIVE: mixed identity
	convey confidentiality/anger	
	change role of speaker	METALINGUISTIC: showing off
		DIRECTIVE: inclusion
	exclude someone	DIRECTIVE: exclusion
		POETIC: puns, evocation
	triggering	

Table 1 presents my interpretation of the above-mentioned three lists and a comparison between them. A few noteworthy aspects merit further comment. First, most of the functions/reasons present in one list have a counterpart in at least one of the others; the only exceptions are Gumperz's clarification (through reiteration),

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[145] The inclusion of 'showing off' in this category may be problematic; while CS in such cases indicates something about the languages themselves, its main function is arguably to indicate something about the speaker.

Grosjean's triggering, and Appel and Muysken's directive function of inclusion, together with the whole poetic function group. Second, this type of explicit comparison reveals differences in the hierarchical ordering and 'levels' of functions. Gumperz's personalization/objectivization, for example, is (as he himself noted) a fairly 'high-level' category, subsuming *inter alia* four of Grosjean's functions. Similarly, 'need-filling' CS, or *gaps*, can be further divided into subcategories such as semantic gaps and gaps in competence (see also Gardner-Chloros 1991: 179). Third, the functions listed here can be categorized in various ways. Some of the functions, for example, pertain to discourse organization and the marking of particular units (e.g. message qualification, quotations, side-comments), others to identities and face-work (e.g. marking group identity, changing the role of speaker, showing off), others again to changes in the participant constellation (e.g. inclusion, addressee specification), and so on. In addition, different types of explanation are employed in referencing such reasons as triggering, gaps, CS appropriate for the situation, or group identity: the first two are something that 'causes' switching, while the latter two are the speaker's 'reason' for switching (see 3.1.4.3 and 5.4 below).[146] Fourth, an explicit comparison of functions presupposes that they are clearly defined; the three lists discussed here include several functions whose boundaries and contents remain somewhat vague.

Next, I briefly discuss two further studies providing something more towards taxonomies than a mere listing of functions. In her study of language choice and switching between Alsatian and French in Strasbourg, Gardner-Chloros (1991: 179–184) lists five different groups of 'factors' affecting CS or language selection. The first relates to *the speaker's competence* – a fairly transparent group. The second relates to *the speakers' perceptions of each other*, covering at least those types of switches referred to above as changes in the participant constellation, but also what in Grosjean's and Appel and Muysken's lists is termed exclusion (see below for this function in general). The third relates to *the characteristics of the particular conversation*; according to Gardner-Chloros (1991: 182), these factors are "independent of the speaker's competence and of the interlocutor's perceived characteristics". The group includes different types of function related to identity, Gumperz's personalization/objectivization, and even situational CS. One interesting function mentioned in this context is CS as an 'avoidance strategy', for example "to avoid having to make a distinction which would be necessary in the other language, such as a *tu/vous* distinction" (ibid.). This is in some ways similar to Grosjean's need-filling function or semantic gap, but in this case the lack of equivalence between two languages is not the problem but the solution. The fourth group relates to *the characteristics of spoken language*, including at least some of the functions

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[146] Even situational switching can be analysed as a type of triggering (see e.g. Matras 2009: 144).

connected to discourse organization, emphasis, and triggering (although it is given a different kind of explanation, namely as a means to limit the number of times one has to switch languages). The fifth group, *deeper reasons*, consists of four different types, three of which are basically factors affecting such aspects as the frequency of switching and the relationship between the particular languages. The only factor which is a type of function is called *ethnic compromise*; it seems to correspond roughly to the above-mentioned 'CS mode'. Gardner-Chloros's overall list of factors resembles that of Appel and Muysken in the sense that individual functions are not listed, as the focus is on the supercategories. Some of the choices in categorization can be criticized: for example, it is unclear why personalization/objectivization or the 'we'/'they' distinction is included in the third group, since they are arguably not independent of the speaker's perception of the addressee.

Zentella's (1997: 82–97) list of functions – based on her research on Spanish-English CS in a Puerto Rican community in New York – is also ordered at least partly in a taxonomic fashion, and includes over twenty different individual functions. In addition to switches or choices related to community norms, she presents three categories of 'strategies'. The first, *footing*, relates to changes of footing (see Goffman 1981: 124–159) and is further divided into *realignment* and *appeal/control*. The former includes for example changes in the speaker's role and certain types of discourse organization (e.g. quotations, side-comments, marking a change in topic); the latter includes switching for *attention attraction* as well as one type of personalization/objectivization or emphasis, namely *aggravating* or *mitigating requests* (cf. Gumperz's example of a reiterated command discussed in 3.1.4.1 above). The second main category, *clarification/emphasis*, includes *translations*, *appositions* (which are basically elaborations), *accounting for requests* (i.e. giving the reason in another language), and what seem to be topic/comment constructions; there is no sub-function covering emphasis *per se*. The third main category is *crutch-like mixing*; it includes for example switches due to (momentary) gaps in competence, switching for *taboo* words, and *triggers*, where a word-form similar in both languages causes a switch. The definitions of the individual functions are not always quite clear, but many of them seem to correspond to those already discussed above. Some problems with the categorization itself may also be mentioned: for example, it is unclear why appositions, explanations for request, and topic/comment switches should not be grouped together with the marking of side-comments, quotations, and other such units, since Zentella seems to analyse them as marking a specific structure or sequence. They differ in this sense from translations, where the switch not only marks an item *as a translation* but makes it possible for the addressee to understand the speaker. As another example, Zentella notes that crutch-like switches "seemed involuntary" (1997: 97), which is an apt characterization of triggering; but this does not necessarily apply to euphemistic

switching, which in turn is connected to issues of face and politeness (see 3.2 below). Nevertheless, it is clear that the three main categories capture something important about the differences between types of functions.

Many of the functions mentioned in the five lists/taxonomies discussed thus far have also been identified in other studies, in conjunction with various types of data (spoken and written, present-day and historical) and various language contact situations. I comment briefly on a few of them. To begin with, quotation or reporting of others' speech seems to be a fairly widely attested function (see e.g. McClure & McClure 1988; Poplack 1988; Swain 2002; Adams 2003; Pahta & Nurmi 2009; Schendl 2012; Montes-Alcalá 2012; Tuominen 2018). There are, however, differences as to whether CS is analysed as marking a unit or stretch of discourse as a quotation, as being the result of striving for authenticity, or something else. Similarly, sometimes such quotations are explained by further postulating more specific functions for them (see e.g. Mäkilähde 2018a). A somewhat similar ambiguity can be seen in the treatment of items such as interjections and discourse markers: according to Gumperz (1982: 77), CS is used to *mark* interjections, while Grosjean (1982: 152) mentions them in connection with the need-filling function. The point is that mentioning such categories does not yet make it clear what the function of or explanation for them is supposed to be (cf. the discussion of 'causes' and 'effects' in 3.1.4.3).

Another illustrative example is provided by the function of exclusion. For both Grosjean (1982: 154–155) and Appel and Muysken (1987: 119), this function seems to refer in particular to situations where the aim of the switch is to 'conceal' the message from some third party. In other words, the speaker does not want this person to become privy to what is being said.[147] A similar function has, again, been mentioned by others (e.g. Dunkel 2000; Swain 2002; Adams 2003), but this is not the only type of exclusion possible. The speaker may also wish to prevent someone from taking part in the conversation regardless of what is being said; the motive in such a case is to damage the third party's face. Both aspects of exclusion are mentioned for example by Scotton (1988: 174–175).

A broad overview of attested functions also highlights some of the possible gaps in Gumperz's typology. As mentioned above, there was no category corresponding to Grosjean's need-filling function or Appel and Muysken's gaps; similar categories are also mentioned in other studies. For example, Poplack (1988) refers both to lexical gaps marked by disfluencies (i.e. gaps in competence) and to CS for *le mot juste* (i.e. semantic gaps). The latter type of gap in particular has been mentioned in various studies (e.g. McClure & McClure 1988; Montes-Alcalá 2012), sometimes in the context of a more specific type of lexis, such as technical terms (e.g. Dunkel

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[147] Appel and Muysken (1987: 119) mention that parents may switch to make sure their children do not understand what is being said, for one reason or another.

2000; Adams 2003: 337–340). In addition, while the category of poetic functions proposed by Appel and Muysken did not have a clear counterpart in any of the taxonomies or lists discussed above, other studies do mention CS used for humour or language play (e.g. McClure & McClure 1988; Dunkel 2000; Swain 2002) or for stylistic effect (e.g. Adams 2003: 403–405; Montes-Alcalá 2012).

As the discussion thus far has demonstrated, there is considerable concord and overlap in the different function lists and taxonomies proposed in previous research, indicating the feasibility of such approaches. Certain problems, however, have also been noted, and possible concerns raised. It has been suggested, for example, that lists of functions can only be open-ended (e.g. Auer 1995: 121), and that the number of such functions is potentially infinite (e.g. Auer 1984b: 11; Martin-Jones 1995: 99). It may be illustrative to compare this claim with what J. L. Austin said about the number of uses of language:

> Certainly there are a great many uses of language. It's rather a pity that people are apt to invoke a new use of language whenever they feel so inclined, to help them out of this, that, or the other well-known philosophical tangle; we need more of a framework in which to discuss these uses of language; and also I think we should not despair too easily and talk, as people are apt to do, about the *infinite* uses of language. Philosophers will do this when they have listed as many, let us say, as seventeen; but even if there were something like ten thousand uses of language, surely we could list them all in time.
>
> (Austin 1979: 234)

It is arguably true that at one level of analysis we can increase the number of possible functions *ad libitum*; the crucial question is whether it is nevertheless possible to bring these together under a set number of function *types*. Furthermore, the function lists and taxonomies discussed above do not support the idea that there might literally be an infinite number of CS functions. The number of *individual explanations* may of course be near-infinite if all minor differences are taken into account, but in all the studies mentioned above the level of analysis in classifying functions into types is much more abstract. It is in fact the function of categorization to emphasize 'unity in diversity'.

Auer (1995: 120) has also criticized function lists for using "ill-defined" categories, suggesting that sequential analyses (see the following section) are needed to illustrate how the functions should be understood. This is indeed the most obvious problem in all studies which refer to CS functions in any manner (see Mäkilähde 2018a); in addition to demonstration by text analysis, explication and (possibly formal) definitions are also a desideratum – perhaps even more so, due to the impressive amount of more pre-theoretically oriented research which already exists.

Most of the criticism levelled against function lists for example by Auer (1995) and Myers-Scotton (1993b) is perfectly justified; the proper response, however, is not to abandon the enterprise but to develop better methods for constructing a taxonomy of functions, and to apply those methods in practice.[148] Here I propose some ways of moving forward. First, the aim should be to construct a proper taxonomy rather than a mere list. This means that the relationships between different functions should be made clear: their differences and similarities, their hierarchies, and so forth. Second, the functions need to be explicated and defined as clearly as possible (whether by formal or other means). Third, the application of the taxonomy needs to be illustrated and tested, using both invented examples and text analysis. Fourth, the taxonomy needs to be subjected to further testing and revised accordingly; even if it is initially based on a specific dataset, it should not remain confined to it. This programme will be applied in practice in Chapters 4 and 5 of the present study.

3.1.4.3   Conversation analysis approaches

The focus in this section is on the conversation analysis (CA) approach to CS. CA in general can be described as a local and 'micro-level' approach to interaction. Initiated most notably by the sociologists Harvey Sacks, Emanuel Schegloff, and Gail Jefferson, its roots are in ethnomethodology, and especially in the ideas of Harold Garfinkel, but also in the sociological theories of Erving Goffman. Analyses are characterized in particular by detailed transcriptions, an emphasis on conversation-internal evidence, and an overall focus on the data.[149] Much of the research undertaken under the general umbrella of CA may fall more accurately under the label of *interaction analysis* (IA) (see e.g. Cashman & Williams 2008; for a theoretical introduction to IA, see e.g. Jordan & Henderson 1995), and CA may also be a component in various other approaches (e.g. in *interactional linguistics*). In the field of CS research, the CA approach and that of Myers-Scotton represent two major proponents of opposing viewpoints in the previous methodological debate (see e.g. Myers-Scotton & Bolonyai 2001; Li 2002; 2005; Auer 2013). Due to the aims of the present work, I focus in particular on these methodological issues; the

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[148]   It should also be pointed out that, although Auer distances his own approach from the construction of function lists, his own model (see section 3.1.4.3) clearly represents one type of taxonomy as well.

[149]   For concise introductions, see e.g. Levinson (1983: 294–370); Duranti (1997: 245–279); Wooffitt (2005); Golato & Golato (2018). For criticism of CA in general, see e.g. Billig (1999a; 1999b).

discussion is followed by an illustration of Peter Auer's approach to the functions of CS.[150]

The following methodological discussion is based on two papers by Li Wei (2002; 2005), who sets out to provide an explicit account of the CA approach to bilingual interaction. The issues I address are mainly connected to the explanation of actions. The particular aspects to be discussed include the nature of language, the roles of different epistemological sources, the roles of rationality and intentionality, the relationship between micro- and macro-sociolinguistics, and that between data- and theory-oriented approaches.

According to Li Wei, "[a]t the heart of the difference between CA and other sociological perspectives is a tension between language as a medium for the expression of intentions, motives, or interests, and language as a topic for uncovering the methods through which ordered activity is generated" (Li 2002: 163). The method itself is described as follows: "CA characteristically takes shape as pieces of inductive reasoning structured around short extracts of transcripts from tape-recorded conversation. These extracts are repeatedly scanned for evidence of procedures whereby the participants accomplish an interactional task, such as disagreeing or changing a topic" (Li 2002: 162). I comment on these aspects further throughout the section, but the two interpretations referred to above – that language is either a medium for expressing intentions or a 'topic' for uncovering something – are not the only options; rather, in the present study, language is considered *a means for doing things* (cf. Austin 1975; Clark 1996: 3).[151] This covers a much broader range of activities than merely expressing intentions (cf. any of the classic examples discussed by Austin, such as marrying someone or naming a ship).[152]

One of the basic principles of CA is that "every claim we as analysts make about what people do must be proven by evidence from the everyday social life of people"

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[150] My choice of researchers to focus on in this section is based on their status as forerunners of the CA approach in the context of bilingual discourse (see e.g. Cashman & Williams 2008).

[151] Cf. Slugoski & Turnbull: "language use is best viewed as a pragmatic endeavour, as an attempt *to accomplish particular goals*" (1988: 101; emphasis added). Li Wei's reference to participants accomplishing specific tasks seems to imply exactly the same idea.

[152] Duranti (1997: 253) argues that "[i]f we are really interested in what speech *does*, it would seem crucial to look at hearers' reactions to what is said to them", something which "is not done by speech act theorists". Hearers' responses are indeed important, but it may be overly simplistic to claim that speech act theories do not consider the hearers' reactions; they may for example determine that an act has failed (see e.g. Searle 1983: 7). Both perlocutionary and illocutionary effects are also dependent on the hearer reacting in a certain way (Searle 1969: 46–47, 71), although the reaction may manifest itself in non-linguistic forms as well. Similarly, the success of indirect speech acts depends on the hearer being able to draw certain inferences and his reacting in a certain way (see e.g. Searle 1979: 46–48).

(Li 2002: 163). It is true that, if we want to determine what people *do in fact*, we cannot rely solely on intuition or introspection: observation is needed. It should be stressed, however, that not everyone studying interaction is interested only in what people do in fact; instead, we may also ask what people *should* or *ought to* do, *why* language functions the way it does, and so on. An analogy with grammars as descriptive-normative accounts of languages may clarify the matter: grammars do not (usually) describe what people *do in fact*; instead, they describe the rules of language, or what would be correct to do (e.g. Itkonen 1978; 2003; 2005; Coseriu 1985; Kac 1992; Zlatev 2008: 42). It is important both to investigate what people do in fact and to attempt to reveal the reasons why people do what they do in fact (cf. Grice 1975: 48). These two viewpoints are complementary, not mutually exclusive; they provide answers to different questions.

Another basic principle of CA – and the one most central for the present discussion – is that "to "know" what people are doing in their everyday life does not require any recourse to hidden motives or models of rationality, but only showing how people actually do it" (Li 2002: 163). In addition, it is noted that the rationality of actors is not taken for granted (Li 2005: 377). It is not, however, stated explicitly what these 'hidden motives' and 'models of rationality' refer to. In the case of the former, Li Wei (2002: 161) refers to Garfinkel's proposal that social actions should be analysed "without any particular recourse for this purpose to the notions of intentionality or motives".[153] This seems to suggest that 'hidden motives' refer to intentions. I discuss *rationality* in detail in Chapter 4; for the present purposes it will suffice to define it as "the application of a specific mode of reasoning […] which guarantees inferences from ends or goals to means that will satisfy those ends" (Brown & Levinson 1987: 64). This refers more precisely to *instrumental rationality*. If motives are intentions, they can be analysed as types of 'ends' or 'goals', or more precisely as conative attitudes together with their objects (e.g. "S wants X"). It is not clear how non-reliance on 'hidden motives' and intentionality can be reconciled with the simultaneous claim that in the CA approach, "[p]articular attention is paid to the way in which individuals *strategically* use the codes in their bilingual repertoires *to achieve specific interactional goals*" (Li 2002: 159; emphasis added). I discuss this problem further below, with the aid of examples.

A 'model of rationality' is presumably a description or explication of rationality, or more precisely, of rational action. The causal model of action discussed at the end of this section, and the rational explanation schema discussed in Chapter 4, probably count as such models. The schema explicates the structure of an action and simultaneously explains actions as being caused by the agent's current goals and

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[153] Cf. Duranti (1997: 263): "One of the features of conversation analysis is that it examines such phenomena as repairs without entering the issue of the individual motivations for such behaviors".

beliefs (e.g. "S did X in order to achieve Y"). The argument thus seems to be that no recourse is needed to such a description or explication of action when we explain actions. In his critique of 'rational choice' approaches, Li Wei identifies Grice's model as one example, along with Sperber and Wilson's Relevance Theory and Myers-Scotton's Markedness Model; according to Li Wei, "these models emphasise the ability of the speaker to behave rationally and to choose linguistic varieties according to a sort of 'cost-benefit analysis'" (2005: 376). There are in fact two separate aspects here: the emphasis on rationality (i.e. instrumental rationality) and the idea of 'cost-benefit analysis' (i.e. game-theoretical models); the latter aspect does not accurately describe Grice's model, in that he sees "talking as a special case or variety of purposive, indeed rational, behavior" (1975: 47), which refers only to instrumental rationality. The game-theoretical 'cost-benefit analysis' interpretation is more apt as a characterization of the Markedness Model (see section 3.1.4.4 below).

To illustrate further, it is useful to consider the following extract from Li Wei's (2002) analysis of a stretch of conversation between three members of a Chinese family in England:

> The mother may believe that she has the authority over her children, and when the daughter asks her to do something, she can decide whether the request is reasonable or not; if she thinks it is not, then she can either reject it or request an alternative. Her repeated use of the repair initiator *Mut-ye* 'What?' is therefore strategic: She is competing for turn control.
>
> (Li 2002: 170)

The analysis is plausible; it does not, however, seem to follow the principles set out above. This is an instance of rational explanation of the ends-means type, where the mother's action (repetition) is explained as being the means for achieving a particular goal (turn control). This is also apparent in the following analysis of a conversation between a mother and a daughter, where the daughter has first mentioned that she is going to the cinema with a friend, and at the end of the excerpt asks her mother for money: "The mother clearly realises that her reply in the previous turn was a bit too strong for the daughter, and asks if there is anything nice to see at the cinema. Interestingly, it is only then that the girl makes her real intention clear. She issues her request for money" (Li Wei 2005: 384). The mother's goal is to achieve some type of face-work, probably to make the daughter feel better; the means, perhaps, is to show an interest in the daughter by attending to her wants (cf. Brown & Levinson 1987: 103–104). We might also ask how the daughter's 'real intention' differs from a 'hidden motive': her request is a transparent means towards achieving the goal of obtaining money from her mother. At least these analyses thus rely on 'hidden

motives' and rational explanation, which in turn presupposes an explicit or implicit model of rational action according to which we analyse the structure of actions.[154] Nor is there any need to try and dispense with rationality or 'hidden motives', since we typically explain an action by understanding it, which consists in seeing it as a means towards attaining a particular goal (see Chapter 4 for discussion).

With regard to explanation, Li Wei adds that CA researchers "try to show how their analyses are *demonstratively relevant* to the participants" (Li 2005: 382; original emphasis). This idea is not explained in further detail, but the method is presumably the type of sequential analysis used in CA: the turn-by-turn analysis ensures that "the analyses are empirically based and eminently verifiable" (Cashman 2008: 287). This, however, does not explain the verification process itself. The idea seems to be that the analyses are 'demonstratively relevant' and verified if we can link our interpretations to features in the actual conversation. This formulation, however, is circular: if the interpretation is based on these features, it cannot be further 'verified' by them. Furthermore, this is still the analyst's interpretation, not that of the participants: it is an interpretation of the participants' interpretations. There is also the possibility of attempting to verify the analyses by using informants' own reports as an additional source of data, as was done for example by Gumperz (1982). Auer (1984a: 93–95; 1984b: 6), among others, has not relied on them, while Bailey (2000) had bilingual consultants offer their interpretations of the recorded CS patterns he studied. Using questionnaires and participants' reports would in general be a valuable source of data; even if there is a mismatch between the analyst's and the participants' interpretations, we should endeavour to determine why this is the case.

Another methodological issue pertains to the relevance of sociological variables in the analyses. According to Li Wei (2002: 162), in CA, "[l]ittle attention is paid to what traditional sociolinguists might consider as key social variables, such as the identity of the speaker (gender, age, occupation, etc.), his or her relations with the other participants in a conversation (e.g., whether they are friends or distant acquaintances), or the formality of the context". This characterization is clarified with a reference to Levinson's (1983: 295, fn. 4) comment that "[i]t is not that the relevance of these factors is denied *a priori*, but simply that it is not assumed – if participants themselves can be rigorously shown to employ such categories in the production of conversation, then they would be of interest to CA" (cf. Duranti 1997:

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[154] To clarify: if an explanation of actions refers for example to agents' motives, goals, or beliefs, the implication is that these facts account for the action; a natural way to interpret this is to say that they *caused* the action. In this case, the use of such explanations is based on an understanding of actions being caused by goals and beliefs. The upshot is that the explanation presupposes an explication of *this particular kind of rationality*.

247; Wooffitt 2005: 63–65). Nevertheless, all the extracts discussed by Li Wei (2002; 2005) are preceded by a brief description of the participants and their roles in relation to each other: labels such as 'mother' and 'daughter' clearly do not refer primarily to any assumed genetic relationship but to a social one. Furthermore, the social norms of the particular speech communities are taken into account, and they are of course connected to various social roles which the members of the community may assume for themselves in any given situation. This is stated explicitly: "These two aspects of the background context [i.e. language preference and family structure] are, of course, relevant to our analysis of the sequence; yet the task of the analyst is not to be satisfied with an interaction-external explanation, but rather to show how the two aspects of the wider context have been "brought about" by the participants in the exchange" (Li 2002: 170). This principle is unobjectionable in the context of micro-level analysis, but it should not be considered to be in conflict with macro-sociolinguistic approaches (such as Labov's), which may focus on the above-mentioned variables. The case is similar to what was said in 3.1.4.1 about situational vs. metaphorical switching, or about intuition-based vs. observation-based approaches above: they offer different and complementary viewpoints.

Finally, Li Wei also notes that CA in general has been criticized for its refusal "to use available theories of human conduct to ground or organize its arguments" (2002: 170) and "to explain the phenomena it studies by invoking "obvious" factors like identities, power relations, rights and obligations of the participants, their motivations, or the institutional context of the interaction" (ibid.). He argues that "these refusals and obsession are necessary in order to get a clear picture of CA's core phenomenon, the in-situ organization of conduct, and especially of talk-in-interaction" (2002: 171). The kind of criticism mentioned here has been presented for example by Myers-Scotton and Bolonyai (2001: 5), who argue that the CA approach to CS ignores speakers' motivations and the wider social context, including the roles of interactants. According to my interpretation, however, the CA studies investigated in this section still rely in practice on such notions as speakers' motivations, aims, problem-solving, and even intentions and rationality (cf. also e.g. Auer 1984b: 16–17, 36, 38–39, 49, 59, 76, 80, 85). The criticism should rather be directed at the fact that this reliance is not acknowledged, and at the failure to incorporate these notions explicitly into the discussion. The same applies to the purported non-reliance on the wider social context. Furthermore, connecting the findings to broader sociological theories in no way implies that the local organization of conversation cannot be accounted for without imposing a rigid theoretical framework on the data from the outset. Li Wei (2005: 387) in fact argues that "[w]hat we need is a dual-level approach, which links, in a principled and systematic way, the sequential analysis of code-switching in conversation to the rational choice analysis of social motivations". Similarly, Auer suggests that "a sequential approach

to code-switching does not exclude linking microscopic aspects of conversational organisation to ethnographically documented wider (macroscopic) structures, but rather serves to ground the former in the latter" (1998: 12–13; cf. 1995: 116).[155] These views are, at least in principle, in agreement with my argument concerning complementary viewpoints, which also serves as a guiding principle in constructing the approach and framework for the present study.

I next discuss certain specific concepts and ideas developed in CA research on CS, focusing on the seminal early work of Peter Auer. In his 1984 monograph on the linguistic practices of the children of Italian migrant-workers in Konstanz, he identifies as his goal to study "members' procedures to arrive at local interpretations of language alternation" (Auer 1984b: 3; original emphasis removed). Auer takes language (or code) *alternation* as a cover term, defining it as "all instances of locally functional usage of two languages in an interactional episode" (1984b: 7; original emphasis removed). The purpose of this definition is to ensure that established borrowings are not included in the category.

In explaining the meaning of language alternation, Auer relies on two category pairs which "provide the 'underlying' procedural apparatus for arriving at local interpretations of language alternation in its individual context" (1984b: 12). The first pair contains the two main types of language alternation, CS and *transfer*, the former being "tied to a particular point in conversation", the latter "to a particular conversational structure" (ibid.).[156] The distinction is clarified as follows: "[p]rototypical transfer does not have any impact on subsequent language choice, concerns a well-defined unit and is […] relatively short", while "[p]rototypical code-switching implies a re-negotiation of the language of interaction, concerns a well-defined point in interaction and does not allow to predict return into the first language" (Auer 1984b: 78–79). The other category pair consists of *discourse related* and *participant related alternation*, the former "providing cues for the organization of the ongoing interaction", and the latter "about attributes of the speaker" (Auer 1984b: 12). The two types of alternation are further characterized as follows:

> Discourse and participant related alternation can be seen as methods to come to grips with two general types of such tasks [that need to be mastered in communication]. One of them concerns the organization of conversation, that is,

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[155]   Auer (1988: 209) has also argued that "although neither the value of the grammatical nor that of the macro-sociolinguistic perspective can be denied, it seems that both have to be incorporated into a third, more basic perspective which is to investigate the contribution of language alternation to members' sense-making activities [here: CA]." The 'basic perspective' adopted in the presented study is discussed in Chapter 4.

[156]   Due to its ambiguity, the term transfer was later replaced by *insertion* (Auer 1995: 133 end-note 6).

turn-taking, topical cohesion, tying, sequencing of activities, repair, overall organisation, etc.. […] This is what has been called discourse related alternation. A second type of task concerns finding/ negotiating [sic] the proper language for the interaction, i.e. (in the ideal case) one that is situationally adequate, that accommodates all parties' competences and preferences, etc.. It also includes finding out if the other has more than one variety at his or her disposal at all. All instances of language alternation serving this second type of task have been called participant related.

(Auer 1984b: 24)

The two category pairs combine into four basic categories or types of language alternation: discourse-related CS, participant-related CS, discourse-related transfer, and participant-related transfer (in the following, I abbreviate these as DR-CS, PR-CS, DR-T and PR-T). Auer (1984b: 12) stresses that these four "are not generic categories assembling language alternation types into groups; that is, they are not superordinates to the subordinated alternation types like addressee selection, citations, and so on", and they are instead "generally available procedures to carry out these local interpretations".[157] Nevertheless, since Auer lists several functions (or 'local interpretations') of alternation under each of these more basic categories, the model does not differ significantly from the function taxonomies discussed in the previous section.

In addition to these four categories, Auer discusses some 'prototypical' and 'polyvalent' (i.e. non-prototypical) meanings of language alternation, the prototypical ones falling under one of the basic categories. DR-CS includes functions similar to those described in the previous section as discourse organization, in particular changes of footing, such as a *change of participant constellation*. Auer (1984b: 32–39) mentions three ways in which this can happen: the speaker selects more than one addressee during one turn, selects fewer addressees than have been involved in the conversation thus far, or tries to enter a constellation as a full participant. Another kind of change of footing is termed *sequential subordination*, where CS marks the beginning or end of a side-sequence such as repair or something unrelated to the main conversation (Auer 1984b: 39–42). The third type is *double cohesion*, where "a speaker may take up the language of one preceding utterance, but refer back, to another preceding utterance by pronominalization, topic, etc., or vice versa" (Auer 1984b: 43). In other words, the speaker is attending to two different activities (or 'tasks') at the same time. In the example discussed by Auer (1984b: 43–46), the speaker is in the middle of recounting something in one language, when a third party tries to enter the participant constellation by asking a question in another

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[157]   It seems to be implied in another context (Auer 1984b: 62) that the four categories are 'local meanings'.

language. The original speaker continues with his report and does not answer the question, but he does switch to the third party's language, showing that he is aware of the question.

PR-CS is connected in particular to language negotiation sequences (i.e. when interactants try to establish the language to be used for a specific communicative episode), which "allow participants to ascribe to each other *individualistic preferences* for one language or the other" (Auer 1984b: 47).[158] More specific cases discussed under this rubric (Auer 1984b: 47–55) include instances of the facilitation of communication, in other words switches due to another interactant's (perceived) incompetence in one of the languages, which may however be face-threatening to the other party. The reverse case is a display of imbalanced competencies by switching to the stronger of the speaker's two (or more) languages. *Preference-related CS* is basically similar to this, but the reason for switching is not (at least *prima facie*) lack of competence. In Zentella's (1997: 84–91) taxonomy, similar examples are included in the category of CS governed by community norms (e.g. a norm according to which everyone should use his or her preferred language). The final type discussed by Auer under this rubric is *turn reformulation*, or *self-initiated self-repair* in traditional CA terminology (e.g. Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks 1977): the speaker begins his turn in a language which is not the currently established language of interaction, stops at some point, and rephrases the turn in the language of interaction. Auer correctly points out (1984b: 54) that since in his examples the speakers cancel their first attempt before producing a complete turn, the function is not elaboration or clarification but correction. However, his analysis of such an instance as "a particularly cautious way to signal language preference" (1984b: 55) can be contested. In particular, Auer does not discuss the possibility of any of these repair sequences being used simply to correct *slips*, structures produced for example in a moment of inattentiveness. I return to this matter at the end of the section.

The examples discussed under the rubric of PR-T all relate to displays and/or assessments of competence (Auer 1984b: 55–62): in general, participants rely on these insertions in order to ascribe (competence-related) predicates to each other, as they indicate momentary retrieval problems (i.e. momentary gaps, as discussed in the previous section). In *time-out transfers*, the speaker introduces an item in one language (which is not the language of interaction), points out that he does not know how to say it in the other language, and appeals to another participant for assistance in translating the word. In other words, there is a short side-sequence, after which

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[158] According to Auer (1995: 125), *preference* "must not be understood as a psychological disposition of the speaker, but rather in the more technical, conversation-analytic sense of an interactionally visible structure". It is unclear, however, how preference in the sense of "structural disposition" (Brown & Levinson 1987: 38) can be at the same time 'individualistic'.

the speaker returns to the original topic and the language of interaction; this basically combines different explanation types by referring to a gap in competence and discourse organization (the side-sequence consisting of a metalinguistic comment). The difference between these and *subsequent same-turn repairs/repair initiations* is that in the latter the transferred item "does not coincide with a change of addressee, and not even a side sequence, although a third party may volunteer the missing same-language item" (Auer 1984b: 60). In other words, the speaker may either correct himself (similar, or perhaps even identical, to self-initiated self-repair) or seek the correct term from his interlocutor while still maintaining the same language of interaction. According to Auer (ibid.), what happens in the former case is that "speakers point to their comparatively better knowledge of the vocabulary of one language". Again, this will be discussed further below in conjunction with 'slips'. The third case consists of the speaker prosodically marking a transferred item 'prospectively', which "orients to its other-language provenance and to the possibility that such use could be subject to a recipient's criticism" (ibid.). Auer (1984b: 60–61) mentions hesitation as the basic means for this kind of marking; presumably such phenomena as (filled) pauses, repetition, changes in pitch, and rising intonation are also included.

Of the four categories, DR-T is perhaps the least transparent. One specific type of function might be characterized as 'flavouring' through the values and attitudes attached to a particular language. The following is a heavily edited version of the example discussed by Auer (1984b: 63–64):

(6)   A: Du musch schaue was des für dein Körper denn isch

       B: Du musch au mal schaue was des für – u partafoglie

As Auer points out, the two turns have parallel structures, presenting an opposition between *dein Körper* ('your body') and *u partafoglie* ('your purse'). He analyses the insertion (in a southern Italian dialect) as follows: "It alludes to elements of the southern Italian context (eating *la pasta* for reasons of poverty) and contrasts them with elements of the northern culture (the luxury of being in the economic position to care about one's body)" (1984b: 64).[159] He also notes that this analysis is similar to Gumperz's approach, where attributes predicated to a language are brought to bear on the meaning of CS (Auer 1984b: 105 end-note 58). According to the interpretation presented in 3.1.4.1 above, this would be similar to metaphorical CS in Blom and Gumperz's (1972) sense. The other type of DR-T is *the marking of quotations*, a

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[159]   The plausibility of this interpretation is difficult to judge, due to the paucity of contextual information. In this case, informants' reports could facilitate the analysis considerably.

function also mentioned in the previous section. Auer (1984b: 64–67) points out here that sometimes the speaker may try to reproduce the quotation in the original form as far as possible, while at other times this may not be the case.

The two groups or categories of non-prototypical (or 'polyvalent') meanings of language alternation can be situated either between PR and DR or between T and CS (in the following, I abbreviate the former as PR&DR-CS, the latter as T/CS). One type of PR&DR-CS is what Auer terms *defensive code-switching* (1984b: 71–77). He discusses two similar examples: in both cases, a female teenager is conversing with an adult female in Italian (the preferred language of the adult), and in both cases there is a moment when the girl is apparently embarrassed and produces laughter together with an interjection in German (*ja ja* in one example, *ach so* in the other). According to Auer, "it is evident that [the speaker]'s response to an activity by [the addressee] which is embarrassing to her, and which thus threatens her face, is to switch into the language which she has agreed to avoid for [the addressee]'s benefit, but which is her own preferred language"; in such a case, "the speaker on the defensive retreats from the interaction to compose himself or herself" (1984b: 77). Auer evidently sees the switching in these instances as strategic. This case would be comparable for example to Gumperz's personalization/objectivization. The other PR&DR-CS type simply concerns the fact that DR-CS always, or at least in most cases, conveys information as to the speaker's competence and individual preference (Auer 1984b: 78); whether this constitutes a separate 'type' of switching is unclear, since it is widely recognized that CS (similar to other strategies) is often multifunctional.

The final non-prototypical category is T/CS; it consists of those instances where all the prototypical features of either transfer or CS (discussed above) are not present or are simply unclear. In the case of *ill-defined units* (Auer 1984b: 79–81), the distinction between alternation affecting a specific unit or point in interaction is blurred. One notable type is formed by instances where the speaker provides a one-word reply in L2 to a question in L1. The addressee may interpret this either as an attempt to renegotiate the language of interaction (=CS) or as the absence of such an attempt (=transfer). In the case of *turn-internal code-switching*, the alternation resembles prototypical CS in the sense that it relates to a point of interaction and not a unit, but it is non-prototypical in the sense that it does not imply that the speaker wants to renegotiate the language of interaction (Auer 1984b: 81). Auer (1984b: 84) notes that frequent switching of this kind "may eventually lead into abolishing the preference for same language talk", which corresponds to the 'CS mode' mentioned in the previous section. Auer (1999) has also called this type of CS *language mixing*. Turn-internal switching often seems to function to organize or structure discourse; it may be used to distinguish between such pairs as setting/events, answer/explanation, new/old, theme/rheme, or different levels of salience in general. This is similar to

Gumperz's message qualification, as interpreted in the previous sections. Finally, *pseudo-translations* are defined as "turn components that 'repeat' what has been said in previous turn components in the other language" (Auer 1984b: 88). The difference between these and turn-reformulations (a type of PR-CS) is that the latter is used for correction, while the former may serve such functions as emphasis, elaboration, or clarification (Auer 1984b: 89–92).

As noted above, there are several points of convergence with the 'meanings' of CS as analysed by Auer and the functions mentioned in 3.1.4.2, and Auer's model may in fact be classified as one type of function taxonomy: the individual functions are brought into a structural relationship by the two pairs of 'interpretive processes'. Although the functions are not necessarily given formal definitions, the advantage of the model is that there are some explicit principles for categorizing them. The main problems with the taxonomy are also similar to those discussed in the previous section; for example, it is not clear why the marking of side-comments (i.e. sequential subordination) and the marking of quotations should not be grouped more closely together, as for example in Zentella's (1997: 94) taxonomy. In both cases, there is arguably a 'predictable' return to the other language after completion of the sequence, and in both cases switching serves to organize discourse. Another issue is that some of the 'local meanings' mentioned are basically what were called 'functions' in the previous section (e.g. the marking of quotations), while others are 'effects' (e.g. switches due to gaps, which *consequently indicate* momentary retrieval problems). In other words, it is not clear whether competence-related CS is analysed as having the function of facilitating communication, of displaying the speaker's lack of competence, or something else. Some of these problems could be addressed by defining the individual functions more rigorously; they are not necessarily inherent to this particular system of categorization.

The problem with 'functions' vs. 'effects' is related to the employment of several different types of explanation in the analyses, mentioned briefly in 3.1.4.2 above. This brings our discussion back to the role of intentionality, and why it should be taken into account in explaining the occurrence of CS. In particular, it provides a way of distinguishing between different types of causes. I illustrate this briefly by means of the causal theory of action. According to Donald Davidson, "[t]he primary reason for an action is its cause" (1963: 686) and "[t]o know a primary reason why someone acted as he did is to know an intention with which the action was done" (1963: 689). Let us, for the purpose of the present argument, accept these proposals, and let us furthermore make a common-sense distinction between the results and causes of actions (although they may, in the case of reasons, contain similar components; see Chapter 4). I propose the following scenario to illustrate the argument:

1. A man wants to split a block of wood in half, so he hits it with an axe, which results in the block of wood splitting in half.

2. While swinging the axe upwards, the man accidentally knocks out his mother-in-law, who happens to be standing behind him.

3. The man notices what has happened, panics, and accidentally drops the axe on his foot, suffering an injury.

The main difference between splitting the block of wood and knocking out the mother-in-law is – from the point of view of ordinary language – that the former was intentional and the latter was not. Both were caused by the swinging of the axe, while the cause of the swinging was the intention of splitting the block of wood (together with the agent's belief that swinging the axe would cause this particular effect). The main difference between knocking the other person out and dropping the axe on his own foot is that the man intended to bring about *something* by swinging the axe, while he did not intend to bring about anything by dropping the axe – 'it just happened'. Whether there is a need to maintain a distinction between 'by-products' and 'plain slips' in all situations is not important for the present argument; some such distinction is nevertheless needed in examining social interactions, and such distinctions cannot be maintained if no mention is made of intentionality. By taking it into account and by analysing the structure of actions, it is possible to uncover differences between various explanation types. For example, it was mentioned above that in some of Auer's examples one may in fact be dealing with 'slips' (although Auer does not discuss this possibility). In turn-reformulations, it is possible that the language choice of the original sequence was due to momentary inattentiveness (cf. grammatical mistakes). Similarly, switches caused by a (momentary) lack of competence certainly indicate something about the speaker's language skills, but this signalling (if we can call it that) need not be intentional or the object of the speaker's conative attitude: it can more properly be analysed as a 'by-product' of the action. Different action and explanation types are discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5 (see in particular sections 4.2.5 and 5.4).

To sum up: the discussion in this section demonstrates that certain central features included in the framework of the present study – the concept of rationality in particular – are also at least implicitly present in the CA approach to CS. The main point of criticism presented here therefore focuses on making the central role of the relevant concepts more explicit. In addition, Auer's model for studying the meanings of CS was analysed and found to be comparable to those function taxonomies which utilize some principled way of organizing the categories. While the CA method is perhaps not suited to the study for example of monologic texts (cf. Hinrichs 2006: 29), some of the concepts discussed here are also applicable to written discourse, especially in the case of dialogues (see e.g. Harjunpää & Mäkilähde 2016; see also

Gardner-Chloros 2018: 29–31). While the present study does not apply the CA method or its conceptual apparatus, it may be noted that the approach developed in Chapter 4 also includes a substantial 'micro-level' perspective.

3.1.4.4   The Markedness Model

To conclude the section on approaches to the functions of CS, I discuss Carol Myers-Scotton's Markedness Model (MM), which is one of the central pragmatic frameworks applied to the study of CS in particular. Although the model was developed initially for the study of CS, its intended applications are much broader (see Myers-Scotton 1998a for illustration). I begin the discussion with an overview of the model itself, including its central concepts and basic structure; this is followed by an examination of the philosophical and methodological foundations of the model. Separate critical evaluations are presented of both the model and its foundations.

Myers-Scotton (1993b: 75) describes the MM as "an explanation accounting for speakers' socio-psychological motivations when they engage in CS", and notes that it includes components drawn from various disciplines. I situate the model among those approaches which aim to integrate either Gricean or neo-Gricean pragmatics with other theories (see Huang 2017: 50), in this case a form of game theory. This characterization will be further substantiated below, but the main connection between the MM and (neo-)Gricean pragmatic theories is the prominent role of implicature.[160] The main idea behind the model is explained as follows:

> The theory behind the markedness model proposes that speakers have a sense of markedness regarding available linguistic codes for any interaction, but choose their codes based on the persona and/or relation with others which they wish to have in place.
>
> (Myers-Scotton 1993b: 75)

> In brief, choices are labeled unmarked when they constitute predicted behavior, given the context; that is, they negotiate the unmarked rights and obligations set for that context. In some sense, they maintain the community's status quo.

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[160]   Myers-Scotton's interpretation of the concept is somewhat unclear because she (1998a: 4) equates implicatures with 'messages of intentionality', and defines intentionality as "the messages conveyed by utterances in addition to those which the utterances literally denote" (1998a: 3). However, she also argues that "[i]ntentionality becomes apparent in implicatures" (ibid.). I discuss intentionality in Chapter 4 below; for present purposes it is enough to note that implicatures are not synonymous with intentions/intentionality, and that implicating/implying X is not synonymous with intending X.

> Choices are marked when they can be seen as negotiations to invoke a rights and obligations set *other than* the unmarked one for the context.
>
> (Myers-Scotton 1998a: 6)

As indicated in these passages, one of the central concepts of the model is *markedness*, which is also an important notion (explicitly or implicitly) in various branches of linguistics (for an overview of markedness in linguistics see e.g. Givón 1995: Ch. 2). Myers-Scotton (1993b: 80) mentions two features which apply to pairs describable in terms of markedness: complexity (i.e. the unmarked form is simpler than the marked one) and frequency (i.e. the unmarked form is more frequent).[161] In terms of CS in the MM, markedness refers to the idea that "the use of a particular code is viewed in terms of the unmarked versus marked opposition in reference to the extent its use "matches" community expectations for the interaction type or genre where it is used: [w]hat community norms would predict is unmarked; what is not predicted is marked" (Myers-Scotton 1998a: 5).[162] In addition, it is presumed that speakers possess a *markedness evaluator*, which provides them with the ability to evaluate linguistic choices according to their degree of markedness, and to infer the implications of different choices along a continuum from more to less marked (Myers-Scotton 1998b: 22).

The other central concept mentioned in the passages quoted is the *rights and obligations set* or *RO set*: "choices are seen as more or less unmarked for a particular rights and obligations set" (Myers-Scotton 1998b: 23; original italics removed). The concept remains somewhat unclear in Myers-Scotton's discussions, but she explains that rights and obligations refer to "what participants can expect in any given interaction type in their community" (ibid.), adding that they are basically another term for norms, and that for any interaction type, there is an unmarked RO set (1998b: 24).[163] Applying the definition of unmarkedness in terms of expectedness, however, produces an odd formulation: for a given interaction type, choices are seen as more or less expected in terms of an expected set of what participants can expect. To elaborate, if RO sets are sets of norms for particular activity types, it seems redundant to stipulate that a particular set of norms is the *expected* set of norms.

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[161]   Givón (1995: 28) makes a further distinction between structural complexity and cognitive complexity; the latter refers to the amount of mental effort required to process a form.

[162]   In 3.1.4.1 it was noted that a distinction needs to be maintained between choices made in conformity with a norm and 'default choices' made merely out of habit. This distinction seems to be absent from the MM. It should also be added that predictability can be understood in a number of different ways, for example as deterministic or statistical (see e.g. Itkonen 1983: 92–95).

[163]   As mentioned in 3.1.4.1 above, Blom and Gumperz (1972: 423) referred to participants' 'rights and duties' in defining the concept of social situation.

Furthermore, it is not clear how the idea of unmarked code choices for unmarked RO sets of particular activity types differs from the idea of domains, or from Gumperz's situational CS (see 3.1.4.1 above).

The explanatory part of the MM consists of one 'global' principle and five maxims. The *negotiation principle* is modelled on Grice's Cooperative Principle (CP; this partly justifies my situating the model among neo-Gricean theories): "Choose the *form* of your conversational contribution such that it indexes the set of rights and obligations which you wish to be in force between speaker and addressee for the current exchange" (Myers-Scotton 1998b: 21). Although Myers-Scotton points out that unlike the CP "the negotiation principle says nothing about interactants as cooperating with each other" (ibid.), the CP clearly needs to be presupposed by the model. The five maxims are the following:

> *The Unmarked Choice Maxim*: Make your code choice the unmarked index of the unmarked rights and obligations set in talk exchanges when you wish to establish or affirm that rights and obligations set.

> *The Marked Choice Maxim*: Make a marked choice which is not the unmarked index of the unmarked rights and obligations set in an interaction when you wish to establish a new rights and obligations set as unmarked for the current exchange.

> *The Exploratory Choice Maxim*: When an unmarked choice is not clear, use switching between speech varieties to make alternate exploratory choices as (alternate) candidates for the unmarked choice and thereby as an index of a rights and obligations set which you favor.

> *Deference Maxim*: Switch to a code which expresses deference to others when special respect is called for by the circumstances.

> *Virtuosity Maxim*: Switch to whatever code is necessary in order to carry on the conversation/accommodate the participation of all speakers present.
>
> (Myers-Scotton 1998b: 26)

The first three maxims all cover similar ground, and their relation to the negotiation principle should be immediately obvious; the two other maxims are 'auxiliary' (Myers-Scotton 1993b: 113). An earlier version of the model (Scotton 1983: 126) included an additional maxim, the *Multiple-Identities Maxim*, which states that speakers should also make exploratory choices in order to establish a multiple identity for themselves. In later versions of the model, this maxim seems to have

been subsumed under the Virtuosity Maxim, since Myers-Scotton (1998b: 26) argues that following it allows speakers to demonstrate their linguistic competence and "show themselves as multidimensional individuals". As mentioned above in 3.1.4.2, Appel and Muysken (1987) classified such switching as fulfilling the expressive function. In another version of the model (Myers-Scotton 1993c), the Unmarked Choice Maxim was replaced by two separate maxims: the *Sequential Unmarked Choice Maxim* and the *CS as an Unmarked Choice Maxim*. Their import will become clear when I discuss the functioning of the individual maxims.

According to the MM, when speakers follow the markedness maxims, their switching pattern can be characterized as falling into one of four types: *unmarked CS*, *sequential unmarked CS*, *marked CS*, or *exploratory CS*. *Unmarked CS* refers to the use of constant switching itself as the unmarked choice (Myers-Scotton 1993b: 117–131), which is similar to Poplack's suggestion of CS itself "as a discrete mode of speaking" (1980: 615) or *intrasituational switching* (2015: 918), or what Auer (1999) calls language mixing (see 3.1.4.2 and 3.1.4.3 above). Myers-Scotton (1993b: 119) notes that this type of switching requires that the interactants are familiar with each other, that they wish to indicate a 'dual membership', that they have a positive attitude towards their linguistic identities, and that they are "relatively proficient" in the languages in question.

In *sequential unmarked CS*, the unmarked RO set changes for some reason, and speakers adapt to this by switching to the code which indexes the new unmarked RO set (Myers-Scotton 1993b: 114).[164] Myers-Scotton includes in this category, *inter alia*, changes in participant constellation (1993b: 115–116), but also the use of quotations, arguing that "[t]he code used in the reported speech is unmarked for the RO set for the earlier conversation" and that this "makes the narration more vivid" (1993b: 117). This corresponds to one of the cases mentioned in 3.1.4.2 above, analysing CS in quotations as the result of a striving for authenticity. As for the category in general, Myers-Scotton also notes the similarity between this type of switching and situational switching as discussed by Blom and Gumperz (1972), but adds that her labelling indicates "that the change in codes is speaker-motivated, not driven by the situation" (1993b: 115). There may, however, be no relevant difference, since Blom and Gumperz argued that "[w]hen within the same setting the participants' definition of the social event changes, this change may be signaled among others by linguistic clues" and that, in those cases, there are "clear changes in the participants' definition of each other's rights and obligation [sic]" (1972: 424). In Auer's model (1984b; see 3.1.4.3 above), the closest equivalent for this category is discourse-related CS used to indicate or produce changes in footing.

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[164] Again, it is not clear what the difference is between a code which indexes an RO set and a code which is the unmarked index of an RO set.

Marked CS is defined in contrast to unmarked CS: the implied meaning is that the speaker does not wish the unmarked RO set to be in force, and that he wishes the newly indexed set to replace it (Myers-Scotton 1993b: 131). Myers-Scotton argues that the general reason for engaging in marked CS is to "negotiate a change in the expected social distance holding between participants" (1993b: 132); the more specific functions include for example expressing authority or anger, excluding participants, or bringing about an aesthetic effect (1993b: 132–142). In Gumperz's typology, a similar category would be personalization/objectivization; in Grosjean's list, such individual functions as marking group identity, conveying confidentiality/anger, changing the role of the speaker, and exclusion all cover similar ground (see 3.1.4.2 above). Finally, *exploratory CS* is employed when speakers are not certain which RO set is the unmarked one for the current interaction type, and may need to probe for a suitable choice (Myers-Scotton 1993b: 142–147). Auer's category of participant-related CS covers some of the examples of this kind of switching (see 3.1.4.3 above).

The two auxiliary maxims play special roles in the model, both of them complementing the Unmarked Choice Maxim: the Deference Maxim instructs participants to choose forms which are polite, while the Virtuosity Maxim instructs speakers to switch in order to enable more interactants to participate in the conversation (Myers-Scotton 1993b: 147–149). My main criticism concerns the status of these maxims within the overall model: they are not directly related to the negotiation principle. Both of them could instead be included under Grice's (1975: 47) extremely simple politeness maxim (i.e. "Be polite"), or for example under Leech's (1983) Politeness Principle (for politeness in general, see section 3.2 below). Their explanatory force is also fairly limited; they do not in themselves explain for example why certain linguistic acts count as polite behaviour. In other words, one would need to supplement the model with some type of politeness or face theory.[165] This is not a problem in itself, of course, but in a more comprehensive framework, the auxiliary maxims would become superfluous.

I next discuss the philosophical/methodological foundations of the MM. If we compare the markedness maxims to Grice's maxims, a few notable differences can be detected in their form; the relevance of these differences is that they bring to the fore certain fundamental differences in the philosophical/methodological status of the models. First, although both the conversational maxims and the markedness maxims can be analysed as (descriptions of) types of *technical norms* or *rationality principles* (see Chapter 4 below), Grice presented his maxims in the form of commands, while all of the markedness maxims (except for the virtuosity maxim)

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[165] For example, no motivation is given for deference other than the fact that in some instances it is required.

take the form of *hypothetical norms* (see von Wright 1963: 10–11).[166] In fact, it would be redundant to formulate the conversational maxims explicitly as hypothetical norms, since they serve the same abstract purpose, while the markedness maxims all cover more specific purposes. Second, and related to the previous point, Grice's maxims are simple and formulated in 'ordinary language' (i.e. they are pre-theoretical), while the three main markedness maxims are fairly complicated and contain theoretical terms. Furthermore, while Grice's individual maxims are simpler than the CP, the three main markedness maxims are arguably more complex and less transparent than the negotiation principle. The upshot is that the two sets of maxims differ greatly in their epistemological status: the conversational maxims are graspable by intuition, while the markedness maxims are perhaps not. Third, similarly to Grice's theory, the MM includes the possibility for speakers to *flout* the maxims: for example, a speaker may flout the Deference Maxim in order to be impolite (Scotton 1983: 127–132). It would be possible to define the Unmarked Choice Maxim and the Marked Choice Maxim in reciprocally negative terms, since flouting one of them means that one is following the other.[167] There are no conversational maxims which present a similar pair, and Grice (1975: 46) himself was doubtful about including for example the Second Maxim of Quantity in the theory, since it could arguably be covered by the Maxim of Relevance.

Myers-Scotton identifies the MM as a type of 'rational actor' (RA) model, or 'rational choice' (RC) approach to CS (Myers-Scotton 1998b; 1999; Myers-Scotton & Bolonyai 2001). She understands rationality in terms of the idea "I do *X* because I hope to achieve *Y*", and norms in terms of the idea "consensus has favored doing *X*; therefore do *X*" (1998b: 35). It may be noted that the term *norm* is used in a somewhat broader sense in the present work (cf. sections 3.1.4.1, 3.2, and 4.2.4; what Myers-Scotton calls 'social norms' seem to amount to what are called *customs* below). In fact, Myers-Scotton's understanding of rationality is also somewhat different from the view espoused in the present work (cf. Chapter 4). Her description of rationality is based on the types of rationality models used particularly in decision theory, game theory, and economics; the most important source for her has been the work of Jon Elster. In the MM, rationality is understood as the agent's assessment of the costs and benefits of any particular course of action (Myers-Scotton & Bolonyai 2001: 5; cf. Li Wei's characterization, discussed in 3.1.4.3). In any given situation the agent has a set of options, and rationality indicates the best possible choice out

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[166]   Briefly: commands take the form *Do X!* while hypothetical norms take the form *In case of Y, do X!* The prototypical form of technical norms is a conditional sentence where the antecedent contains a volitional element and the consequent a deontic element: *If you want Y to be the case, you ought to do X.* Norms are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

[167]   Although Auer (2013) says that in marked CS the speaker flouts the negotiation principle, it is clear that what is flouted (if anything) is the Unmarked Choice Maxim.

of this set (Myers-Scotton 1998b: 34). It is maintained that choices "are best explained by an analysis assuming that choices depend on the speaker's estimation of what choices offer him or her the greatest benefit" (Myers-Scotton & Bolonyai 2001: 6). An action is therefore considered rational "if it appears to optimize outcomes, given the actor's beliefs and values" (Myers-Scotton & Bolonyai 2001: 23). With regard to the analyses themselves, the following claim is made:

> The test that [the interpretations] have some measure of independence from the analyst is the extent to which they are consistent with the rational mechanism that RC theory claims actors use (i.e. check the internal consistency of desires, values, and beliefs and take account of available evidence). At the same time, note that, as an explanation, rationality is not to be confused with objectivity or truth. A rational belief does not have to be objective or true.
>
> (Myers-Scotton & Bolonyai 2001: 15)

The main problem with this approach is that it operates with an overly narrow conception of rationality. The perspective of maximum benefits with minimum costs may be reasonable in economic theory or game theory, but it is not a good fit with our commonsense understanding of ordinary rationality as manifested in our daily lives, in all kinds of ordinary tasks (cf. e.g. Slade 1994). Rationality of this latter sort is more precisely *instrumental rationality* (cf. 3.1.4.3 above), defined in terms of reasoning from ends to means and vice versa (e.g. Gibson 1976; Itkonen 1983; Nozick 1993; Wedgwood 2011). According to the RC view, actors choose those means which they deem to be *optimal* considering their current goals, and this implies that they see the chosen means as *necessary conditions* for achieving their goals. It seems much more natural, however, to assume that in practical reasoning actors choose *sufficient means* to achieve their goals (cf. Itkonen in press), and that this is all that is required in terms of instrumental rationality.[168] Game-theoretical rationality also implies that agents are able to assess all the options available to them, to order them in terms of costs and benefits, and to choose the option which – based on their calculations – results in the best possible outcome.[169] There are several problems with this idea from a commonsense point of view. First, this claim simply assumes that actors have the cognitive capabilities to carry out such presumably

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[168]   Briefly: let Y represent the agent's ends and X some means. In terms of instrumental rationality the agent reasons that *if* he does X, then Y will follow, while in terms of maximal rationality he reasons that *unless* he does X, Y will not follow. The difference is that in the case of instrumental rationality the possibility of other sufficient means is not eliminated.

[169]   The situation is similar in utility theory, where actions are evaluated according to the preferential values and probabilities of their outcomes (see Itkonen 1983: 67–68 and references therein).

highly complex calculations. Second, in the context of language use in particular, it may be possible to state how two different speech acts differ in their meanings, but it is unclear how such differences could be analysed in terms of costs and benefits. For example, if I want to engage in small-talk with someone I have met for the first time, what are the costs and benefits of my asking the other person about his or her line of work, as opposed to asking about his or her personal background, family, or other such matters? Choosing between these acts carries various implications, but it is unclear how these implications are to be analysed in terms of costs and benefits.

The RC approach also erases the distinction between deliberative and non-deliberative actions: the former by definition require more careful planning and perhaps the optimization of rewards, while the latter do not. It is also problematic to assume that rationality (either instrumental or game-theoretical) is *primarily* unconscious (e.g. Myers-Scotton 1998b).[170] If this were the case, we would in the majority of cases not 'know' why we did or are doing something – contrary to common sense. It may also be added that although we have no direct access to our own or others' unconscious mental states or processes, in explaining actions it seems unproblematic to refer for example to agents' volitional and epistemic states (i.e. wishes and beliefs). I add that Auer's (2013: Ch. 3.4) characterization of the MM as "more cognitive in orientation" than for example Fishman's domain-based approach or that of Gumperz is not supported by my interpretation of the model.[171] All the approaches discussed in the present chapter are *social* in orientation, despite the fact that explanations refer to such *prima facie* mental entities as intentions, goals, and beliefs. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

Finally, Myers-Scotton (1998b: 36) argues that "although RA models such as the MM do not claim that people are always rational, they do claim that the assumption of rationality *accounts* for the data". It should be noted, however, that rationality (of either kind) is not in itself an explanation of any particular action; it is a presupposition in the commonsense explanation of actions which makes reference to *reasons*, in other words the above-mentioned volitional-epistemic mental states. Li Wei argues – correctly in my view – that "the assumption of rationality at the level of each individual social actor is not sufficient to explain specific structural phenomena or social conditions in each individual social act" (2005: 377). This is true of both instrumental and game-theoretical rationality. As argued in the present study, to understand an action is to rationalize it, in other words to posit that the action was a means towards a particular goal.

To sum up: the Markedness Model presents the most theory-oriented of all approaches discussed in section 3.1.4. While my discussion has been fairly critical,

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[170]   Cf. Gumperz's argument, mentioned in 3.1.4.1 above, as to metaphorical CS being unconscious.

[171]   The characterization does, however, aptly describe the MLF model (see 3.1.2 above).

the merits of the model are obvious. For example, although Myers-Scotton mentions individual functions in her studies, the main aim of the model is not to merely list or even classify functions, but to account for them within an explicit theoretical framework. In addition, the model provides an illuminating generalization by covering basically all language use; it is not a CS-specific model. One of the weaknesses of the model, however, is that it is not well suited to account for strategies such as discourse organization, since switching in such cases has nothing to do with the rights and obligations of the interactants (unless the notion is understood in extremely broad terms). Nevertheless, it is clear that markedness in general is a useful explanatory tool in accounting for some of the functions of CS. My philosophical and methodological critique was focused in particular on the concept of rationality and its role in the model. I argued that rather than game-theoretical 'maximal rationality', analysing linguistic actions should make reference to instrumental rationality of the means-ends type, even if this type of rationality is not in itself an explanation for an action but merely a necessary part of such an explanation.

3.2   Face and face-work

Section 3.1.4 provided an overview not only of some of the major approaches to analysing the functions of CS, but also of the broad inventory of function types identified in previous research. As previously noted, explanations for the occurrence of multiple languages within a single communicative event (or for the choice of language according to the situation) can vary at a number of levels. At one level, there is a distinction between explanations which refer to the *cause* of switching (e.g. triggering, gaps in competence) and those which refer to the *goal* of switching (e.g. to elicit a particular response from the addressee). The functions of CS fall, strictly speaking, within the latter group (cf. 5.4 below). At another level, the distinction is between functions related for example to the textual level (as in the case of discourse organization and highlighting) or to the interpersonal level (as in the case of identities and roles).[172] As demonstrated above, many of the previously identified functions of CS are situated at this interpersonal level; this type of usage is arguably one of the most important aspects not only of CS but also of a number of other linguistic strategies. In this section, I introduce a set of concepts to account for this aspect of communication. As in the preceding section, I discuss many of the concepts in detail,

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[172]   These levels are roughly equivalent to the textual and interpersonal *metafunctions* (i.e. uses of languages) in Systemic Functional Linguistics (see e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 30–31) as well as the textual and interpersonal *rhetorics* in Leech's (1983) model of pragmatics.

as to set the stage for the development of a clearly defined and well-founded framework for the present study.

The conceptual inventory to be introduced is connected to such informal notions as 'self', 'identity', 'person', 'persona', 'social role', and 'relationship'. Aspects of language use may be part of one's self-image or identity; they may index something about the type of person one is, the persona one has assumed, or the social role which one is enacting; and they play a central role in managing social relationships. The main theoretical concept to be discussed is *face*, which refers roughly to a person's public self-image.[173] Face is a mainstay in the conceptual apparatus of sociology, sociolinguistics, and related disciplines, and has often been applied in the analysis of various linguistic strategies. Nevertheless, face has also been conceptualized and defined in various (and sometimes mutually incompatible) ways. In the following sections I discuss some of the most important of these definitions and develop the notion further, so as to apply it in the textual analyses presented in Chapter 5.

In the context of sociology, the seminal discussion of the concept of face and its role in interaction was provided by Goffman (1967). In the study of language use, however, the concept of face most often applied has been that proposed in Brown and Levinson's (1987) *politeness theory*; further work on the concept has similarly been undertaken by researchers focusing in particular on politeness (and impoliteness) in language use. In fact, as I will argue below, Brown and Levinson's model should be seen more broadly as a theory of face-related (linguistic) actions. Since politeness itself is not the focus of the present study, I concentrate for the most part on the theoretical basis of their model and its central concepts. In the present work, I propose to treat face by combining certain insights both from Goffman and from Brown and Levinson, while also taking into account more recent developments in the field. The first two sections discuss the above-mentioned theories, while section 3.2.3 focuses on more recent proposals and additional concepts. I also briefly outline a framework for analysing face in terms of both person and persona, or identity and social 'mask'.

3.2.1   Goffman's conceptualizations of face and face-work

The focal point of Goffman's work was an attempt to account for specific features of social interaction, in particular face-to-face communication. He conceptualizes the self (or person) as a 'sacred object', and interaction as ritual activity (Goffman 1967: 19). Goffman (1967: 5) defines *face* as "the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact", while a *line* is "a pattern of verbal and nonverbal acts by which

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[173]   The *prima facie* contradictory characterization of face as both a social and a mental entity will be discussed in the following section.

he expresses his view of the situation and through this his evaluation of the participants, especially himself". During an interactive event, a person may *maintain face*, *be in the wrong face*, *be out of face*, or *be shamefaced* (Goffman 1967: 6–9). When a person *maintains face*, the line he adopts is – one might say – logically consistent, epistemically coherent, and empirically verifiable; in other words, the line taken by the person does not conflict with his previous (public) actions, the judgments of other participants, or other available evidence. If such conflict arises, the person is *in the wrong face*. If the situation is one in which a particular type of line is expected or required of the person without actually being available to him, the person is *out of face*. In essence, if a person is out of face, any move expected by the other participants or socially sanctioned in the situation would place him in the wrong face. Such events may be emotionally challenging to the interactant, leading to anxiousness, embarrassment, and feelings of shame, in which case the person becomes *shamefaced*.

At several points, Goffman stresses the social (as opposed to mental or physical) and emergent nature of face, noting that it is "diffusely located in the flow of events in the encounter" (1967: 7) and that, although a person's "social face can be his most personal possession and the center of his security and pleasure, it is only on loan to him from society; it will be withdrawn unless he conducts himself in a way that is worthy of it" (1967: 10). These provisions do not necessarily entail that face has no existence outside interactive events, but merely that face is a social or intersubjective entity in the same sense as institutions (cf. the Durkheimian idea of 'social facts').[174] Face 'being on loan from society' can be understood in terms of one's ability to maintain face: other interactants will not necessarily sustain a particular face for a person if that person does not adopt lines consistent with this face. Maintaining face, in other words, is what Clark (1996) calls a *joint project* (see 4.3.1 below). The mental aspect of face should nevertheless not be downplayed, since it is arguably the case that a person's self-image is intricately connected to the face to which he is emotionally attached.

Goffman defines *face-work* as "the actions taken by a person to make whatever he is doing consistent with face", noting that the goal of face-work is to balance out

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[174] See Durkheim (1919); especially p. 6: "Le système de signes dont je me sers pour exprimer ma pensée, le système de monnaies que j'emploie pour payer mes dettes, les instruments de crédit que j'utilise dans mes relations commerciales, les pratiques suivies dans ma profession, etc., etc., fonctionnent indépendamment des usages que j'en fais. […] Voilà donc des manières d'agir, de penser et de sentir qui présentent cette remarquable propriété qu'elles existent en dehors des consciences individuelles". Similarly, Lagerspetz (1995: 14) notes that "[c]onventional facts are like natural facts in the sense that they are not dependent on the beliefs and actions of any particular individual. They are unlike natural facts in the sense that they are dependent on the beliefs and actions of all relevant individuals".

acts or events which threaten face (1967: 12). This presumably includes actions taken to enable other participants to maintain their faces. The activities handled through face-work are referred to as 'interpersonal rituals' (Goffman 1967: 57). Every member of a society is expected to have specific qualities or capacities which play a role in face-work (Goffman 1967: 9–14). One of these is *self-respect*, which refers to one's commitment to maintain the self-image which his face allots him. Goffman further notes that when the reason for this commitment is a duty to oneself the appropriate term is *pride*, while for example a duty to a broader social unit is termed *honour*. In addition to self-respect, a person should also exhibit *considerateness* by empathizing with his interlocutors and striving to maintain their faces. Although Goffman (1967: 12) notes that "maintenance of face is a condition of interaction, not its objective", people may have various reasons for wanting to maintain their own or their interlocutors' face: they may be attached to a certain face, they may be guided by some particular norms such as moral principles, or they may view it in an instrumental fashion as a means for further goals. In addition to the above-mentioned two capacities, members of a society are also expected to possess face-work skills (or *savoir-faire*) and *perceptiveness*: an awareness of how acts in social interaction are to be interpreted, and may be interpreted by others.

The four capacities are not only relevant for explaining the logic behind face-work; they can also be used as variables in describing different types of persons and in particular certain social 'pathologies', which arise when a person possesses or exhibits any of the four capacities either excessively or insufficiently:

> Too little perceptiveness, too little *savoir-faire*, too little pride and considerateness,[175] and the person ceases to be someone who can be trusted to take a hint about himself or give a hint that will save others embarrassment. Such a person comes to be a real threat to society; there is nothing much that can be done with him, and often he gets his way. Too much perceptiveness or too much pride, and the person becomes someone who is thin-skinned, who must be treated with kid gloves, requiring more care on the part of others than he may be worth to them. Too much *savoir-faire* or too much considerateness, and he becomes someone who is too socialized, who leaves the others with the feeling that they do not know how they really stand with him, nor what they should do to make an effective long-term adjustment to him.
>
> (Goffman 1967: 40)

I suggest that a person who does not possess any of the four capacities sufficiently could be termed 'unreliable', since the other members cannot rely on the person to

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[175] Note that 'pride' should here be replaced with the broader term 'self-respect'.

maintain face adequately, while someone who has too much *savoir-faire* could be termed 'ambiguous'. The four capacities, and the related 'pathologies', are summarized in Table 2 below. In addition to constituting these 'pathology' types, the particular manifestations of the four capacities could be used as variables to describe and account for problems which arise in interaction. Certain stock characters of drama can also be described along roughly the same lines: for example, clowns, fools, and bumpkins exhibit either too little pride or too little perceptiveness. In the former case, they do not care if they appear foolish, while in the latter they may simply not realize it.

Table 2. Goffman's (1967) taxonomy of social capacities and their 'pathological' outcomes (with the additional categories 'ambiguous' and 'unreliable').

Capacity	Contents	Excessive	Insufficient
self-respect	conviction to maintain own face	thin-skinned	unreliable
perceptiveness	interpretative skills	thin-skinned	unreliable
considerateness	conviction to maintain others' faces	ambiguous	unreliable
savoir-faire	face-work skills	ambiguous	unreliable

Goffman does not provide an extensive taxonomy of acts which threaten face; instead, he discusses three basic types which have wide currency (Goffman 1967: 14): *unintentional offences* ('*faux pas*'), *intentional offences*, and *incidental offences*. These correspond roughly to the three types of actions discussed in 3.1.4.3, i.e. intentional actions, 'plain slips', and 'by-products', although Goffman's incidental offences refer to results which were produced by the agent knowingly but not maliciously.[176] The types of face-threat can be further analysed from the point of view of a particular person, in terms of whether they were produced by the person himself or other participants, and whether they threaten the face of the offender or of someone else. Face-work directed at maintaining one's own face is termed *defensive*; face-work directed at maintaining that of others is *protective* (Goffman 1967: 14–15). As might be expected, the appropriateness of a particular face-work strategy is determined by the conjunction of these variables. For example, if one unintentionally insults another participant, the appropriate course of action may be to state one's lack of intention and possibly apologize, thus restoring the social equilibrium, but if someone intentionally threatens his own face (e.g. by demeaning himself), the obligation for face-work falls on the shoulders of the other interactants.

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[176] Another way to clarify the logical structure of these three types of offence is to describe them in terms of wants and beliefs (see 4.2.5 below for discussion).

Goffman's taxonomy of face-work strategies consists of two basic types or 'processes': the *avoidance process* and the *corrective process*. The former refers to a conglomeration of strategies whereby a person attempts to avoid the face-threat completely, or at least to ignore it (Goffman 1967: 15–18). This can be achieved by avoiding certain types of encounters (e.g. encounters with particular individuals), or by avoiding making any strong claims about the speaker's own or the interlocutor's face. Defensive strategies include avoidance of potentially 'dangerous' topics, minimization of emotional displays, hedging, and modesty.[177] Protective moves include displays of respect and politeness, discretion (e.g. avoiding 'dangerous' topics), avoiding clear statements of opinion, and adopting a joking manner when performing a potentially threatening act. If a threatening act has nevertheless been produced, the participants may act as if they had not noticed the event.[178] In a sense, this type of non-observance blocks the occurrence from entering the interactional common ground, meaning that it does not need to be managed through other balancing measures.

The corrective process is described by Goffman as a sequence of four phases he calls an *interchange*: the phases are *challenge*, *offering*, *acceptance*, and *thanks* (Goffman 1967: 19–23). When the offence has been produced, the first move is to produce the *challenge*, whereby a participant signals that the threat has upset the interactional equilibrium and the balance must now be restored. Another way to analyse this situation would be to say that a logical inconsistency has entered the social arena and has to be dealt with, to enable the participants to make sense of their bearings and relationships. The second move is the *offering*, where one of the participants (prototypically the offender) performs the actual corrective action. One strategy for this is to redefine either the act – for example as an unintentional slip or a joke – or the face of the offender. In the latter case, the person may indicate that the face which is consistent with the line taken is not to be taken seriously (an example might be sarcasm), or that the definition of the person's face matches the adopted line after all, although others had expected something different.[179] For example, if a person spills his coffee, he may posit that he has shaky hands and that this is a common occurrence for him. Another strategy is to provide compensation to the threatened person, in the form of material, psychological, or social goods. The

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[177] See also Cupach and Metts (1994: 6–7) on *preventive face-work*.

[178] Even if the occurrence of the threat is acknowledged, the person whose face is threatened may choose to treat it as a 'non-threat' by using *poise*, "the capacity to suppress and conceal any tendency to become shamefaced during encounters with others" (Goffman 1967: 9). By suppressing one's own feelings of shame, the person is also able to suppress the others' (empathy-driven) feelings of shame.

[179] Redefining the act as non-serious is perhaps the most obvious one available to people other than the offender; it resembles some of the above-mentioned avoidance strategies by acknowledging the threatening act but dismissing it as non-threatening after all.

offender can also engage in self-punishment, which presumably covers such actions as apologizing and self-reproach.[180] The third move is *acceptance*, whereby the offended member accepts the offering and deems it satisfactory so as to neutralize the threat. The final move, *thanks*, involves the offender expressing gratitude for the acceptance move. The third move in particular is crucial for maintaining interpersonal relationships: it gives power to the other participants, eliminating the possibility of someone continually offending others while apologizing and simply getting away with it.[181] The corrective chain of events will not of course always unfold in its entirety. Goffman (1967: 22–23) notes that one crucial moment occurs after an act has been challenged: if the offender dismisses the challenge, the challengers may either capitulate or persevere. If they do not pursue the matter, they will not be able to maintain their face. If they hold their ground, they will be able to maintain their own face, but they will also threaten or damage the face of the offender. In this scenario, possible moves include violent retaliation as well as an indignant exit from the interactive event.

As argued at the beginning of this section, the social or intersubjective nature of face in Goffman's theorizing should be understood primarily in the sense that face-maintenance is a cooperative effort (see also e.g. Clark 1996: 292). The subjective aspect of face nevertheless needs to be taken into account as well. Goffman argues that "if a person *wishes* to sustain a particular image of himself and trust his feelings to it, he must work hard for the credits that will buy this self-enhancement for him; should he try to obtain ends by improper means, by cheating or theft, he will be punished, disqualified from the race, or at least made to start all over again from the beginning" (1967: 42–43; emphasis added).[182] An example of cheating might be exaggerating claims about one's accomplishments. The cooperative nature of face and face-work is evident from the fact that maintaining one's own face depends on other members of the social group, which provides incentive to maintain others' faces as well. Nevertheless, the 'aggressive' aspect of social behaviour is also

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[180]   For a further list of strategies, see e.g. Cupach & Metts (1994: 8–12).

[181]   It is somewhat paradoxical that in some cases it may be beneficial for a person to intentionally produce a face-threat, pretend that it was produced unintentionally, and go through the corrective process, since someone who is able to self-castigate himself when it is the appropriate course of action displays awareness of his own shortcomings and his alertness to the conventions which govern social interaction (cf. Goffman 1967: 21). A similar strategy might be used to elicit sympathetic displays from other participants. See 3.2.3 below on such 'aggressive uses' of face-work.

[182]   Watts argues that the social nature of face entails that "it cannot be the image that an individual *wishes* to have accepted by the other participants" (2003: 105; emphasis added); this interpretation, however, is not supported by Goffman's broader discussion, as demonstrated here. Similarly, according to Cupach and Metts (1994: 3; emphasis added), when an interaction occurs "the individual offers an identity that he or she *wants* to assume and *wants* others to accept".

included in Goffman's model. For example, one way to attack another person is to threaten their face and attempt to 'destroy' it (Goffman 1967: 24–25, 39); Goffman, however, does not develop a separate apparatus for analysing these aggressive behaviours.

Finally, the theory includes the possibility of participants 'sharing' a face (Goffman 1967: 5, 42). Goffman does not develop this idea in detail, but in essence a person may act as and be considered a representative of some broader social group (e.g. social class, profession, ethnic group). In such cases, the person's actions may threaten the face of others who identify as members of the same group, and conversely any positively appraised actions may also accrue social capital to the other members. Rather than claiming that these people 'share' a face, however, a more transparent formulation could be to say that people may share some *aspects* of face: depending on the context, some specific aspect may be more salient than others. This reconceptualization of face is compatible with the way Goffman treats social roles. He notes, first, that an individual "does not participate as a total person but rather in terms of a special self", and, second, that "during face-to-face encounters individuals may participate officially in more than one capacity" (Goffman 1967: 52; cf. 1981: 155–156). Similarly, rather than having regard for a person *in toto*, it is possible to appreciate a person in a particular capacity, such as when he assumes the role of performing a particular profession (see Goffman 1967: 59). What people may share, then, are traits connected to specific roles, which they assume through the faces they maintain. The concept of 'sharing' a face is closely related to the idea that people's self-image is constituted by both their *personal identity* (i.e. identity without reference to any particular social group) and their *social identities* (i.e. identities with reference to particular social groups) (see e.g. Brown 1986: 551–574). One's self-esteem rises or falls according to the fortunes of the groups one identifies with, and one can also directly affect the status of these groups for example by acting as an identified member of them.

To sum up: Goffman's theory provides a useful tool-set for analysing interpersonal actions, in particular for classifying those acts in terms of the public self-images maintained by the participants. As will be demonstrated in the following sections, others have developed more fine-grained taxonomies of both face-threats and face-work strategies; however, they may lack some of the flexibility which is inherent in Goffman's model.

3.2.2 Face in Brown and Levinson's politeness theory

Brown and Levinson's *politeness theory* attempts "in the first place to account for the pan-cultural interpretability of politeness phenomena, broadly defined" (1987:

283).[183] This refers to their observation, first of all, that across cultures it is possible to recognize the type of activity people are engaged in not by the content of their utterances but by the ways these are formulated; secondly, strategies for performing many types of acts (such as requests, offers, or complaints) are remarkably similar in unrelated languages and cultures (Brown & Levinson 1987: 56–57). The purpose of the theory is to account for these observations by postulating certain universal features of people as social actors. While the focus of Brown and Levinson's study is on linguistic strategies for politeness, the model they develop is in effect "a tool for describing […] the quality of social relationships" (1987: 55). One could also describe the theory as a model of face-work in Goffman's sense, or face-related action more generally. I return to this point in 3.2.3, in connection with criticism directed at the model.

Brown and Levinson (1987: 61) propose that "all competent adult members of a society have (and know each other to have)" *face* and *rationality*.[184] They define *face* as "the public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself", and argue further that face consists of two aspects: *negative face*, "the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction – i.e. to freedom of action and freedom from imposition", and *positive face*, "the positive consistent self-image or 'personality' (crucially including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants" (ibid.). They also formulate these concepts in terms of specific *wants*: negative face is analysed as "the want of every 'competent adult member' that his actions be unimpeded by others", positive face as "the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others" (Brown & Levinson 1987: 62). In everyday terms, the former refers to the desire to act of one's free will, the latter to the desire to be liked, admired, respected or revered by others and to receive deference from them, in the sense of Goffman (1967: 56–58; cf. Mäkilähde 2018a: 307). *Rationality* refers to "certain rational capacities, in particular consistent modes of reasoning from ends to the means that will achieve those ends" (Brown & Levinson 1987: 61); more precisely, this is instrumental rationality, as discussed above in 3.1.4.3 and 3.1.4.4; see also Chapter 4 below.

The premises that (i) all members of a society possess the above-mentioned attributes, and (ii) that knowledge of this fact is 'mutual knowledge' among them –

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[183] The theory was originally formulated in a paper published in 1978, and later published with few modifications but with a lengthy introduction as the 1987 volume. I refer here exclusively to the latter source.

[184] To be precise, they propose to construct a 'model person' who possesses these attributes (Brown & Levinson 1987: 58). However, as noted by Leech (2014: 25), "even if abstract and hugely influenced by social context, face has to be considered a psychological property of real people". I argue in Chapter 4 that this is also true of rationality (as the term is understood in the present work), although it should be added that face is of course not solely a psychological property.

or *common knowledge* (Lewis 1969)[185] – entail that it is generally beneficial for all members to maintain each other's faces in interaction, since it is the only way for a member to maintain his own face (Brown & Levinson 1987: 61). As noted above, a similar dependence on others is built into Goffman's face theory, and there is also intuitive support for it. This does not imply that people never find it advantageous to refrain from maintaining others' faces, but simply that fulfilling the above-mentioned two wants prototypically depends on cooperation. Although Brown and Levinson (1987: 61–62) suggest that face is a universal feature, they add that the content of face may differ from one culture to another: for example, the order of importance between positive and negative face varies, and there may be differences in how freedom of action is understood and which aspects of personality are generally considered socially relevant. They also clarify the notion of positive face wants, noting that the relevant wants may be ones which have already been fulfilled (i.e. they include what the person currently values about himself), and that people will generally want their wants to be desirable to particular (sets of) persons (Brown & Levinson 1987: 62–64). It seems, then, that the concept of *want* in this context is roughly coterminous with *pro-attitude*; the term is sometimes used in reference to any kind of positive attitude towards actions, events, or states (see e.g. Davidson 1963: 683; Mortimore 1976: 95).

In order to satisfy their face-wants, and to achieve anything in general, people will inevitably threaten each other's or their own face; they will perform *face-threatening acts* (FTAs) (Brown & Levinson 1987: 65). Politeness is seen primarily as an instrument for 'softening' or neutralizing FTAs, which is comparable to Goffman's treatment of face-work strategies as threat-avoidance or threat-neutralization. FTAs can be further categorized according to whether they threaten S's or H's face, and whether they threaten positive or negative face (cf. again Goffman's typology of face-threats above); certain act types are also considered to be intrinsically face-threatening (Brown & Levinson 1987: 65–68). Acts which threaten H's positive face include those which indicate negative evaluation of H's face (e.g. criticism, insult, ridicule) or indifference towards H's face (e.g. expressions of violent emotions, mention of taboo topics, boasting, disregard for cooperation). Those which threaten H's negative face include acts which predicate a future act on the part of H (e.g. orders, requests, threats), predicate a future act on the part of S that will be beneficial to H (e.g. offers, promises), or indicate S's 'desire' towards H or H's goods (e.g. compliments, envy, expressions of negative emotions towards H).[186] The reason that offers and promises constitute FTAs is that they "put some pressure on H to accept or reject them, and possibly to incur a debt" (Brown &

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[185]   For the relevance of common knowledge for language use in general, see e.g. Itkonen (1983: 73–76, 164–166); Clark (1996).

[186]   Cupach and Metts (1994: 19–21) present a partly similar list of 'types of predicaments'.

Levinson 1987: 66). Indications of desire towards H's goods as FTAs may seem counterintuitive, but the idea is that H may feel pressure for example to give the object of desire to S (ibid.). Expressions of negative emotions imply potential harm directed at H; they should arguably be analysed as a separate category, since displays of anger and hatred do not contain a desire towards H's goods in the same sense as expressions of envy. Acts which threaten S's positive face include apologies, acceptances of compliments, breakdown of physical control, self-humiliation, admissions of guilt, and emotion leakage, while S's negative face is threatened by expressions of thanks, acceptances of offers, and unwilling promises.

Although Brown and Levinson present the FTA types in terms of this four-way categorization, they also note that some acts threaten both positive and negative face (e.g. complaints) or both S's and H's face. The latter seems to be the case in many pairs or chains of actions, or what Goffman termed interchanges, such as an offence followed by an apology followed by an acceptance of the apology (see e.g. Clark 1996: 207–209; cf. 4.3.1 below). FTAs also differ greatly in how serious the threat is from a commonsense perspective; for example, without any additional contextual variables, insults are – *ceteris paribus* – intuitively more threatening than offers (at least for example in British culture). Brown and Levinson (1987: 74) also introduce three sociological variables that can be used to calculate the severity of an FTA: the social distance (D) of S and H, the relative power (P) of H over S, and the absolute ranking (R_x) of the imposition x in the relevant culture. They emphasize (1987: 74–76, 78–80) that only the values presumed by the interactants themselves are relevant, and that the intensity of each variable depends on the situation: these are not constant values even within stable dyadic relationships. Brown and Levinson (1987: 76) introduce the following formula for calculating the weightiness (W_x) or severity of an FTA x:

$$W_x = D(S,H) + P(H,S) + R_x$$

The model assumes by definition that S and H are able to work out the formula and consider its implications. Depending on both the weightiness of an FTA and the factor which is the primary cause of the weightiness, the politeness strategies chosen may differ. The taxonomy of politeness strategies is further subordinated to a more general schema for performing FTAs. Brown and Levinson (1987: 68–71) order the strategies for doing FTAs as a chain of options, where certain choices again resemble Goffman's face-work processes (Figure 3).

Figure 3.   Decision chain for FTAs. Adapted from Brown & Levinson (1987: 69 Fig. 1).

The first choice is between doing and not doing the FTA; the latter is similar to Goffman's avoidance process, and is predicted to be chosen when W_x is high. If S decides to do the FTA, the next choice is between *off-record* and *on-record* strategies, the former of which are in effect conversational implicatures. By choosing this option, S avoids making any clear commitment to the implicature (since it is cancellable), but there is also a risk involved, since H has the option of ignoring the implicature. On-record strategies occur either without redress (i.e. as straightforwardly as possible) or with redress in the form of positive or negative politeness. Brown and Levinson characterize *redressive action* as 'giving face' (cf. Goffman 1967: 9), which amounts to satisfying H's face wants. *Positive politeness strategies* satisfy H's positive face wants, *negative politeness strategies* H's negative face wants. Off-record strategies also satisfy H's negative face wants, and to a higher degree than negative politeness because H has the option of not acknowledging the threat, while in the case of negative politeness the existence of the threat is already a public matter (i.e. part of the common ground). Brown and Levinson (1987: 71–75) hypothesize that the five basic output strategies form a continuum according to the weightiness of the FTAs that they would typically be used to neutralize, as follows: no redress < positive politeness < negative politeness < off record < refrain from doing the FTA. In addition, different strategies have different 'payoffs': on-record strategies allow S to be clear and demonstrably non-manipulative. As noted above, redress through positive or negative politeness allows the satisfaction of H's corresponding face wants, while forgoing redress completely is efficient. In some contexts, efficient and rapid communication of information is much more important than not imposing on the addressee, for example when warning someone of a falling boulder or an approaching vehicle. In addition to satisfying H's negative face wants, off-record strategies enable S to avoid accountability; depending on the context, however, there may be a risk of appearing manipulative. Finally, foregoing the FTA minimizes the risk of threat completely; according to the model, this would probably

count as an FTA towards S's negative face if he abstains from doing something he wants to do.

Beyond the conceptual tool-kit introduced by Brown and Levinson, the bulk of their work focuses on different linguistic realizations of politeness strategies. Here I present only a brief outline of the major categories. The major positive politeness strategies are *fulfilling H's wants* (giving material or immaterial goods), *indicating that S & H are cooperators* (e.g. offers and promises, using inclusive pronouns, asserting reciprocity), and *claiming common ground with H* (e.g. seeking agreement, joking, using in-group identity markers) (Brown & Levinson 1987: 103–129). Negative politeness strategies include *avoiding making assumptions about H's wants* (questions, hedging), *giving H the option not to act* (being indirect, questions and hedging, being pessimistic), *indicating S's reluctance to impinge on H* (e.g. apologizing, stating the FTA as a general rule), and *redressing H's other wants* (giving deference, going on record as incurring a debt or not indebting H) (Brown & Levinson 1987: 129–211). Off-record strategies are grouped according to the Gricean Maxim which they violate: Relevance (e.g. giving hints about motives or conditions for doing the act, presupposing), Quantity (overstatement, understatement, tautologies), Quality (contradictions, irony, metaphors, rhetorical questions), or Manner (e.g. ambiguity, vagueness, over-generalization) (Brown & Levinson 1987: 211–227).

Next, I illustrate potential applications of the model by way of invented examples. I first demonstrate the relevance of the three sociological variables (D, P, R) in analysing politeness strategies in different contexts by means of the following invented example:

(7)   S: I'm terribly sorry to bother you, but I was just wondering if it would by any chance be possible – and I wouldn't burden you but I'm in quite a pickle...

The utterance contains apologizing, questioning, hedging, minimizing R, indicating reluctance, giving reasons, and circumstantiality. In other words, the utterance is loaded with negative politeness strategies, implying a high value for the weightiness of the FTA (which has not yet been produced). How the act is to be interpreted depends on the three variables, which are derivable from the context (including the co-text); I discuss a few different cases. If the D and P values are assumed to be low, the logical inference would be that R is the variable which causes a high W, meaning that S is going to ask for something very costly to H (e.g. a considerable amount of money, considerable physical exertions, something distressing or morally questionable). If this is what happens, interpreting the act should be straightforward. However, if R is revealed to be low – for example if S simply wants to know the time – H is confronted with a contradiction and needs to resolve it by drawing some

further inferences, in a manner similar to working out conversational implicatures.[187] On the one hand, if everything supports the assumption that D and P are low and S considers them to be low, then a possible interpretation is that S is drawing attention to these facts through irony. In that case the act is meant to be humorous, and it thus serves to maintain, 'reaffirm', or 'give' face (in Goffman's sense). If, on the other hand, something in the context suggests that S is implying that he considers D or P to be higher than has been the case previously, the act may convey the implication that S considers H to have too much self-respect (in Goffman's sense), forcing his equals to treat him as carefully as possible. In other words, this would count as an FTA towards H's positive face.

As Goffman argues, the main unit of face-work is not a single act but the interchange; my second example therefore presents further steps, in addition to S's utterance and H's inferences. It also brings to the fore some of the complexities of applying the model in practice. In the following exchange, S asks H to do something for him and goes on record as incurring a debt. In this example D and P are low, suggesting that S and H are for example friends or acquaintances. The initial analysis is depicted schematically in Figure 4. The numbered levels here refer to the logical structure of the exchange, not necessarily to their temporal or sequential order.[188]

Figure 4.   Schematization of politeness strategies in action (Version 1).

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[187]   Although the explanation of actions is analysed in more detail in Chapter 4, I note at this point that no problem is posed by the fact that "it is relatively easy to imagine other interpretations" (Watts 2003: 65) to analyses such as these. In brief: the whole idea of pragmatic meaning is that it is context-dependent, and by changing the context the meanings ought to change – otherwise they would not be pragmatic. When these types of 'bare-bones' examples are presented, the assumption is that they come with a form of *ceteris paribus* clause; for instance, the example here clearly presupposes that having to tell someone the time is not a great burden, but we could easily come up with contexts where this would be so.

[188]   For the present purpose, an exchange to the effect of "S: *Could you do X?* H: *OK.* S: *I owe you one*." would be analysed similarly.

S performs a request by asking H to do some act A, constituting an FTA towards H's negative face. In addition to using a conventional, negatively polite formulation of the utterance (e.g. *Could you do X?*), S can choose some additional politeness strategy to soften the FTA. S states that he is willing to incur a debt, which is an FTA against his own negative face (since he is now committed to doing something which he may not want to do); at the same time, however, it redresses H's negative face, meaning that H may now be more willing to perform A. If he does so, this satisfies S's positive face wants (since the act implies that H wants S's wants to be fulfilled; see Brown & Levinson 1987: 129).

What this example demonstrates above all is that politeness as conceived by Brown and Levinson is a game of *quid pro quo*: in order to satisfy one's own face wants one will inevitably threaten others' faces. In order to neutralize these threats, S may have to threaten his own face, but in the end, an equilibrium (cf. 3.2.1 above; cf. Leech 1983: 125) is maintained. As for the analysis itself, the implications of most of the actions may seem fairly straightforward, but S's going on record as incurring a debt requires further discussion. Although Brown and Levinson include it in their list of negative politeness strategies and it clearly "performs the function of minimizing the particular imposition that the FTA unavoidably effects" (which is the definition of negative politeness; Brown & Levinson 1987: 129), it may not be immediately obvious how it satisfies H's want to act freely and autonomously; it would seem more appropriate to say that it implies that H will have power over S in the future. This is also how Brown and Levinson analyse the act type. They argue that the satisfaction of H's negative face wants is derivable from it: "if H is more powerful than S, then S will be likely to respect H's preserve; therefore H may be presumed to have the derivative want to be more powerful than S. Also, if S falls into H's debt […], then S will fall […] into H's power, and again be expected to treat H's preserve with more circumspection" (1987: 209). The argument seems plausible, at least *prima facie*; however, it could also be argued that in conjunction with an FTA (as in our example), stating one's willingness to incur a debt 'resets' the power balance between S and H. However the analysis is to be conducted, it is evident that bringing the three sociological variables more explicitly into it clarifies the logical structure of the exchange. An alternative analysis is depicted in Figure 5. For brevity of expression, I here introduce additional *ad hoc* symbols (T1–3 = points of time; G_S = S's goal):

Figure 5.   Schematization of politeness strategies in action (Version 2).

In this formalization, the reason for S's initial act is made more explicit by referring to his pro-attitude towards (H's doing) act A.[189] The temporal points indicated in the figure should again be understood metaphorically; they attempt to show how the 'interpersonal scales' may tip one way or the other. In this analysis, S's request is interpreted as implying that S's power over H is higher than H's over S. As stipulated above, this does not match the understanding of the participants, who assume P values in the present context to be low. The balance can be restored by S stating that H's doing A will actually reverse the roles, implying that an equilibrium will be maintained. It should be added that simply maintaining interpersonal relationships was not of course the main goal of the exchange, but rather the satisfaction of S's wants without upsetting the scales too much.

The final point about this example concerns S's wants that are satisfied at T3, or more precisely their type: are they positive or negative face wants, or can they also be reformulated in terms of D or P values? This seems to ultimately depend both on how broadly face wants are to be understood and on the reason for S to want A. If negative face is understood to include a desire to have a high P value (relative to certain individuals, certain groups, or others in general), then being able to coerce others into obeying one's will would satisfy negative face wants. In this situation, S would not want A in particular, but more precisely to make someone do A. If, however, S wants A because it is desirable in itself (for whatever reason), we are dealing with some kind of 'basic want'. It is unclear whether these wants should be incorporated into positive face wants: one possible argument would be to claim that, since S's wants are part of his 'self-image' (i.e. positive face), then a situation where these wants are not satisfied presents a threat to his positive face due to the contradiction between his self-image and the reality. In this sense, satisfying his basic wants would also fulfil his positive face wants. The problem with this idea is

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[189]   I discuss the two different pro-attitudes alluded to here (by the use of brackets) in Chapter 4. In one case, S wants H to do A; in the other, S wants H to do A *because* S wants A. See also the discussion below concerning the satisfaction of S's wants at T3.

that the fulfilment of these wants does not make them desirable to other members of the society, and therefore these wants should probably not be reduced to positive face wants. If positive face includes wants about one's wants (beyond the want that they be desirable to some others), they turn out to be similar to *meta-wants*, or what Frankfurt (1971) terms *second-order desires*: a person may want to possess or lack certain desires, for example when undesirable wants guide one to perform harmful acts (as in Frankfurt's drug-addict example), or when one knows that those wants are socially unacceptable.[190] In sum, second-order and first-order desires should be clearly distinguished from each other, and other types of wants beyond face wants need to be taken into account.

3.2.3 Exploring and expanding the conceptual inventory

As demonstrated above, implications about face-threat and politeness are highly context-dependent. One type of criticism directed at Brown and Levinson's model has in fact been that there are no intrinsically face-threatening or inherently polite acts (e.g. Watts 2003: 140). Culpeper (2011b: 118) argues that Brown and Levinson are not claiming that the acts they list always produce FTAs; they are merely saying that some acts 'primarily' or 'mainly' threaten face. He therefore suggests that the notion of intrinsic FTAs is 'fuzzy'. It may be noted, however, that when Brown and Levinson state for example that some acts "primarily threaten *H*'s face" (1987: 67), it seems to be as opposed to acts that threaten *S*'s face – not to the same acts when they fail to threaten H's face (and similarly for acts which primarily threaten positive rather than negative face). The 'fuzziness' of FTAs becomes relevant when we move from act types to specific acts and their conventional realizations: commands are intrinsically threatening towards H's negative face, but a command to 'have a nice day' is not interpreted as a genuine command due to its highly conventionalized character, and the ranking of the imposition is therefore quite low.[191] Furthermore, some acts can be considered intrinsically threatening even beyond Brown and Levinson's model specifically. This is the case for example with the speech act of insulting – it is the *function* of an insult to threaten H's positive face. This does not mean that forms which are commonly used to perform insults cannot be used in practice to attain some other ends. I refer back to the tool metaphor introduced above

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[190]   It may be consistent to speak of 'meta-meta wants' in some situations, but there is a danger of multiplying the levels of wants infinitely. For the philosophical relevance of multi-level cognitive phenomena for linguistics in general, see e.g. Itkonen (2003: 113–119).

[191]   The difference is describable in terms of *direct* vs. *indirect speech acts* (e.g. Searle 1979).

(in 3.1.3.3): an axe can be used as a paperweight, but its intrinsic function is to chop wood.

While some support can be brought to bear in defence of the claim that some acts are intrinsically face-threatening, it has also been pointed out that all acts and all situations are *potentially* face-threatening. Goffman (1967: 37), for example, argues that "when a person volunteers a statement or message, however trivial or commonplace, he commits himself and those he addresses, and in a sense places everyone present in jeopardy. By saying something, the speaker opens himself up to the possibility that the intended recipients will affront him by not listening or will think him forward, foolish, or offensive in what he has said".[192] This provision applies to face in both Goffman's and Brown and Levinson's senses. A distinction thus needs to be maintained between those acts and situations which threaten face and those which pose a potential threat; even in the latter case, however, there are differences as to how threatening a situation is considered to be. Another dimension relevant to classifying different types of threats is the intentionality or deliberateness of the threatening act, in other words whether an act is primarily intended to threaten face. As discussed above, Goffman suggested that offences can be divided into three categories: unintentional, intentional, and incidental. Although Brown and Levinson's model can account for these aspects in some ways (for example through the R variable), the framework was not developed specifically for analysing aggressive interaction, and there have accordingly been proposals for a separate framework for such acts, particular for a model of impoliteness.

It is arguably the case that not all FTAs count as 'aggressive' or 'impolite' behaviour, and consequently various other terms have been introduced to refer specifically to acts such as insults. For example, Watts refers to *aggressive face-work* (2003: 259) and *face-damaging acts* (2003: 133), while Culpeper (1996; 2011b: 20–21, 118) prefers the term *face-attacking*.[193] Although Culpeper does not explicitly define face-attacking, he notes that impoliteness "is constituted by words and actions which themselves are taken as damaging face" (2011b: 118); this seems to imply

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[192] Brown and Levinson (1987: 247) note that one variable according to which cross-cultural variation in politeness phenomena may be described is "the extent to which all interactional acts in a culture are considered FTAs, and the different kinds of acts that are so considered", giving as an example the distinction between 'debt-sensitive' and non–debt-sensitive' cultures: in the latter, offers are not highly threatening (because there is no automatic assumption of debt-incurrence), while in the former they can be highly threatening (because it is assumed that the recipient will automatically incur a debt). This point also relates to the above-mentioned intrinsic FTAs.

[193] Although Culpeper notes that Goffman also uses the term 'aggressive face-work', what Goffman (1967: 24–26) meant by 'aggressive uses of face-work' is quite different from what face-attack seem to cover. Under this rubric, Goffman mentions such strategies as fishing for compliments and deliberately becoming the offended party in order to elicit apologies from others.

that face-attacks are actions which 'damage' face (I discuss such terms as 'threat' and 'damage' at the end of the present section). He notes (2011b: 23) that in a previous study he defined impoliteness as those events where S attacks H's face intentionally or H interprets S's act as an intentional face-attack, but that the definition has been revised to eliminate the reference to face-attacks (and to intentionality):

> Impoliteness is a negative attitude towards specific behaviours occurring in specific contexts. […] Situated behaviours are viewed negatively – considered 'impolite' – when they conflict with how one expects them to be, how one wants them to be and/or how one thinks they ought to be. Such behaviours always have or are presumed to have emotional consequences for at least one participant, that is, they cause or are presumed to cause offence.
>
> (Culpeper 2011b: 23)

I comment first on the more practical details of the definition, and focus next on its ontological implications. First, as Culpeper himself notes (ibid.), he is using the term 'impoliteness' here in a technical sense, not as it is used in ordinary language. Behaviours which fall under the term in this context are, in effect, whatever someone finds offensive. If these offensive acts are synonymous with face-attacks, and if face 'damage' is to be understood as the above-mentioned emotional consequences of such acts, it follows that we are ultimately dealing with face more in Brown and Levinson's sense than in Goffman's, since the focus is on the individual's subjective feelings. Culpeper (2011b: 52) rightly notes that intentionality is not a necessary component of acts which should count as impolite (probably also in the everyday sense of the term), since an accidental act can also cause offence, and an act can cause offence accidentally.[194] Similarly, if face-attacks are those acts which manage to cause face 'damage', then it is true that face-attacks can also be either intentional or unintentional. There is, however, a problem in counting as impolite only those acts which manage to cause offence. Deliberate acts of impoliteness such as insults are not always damaging, for example if the addressee misinterprets the utterance (e.g. as a compliment), or indeed if H uses one of Goffman's avoidance strategies to neutralize the threat. Presumably in such cases there is no face damage, while if it is stipulated that an insult automatically causes damage, then there seems to be no difference between a threat (in Goffman's sense) and an attack. For these reasons, I prefer to stress the intentionality of face-attacks; by intentionality in this context I mean simply that it is S's primary aim to threaten or 'damage' H's face.

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[194]   To clarify: by accidental acts which cause offence I mean acts which the agent did not intend to do (at all), by acts which accidentally cause offence those acts which the agent intended to do but by which they did not intend to cause offence (see 4.2.5 below).

Culpeper (1996: 356–357) suggests that, for each of Brown and Levinson's five strategies for doing an FTA (i.e. not doing the FTA, doing it off record, doing it on record without redress, doing it with positive politeness, doing it with negative politeness), there is a corresponding 'impoliteness superstrategy': *bald on-record impoliteness*, *positive impoliteness*, *negative impoliteness*, *sarcasm/mock politeness*, and *withholding politeness*. I note very briefly a minor problem with this list, namely that although Culpeper refers to Brown and Levinson's list of 'politeness superstrategies', they are strictly speaking strategies for doing FTAs; Brown and Levinson do mention the possibility of using a bald on-record FTA to 'destroy' H's face (1987: 69). Hence the 'without redress' category covers the corresponding impoliteness superstrategy as well. The same may be true of sarcasm/mock politeness, since irony (i.e. one way of flouting the Maxim of Quality) is one of the strategies mentioned by Brown and Levinson (1987: 221–222) in connection with off-record strategies for doing an FTA; some of their examples are indeed superficially 'positive' comments, meant to be understood for example as criticism. Finally, withholding politeness is effectively a type of bald on-record FTA – assuming that an 'act' in this context includes intentionally forbearing to do something.[195] The categories of positive and negative impoliteness also include a number of more specific strategies (Culpeper 1996: 357–358; see also Culpeper 2011b: 256), which are basically similar to FTAs directed at H's positive or negative face as discussed by Brown and Levinson. The main difference is that most of the strategies are clearly more 'threatening' than some of the FTA types.[196]

While politeness strategies in Brown and Levinson's theory function to redress FTAs, Culpeper (2011b: 252) argues that "impoliteness has the general function of reinforcing or opposing specific identities, interpersonal relationships, social norms and/or ideologies". He furthermore posits three central functional categories of impoliteness: *affective impoliteness* refers to "the targeted display of heightened emotion, typically anger" (2011b: 223), *coercive impoliteness* "seeks a realignment of values between the producer and the target such that the producer benefits or has their current benefits reinforced or protected" (2011b: 226), while *entertaining impoliteness* is the kind of impoliteness that causes pleasure to an observer (2011b:

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[195]   I use the term *forbear* here in a technical sense. Von Wright's (1963: 45) definition of forbearing is the following: "An agent, on a given occasion, forbears the doing of a certain thing if, and only if, he *can do* this thing, but *does* in fact *not do* it." Culpeper's example of not thanking someone for a present could be represented in von Wright's (1963) logic of norms and actions as follows: O(~pTp) & f(~pTp). Formalizations based on these logics are discussed in section 4.2.5 below.

[196]   Some of the overlapping strategies are also analysed differently in the two lists; for example, Brown and Levinson (1987: 66) mention ridicule as an FTA towards H's positive face while Culpeper (1996: 358) analyses it as an attack towards H's negative face.

234–235). In sum, just as politeness may serve as a means towards some 'higher-level' goal, impoliteness, face-attacks, and intentional FTAs may be employed for a variety of reasons.

Since my primary focus is on face-work in general rather than on politeness/impoliteness in particular, I here present only a very brief sketch of how politeness is conceptualized in the present study. This will also justify my focusing primarily on face-work, which I understand here more broadly as face-related actions (i.e. actions which target face in particular). To begin with, definitions of politeness in previous research have not only been different but of different kinds.[197] Although Brown and Levinson do not provide an explicit definition of politeness, it follows from their analysis of negative and positive politeness (as strategies) that politeness for them is basically FTA redress. In Leech's earlier model (1983: 81), politeness refers to maximizing the expression of beliefs favourable towards H or a third party and minimizing the expression of beliefs unfavourable to them. In the latest version of his model, he provides the following definition: "S, in communicating politely to H, gives (or attributes) greater value to O (the other person(s), who is probably H), than to S" (2014: 50; original italics removed). Watts's approach to politeness is quite different from neo-Gricean approaches such as Brown and Levinson's and Leech's; he adopts a postmodern and 'discursive' framework, arguing that politeness theory should focus on "the ways in which (im)polite behaviour is evaluated and commented on by lay members" (2003: 9). He further proposes a distinction between politeness and *politic behaviour*, understood as behaviour "which the participants construct as being appropriate to the ongoing social interaction" (2003: 20). In his scheme, politeness refers to "behaviour beyond what is perceived to be appropriate to the ongoing social interaction", while impoliteness is "behaviour that is perceived by participants to be inappropriate behaviour" (2003: 21). Furthermore, both polite and impolite behaviour can be evaluated positively or negatively (ibid.). Finally, as noted above, Culpeper defines impoliteness as a type of attitude, but he also notes (2011b: 99) that impolite behaviour is one type of 'inappropriate' behaviour.

In the context of the present work, I propose to conceptualize politeness straightforwardly in terms of norms. Norms of various kinds are often mentioned in connection with politeness and face-work (cf. Brown 2017: 385), as are normative concepts such as 'appropriateness'. My suggestion is simply that the politeness (or impoliteness) of an action is determined by reference to some specific norms; the same point has previously been made for example by Leech (2014: 44).[198] More

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[197] For overviews of various politeness theories, see e.g. Leech (2014: 32–43); Terkourafi (2016); Brown (2017).

[198] Norms are also a central component for example in Terkourafi's (2005) frame-based approach. One notable difference compared to the interpretation presented here is that

specifically, I argue that the relevant norms in this case are what von Wright (1963) calls *customs*. They are "patterns of behaviour for the members of a community", differing from 'mere' regularities in that "they *influence* conduct; they exert a 'normative pressure' on the individual members of the community whose customs they are" (von Wright 1963: 8–9). According to this view, politeness primarily concerns actions; only secondarily beliefs or attitudes. In other words, acts are polite/impolite according to how they relate to the way things *ought to be*, not to the way any one person *thinks* they ought to be. This of course in no way implies that beliefs, attitudes, or lay interpretations are not relevant at all; I would argue that they simply present different viewpoints on the matter: an act can be considered polite both objectively (i.e. by reference to the relevant norms) and subjectively (i.e. how an individual subjectively understands it).

One of the advantages of analysing politeness in terms of norms is that this places it at the same conceptual level as for example correctness, rationality, and legality – the corresponding norm groups in von Wright's taxonomy are *rules*, *directives*, and *prescriptions* (1963: 6–11). Instead of the above-mentioned 'appropriateness', acts governed by any type of norm can be described at a general level more technically as norm-conforming or non–norm-conforming. By comparing the different norm categories with each other, some of their logical and functional properties also become more apparent. As mentioned above, Brown and Levinson characterize politeness in terms of FTA redress, which seems not to characterize the nature of politeness but to capture its function (see also e.g. Cupach & Metts 1994: 8; Leech 2014: 43). In fact, criticism of Brown and Levinson's model should take into account that they set out to explain why people in different cultures diverge from Grice's Cooperative Principle, proposing politeness as the explanation for this. Von Wright does not delve into the functions of different norms, but one possible way to explain them is to note that they control various types of social behaviour (see e.g. Ullmann-Margalit 1977: 9–10), thereby enabling such activities. Customs in general seem to control actions which concern in particular the maintenance of relationships and group-memberships; face-work in general and FTA redress in particular are clearly important aspects of these activities.

The discussion thus far implies (i) that actions can be evaluated in terms of various types of norms, (ii) that actions can be viewed approvingly or disapprovingly for many reasons, and (iii) that politeness is not strictly speaking the most relevant concept in analysing all face-related actions. As a classic example, let us consider Cicero's first Catilinarian Oration: accusing Catiline of conspiracy certainly threatened his face (in both Goffman's and Brown and Levinson's senses); it did not, however, violate any custom whereby it could be termed an impolite act. It might be

I consider these norms to be known intuitively and not – as frames are – by "establishing regularities of co-occurrence in a corpus of spontaneous data" (Terkourafi 2005: 253).

more relevant to question whether the act was for example moral, just, legal, or reasonable. A related issue is that, as noted a number of times in earlier studies, Brown and Levinson's politeness strategies are in fact face-work strategies (e.g. Watts 2003: 93). The point is in fact also made by Brown and Levinson themselves: they argue that "positive-politeness techniques are usable not only for FTA redress, but in general as a kind of social accelerator" (1987: 103), and similarly, negative politeness techniques are "likely to be used whenever a speaker wants to put a social brake on to the course of his interaction" (1987: 130). The various strategies all create certain implications which are useful for neutralizing FTAs, and when used to such ends they are analysed within the theory as instances of politeness. In other words, all politeness strategies count as face-work, but not all face-work counts as politeness. I therefore propose to treat Brown and Levinson's theory as a model of face-work or face-related action more generally, while treating politeness as outlined above.[199]

As a final terminological note, I point out that even when the focus is on face-work, there are problems similar to those discussed above in conjunction with impoliteness. In addition to difficulties with terms such as 'threat' and 'attack', it is also unclear how terms such as 'face damage', 'face loss', and 'face destruction' are to be understood. According to Cupach and Metts (1994: 8), for example, corrective face-work is used to "repair face damage", while Goffman refers to practices used for 'face-saving' when there are 'threats' to face (see e.g. 1967: 19–24). Goffman also speaks of 'sustaining face' (1967: 42), which seems to be synonymous with being in face. Again, 'losing face' for him refers to being in the wrong face, being out of face, or being shamefaced (1967: 9), while someone can 'give face' by arranging for another person to adopt a line more advantageous than this person would have anticipated, which is one way for the person to 'gain face' (ibid.). The term 'face-enhancement' has also been used (e.g. Cupach & Metts 1994: 97, 99; Leech 2014: 99; Mäkilähde 2018a: 308, 313–314) in reference to either acts which help one to maintain (or 'reaffirm') a particular face or which 'give face' to another.

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[199]   Watts's distinction between politic and polite behaviour will not be applied in the present work, as it is incompatible with the interpretation of politeness and face-work as outlined here. First, since I consider polite behaviour to be one type of norm-conforming behaviour, it would in fact fall within the domain of politic behaviour. Phenomena such as everyday greetings, thanking one's host for dinner, and so on, would not count as polite behaviour, which seems counterintuitive. Second, if polite behaviour refers to everything 'beyond' norm-conforming, it seems to follow that all instances of 'social acceleration' would be instances of politeness; here I argue, however, that they are not instances of politeness but of face-work more generally. For additional critique of the politic vs. polite distinction, see e.g. Terkourafi (2005: 252); Leech (2014: 42).

In the present work, I propose to combine certain insights from both Goffman's and Brown and Levinson's conceptualizations of face, in the following loose outline of a framework. As noted above, while Goffman emphasizes the social nature of face, he does not suggest that face is simply something that others bestow upon a person, or that face is something unconnected to a person's own wants. I repeat part of the quotation given above: "if a person wishes to sustain a particular image of himself and trust his feelings to it, he must work hard for the credits that will buy this self-enhancement for him" (Goffman 1967: 42). It also seems to be the case that everyone wants the best possible face for himself – or, more precisely, the best possible face that can be sustained – presumably because this provides the person with the best possible self-image (cf. Goffman [1959] 1990: 15–16). It may therefore be helpful to distinguish between a person's face and *identity*, where the latter refers to the person's own conceptualization of himself or herself. Arguably people want on the whole to 'feel good' about themselves; a state in which one is not happy with one's own self-image is dysfunctional. If the face maintained for a person is somehow worse than his identity, he will presumably view this state negatively, while a face which is somehow better than his identity would be viewed positively (assuming that this face can be easily maintained and the person's identity adjusted accordingly; otherwise the situation may justifiably give rise to anxiety). There is therefore an intimate causal connection between identity and face: when a person enters the social arena, he builds (in cooperation with others) a face to reflect his identity, and the face maintained for him can also affect his identity.

Goffman's theory contains a provision according to which people become attached to their face, and it is worth stipulating explicitly that – on the whole – it is assumed that people want others not only to sustain this image but also to evaluate it positively. This basic want amounts to Brown and Levinson's positive face want. In effect, both positive and negative face wants seem to be basic wants, which can be assumed to be part of everyone's identity to some extent, these wants being reflected in the faces people construe. In different situations, relationships, or contexts, different aspects of one's face may be more salient, important, or relevant than others (cf. 3.2.1 above). It is also possible for a person to maintain quite different social images with different people; it is possible to be completely oblivious to some aspects of another person's face. A metaphorical way of thinking about this is that identity is a person's 'true' visage, while face is effectively a mask he wears: a person's identity is filtered through face into the social world, and social actions affect his identity as filtered through his face. Some parts of this 'mask' may be hidden in certain encounters, and being 'in the wrong face' means basically that parts of the mask are both discernible and incompatible. One may also wear a mask without being attached to it at all, for example when someone infiltrates another

group by assuming a fake identity (i.e. identity in the everyday sense of the term).[200] In that case, the consistency of his face may of course be threatened, but insults directed at the group, a member of which the person only pretends to be, should not be hurtful to him because his face is not connected to his identity. With regard to the above-mentioned problems with terminology, we can now say that one's face is 'damaged' when some aspect of it becomes worse than it was before, and that the face is 'lost' or 'destroyed' when it is no longer possible for the person to don a specific mask –in other words, to maintain a particular combination of features as one's public self-image.

As argued in 3.2.2 above, making the P and D variables more explicit clarifies the logical structure of interpersonal exchanges; rather than referring only to positive and negative face wants, it is fairly straightforward to characterize Brown and Levinson's face-work strategies in terms of what they imply about these variables. The question of whether other variables are needed will be addressed implicitly in the textual analyses. It can already be suggested at this point, however, that an additional variable may be needed at least to account for one's *social status*, which is of course connected to the P variable but is arguably not coterminous with it (but cf. e.g. Slugoski & Turnbull 1988: 103). It has also been suggested that the D variable may need further analysis. For example, Slugoski and Turnbull (1988) demonstrated that, instead of the social distance between S and H, in some cases the degree to which an utterance is considered complimentary or insulting depends on the perceived level of *affect* between S and H, in other words how much they like or dislike each other (see also Brown & Gilman 1989). More importantly, their research shows that affect and intimacy (i.e. low D value) operate in opposite manners: high intimacy implies less politeness, while high affect implies more politeness. Slugoski and Turnbull (1988: 117) also note, however, that it is difficult to separate the two variables from each other, leading to scepticism as to the possibility of simply inserting affect as an additional variable into the FTA weightiness formula. They further note that "for subjects to attribute extremes of affect to personal relationships it appears, as a precondition, that the relationship must be high in intimacy" (ibid.), which is consistent with the intuitively odd case that S and H are distant (in the sense of 'not intimate') but still like each other. What may also be at issue here is that Brown and Levinson's D value does not explicitly distinguish between distance in the sense of familiarity and in the sense of membership in the same (minimal) social group. The distinction may be clarified by means of the concept of *common ground* (e.g. Clark 1996): in the former case the relevant part of common ground consists of shared experiences and knowledge, in the latter it consists of shared attributes. As far as affect goes, it is clearly an important variable to be accounted for in the

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[200] Familiar examples are situations described e.g. in espionage fiction.

explanation of actions, but its role in politeness theory is unclear. If, as proposed above, politeness is understood in terms of norms, the following hypothesis may be suggested: actions relevant to these different variables are governed by different types of norms. Customs, for example, dictate what one ought to do in a situation where D is this and P that, while technical norms or rationality principles dictate what one ought to do if one wants to show that one likes another person. I emphasize that this is a hypothesis, not a working solution.

To sum up: while my approach relies heavily on Goffman's conceptualization of face, Brown and Levinson' model complements it with positive and negative face (interpreted here as 'basic' wants) as well as with its sociological variables. In addition, their taxonomies of FTAs, FTA strategies, and face-work strategies will be relied upon in the textual analyses.

I conclude section 3.2 by emphasizing the relevance of face for understanding the interpersonal functions of CS. As noted above in 3.1.4, many previous studies have either applied the concept explicitly or have relied on some similar notion implicitly. In terms of the three early function taxonomies discussed at the beginning of 3.1.4.2, face is directly relevant to at least the following functions: personalization/objectivization (Gumperz 1982); specifying speaker involvement, marking group identity, conveying confidentiality/anger, changing the role of the speaker (Grosjean 1982); EXPRESSIVE: mixed identity, METALINGUISTIC: showing off, DIRECTIVE: inclusion/exclusion (Appel & Muysken 1987). Furthermore, as noted above, Auer (1984b) refers sporadically to face and face-threats, while the Markedness Model (e.g. Myers-Scotton 1998b) includes a specific Deference Maxim.

Finally, Brown and Levinson (1987: 110–111) also discuss CS as a positive politeness strategy, namely a subtype of in-group identity markers. This strategy basically equals implying a low D(S,H) value; it can also function without an FTA as the above-mentioned 'social accelerator'. I have argued elsewhere (Mäkilähde 2018a) that CS as an instance of this positive politeness category is a subtype of a more general 'solidarity' function of CS; I comment further on it in Chapter 4. What is particularly relevant for the present discussion is that in Brown and Levinson's model CS occupies a place within this broader category of in-group identity markers; these markers provide a useful point of comparison for understanding how CS is similar to or distinct from other discourse strategies. The strategies they mention include address forms, jargon/slang, and contraction/ellipsis (Brown & Levinson 1987: 107–112). Furthermore, since address forms can also be used to convey deference by indicating that P(H,S) is high (Brown & Levinson 1987: 178–184), it is worth considering whether CS can also be used to achieve a similar effect. Indeed, the concepts of face and politeness (as well as several of the models discussed above) have been fruitfully applied in many studies of historical data, with a variety of

linguistic strategies and text-types (see e.g. Brown & Gilman 1989; Nevala 2004; 2010; Mazzon 2009; Jucker 2011; see also the papers in Culpeper & Kádár, eds., 2010). In the present study, this will be achieved by supplementing the textual analyses of language choice and CS with two brief comparative analyses: one in terms of form-to-function mapping of CS and address forms in a single text, another in terms of function-to-form mapping in general.

4   Philosophical and methodological analyses

Understanding the philological-pragmatic approach

The preceding chapter set out, on the one hand, to provide a critical overview of theories and approaches relevant for the present topic, on the other, to highlight specific problems and suggest tentative solutions to them. In this chapter, I delve more deeply into the latter, by way of philosophical and methodological analyses of the approach adopted in the present study. The term 'methodology' is used in this context in the sense of "the philosophy of scientific method" (von Wright 1971: 3): the analysis aims at establishing the philosophical basis of the approach and of the methods employed. It can also be called *metatheoretical*, if metatheory is taken to include the philosophy and methodology of a particular discipline. The inclusion of analyses of this type in a work whose focus is not solely philosophical may initially appear surprising; I begin therefore by briefly justifying this mode of inquiry, by discussing the rationale behind it and the way the analyses will be conducted. I also present a preliminary explanation of the approach itself, and outline the content of the following sections.

The approach delineated in this chapter is in essence a combination of philology and pragmatics: *the philological-pragmatic approach*. The term is meant to convey that the approach contains two related but different types of activities. It also exemplifies, in some sense, a combination of data-driven and theory-driven approaches, or perhaps, 'data-up' and 'theory-down'. In a more technical sense, the method employed can be described as one of *understanding and explanation*, or *explanation and explication*. At a general level, the approach falls most conveniently under what might be called 'action analysis' and the related 'theory of action' (broadly conceived), as will be discussed below. In fact, the conceptualization presented in the following sections seems to cover various approaches or fields within what is commonly known as historical pragmatics; the argument is that it captures the essence of a particular type of approach to the study of language use, something that is exemplified in (types of) such approaches as 'historical socio-pragmatics', 'pragmaphilology', 'historical discourse linguistics', 'historical discourse analysis', and 'sociophilology'. The 'idea' of a certain type of research

already exists; the aim of the present study is to clarify and further develop that idea. To achieve this goal, I adopt the following three-stage method:

1. Conducting a philosophical and methodological analysis of the 'philological-pragmatic' approach

2. Building an explicit framework on the basis of that analysis

3. Testing the framework

I thus propose to build bridges between philosophy/methodology, theory/methods, and data-analysis/empirical research. It seems uncontroversial to state that combining an extensive philosophical account with a lengthy empirical account is somewhat atypical; it is one of the main aims of the present study to demonstrate both its feasibility and usefulness. Although the present enterprise may be novel in certain ways, many examples of practically the same idea can be found in earlier research. For example, the study published as Kac (1992) consists of two parts, one devoted to a discussion of the nature of syntactic theory, the other to the development of a syntactic framework and its applications. On a much broader scale, the metatheoretical analyses in Itkonen (1978) and (1983) formed the basis for a typological analysis in Itkonen (1997). In the field of pragmatics (broadly conceived), many seminal studies, such as Leech (1983) and Brown and Levinson (1987), also contain detailed discussion of philosophical/methodological questions.

The rationale for combining these different aspects in a single study is the following: the philosophical and methodological analyses elucidate what it is in fact that one does in the type of approach outlined here. For example, many philologically oriented studies rely primarily on the method of 'close-reading' or 'interpretation', but the precise nature of such a method often remains unclear. What does it actually involve, and how is it justified? How are we to evaluate such interpretations? Furthermore, as noted in the previous chapter, while a number of studies have set out to enumerate the functions of CS, the notion of *function* is itself notoriously ambivalent; it is not even clear, in fact, whether functions in the strict sense should be the sole focus of such studies. In general, then, the philosophical and methodological analyses further our understanding of what it is that we actually do. Rather than being purely descriptive, however, the analyses are also used in the present study to inform both framework-building and the analysis of concrete data. In particular, I propose that various elements of the philosophical and methodological analyses can be fruitfully applied in the textual analyses. For example, explications and formalizations of central concepts provide us with *tools* to be used in the textual analyses. This implies that the philosophical analysis of a concept can usefully be applied to the study of phenomena falling under that concept. There are many examples of such cases familiar to the linguist: *speech acts* may be mentioned as one such instance. A more profound understanding of the logical

properties of speech acts, such as 'requesting', will provide us with a new set of tools, enabling us to analyse these acts in various contexts.

To sum up: the philosophical and methodological analyses and the framework are designed to be relevant for the textual analyses in Chapter 5. The relevance of including 'micro-level' analyses of particular data should also be considered from the perspective of steps one and two in the above three-step method. In terms of the framework, its application to empirical data is obviously the main way of testing and refining it. In terms of the philosophical and methodological analyses, the inclusion of an 'empirical' part serves to ground them in concreteness, as well as bringing forth details which are lost when a scientific discipline is analysed purely *in abstracto*.

Section 4.1 sets the stage by providing an overview of the field of 'historical pragmatics' and the various approaches situated within it, especially those which fit the conceptualization of the philological-pragmatic approach as envisaged here. In 4.2 I introduce the present approach in general outline, going on to discuss various aspects of its philosophical underpinnings: the basic methods, the nature of understanding and explanation, the concept of rationality, the structure of actions and their explanations, and the evaluation of philological explanations. Section 4.3 connects the philosophical analysis to framework-building by introducing additional concepts and developing new tools for the analysis of linguistic acts. Finally, in 4.4 I summarize the philosophical and methodological discussion and the framework.

4.1 An overview of related approaches in earlier research

The philological-pragmatic approach developed in the present study is meant to capture the main features found in various related approaches which have come under the rubric of historical pragmatics. In this section, I briefly introduce these approaches and discuss how they have been defined. The most important ones to be discussed include pragmaphilology, historical socio-pragmatics, sociophilology, historical discourse analysis, and historical discourse linguistics.

In their seminal overview of *historical pragmatics*, Jacobs and Jucker (1995) divide the field into two types of research: *diachronic pragmatics* and *pragmaphilology*. The former is fairly transparent: it "focuses on the linguistic inventory and its communicative use across different historical stages of the same language" (Jacobs & Jucker 1995: 13). In other words, it is similar to historical linguistics, although the focus is on the pragmatic level. Again, similarly to historical linguistics, diachronic pragmatics may be conducted in the direction of form-to-function, function-to-form, or a combination of both. This type of research also includes studies which have "been described as pragmahistorical linguistics, rather than historical pragmatics, that is to say they are primarily concerned with pragmatic

explanations of language change" (Jacobs & Jucker 1995: 14). The other main type of research, *pragmaphilology*, "describes the contextual aspects of historical texts, including the addressers and addressees, their social and personal relationship, the physical and social setting of text production and text reception, and the goal(s) of the text" (Jacobs & Jucker 1995: 11); it also includes the "pragmatic analysis of literary texts" (1995: 12). In Taavitsainen and Jucker (2010: 12), pragmaphilology is also described as "[t]he pragmatic study of the use of language in earlier periods". In Jucker and Taavitsainen (2013), the term is not used explicitly; instead, they divide the field of historical pragmatics into three types of approaches (or subfields), one of which "investigates the communicative patterns of earlier periods and explicitly sets them in their social context" (2013: 4).[201] The 'qualitative approach' they discuss in another context (2013: 38–41) presumably belongs precisely to this subfield, and can be equated with pragmaphilology.

While the basic idea behind pragmaphilology comes across, these definitions fail to distinguish it clearly from other types of research. In particular, it is not obvious how pragmaphilology is distinct from traditional philology, which also focuses on 'the contextual aspects of historical texts' and is interested in the social context of linguistic communication in earlier periods (cf. e.g. Fulk 2016). The description given in Taavitsainen and Jucker (2010), however, implies that pragmaphilology is not simply a different term for philology. In fact, pragmaphilology (as the form of the term implies) seems to refer to some kind of combination of philology and pragmatics – an interpretation that has indeed been proposed in several recent studies (see e.g. Schrott 2014: 309; Mäkilähde & Rissanen 2016: 240; Dekker 2018: 38–39). The term, however, has not enjoyed wide currency, probably at least in part due to overlap with other fields and because of the vagueness of the notion itself.

A field which covers a lot of the same ground as pragmaphilology, and a term which seems to enjoy wider currency, is *historical socio-pragmatics*.[202] According to Culpeper (2011a: 3), it encompasses roughly the same field as Jacobs and Jucker's historical pragmatics, excluding pragmahistorical linguistics; in other words, it consists of both diachronic and synchronic approaches to pragmatic phenomena. With regard to the synchronic side of historical socio-pragmatics, Culpeper notes that it is "at home amongst philological approaches, which typically consider linguistic features and account for their role in relation to the text in which they appear and/or context(s) of that text", and that "[c]entral examples of historical sociopragmatics […] include studies which not only describe the relationship between language and its contexts, […] but which also deploy theoretical concepts by which that relationship can be treated" (ibid.). As he notes, pragmaphilological

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[201] The two other approaches can be equated with diachronic pragmatics and pragmahistorical linguistics.

[202] For the concept of socio-pragmatics in general, see Leech (1983: 10–11, 84; 2014: 17).

studies would also fit into the same category. Once again, the definition seems to imply some kind of combination of philology and pragmatics.

A family resemblance to historical pragmatics is also found in the field of *historical discourse analysis* (Brinton 2001). Similarly to the way Jacobs and Jucker distinguished between different types of research, Brinton divides historical discourse analysis into three types: *diachronic discourse analysis* parallels diachronic pragmatics, while *discourse-oriented historical linguistics* parallels pragmahistorical linguistics (2001: 140); finally, *historical discourse analysis proper* consists of the "application of discourse analysis to language history" (Brinton 2001: 139) – or, presumably, historical texts/discourses – and is thus similar to pragmaphilology, as well as to the synchronic part of historical socio-pragmatics. In this case, the amount of overlap between the fields depends largely on how one conceptualizes the relationship between pragmatics and discourse analysis; at least in some cases, a particular study could be seen as falling under either approach.

Another term which at least implicitly covers some of the above-mentioned common ground is *sociophilology*, "an approach to the linguistic study of texts from the past which attempts to combine traditional philological analysis with the insights of modern sociolinguistics" (Wright 2002: vii). It has, however, also been defined as "describing or tracing how historical contexts […] shape the functions and forms of language taking place within them" (Archer & Culpeper 2011: 110). Regardless of where these approaches should be situated within the field as a whole, it should be noted that they in any case share something in common with the approach developed in the present study.

Yet another term is employed by Carroll et al. (2003: 2), *historical discourse linguistics*, which they see as "overlapping to a significant extent with both historical discourse analysis and pragmaphilology". They describe the approach as follows:

> We study language use, aiming to come to grips with the ways in which language is used by specific discourse communities, in specific communicative settings, to serve specific communicative functions. The three elements of the term aptly capture the essential dimensions of the field: by referring to our work as 'historical discourse linguistics' we emphasise that the approach is very much a part of historical linguistics, with a solid philological basis, and broader than discourse analysis in its narrow sense. We are convinced that *the synchronic study of the function(s) of linguistic phenomena in historical data* provides an important link between a more formal or traditionally philological synchronic description of any linguistic phenomenon and a diachronic study of its evolution.
>
> (Carroll et al. 2003: 2–3; emphasis added)

This approach overlaps with historical socio-pragmatics, in the sense that both synchronic and diachronic studies are included under one heading. It remains unclear whether any other kind of hierarchy is implied; pragmaphilology, however, would presumably be at least a part of this field. The 'broad interpretation' of discourse analysis may mean for example that what is at issue is the study of discourse in general (cf. 'conversation analysis' vs. 'the analysis of conversations'), or possibly the inclusion of discourse analysis and pragmatics under one rubric. Similarly to pragmaphilology, the term has not been widely adopted. The important point, however, is that at least some studies within historical discourse linguistics can be described in terms of a combination of philology and pragmatics. An illustrative example is offered by Hiltunen (2003), who analyses excerpts from the *Ancrene Wisse* – a Middle English guide for anchorites – to further an understanding both of the socio-historical context of the text and of the specific linguistic choices made by the author, applying in the analysis such notions as Grice's (1975) Maxims and the Cooperative Principle as well as Leech's (1983) Politeness Principle.

Finally, the 'pragmatics on the page' approach, undertaken by partly the same group of researchers (Carroll et al. 2013) may also be mentioned in this context. Since they state as their objective "an integration of pragmatics and materialist philology" (2013: 55), the approach is again covered by the idea of combining philology and pragmatics. However, they use the term 'pragmaphilology' with a slightly different meaning than that discussed above. They define it as "the study of historical data from a pragmatic perspective" (2013: 67 end-note 3), and use the term to describe one of the stages in their four-stage method, namely one where they "applied historical pragmatics and discourse linguistics to reconstruct patterns of correspondence between communicative functions and visual forms and contextual reasons for selections between alternative forms" (2013: 56). If the approach were to be understood in terms of the one developed in the present study, this fourth stage could more transparently be described as the *pragmatic* stage.

To sum up: the field commonly known as historical pragmatics comprises various areas or approaches, which seem to overlap to a considerable extent. It is also at times unclear how precisely they are or should be defined, especially in contrast to other approaches. This problem is probably partly due to the fact that the terms have been used as convenient labels to draw attention to certain similarities between particular groups of studies, varieties of research, and so on. In other words, it is not necessarily the case that they are even meant to refer to any clearly delineated approach or method, let alone a scientific sub-discipline. I have suggested at several junctures that there is a certain common core identifiable in a number of these approaches, constituted by the combination – in one form or another – of philology and pragmatics. Since the approach to be developed in the present study takes this common core as its point of departure, it may most aptly be termed *the philological-*

pragmatic approach. In section 4.2, I illustrate how such an approach works, how both 'philology' and 'pragmatics' should be understood, and what the basic methods in this approach are.

4.2   Conceptualizing the philological-pragmatic approach

Section 4.2 is organized as follows: I begin in 4.2.1 by illustrating the philological-pragmatic approach both schematically and in practice. In 4.2.2 I discuss the nature of *interpretation* as a 'basic method' of the approach, and introduce the notion of *rational explanation*. In 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 I develop the concept of rationality further, addressing central conceptual problems in general, and elaborating on the norms of rationality, i.e. *rationality principles*. In 4.2.5 I develop and apply a formalism for explicating different types of actions, and consequently different types of explanations. In 4.2.6 the focus is on the problem of evaluating explanations within the approach; I introduce the notion of *coherence*, and illuminate it by reassessing the argument concerning the authorship of the *Orationes* texts, introduced in 2.3.1 above.

4.2.1   Outline and illustration of the approach

To begin with, it may be worth illustrating the type of approach I am envisaging with a very simple example: a brief analysis of an instance of CS in the *Orationes* manuscript. I return to the same example in later sections and discuss additional complications, but for current purposes a simplified analysis should suffice. The following extract occurs in one of the Christmas performances, *Certamen Doctrinale*, in a dialogue where four boys are complaining about conditions in the school – namely, that it is cold – and the fact that their teacher (their 'Priscian') does not wish to grant them a holiday:

(8)   **D[ick]:** Tis true the weather is cold. Ah! but Priscian, Priscian […] he denies us this just relief; which he himselfe being in our case would haue been glad to enjoy. But (as the proverb goes) the Priest hath forgot that he was a Clark. And he has forgot since he was under the lash.[203]
      I[emmy]: Yes yes, he's warm, but wee freeze, and are all turn'd Quakers against our wills God knows. For our hands quake with cold; our teeth chatter in our head; our brains are soe frozen that wee cannot cry out with the Poet Est Deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo ['There is a divine part in us; when

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[203]   I.e. 'forgot the time when he was under the lash'.

it moves, we become warm']. But where shall wee find a Westminsters months sleeping: or a remedy as they say at Winchester; or a fat Ocium as they call it at Eton.

(*Certamen Doctrinale*, f. 93r)

Our focus here is on the intersentential switch (i.e. 'alternation' in Muysken's terms), namely *Est Deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo*.[204] Apart from being foregrounded due to the switch from English to Latin, there are clear indications within the text itself that this is a quotation from a poem: it is in hexameter – which would have been obvious when the lines were spoken out aloud – and is marked metalinguistically by reference to *the Poet*. The line derives from Ovid's *Fasti* (Ov. *fast*. 6,5), but its precise meaning in the original context is not quite the same as in the *Orationes* text; this can be seen by comparing example (8) to the original (I also modify my translation of the first verse in the couplet, to emphasize this difference):

(9)   est deus in nobis; agitante calescimus illo:
        impetus hic sacrae semina mentis habet.

        'There is a divine part in us; when it moves, we become inflamed:
        This impulse carries the seeds of the sacred mind.'

(Ov. *fast*. 6,5–6)

The *mens sacra* mentioned here refers to a mind devoted to the Muses, in other words a disposition to compose poetry. The phenomenon described here is therefore inspiration, manifested in the poet entering a certain mental and physical state. Clearly, the use of *calesco* in Ovid's original is metaphorical, while in *Certamen Doctrinale* it refers to a concrete feeling of warmth – as indicated by the co-text, where the topic has been that the students are freezing (one of the favourite topics in the Christmas performances in general).

Throughout the manuscript, the same generic reference – *the poet* or *poeta* – is also used in connection with other authors, such as Horace and Vergil (see also Mäkilähde 2018b: 465). For the audience, it would probably have been unnecessary to provide a detailed reference, as Ovid was part of the basic grammar school curriculum. The *Fasti* is not mentioned in the King's School documents, but it was recommended as reading material for example by Erasmus and Juan Luis Vives, and we know that it was used in other grammar schools in Britain in the sixteenth and

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[204]   The intrasentential switch *Ocium* will be discussed further in Chapter 5. The proverb mentioned by Dick can be found in contemporary collections of such sayings; see e.g. Ray (1670: 133).

seventeenth century (see e.g. Baldwin 1944: 196, 339).[205] One suggestion might therefore be that the intersentential switch functions as an in-group identity marker between actors and audience (but see 4.2.6 and 4.3.2 below for further discussion). As noted in 3.1.4.2, this type of function is frequently mentioned in previous CS research, under various terms.

The next step would be to analyse this function in more detail, namely by explicating it and possibly employing concepts derived from (for example) pragmatic theory. I have suggested elsewhere that this type of function may be termed *solidarity*, and that it can be defined in terms of notions discussed in the previous chapter, as follows: "An act has the function of establishing solidarity iff (i) it implies a low D-value between S and H through shared membership in a social group, and (ii) at the same time enhances the positive face of both S and H" (Mäkilähde 2018a: 308). This definition could be further tested by identifying similar instances of language use in the texts and determining whether the definition covers them in a satisfactory manner.[206]

As the above example demonstrates, the idea behind this approach is to combine a data-driven method with a theory-driven one, the former represented by philology and the latter by pragmatics. The former is both logically and practically primary: the aim is to understand the texts and the phenomena we are analysing. The general form of the approach is as follows: first, we provide as full a contextualization of the data as possible; in other words, we describe in detail its socio-historical, cultural, linguistic, and material contexts (represented in the present study by Chapter 2 in particular). Second, the texts are interpreted with the aid of this contextualization. Third, a specific framework may be applied to explain and organize these findings. Explanations at this stage may take the form for example of explication by reference to specific social variables (e.g. D and P values, social roles, norms) and their role in the interaction, while organization is achieved by formal categorization and comparison. By *explication* I here refer to the process of "transforming a given more or less inexact concept into an exact one or, rather, […] replacing the first by the second" (Carnap 1963: 3). Figure 6 shows a schematic representation of the approach.

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[205]   It is not, however, mentioned explicitly by Ascham, Brinsley, or Hoole.
[206]   I also proposed an alternative definition applying a slightly different set of concepts: "An act has the function of establishing solidarity iff (i) it implies a low D-value between S and H through shared membership in a social group, and (ii) both S and H feel that they are in face" (Mäkilähde 2018a: 315). Note that, due to the parallelism of the definitions, I equated face-enhancement with being in face; my current view, however, is that the two concepts are not fully coterminous.

Figure 6.   Schematic representation of the philological-pragmatic approach. A–E represent various 'functions' or explanations of language use.

We begin with the material, and interpret it by means of philological close reading. A sufficient understanding of the text or discourse *in toto* is required, as each individual act needs to be interpreted in context, the textual context (or co-text) being the most immediate one. If we are interested for example in the functions of language choice and CS, we could then focus on their occurrences and endeavour to explain them. At this stage, the explanations are pre-theoretical and case-specific.

Next, we attempt to make sense of our findings by means of pragmatic theory (in a broad sense). We analyse individual instances by referring to variables and theoretical constructs, thereby bringing structure and robustness to our pre-theoretical explanations. Finally, we may attempt to classify the findings by organizing the individual instances into groups. At this stage, minute differences between the individual instances are relegated to the background, while broad similarities are foregrounded. By applying this method, we may determine for example that two explanations of CS in our dataset are similar enough to be counted as instances of a single function (see A and E in Fig. 6). We may also be able to uncover the relations between various functions by arranging them hierarchically; we may for example consider two functions to be different subtypes of a single, more general one (see B, C and D in Fig. 6). At this stage, the explanations are theoretical and general.

On the one hand, the theory-driven part of the approach enables us to provide explicit definitions for the functions and other explanations (i.e. to explicate them formally), meaning that it should be more straightforward to determine whether or

not the analyses are correct.[207] The difference between two functions can also be expressed in formal terms; the function taxonomy is therefore organized according to a set of principles – it is not merely a list. The inclusion of a more general framework also enables us to connect our findings to the 'big picture', in this case to our understanding of (linguistic) actions in general. On the other hand, the data-driven part of the approach enables us to provide interpretations based on and justified by in-depth contextualization: the more detailed the contextualization, the more transparent and – hopefully – intersubjectively plausible the explanation can be. In pragmatics of the 'armchair variety', namely in theoretical pragmatics (or *general pragmatics*; Leech 1983: 10), it is always possible to limit the number of variables relevant to the topic at hand, but when we are studying particular actions, texts, discourses, or events – in other words something that takes place in space and time – the relevance of any particular factor cannot be known *a priori*.

Thus far, what I have presented is a simplified and somewhat schematic view of the philological-pragmatic approach. In practice, the analysis itself does not necessarily consist of clearly defined stages. The 'understanding' stage must, of course, occur prior to any kind of explanation (cf. von Wright 1971: 135), but it is not necessary to analyse *all* the data by one method before moving on to the other. Furthermore, the schematic representation in Figure 6 implies that the analysis begins with the material, proceeds through application of the methods, and ends with a complete classification; this, however, is another simplification. After completing the analysis, we may have acquired a better understanding of the data and the context, which in turn enables us to refine our initial interpretations (this also applies to the taxonomy, of course). What we have here is a methodological cycle (see Figure 7 below): we begin with an understanding (U-1) of the context, arrive at an interpretation (I-1) and an explication (E-1), adjust our understanding (U-2), arrive at a refined interpretation (I-2), and fine-tune the explication (E-2).[208] This type of reasoning exemplifies the *hermeneutic cycle* (or *circle*, *spiral*) (see e.g. Itkonen 1978: 233–234; 2003: 43). The movement is, then, not simply 'back-and-forth', as we are constantly proceeding towards a more complete understanding of the phenomenon under scrutiny (cf. Itkonen 2019: 455–457). In fact, since both stages in the schema contain an aspect of understanding and one of explanation, the approach could be characterized as moving from *explanation by understanding* to *understanding by explanation*.

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[207] To clarify: explication itself as an activity can be fully pre-theoretical in the sense of not utilizing a particular theory as a tool, although the explications themselves are indeed theoretical. It may be noted that the methodological analyses presented in this chapter are in many cases explications of concepts.

[208] Rather than speaking of understanding, interpretation and explication, one could speak for example of knowledge, explanation and formalization. This reflects the progressively diminishing intuitive certainty in the course of the process.

Figure 7. Schematic representation of the 'hermeneutic cycle'. The cycle proceeds from understanding to interpretation, from interpretation to explication, and from explication to enhanced understanding.

The outline presented here has aimed at capturing the 'essence' of a particular type of approach, as discussed in the previous section: the combination itself is of course not in any way novel. What I propose to do is to develop this imprecise 'idea' into a clearly defined approach and to strengthen it, first by a discussion of its philosophical basis and secondly by the introduction of a framework for its application. At a very general level, the philological-pragmatic approach is perhaps best conceived of as belonging to what might be called the field of 'action analysis'. The manner in which the two main components of the approach are conceived of in the present study can thus be interpreted along the following lines: philology is the analysis of *concrete action-tokens*, pragmatics is the analysis of *abstract action-types*. One important implication of this is that while philology is concerned with the explanation of actions which have actually occurred, pragmatics is concerned with actions that may or may not have occurred: the former is 'empirical', in the sense that the spatiotemporality of an action is relevant, while in the latter it is not; hence pragmatics as conceived of in this manner is fully 'non-empirical' (in other words, it is fully justified for 'armchair pragmatics' to deal with imaginary speech acts).[209] This characterization of pragmatics may seem atypical, but it is only *prima facie* so;

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[209] To clarify: I take it that on the one hand philologists are not on the whole interested in analyses of texts, actions, events, or cultures which they have merely themselves imagined. One may of course employ completely invented examples in discussing, say, the methods of philology, but the same is true of the philosophy of *all* sciences. On the other hand, there is nothing objectionable about the fact that, say, Grice (1975) employs invented examples in analysing the nature of implicature.

it is in fact quite compatible with several different intensional definitions of pragmatics.[210] Itkonen (1983: 164), for example, argues that "[p]ragmatics is part of the theory of action" and that it employs a type of 'explanation-by-intention' (1983: 164–165), while according to Ariel (2010), pragmatics deals with inferential meaning. As will become clear in the following sections, my 'actionist' conception of philology and pragmatics is fully compatible with such definitions.

4.2.2   Philology, interpretation, and rationality

The next question to be answered concerns the nature and methods of *philology*. A starting point for the discussion is offered by Raimo Anttila's writings on the philosophical and methodological status of philology. The following is how he characterizes philology in general:

> Philology […] studies language in its total cultural setting using all the possible connections with the human environment (customs, artifacts, etc). Here one actually has to use language and linguistics in connection with various kinds of history, archaeology, folklore, religion, etc. Thus philology itself represents in a way the combination 'linguistics and history'. To sum up: philology uses language as a tool for penetrating into a culture; linguistics studies this tool *as* a tool.[211]
>
> (Anttila 1975: 145)

> In philology, language serves as a means toward the understanding of a particular culture. Philology has been directed mainly toward written documents produced by past cultures. It studies language as used by a people or an individual in a given historical environment, the ultimate goal being the understanding of the human aspects.
>
> (Anttila 1989: 323)

In a similar vein, Anttila states that philologists "deal with language use in concrete cultural contexts" (1975: 150), and that "[i]n the philological study of language the total cultural setting […] is considered in connection with texts" (1989: 22). At a

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[210]   Extensional definitions of pragmatics have been employed particularly in handbooks and textbooks (for discussion, see e.g. Ariel 2010: 93–97).

[211]   Cf. Anttila (1979: 501): "[T]he philologist studies language as an instrument of culture; the linguist studies it as a mere tool without its use". Note, however, that a tool without its use is not in fact a tool; Anttila is probably referring here to use *in a particular context*. It should also be pointed out that, in this context, 'linguistics' refers in particular to varieties of 'autonomous' linguistics, such as grammatical theory, not to all possible areas of linguistics.

general level, then, philology can be described as a holistic approach which utilizes various types of methods and tools (cf. Fulk 2016: 95). At a more philosophical level, Anttila (1975: 153; see also 1979: 498, 500) notes that the primary objective of philology and other historical sciences is *understanding*, and that "[t]he most characteristic method for understanding among the humanities is so-called hermeneutics, i.e. interpretation". These connections and overlaps between different disciplines – or more properly, different *activities* – are perhaps the most characteristic aspect of Anttila's conception of philology (see in particular Anttila 2000: 11–12).

On the one hand, then, the basic method of philology can be said to be interpretation, also known as *text-interpretation*; this is also what *close reading* essentially refers to.[212] On the other hand, the basic method can be said to be understanding, or what is known in the terminology of hermeneutics as the method of *Verstehen*;[213] various other terms are also used to refer to roughly the same notion. Itkonen (e.g 1983: 196), for example, notes that the term *re-enactment* was coined by R. G. Collingwood to serve the same purpose as *Verstehen* in the context of history:[214] Collingwood describes this method thus:

> But how does the historian discern the thoughts which he is trying to discover? There is only one way in which it can be done: by re-thinking them in his own mind. […] The history of thought, and therefore all history, is the re-enactment of past thought in the historian's own mind. This re-enactment is only accomplished, in the case of Plato and Caesar respectively, so far as the historian brings to bear on the problem all the powers of his own mind and all his knowledge of philosophy and politics. […] The historian not only re-enacts past thought, he re-enacts it in the context of his own knowledge and therefore, in re-enacting it, criticizes it, forms his own judgement of its value, corrects whatever errors he can discern in it.
>
> (Collingwood 1946: 215)

Itkonen (2008b: 26; 2013: 59) has also suggested that both *Verstehen* and re-enactment are basically equivalent to *empathy* ('stepping into someone else's

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[212] Compare for example the way Kauko (2015: 18) characterizes what it means that his approach is philological: he reads the texts carefully and attempts to interpret them, producing in effect a *commentary* on the texts. Palola's definition of philology as "a subfield of linguistics which studies and compares old texts on the basis of their cultural history by applying the methods of textual criticism" (2015: 237; my translation) is somewhat more narrow, although there is obviously a great deal of overlap.

[213] For hermeneutics and the concept of *Verstehen* in general, see e.g. von Wright (1971: 5–7); Itkonen (1978: 20–54; 2003: 56–60); Scholz (2016); and references therein.

[214] For Collingwood's philosophy of history in general, see e.g. Dray (1995).

shoes'), which he has defined as *vicarious introspection*.[215] This amounts to saying that we form beliefs about another person's mental states based on our beliefs about our own mental states in similar situations. In other words, we "rethink his thoughts" (Itkonen 2003: 58; cf. the quote from Collingwood above). A similar point is made by Austin: "[i]n order to know what you are feeling, I must also apparently be able to imagine (guess, understand, appreciate) what you're feeling" (1979: 104); in other words, one must know what this feeling (or other mental state) is like *in general*.[216]

It is clear that these three concepts are connected, but their precise relations are not quite clear. According to Itkonen (1978: 205), "the simplest case of *Verstehen* is understanding the meaning of some ordinary word or action", but "when we set out to describe societies that differ markedly from our own, the role of so-called 'empathy', or *Einfühlung*, obviously increases". This implies that the notions are not completely synonymous. I propose the following way to distinguish between them: *empathy* is the general ability or activity whereby we form beliefs about others' mental states, and this ability is used in understanding or *Verstehen*, at least when the object of understanding is *an action*. Understanding an action in this sense means only that one sees it *as* an action (see e.g. von Wright 1971: 124, 132–135, 152–153): for example, seeing certain bodily movements as the opening of a door, or as a greeting, and the producing of a certain utterance as a greeting, a command, or a request. This type of understanding is of course a prerequisite for philological analysis, but it arguably does not end here. For example, when analysing one of Cicero's letters to Atticus and noting that the letter begins with the words *Cicero Attico salutem dicit*, we may go beyond pointing out that this is a greeting; we may, for example, wish to ask *why* the greeting was included in the letter, *why* this particular form for the greeting was chosen, and so on. Or, in the case of example (8) above, we may first note that Iemmy quotes Ovid, produces a verse line in hexameter, juxtaposes the conditions at the school with the contents of the line in an amusing way, and so on. Next, as above, we may ask *why* these actions were performed (and precisely in these ways, etc.).

There are, in effect, two different types of interpretation: one answers *what*, the other *why* (von Wright 1971: 152–153).[217] When Anttila (1979: 499–500) argues that "[w]e need a strict method of Geisteswissenschaft which ends finally in a *Verstehen*"

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[215] Itkonen (2013: 59) further suggests that the relationship between introspection and intuition can be elucidated by reference to empathy, which occupies the 'middle ground' between the two: intuition is 'conventionalized empathy'.

[216] The feeling Austin is discussing in this context is anger. It seem intuitively clear that one cannot be said to *know* what it is like for someone to be angry without ever having felt anger oneself.

[217] It is important to note that the difference between the two is not the presence or absence of reference to *intentions*, since they are precisely what we need to understand an action as an action in the first place.

– or more precisely, a refined version of a *Verstehen* – the end-point in fact seems to cover this latter kind of understanding too, while the former is more similar to *Vorverständnis* (1979: 499), or 'pre-knowledge'. Compared to understanding at the stage where we understand which actions have been performed, *re-enactment* could be considered a more purposeful and systematic application of the method of *Verstehen* (and hence of empathy); this is how interpretation is conceptualized in the present study. At this stage, we move from understanding to explanation of one kind (cf. the idea of 'understanding by explanation' in 4.2.1 above). Empathy is present at all 'levels' of understanding, but its role becomes more noticeable when understanding can no longer be taken for granted.[218]

The type of explanation utilized in this context is *teleological explanation*: positing that an action was performed for a certain *purpose*, to attain a certain *goal*. Von Wright (1971: 58–60) draws a distinction between teleological explanations and what he terms 'quasi-teleological' ones: the former account for behaviour as *purposive* in the sense of being directed at a certain end (i.e., it is literally *intentional*), while the latter account for processes which are *purposeful* in the sense that they are necessary conditions for some other process (without the presence of any intention). He notes further (1971: 59) that functional explanations for example in biology are typically of this latter kind (see also Itkonen 2013: 62–64; 2013/2014: 14–16). Itkonen (e.g. 1983; 2013/2014) has argued that the type of teleological explanation used in the human sciences in general is more precisely *rational explanation*. The concept of rationality was discussed briefly in 3.1.4 above; to reiterate, instrumental rationality refers in the present context to reasoning from ends to means and vice versa (see e.g. Mortimore 1976: 93; Gibson 1976: 112–113; Brown & Levinson 1987: 64; Nozick 1993: 64–65, 133; Wedgwood 2011).[219] In other words, it denotes the capacity to enter into instrumental reasoning of a specific kind (see also Levinson 2000: 42–45). Itkonen gives a preliminary characterization of both rational explanation (henceforth RE) and rational action as follows (cf. e.g. Mortimore 1976: 96; Gibson 1976: 112–113):

> What the agent *wants* is his *goal*, and he *believes* that his action will serve as a *means* for attaining the goal. This formulation presupposes that the agent himself

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[218]   That is, we become aware of the need to 'rethink someone's thoughts' when there is less common ground between us. It is worth noting that philology as conceived here is not concerned specifically with past cultures; the activity of interpretation seems to be fundamentally the same in both its diachronic and synchronic varieties.

[219]   Cf. also the term 'instrumentally rational' as the English translation of Max Weber's notion of action as *zweckrational* (Weber 1978: 24). Mortimore's (1976: 96) notion of *formal practical rationality* also seems to cover the most 'basic' kind of instrumental rationality, i.e. the one where the rationality of the ends and beliefs of the agent is not under consideration.

sees his own action as *rational* (i.e. as an *adequate* means for attaining the goal), even if it is, in fact, irrational. But we can *understand* this (irrational) action, only if we *empathize* with the agent, i.e. if we 'rethink his thoughts' and learn to *see* the action *as* rational (although we, at the same time, fully well know that it *is*, in fact, irrational).

(Itkonen 2003: 58; boldface changed to italics)

There are, in a sense, two types of rationality at issue here: on the one hand, an action is rational from the agent's perspective when it serves as an adequate means for an intended goal; on the other, it is rational from the interpreter's perspective when it is seen empathetically as rational in the former sense. A somewhat different but overlapping sense in which an action may be considered rational is provided by the following definition: "[an action] *A** is rational if, and only if, it is (maximally) adequate to achieve a rational [goal] *G*, given a rational [belief] *B*. The irrationality of *G* or *B* is transferred to *A**: an action serving an irrational goal and/or based on an irrational belief is irrational" (Itkonen 1983: 65). The notion of 'adequacy' will be discussed in more detail in the following section; the relevant aspect for the present point is that this definition is stricter than the one given above, since the agent's goals and beliefs about actions as means for these goals are also evaluated in terms of their rationality. Itkonen (1983: 64–65) argues that rational goals are (i) "good or desirable" (by some objective criteria) or serve as means for other goals which can be considered such and (ii) ones which are actually achievable, while rational beliefs are identical with justified beliefs (see also e.g. Mortimore 1976: 96).[220] As will be discussed in the following sections, there must also be objective (i.e. intersubjectively valid) criteria for determining the rationality of beliefs about actions as means to ends.

Next, I discuss Itkonen's formalization of rational action, which is at the same time a formalization of RE. Elaborations to this formalism will be proposed in 4.2.5. To begin with, the following concise version from Itkonen (1983: 49) should clarify the main idea. Here, G = a (mental representation of a) goal, B = a belief about the agent's situation, A = a mental representation of an action, A* = a spatiotemporal action, ⊢ = entailment (i.e. conceptual necessity), ⇒ = mental causation (i.e. practical necessity):

$$[(G\&B) \vdash A] \Rightarrow A*$$

[220] The notion of a rational goal as a good or desirable goal overlaps with Weber's (1978: 24–25) notion of action as 'value-rational' (*wertrational*); it is worth noting, however, that a value-rational action may be one which has no hope of succeeding, and therefore need not be rational in terms of beliefs as to its achievability.

The formula extends the preliminary characterization discussed above. It states, basically, that based on his or her goal and beliefs, the agent "derives *A* as a necessary [...] means to achieve *G*" and "*must* (try to) do *A" (ibid.).[221] Itkonen's formalization thus represents a variant of a causal model of action (e.g. Davidson 1963; cf. 3.1.4.3 above): the goals and beliefs of the agent *cause* the action. The exact nature of this model becomes clearer in the following, more detailed version of the formalization (Itkonen 2013/2014: 10). Here, G = a volitional attitude, Y = its object, B = belief, X = a means (prototypically an action), → = ordinary causation, ⊢ = entailment (i.e. conceptual necessity), ⇒ = mental causation (i.e. practical necessity):[222]

$$\{[G{:}Y \ \& \ B{:}(X{\rightarrow}Y)] \vdash G{:}X\} \Rightarrow X; \text{ and if all goes well, } X{\rightarrow}Y$$

The mental part of the formula is located within the curly brackets, the spatiotemporal part after the mental causation sign (⇒). The part within the square brackets forms a 'volitional-epistemic complex', or what von Wright (1971: 97) calls a 'cognitive-volitative complex' (or 'volitional-cognitive complex', see von Wright 1980: 50). The actor wants Y (i.e. G:Y), and he believes that by doing X he will attain Y (i.e. B:(X→Y)). The entailment sign (⊢) expresses the fact that if the actor truly wants Y and believes that X is an adequate means to attain it, it is a conceptual necessity that the actor must then want (to do) X.[223] Having the goal and the belief thus causes the actor to do X. It is worth adding that Itkonen's argument that RE is a type of causal explanation is not necessarily in any conflict with von Wright's (1971) argument that teleological explanations should be distinguished from causal ones; in von Wright's words, the difference between causal and teleological explanations is that "explanations of the former type depend for their validity upon the truth of nomic connections whereas explanations of the latter type do not" (1971: 85), while Itkonen (1983: 35–38) maintains that a distinction should instead be made between nomic and non-nomic causation.[224] In other words, Itkonen's nomic causal explanation is identical with von Wright's causal explanation, while non-nomic causal explanation is identical with teleological explanation.

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[221] In order to emphasize the normativity of such reasoning, one would replace 'derives' with 'ought to derive' and 'must' with 'ought to'.

[222] A prototype version of this 'definitive' version was presented in Itkonen (1983: 50) as follows: $\{[p_G \& (s{\rightarrow}p)_B] \vdash s_G\} \Rightarrow s^*$. Here the choice of symbols is closer to, for example, epistemic logic: the propositional symbols represent states of affairs, while subscripts represent mental states such as entertaining a goal *p* or believing that *p*.

[223] The underlying idea can be compared to the following norm of practical rationality: "If you have end *E* and *x* is a way of achieving *E*, then – *ceteris paribus* – do *E* [sic; read: 'do *x*']" (Mortimore 1976: 106).

[224] The latter distinction is practically the same as Giddens's (1993: 91–92) 'event causality' vs. 'agent causality'.

To sum up the discussion thus far: the 'basic method' of philology can be considered to be interpretation, which consists of the systematic application of the method of *Verstehen* or understanding; that in turn is based on the ability to empathize with those whose actions (or the results thereof) we are attempting to explain. This understanding of someone's behaviour as an action of some kind is a prerequisite for explaining (and understanding) why the action was performed, which takes the form of teleological or rational explanation: positing that the agent did X because he or she entertained a goal Y and believed that X would be an adequate means to attain Y. Next, I discuss RE in more detail and address certain 'problems of rationality'.

4.2.3   Problems of rationality

The first problem to be discussed is the notion of 'adequate means'. In most cases – in particular where linguistic actions are involved – the agent has several different options from among which to choose the means to attain an end (Mortimore 1976; Itkonen 1983: 100; Wedgwood 2011). How does the agent choose a particular means? As discussed above in 3.1.4.4, Myers-Scotton's RC model operates on the assumption that people will choose 'the best' means for attaining the goal. This seems *prima facie* satisfactory, since it accounts for the choice of one particular course of action from among the many possible ones. It is not quite clear, however, what it means to say that something is 'the best' means to attain an end; it may imply that the agent considers a particular course of action *necessary* to attain the goal(s) he or she currently entertains. This, however, is unsatisfactory, since in many cases it is more natural to say that the action chosen was a *sufficient* means to attain a certain end, for example when one chooses between different types of greetings in order to greet someone. It therefore seems more reasonable to claim that, if the agent wants Y and has a set of choices {X, Z, W}, or in other words, believes that X→Y *and* believes that Z→Y *and* believes that W→Y, then each of these means is by itself a sufficient means, while X ∨ Z ∨ W represent the necessary means (von Wright 1971: 98–99; Itkonen in press).[225] Similarly, it may be argued that in acting rationally, the agent ought to choose a means which is at least no worse than any other available means; in other words, compared to which there is no better alternative (Wedgwood 2011). It seems sensible, then, to include in the RE schema the assumption that the agent may be choosing from among equally adequate

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[225]   There are of course necessary conditions to achieving certain things: for example, it is necessary to keep one's eyes open to see something (see e.g. Itkonen in press). Even in such cases, however, there may be several different sufficient means for attaining the goal represented by the necessary condition. One might for example use the facial muscles to hold the eyelids open or resort to taping them open.

choices, although this choice between options cannot always be explained (von Wright 1971: 99).

The above should not be taken to suggest that 'anything goes' as far as the means-end relationship is concerned: the assumption is that the agent considered the means as 'good enough' to attain the particular goal and 'adequate enough' considering all of his or her other current goals. It is also possible that the action chosen was indeed in some complex manner the best possible option, but that the agent did not choose it *because* it was the best option but for example out of habit, or completely on a whim. This is still different from something happening accidentally (see 4.2.5 below). In addition, in the case of certain explanations, such as the principle of least effort, it may sometimes be presumptuous to postulate that the means was *consciously* chosen by the agent (for the notion of 'unconscious rationality', see Itkonen 1983: 185–188); often, however, the choice is indeed a conscious one.

The second problem concerns the nature of 'ends', 'wants' and 'goals', a problem which is closely connected to the question of intentions and intentionality. As noted above in 3.2.2, it may be useful at least in some cases to distinguish between wants (in the sense of 'desires') and *pro-attitudes*. The latter term may refer more broadly to a type of positive inclination towards something (see e.g. Davidson 1963: 683; Mortimore 1976: 95). This distinction becomes relevant when we need to differentiate between goals which are entertained 'actively' and those which are not; in the explanation of concrete actions, however, the distinction may not always be as relevant. For example, if S wants to drink a glass of water, he may ask H to give him one, but it might do just as well for someone else to provide the water. In other words, S wants the water, but has a (mere) pro-attitude towards H giving him a glass of water. In this case, getting H to give S the water is a subordinate goal, serving the purpose of attaining the ultimate goal. The ultimate want, however, may also be directed at this stage in particular, namely if S wants H *specifically* to give him a glass of water: perhaps S does not want the water *for* anything. Nevertheless, even in this case one would probably want to know *why* S wants H to provide the glass of water – maybe S just wants to order H around. In that case too, then, getting H to provide the glass of water would be an auxiliary goal. Similarly, one may want one's face to be enhanced by someone in particular or someone in general. This 'chaining' of goals seems in fact to be a better way of viewing the situation than positing that the wants themselves are somehow different. (I return to the idea of chains in section 4.3.)

Although intentions were discussed together with 'hidden motives' above in 3.1.4.3, wants, or volitional attitudes, should not be equated with intentions *simpliciter*. Von Wright (1971: 197–198) discusses an example of a man falling into a river and shouting for help, noting that "[t]o be rescued is not what the agent

intends. This is something he *wants*. What he intends is, roughly speaking, to do what he can in order to be rescued". This, however, does not mean that his actions are explainable without reference to intentionality. As noted above, understanding behaviour means seeing it as an action, which effectively means seeing the action as *intentional* and *purposive*. In fact, simply stating that the man shouted for help in order to be rescued from the river makes reference to both intentions and 'hidden motives', in the sense of the agent's ultimate wants (cf. 3.1.4.3 above).

The third problem concerns the nature of irrational actions, touched upon briefly above. We might call this the *pseudo-paradox of rationality*. According to the conceptualization of RE discussed above, an act can be considered rational if the actor chooses those actions whereby he believes he can (adequately) attain his currently entertained goals. The paradox is that because we can only understand rational actions (Itkonen 1983: 65), all *prima facie* irrational actions are also explained by providing a rational explanation for them (2003: 58; cf. Myers-Scotton 1998b: 36). Let us consider a case where the agent wants to arrive at work in time and believes that if he gets up early he will be able to catch the bus to work. A problem arises if the agent nevertheless does not get up early but instead chooses to lie in bed. In this case, his action would be explained by positing that he had a desire which was stronger than his desire to arrive at work early – namely, the desire to sleep for a long time.

This type of explanation may seem unsatisfactory if it is taken to mean that whenever a person does something, we simply 'explain' it by stating that he wanted to do this.[226] As the discussion of example (8) demonstrated, however, this is not where philological explanation stops. It may also be noted at this point that the RE schema should strictly speaking be understood as starting not from wants regarding certain ends but from the *intention to achieve* certain ends which the agent wants (see Wedgwood 2011): we may want things (in the sense of 'desire') which we still do not intend to attain – Wedgwood's example is that of an ex-smoker who wants to smoke but manages to refrain from it. Wedgwood (ibid.) also mentions a third kind of reasoning in addition to intentions-to-ends and desires-to-ends, namely in terms of *possible ends* (i.e., 'If I had this end in mind, what ought I to do to attain it?'). These distinctions do not necessarily become relevant in all of our actual explanations, but it is important to keep them in mind.

I return to the claim that it is somehow unsatisfactory that there are no 'genuinely' irrational acts – there are only acts which we do not understand, and even they are potentially rational. At the same time, I elaborate on Itkonen's two different definitions of an action being rational. We may consider first the case where a person

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[226] The pseudo-paradox also has an interesting connection to questions of determinism and free will; that, however, is well beyond the scope of the present study (for the importance of free will for action theory, see Campbell 1996: 147–150).

wishes to lose weight and at the same time wishes to continue eating unhealthy foods. If the person did not have the former desire, eating unhealthily would be fully rational, in the sense that this is indeed what the person wants to do (the reason for this want may simply be enjoyment). However, even if the person does have the former desire, the action of eating unhealthy foods would still be rational with respect to the want to eat this way; it would, however, be irrational in terms of the want to lose weight. Rationality is thus a relative notion: an action may be both rational and irrational at the same time with respect to different goals. In some ways, rationality is similar to *relevance*: interactants work from the assumption that what is said is relevant in terms of the current goals of the interaction, and if it is *prima facie* irrelevant, they try to work out how it might nevertheless be relevant. This is reflected in the special status of Grice's (1975) Maxim of Relevance, as opposed to the other maxims; in the case of the Maxim of Quality, for example, *prima facie* false statements may truly be false and be accepted as such. In interpreting actions, in other words, we seem to be able to tolerate lies more easily than irrelevance.

In a similar vein, one may consider the behaviour of a person who wishes to quench his thirst, believes that this can be achieved adequately by consuming sand, and then goes ahead and 'drinks' sand. When his action is explained in this manner, it has already been *rationalized* (Davidson 1963: 685); it is therefore rational in this *one* sense, namely vis-à-vis a specific goal and belief. From a commonsense point of view, however, the action does seem irrational, since the belief that X→Y (i.e. that consuming sand is an adequate way to quench one's thirst) is not intersubjectively valid. There are thus at least two different ways in which an action can be called rational or irrational; these can be called *instrumental rationality* and *intersubjectively valid rationality*.[227] The criteria for intersubjectively rational actions are the topic of the next section.

4.2.4   Rationality principles

Itkonen (e.g. 1983: 65–66) has suggested that the objective criterion for determining the rationality or irrationality of an action is one type of *norm*. Norms have been mentioned several times in previous sections; they can in general be considered entities which provide "a criterion with which we may evaluate actual behaviour as either correct or incorrect" (Itkonen 1978: 43), or which "enter essentially into

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[227]   This distinction is related to that drawn between *motivating reasons* and *normative reasons* (e.g. Parfit 1997: 99). Alvarez (2018: 3297–3298) suggests that both should be further distinguished from *explanatory reasons*, which are again connected to the distinction between two different types of instrumental rationality mentioned above, namely the agent's subjective rationality and an observer's empathy-based ascription of instrumental rationality to the agent.

judgments of what is right or wrong to do, what ought or ought not to be done" (MacCormick 1998: 303). This reference to 'oughts' of one kind or another is one of the central features of norms of the relevant kind; the other is that they are social entities (see e.g. Itkonen 1978: 136; 2003; 2008a; Bartsch 1987: 4, 74–75; Zlatev 2008; Brennan et al. 2013: 3). Itkonen (e.g. 1983) has further suggested that two types of norms are the most crucial for linguistics and its subdisciplines: namely *rules of correctness* and *principles of rationality*, or *rationality principles* (RPs). Systematizations of the former are presented in grammars; the latter are investigated in particular in pragmatics. The Gricean Maxims and the felicity conditions of speech acts, for example, can be considered abstract descriptions or expressions of RPs (Itkonen 1983: 68, 176–177; but see further below). I first comment briefly on the nature of RPs in general; this is followed by a few remarks on the similarities and differences between RPs and other types of norms.

In Itkonen's framework, RPs exist in the same way as rules of correctness, namely as *social entities* or objects of *common knowledge*, and they are known by *intuition* (Itkonen 1978: 135; 2008: 20). The notion of common knowledge derives from Lewis (1969), who explicated it in terms of hierarchical knowledge: *p* is common knowledge among the members of a community, iff every member of the community (i) knows that *p*, (ii) knows that everyone else knows that *p*, and (iii) knows that everyone else knows that everyone else knows that *p* (see also Itkonen 2003: 113).[228] Itkonen (1983: 8; 2003: 44) characterizes the nature of intuition by means of Popper's 'three worlds' ontology to separate three different 'acts of knowledge' (see also Mäkilähde in press): *observation*, which pertains to physical events and objects (World 1); *introspection*, which pertains to the agent's own mental states (World 2); and *intuition*, which pertains to social entities, such as concepts and norms (World 3) as well as their particular exemplifications. All three acts are subjective, in the sense that they emanate from 'World 2'; objects, however, are subjective only in the case of introspection. Similarly, Leech (1983: 55) argues that "linguistic knowledge is public knowledge", although he refers in this context to introspections (about intuitions).[229] Although norms are social (or 'intersubjective', 'objective'), their internalizations are subjective mental entities; in the context of RPs, Itkonen terms these internalizations *reasons* (1983: 66). They are in effect what is included within the curly brackets in the RE schema. He refers to

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[228] A more formal version might be the following (with the aid of symbols from epistemic logic): *p* is common knowledge among the set *A* of members of a community *C* iff for every a, b ∈ A, (i) K_ap (i.e. 'a knows that p'), (ii) K_aK_bp, and (iii) $K_aK_bK_ap$. Cf. e.g. van Ditmarsch, van der Hoek & Kooi (2008: 30–31).

[229] I note in passing that both Itkonen (1983) and Leech (1983) illustrate their arguments by referring to Popper's 'three worlds' ontology, although their interpretations of the place of language in it are not identical. For the relevance of *certainty* for these acts of knowledge, see Itkonen (2003: 28–31); see also Mäkilähde (in press).

this social/mental dualism as the 'Janus-like character' of rationality (e.g. 1983: 177–181; 2013/2014: 12): beliefs are mental states, but their objects are propositions (i.e. logical entities), and it is in terms of the latter that beliefs can be 'shared' by more than one person.

On the basis of this epistemological discussion, I suggest another reason and another way to distinguish between empathy (which, as noted above, Itkonen defines as 'vicarious introspection') and *Verstehen*: in the simplest case of empathy, namely when we 'know' another person's mental state, such as their feeling of joy or anger, we do not rely on RPs; the normative dimension is absent here.[230] In the understanding of actions, however, RPs provide the objective basis for understanding the logical part of rationality. *Verstehen* can therefore be characterized as epistemologically complex by definition: it consists in the application of both empathy (pertaining to the mental states of others) and intuition (pertaining to RPs).

As for the content of RPs, when verbalized they state "that if the context is *C* and the goal is *G*, the rational thing to do is *A*" (Itkonen 1983: 66).[231] In certain ways, then, they are similar to von Wright's *technical norms* (cf. 3.1.4.4 and 3.2.3 above), which are "concerned with the *means* to be used for the sake of attaining a certain *end*" (1963: 9), and are prototypically formulated as "conditional sentences, in whose antecedent there is mention of some wanted thing, and in whose consequent there is mention of something that must (has to, ought to) or must not be done. An example would be 'If you want to make the hut habitable, you ought to heat it'" (1963: 10).[232] This equation is also evident for example in Niiniluoto's (1993: 12) rephrasing of a technical norm as a statement, such as "If you want *A*, and you believe that you are in a situation *B*, then you ought to do *X*", and the consequent as for example "It is rational for you to do *X*".[233] The distinction between rules of correctness and RPs is

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[230] Note that empathy as understood here is not about knowing for example why a person feels a certain way, or whether a particular feeling is justified, and so on. In such cases, the normative dimension is of course present.

[231] It is worth noting that although instrumental rationality is in a sense subjective, the notion itself is based on an objectively (i.e. intersubjectively) valid RP (see. e.g. Scanlon 2014: 16–17 fn. 1; cf. Mortimore's norm of practical rationality, mentioned above in 4.2.2).

[232] Cf. e.g. Giddens's (1993: 90) 'principles of action'.

[233] The nature of technical norms, however, is discussed only briefly by von Wright (1963: 9–11). It is therefore unclear whether they exist in the same way as rules of correctness and RPs, or whether they are in fact arrived at through inference from propositions which state a necessary condition for something (i.e. whether they are somehow 'emergent'). It is relevant to note that von Wright's norm-category of prescriptions contains not only laws but also commands issued by someone; these are also rather different from the above-mentioned two types of norms. Furthermore, sometimes technical norms seem to refer to a specific way of *formulating* a norm (cf. e.g. Aarnio 1987: 55–56). The question at issue here is complex and deserves an in-depth investigation in another context.

also analogous to that between *constitutive* and *regulative rules*: the former "create or define new forms of behavior", while the latter "regulate antecedently or independently existing forms of behavior" (Searle 1969: 33). To some extent, these pairs are certainly analogous. For example, while rules of correctness "constitute a rather tight network, or institution", RP's "hang more loosely together" (Itkonen 1983: 67), as do regulative rules. The main difference is that regulative rules cover other types of norms in addition to RPs or technical norms, for example von Wright's (1963: 8–9) *customs*; it was argued above in 3.2.3 that customs are the type of norm which determine for example the politeness or impoliteness of an action.

It might seem that RPs are in fact pan-human, and therefore not culture-specific, but this is not the case. As Itkonen notes (1983: 65), something may be considered rational in one culture and irrational in another. In ancient Rome, for example, it would possibly have been *objectively* rational (in terms of intersubjectively valid rationality) to produce a curse-tablet when one wished ill on another person, while the same action would be *objectively* irrational for example in present-day Britain (although it could still be instrumentally rational).

Finally, in addition to individual RPs which state in which context and in terms of which goals doing something is rational, we can attempt to formulate informative generalizations about RPs. These in effect describe more abstract principles, applying to a variety of given situations. Some examples of such generalizations applied (or alluded to) by Itkonen (1983; 2013) in specific cases of RE include 'It is rational to maximize the economy of expression', 'It is rational to maximize iconicity', 'It is rational to maximize isomorphism', 'It is rational to satisfy primary needs before secondary needs'. The principles proposed by Leech (1983) have a similar status. At this level there can be several competing and mutually exclusive RPs, such as 'the principle of least effort' vs. 'the principle of perceptual differentiation' (see Anttila 1989: 198).

The philological-pragmatic approach can now also be characterized as follows: in the first stage RPs are applied in REs of particular actions, in the second stage generalizations about the relevant RPs are formulated. At this point it also becomes possible to more clearly discern the differences between for example Gumperz's and Myers-Scotton's approaches to the functions of CS: Gumperz is operating with pre-theoretical, fairly 'low-level' generalizations, while Myers-Scotton is operating with fully theoretical, abstract generalizations about RPs.

4.2.5 Types of actions: Intentions and effects, results and consequences

In this section, I return to an issue raised in the previous chapter (in 3.1.4.3 and 3.2.1): that of different types of actions, such as intentional ones and plain slips, and

different types of effects, such as intended ones, incidental ones, and unexpected 'by-products'. In explaining particular actions, there is reason to consider at least the intentions of the agent and the effects of the action. To these may be added the interpretation of the addressee(s) or third parties; these can also be subsumed under the category of effects. While both intentions and effects are relevant in text interpretation, it is worth noting that only recourse to intentions provides what are in essence *genuine explanations* of actions, namely REs. Recourse to effects basically provides descriptions of certain actions, more precisely certain causal events. In other words, effects do not strictly speaking explain anything, but they are themselves explained by reference to certain actions. Nevertheless, as will be argued below, effects are an important part of action analysis, and may in turn become causes of further actions. In philology, as in history, it is in fact often relevant to consider both the causal antecedents of situations which lead to certain actions (which are explained teleologically) and the effects of these actions as the causal antecedents of further events which take place.[234]

If we say that "S used X to achieve Y", we are *not* talking about effects but intentions, since this is a description of *purposive* action: someone did something *in order to* such-and-such. What is particularly relevant for philological analysis is the relationship on the one hand between intention and effect, on the other between intention and interpretation. In the ideal case, all three fall together (i.e., to simplify matters grossly, intention = effect = interpretation). We can construct a simple schema for describing non-ideal cases by identifying discrepancies between these relations: for example, if intention and effects do not overlap at all – if, for example, the set of intended goals A={a, b, c}, and the set of effects B={d, e, f}, then A∩B=∅ – we are dealing with a *failed action*. When intention and interpretation do not overlap, we are dealing with a *misunderstanding* or *disagreement*. It might be objected that pragmatics should focus squarely on illocutions, not perlocutions (see e.g. Leech 1983: 203). As conceptualized in the present study, however, pragmatics is concerned with *actions*, of which perlocutions are an integral part – they are, for example, prototypical objects of wants.

In addition to providing formalizations of different action types, the purpose of this section is to demonstrate that Itkonen's and von Wright's analyses of the structure of actions can be fruitfully combined. The former's views have been discussed in detail in the preceding sections; I now present a brief overview of the latter's views, highlighting connections between the two. In von Wright's analysis (1971: 86–87), an action normally contains two aspects. The *inner aspect* is the intention. The *outer aspect* consists of two parts: the *immediate part* is some muscular activity (e.g. raising a hand, moving the fingers, producing sounds), but it

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[234] An excellent illustration of this is provided by von Wright's (1971) 'ruined city' example.

need not be movement. The *remote part* is some event for which the immediate aspect is causally responsible (e.g. a handle turns, a window opens, a speech act is produced). The remote part need not be change; it may also be the maintenance of a state, or it may be entirely absent. In Itkonen's condensed RE schema – roughly speaking – G represents the inner aspect and *A the outer aspect. In the more extensive version, the outer aspect is represented by the whole spatiotemporal element (i.e. that following the mental causation sign). If X and Y represent the immediate and remote parts of the outer aspect of an action, then the action in question is what von Wright calls a *basic action* (i.e. this action is not achieved by doing something else; see 4.3.1 below for action chains). Von Wright (1971: 66–69) further distinguishes between *doing* and *bringing about* things: agents bring about things by doing something. For example, opening the window causes fresh air to enter the room. The cause is called the *result* of the action, the effect the *consequence* of the action: "[t]he consequences of an action are thus effects of its result" (von Wright 1971: 88). The distinction between results and consequences is relevant for explicating various types of actions. In the extended RE schema, X may also stand for the result (i.e. for the outer aspect as a whole) and Y for the intended consequence.

In order to explicate and formalize different action and consequence types, I propose certain elaborations to Itkonen's basic RE schema, which was discussed above (in 4.2.2). I repeat it here for clarity:

RE (intended consequence)
$\{[G:Y \,\&\, B:(X \to Y)] \vdash G:X\} \Rightarrow X$; and if all goes well, $X \to Y$

A convenient point of departure for elaboration is offered by the conditional statement *and if all goes well*. Quite often, all does *not* go well: all kinds of failures, due to ignorance, miscalculation, or 'chance', are common occurrences in our everyday lives.[235] They are also important devices in such literary genres as drama; many comedies centre precisely on something going wrong. I analyse a *failure* as follows:[236]

Failure
$\{[G:Y \,\&\, B:(X \to Y)] \vdash G:X\} \Rightarrow X$; $\sim(X \to Y)$

This formula states that the agent intended and tried to bring about Y by doing X, but Y did not follow from X (for one reason or another); what Austin (1975: 15–18)

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[235] For the causes of failure, see e.g. Merton (1936: 898–904). For simplicity, I omit subscripts indicating the agent for the volitional and epistemic states.

[236] I use the semi-colon in these formalizations as a 'loose' conjunction.

calls *misfires* are part of this category. A different scenario is presented by the above-mentioned 'by-products', where something *in addition to Y* follows from X; these are generally *unintended consequences* (cf. von Wright 1971: 66–67).[237] These actions may again be of various types; it is useful to distinguish at least among the following in terms of the agent's mental states concerning the unintended consequences: they may be on the one hand anticipated/unanticipated, on the other neutral/felicitous/infelicitous. Unanticipated consequences are ones which the agent did not expect to result from the action (cf. e.g. Merton 1936); in the 'wood-chopping' example discussed above in 3.1.4.3, knocking out the mother-in-law would be an *infelicitous unanticipated consequence* (cf. Goffman's unintentional offences). The unanticipated consequence may also be *felicitous*, if it was something the agent wanted (see below), or *neutral*, if it was neither wanted nor unwanted. *Anticipated consequences* can be distinguished in a similar manner; a particularly relevant case is the *infelicitous anticipated consequence*, which covers Goffman's incidental offences (see 3.2.1 above). These actions can be analysed for example as follows:

Neutral unanticipated consequence
$\{[G{:}Y \ \& \ B{:}(X{\rightarrow}Y) \ \& \ {\sim}B(X{\rightarrow}Z)] \vdash G{:}X\} \Rightarrow X; X{\rightarrow}(Y \ \& \ Z)$

Felicitous unanticipated consequence
$\{[G{:}Y \ \& \ G{:}Z \ \& \ B{:}(X{\rightarrow}Y) \ \& \ {\sim}B(X{\rightarrow}Z)] \vdash G{:}X\} \Rightarrow X; X{\rightarrow}(Y \ \& \ Z)$

Infelicitous unanticipated consequence
$\{[G{:}Y \ \& \ G{:}{\sim}Z \ \& \ B{:}(X{\rightarrow}Y) \ \& \ {\sim}B(X{\rightarrow}Z)] \vdash G{:}X\} \Rightarrow X; X{\rightarrow}(Y \ \& \ Z)$

Infelicitous anticipated consequence
$\{[G{:}Y \ \& \ G{:}{\sim}Z \ \& \ B{:}(X{\rightarrow}Y) \ \& \ B{:}(X{\rightarrow}Z)] \vdash G{:}X\} \Rightarrow X; X{\rightarrow}(Y \ \& \ Z)$

Four caveats are in order. First, it should be observed that the scope of the negation sign is relevant in formalizing volitional and epistemic states. In terms of the agent's wants, $G{:}{\sim}Z$ indicates that *the agent wants Z not to be the case*, while ${\sim}G{:}Z$ indicates that *the agent does not want Z to be the case*. In the latter situation, the agent may be completely indifferent towards Z occurring. For simplicity, I refer here only to the former case in analysing infelicitous consequences; similarly, the formula for neutral consequences could include the conjunction ${\sim}G{:}Z \ \& \ {\sim}G{:}{\sim}Z$.[238] In terms of the

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[237] Results and intended consequences overlap with what Searle (1995: 20–23) calls *agentive functions*, while unintended consequences overlap with *nonagentive functions*.

[238] In other words, $\{[G{:}Y \ \& \ {\sim}G{:}Z \ \& \ {\sim}G{:}{\sim}Z \ \& \ B{:}(X{\rightarrow}Y) \ \& \ {\sim}B(X{\rightarrow}Z)] \vdash G{:}X\} \Rightarrow X;$ $X{\rightarrow}(Y \ \& \ Z)$.

agent's expectations, ~B:(X→Z) can be interpreted as *the agent not having any clear beliefs that Z would be the consequence of X*, and B:~(X→Z) as *the (mistaken) belief that Z would not be a consequence*. In analysing concrete action-tokens, the choice between the two can be justified if there is further evidence about the agent's beliefs; in many cases, however, it is not necessary to refer to this distinction. Second, in the case of a felicitous unanticipated consequence, we need to stipulate that the second reference to the agent's volitional attitude (i.e. G:Z) does not need to represent a *want* to achieve something (nor an intention); it may also represent a *pro-attitude* (see 4.2.3 above). Third, in the case of infelicitous anticipated consequences, we need to stipulate either that G:Y is 'stronger' than G:~Z, or that the agent *wants* Y and only has a *pro-attitude* towards Z.[239] Fourth, in all of these cases the additional consequences may also be brought about by a failure (cf. Austin 1975: 17), in other words when the outer aspect or the remote part is ~(X→Y) & X→ Z. For ease of terminology, we may for now refer to these simply as failures combined with other types of consequences.

Finally, we have the case of *plain slips*; in the 'wood-chopping' example, this consisted in the agent becoming startled and accidentally dropping his axe, which then hit his foot. This 'action' needs to be analysed quite differently compared to the previous ones. We may begin with the following preliminary analysis:

Plain slip (1)
X; X→Y

This seems to also be the logical form of a description such as 'He fell off the roof and broke his leg'. In other words, this is a causal explanation of Y. The distinction between plain slips and intentional actions becomes more apparent when we attempt to explain X, for example by noting that it was caused by momentary inattention (as in the 'wood-chopping' example) or being struck by lightning (as in the 'falling off the roof' example); these are represented below by Z. It is also useful to add to the formalization a reference to the agent's volitional and epistemic states:

Plain slip (2)
{~G:X & ~G:Y & ~B:Z}; Z→X; X→Y

In the case of a plain slip, the agent does not intend X or want Y (i.e. ~G:X & ~G:Y), or believe that Z will happen. When we explain such occurrences, however, we can still refer to something that the agent did in fact do (e.g. stand on the roof) or fail to

[239]   These formulae could also be expanded for example by adding the possibility that Y, not X, is the immediate cause of Z; and thus, following the previous examples, that the agent does not believe that Y will cause Z, and so forth.

do (e.g. hold on to the axe). It turns out that the 'wood-chopping' example is closer to an infelicitous unanticipated consequence than the 'falling off the roof' example. It should be noted that failing for example to hold on to the axe was something that the agent arguably did do, but the action nevertheless cannot be described with the above formalization for an infelicitous unanticipated consequence, since *the consequence is not the result of an intentional action*: plain slips as envisaged here do not occur due for example to ignorance or miscalculation, but to such factors as psychological or neural processes (e.g. momentary inattention, psychological priming, a nervous-system disorder which causes twitching). As von Wright notes, "not everything called action (or activity) has an inner as well as an outer aspect. Action (activity) void of intentionality is often called *reflex action*. Such action is also said to be the *reaction* or *response* of a (living) body to a *stimulus*" (1971: 87). A prototypical example in multilingual language use is 'triggering'.

To further explicate the differences between types of actions and their components, I introduce elements from von Wright's tense-logic and logic of action (1963: 17–69; 1965; 1969; 1971: 45–48; 1981), and use them to expand upon Itkonen's RE schema. This allows us to discern more nuanced differences; here I cover only the most crucial cases. I first briefly explain the meanings of the additional symbols to be employed. Propositional symbols (p, q, r etc.) represent states of affairs (e.g. 'the window is open'). The binary connective T (which can be read 'and next') combines two propositional symbols into a 'T-expression' representing an event, such as pTq, pTp, or $pT\sim p$. For example, if p = 'the window is open', then $pT\sim p$ can be read as 'The window closes', pTp as 'The window stays open', and $\sim pTp$ as 'The window opens'. Two different types of actions are indicated by the symbols d (=doing) and f (=forbearing). A formula such as $d(pT\sim p)$ can be read as 'The window is open, and next it has been closed', or more naturally as 'The window is being/has been closed'. For the sake of clarity, I indicate agents of actions with subscripts (but omit these for volitional and epistemic attitudes; in the formulae below, a is always the agent whose action we are analysing). Now $d_a(pT\sim p)$ can be read as 'The window is open, and next a closes the window', or again more naturally as 'a closes the window'. Similarly $d_a(pTp)$ can be read as 'a keeps the window open', and $f_a(pT\sim p)$ as 'a lets the window stay open'.

In Itkonen's RE schema, the object of the agent's volitional attitude (i.e. Y) is not further specified, but there are of course various different types of things that can be wanted. Y may be an action, namely A_a (that a does A) or A_x (that someone does A; i.e. A happens). Y may also be a change of state, such as $\sim pTp$, or the maintenance of a state, such as pTp. With the extended formalism, a wanted action may be analysed in further detail, for example $d_a(\sim pTp)$ or $d_x(\sim pTp)$ (i.e. 'a sees to it that p' vs. 'some person x sees to it that p'), or $f_a(\sim pTp)$, and so on. This system can be used to further explicate central face-related notions introduced in section 3.2: for

example, let *p* represent a positively evaluated face-state, and *q* a more desirable face-state. We may now analyse *maintaining face* as $d_a(pTp)$, *avoiding an FTA as $f_a(pT{\sim}p)$*, *enhancing face* as $d_a(pTq)$, and *damaging face* as $d_a(pT{\sim}p)$. I return to these analyses in section 5.4.

With the expanded formalism, we are now in a position to represent actions and events in more detail. I briefly discuss a few examples. To begin with, an *intentional change-of-state action* is analysed as follows:

> *Intentional change-of-state action*
> $\{[G{:}({\sim}pTp) \,\&\, B{:}(d_a({\sim}qTq){\rightarrow}({\sim}pTp))] \vdash G{:}d_a({\sim}qTq)\} \Rightarrow d_a({\sim}qTq);$
> $d_a({\sim}qTq){\rightarrow}({\sim}pTp)$

To use a simple example: if *q* now represents 'the window is open' and *p* represents 'fresh air is flowing into the room', the formula says basically that '*a* opened the window in order to let fresh air into the room, and fresh air started to flow into the room'. Variants can be produced for example by changing *doing* into *forbearing*, or *changing* to *maintaining*. Sometimes we bring about changes in the world by refraining from doing something else, or by continuing to do what we are doing:

> *Intentional change-of-state forbearance*
> $\{[G{:}({\sim}pTp) \,\&\, B{:}(f_a({\sim}qTq){\rightarrow}({\sim}pTp))] \vdash G{:}f_a({\sim}qTq)\} \Rightarrow f_a({\sim}qTq); f_a({\sim}qTq){\rightarrow}({\sim}pTp)$

> *Intentional maintenance-of-state action*
> $\{[G{:}(pTp) \,\&\, B{:}(d_a({\sim}qTq){\rightarrow}(pTp))] \vdash G{:}d_a({\sim}qTq)\} \Rightarrow d_a({\sim}qTq); d_a({\sim}qTq){\rightarrow}(pTp)$

> *Intentional maintenance-of-state forbearance*
> $\{[G{:}(pTp) \,\&\, B{:}(f_a({\sim}qTq){\rightarrow}(pTp))] \vdash G{:}f_a({\sim}qTq)\} \Rightarrow f_a({\sim}qTq); f_a({\sim}qTq){\rightarrow}(pTp)$

If the volitional attitude is directed at an action (i.e. when the intended consequence of an action is another action), the formula needs to be changed only by adding a *d* or *f* -operator (together with its subscript) to the *T*-expression:

> *Intentional action-as-a-consequence action*
> $\{[G{:}d_b({\sim}pTp) \,\&\, B{:}(d_a({\sim}qTq){\rightarrow}d_b({\sim}pTp))] \vdash G{:}d_a({\sim}qTq)\}$
> $\Rightarrow d_a({\sim}qTq); d_a({\sim}qTq){\rightarrow} d_b({\sim}pTp)$

Variants of the latter formula can be produced in the same way as above, with the addition that we may wish to distinguish between not-doing and forbearing (i.e. *~d(pTp)* vs. *f(pTp)*; cf. von Wright 1963: 45); these will not be discussed further.

Finally, instead of general failures, we may now distinguish for example between *change-of-state failures* and *action-as-a-consequence failures*. For the other types of 'mishaps', there are similarly possibilities of indicating in more detail whether for example the consequence was a change of state or an action. The difference between the above-mentioned 'wood-chopping' and 'falling off the roof' examples can now be indicated by the presence or absence of the *d/f* operator. I illustrate this by listing some of the variants of these formulae, without distinguishing explicitly between all the different variants; in other words in each case below the formula is only one example of the action-type in question:

Change-of-state failure
$\{[G:(\sim pTp) \ \& \ B:(d_a(\sim qTq) \rightarrow (\sim pTp))] \vdash G:d_a(\sim qTq)\}$
$\Rightarrow d_a(\sim qTq); \sim(d_a(\sim qTq) \rightarrow (\sim pTp))$

Action-as-a-consequence failure
$\{[G:d_b(\sim pTp) \ \& \ B:(d_a(\sim qTq) \rightarrow d_b(\sim pTp))] \vdash G:d_a(\sim qTq)\}$
$\Rightarrow d_a(\sim qTq); \sim(d_a(\sim qTq) \rightarrow d_b(\sim pTp))$

Neutral unanticipated consequence
$\{[G:(\sim pTp) \ \& \ B:(d_a(\sim qTq) \rightarrow (\sim pTp)) \ \& \ \sim B(d_a(\sim qTq) \rightarrow (\sim rTr))] \vdash G:d_a(\sim qTq)\}$
$\Rightarrow d_a(\sim qTq); d_a(\sim qTq) \rightarrow ((\sim pTp) \ \& \ (\sim rTr))$

Felicitous unanticipated consequence
$\{[G:(\sim pTp) \ \& \ G:(\sim rTr) \ \& \ B:(d_a(\sim qTq) \rightarrow (\sim pTp)) \ \& \ \sim B(d_a(\sim qTq) \rightarrow (\sim rTr))]$
$\vdash G:d_a(\sim qTq)\} \Rightarrow d_a(\sim qTq); d_a(\sim qTq) \rightarrow ((\sim pTp) \ \& \ (\sim rTr))$

Infelicitous unanticipated consequence
$\{[G:(\sim pTp) \ \& \ G:\sim(\sim rTr) \ \& \ B:(d_a(\sim qTq) \rightarrow (\sim pTp)) \ \& \ \sim B(d_a(\sim qTq) \rightarrow (\sim rTr))] \vdash$
$G:d_a(\sim qTq)\} \Rightarrow d_a(\sim qTq); d_a(\sim qTq) \rightarrow ((\sim pTp) \ \& \ (\sim rTr))$

Infelicitous anticipated consequence
$\{[G:(\sim pTp) \ \& \ G:\sim(\sim rTr) \ \& \ B:(d_a(\sim qTq) \rightarrow (\sim pTp)) \ \& \ B(d_a(\sim qTq) \rightarrow (\sim rTr))]$
$\vdash G:d_a(\sim qTq)\} \Rightarrow d_a(\sim qTq); d_a(\sim qTq) \rightarrow ((\sim pTp) \ \& \ (\sim rTr))$

Plain slip
$\{\sim G:d_a(\sim qTq) \ \& \ \sim G:(\sim rTr) \ \& \ \sim B(\sim pTp)\}; (\sim pTp) \rightarrow d_a(\sim qTq); d_a(\sim qTq) \rightarrow (\sim rTr)$

Finally, I mention one more caveat about a particularly central concept: situational CS. In 3.1.3.1 above, I suggested that the situational vs. metaphorical dichotomy could be analysed in terms of two different types of norm and two different types of

explanation. Metaphorical CS is governed by RPs, and is thus accounted for by RE precisely as outlined above. Situational CS is slightly different: here we also need to consider category of norms corresponding to what von Wright (1963) calls *customs*; similar points can be made regarding *rules* and *prescriptions*. These are not contingent upon any *particular* goals, and actions which are performed in accordance with them are explained simply by reference to the existence of these norms, not necessarily to any of the agent's current goals. The agent does of course have to know the norms in question and intentionally follow them; otherwise the norms could not possibly play any explanatory role. Although it seems intuitively fairly clear what this type of explanation consists of, formalizing the logical structure of the relevant action is more complicated. The main challenge for the present system is the step from an agent's believing that he ought to do something to his intending to do it; in order to rely on the same general formula employed thus far, there needs to be some other goal, which the agent attempts to achieve by following the norm in question; as argued above, however, explanations based on norms often make no reference to such goals. Philosophers have proposed various explanations as to why people follow (conform to, comply with) norms of this sort, ranging from the avoidance of sanctions to the maintenance of game-theoretical equilibria (see e.g. Ullmann-Margalit 1977; Bicchieri 2006). Solving these problems, however, is well beyond the scope of the present study; for our purposes, the main point is that some explanations of linguistic behaviour (including CS) may replace the reference to an ultimate goal with a reference to particular norms other than RPs.

To sum up: I have demonstrated that the analyses of the structure of actions proposed by von Wright and Itkonen can be fruitfully combined. In addition, Itkonen's RE schema can be expanded upon to capture differences between types of actions, for example when something happens that is unintended or unanticipated. By applying a notation derived from von Wright's tense-logic and logic of action, it is possible to create a more refined formalism, in particular for distinguishing between states and events and between 'doing' and 'forbearing'. The explications of action types presented here will be applied in the textual analyses to identify particular action types and to classify explanations of CS into categories.

4.2.6   Explanation and coherence

The preceding sections have focused on the structure and nature of the type of explanation used in interpretation. The reliability of the principles on which the explanations are based was touched upon briefly in 4.2.4; the present section continues this theme by examining the status of individual explanations of particular actions. The point of departure here is Itkonen's (e.g. 1983) argument that 'coherentist explanation' is an inevitable component not only of our everyday

activities but also of the human sciences, particularly in connection with 'pattern explanation', as for example in analogizing. I suggest here that interpretation as practised in 'action analysis' in general, and in philology in particular, may also be fruitfully analysed in terms of *coherence*.

According to the *coherence theory of truth* (see e.g. Bradley 1914; Rescher 1973; Walker 1989; Davidson 2001: 137–157), the truth of a proposition consists in it being 'coherent' with some set of propositions. What *coherence* actually consists of is a problematic question; it may be consistency with other propositions, the logical entailment of a proposition from a set of propositions, or 'support' between different propositions. The last of these is suitable for our present purposes.[240] Here I am not taking a stance one way or the other on coherence theory *as such*; my aim, rather, is to use the notion of coherence as a tool.

I first illustrate one possible way of 'adding coherence' to a set of propositions (in the case of philology, certain facts). Let the situation we are attempting to explain be represented by a set of statements, for example $\{p, q, r\}$. In this case, we want to understand why this situation exists. Suppose that there is good justification for proposing a statement which can be represented by $(p\&q)\rightarrow r$, where the arrow stands for neither material implication (which is too weak, since negation of the antecedent does not affect the consequent) nor logical entailment (which is too strong), but something in-between. The statement attempts to indicate that $p\&q$ and r "hang together [...], fit together and reinforce each other in a significant way" (BonJour 1985: 96). Adding this statement to the above set arguably 'explains' why r is the case, hence adding to the coherence of the set of statements.

Something to this effect seems to be, in a nutshell, what also takes place in action-interpretation. The basic idea is that we attempt to build a *coherent picture* of the situation, which may be accomplished either by adding further statements to the set or by postulating connections between the statements. What contributes to the coherence or incoherence of our explanations can be facts of many types: often it is further information about the context. We can compare this idea with Austin's 'imagined situation' method (1979: 183–184); the difference is that we are not adding further background information from our imagination but from additional contextualization. Next, our explanation is evaluated in terms of its coherence: a particular explanation may, for example, become implausible if some facts about the context that have previously been ignored are added to the set of statements. A possible objection to the above characterization is that any 'facts' at all might be introduced in this manner, to add to or detract from the coherence of the set of statements. The additional facts, however, should be *justified through some other*

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[240]   Coherence should more properly be understood as *inductive support*, a notion which has also been very difficult to define in precise terms.

means as well; any set of preposterous statements may be mutually coherent, but may lack justification outside the system.

To illustrate, I evaluate the coherence of certain interpretations presented earlier in this work. First, the authorship of the *Orationes* texts was discussed briefly above, in 2.3.1, where I suggested that a plausible point of departure would be to assume that the boys took part in the composition of at least parts of the texts. As support for this conclusion, I pointed out the following factors: (i) the practical functions of the performances (e.g. obtaining a holiday), (ii) the linguistic competence of the boys, (iii) the general practice of emulation and replication in school exercises and the similarities observable in other academic drama from the same period, (iv) the recurrent theme of complaining about school life and the teachers, (v) the formulation of the title of the manuscript (i.e. *à Scholasticis* as possibly indicating the agent of *composita fuerunt*). I argue that these are statements of *objective facts*, which can be justified independently of each other and independently of their occurrence in this argument. This of course does not prove beyond doubt that the boys were in fact involved in composing the texts; nevertheless, this interpretation is arguably more coherent than for example assuming that Lovejoy composed all the texts by himself, unless additional facts can be brought forth in support of the claim and to account for the above-mentioned factors. The five facts listed above 'fit together'; they also 'fit together' with and 'support' the statement that the boys took part in composing the texts.

Another example relates to the use of quotations in the texts, and our knowledge of the school curriculum. If we identify a particular phrase in one of the texts as a quotation from an ancient author, as in example (8) in 4.2.1, we can use this as evidence in arguing that the students read the particular work in school, and we can also attempt to explain the occurrence of the quotation by referring to the assumption that the students had encountered the original text during their lessons. Although this argument is not incoherent, it is clearly circular, and should not be accepted in its present form. Further justification should therefore be sought for the statement that the boys actually read the text in school. As discussed above in 2.2.2.3 (see also Mäkilähde 2018b), it is reasonable to assume that the boys read Cicero's letters, although they are not explicitly mentioned for example in the 1665 or 1682 regulations. The objective facts which justify this supposition are the following: (i) the letters were part of the official curricula of other schools in both England and elsewhere in Europe at the time, (ii) they were recommended as reading material in a number of pedagogical treatises, (iii) the *Orationes* texts contain quotations from the letters, and (iv) the boys explicitly state that they have read them. One may compare the situation with example (8), namely the intersentential switch beginning *Est Deus in nobis*: although it is an *objective fact* that the line is a quotation from Ovid's *Fasti*, the claim that the boys had read the text in school receives less support

than the claim concerning Cicero's letters; it is also possible that the boys had encountered the line in a collection of *sententiae*, a florilegium, or something similar. I return to this example in 4.3.2.

To sum up: the plausibility of philological explanations can be analysed in terms of the notion of coherence. In a coherent explanation, statements concerning actions and their context 'fit together' and 'support' each other. The coherence of a set of statements can be strengthened by adding new statements to the set or by positing connections between the statements; when new statements are added, however, they need to be justified on some other, external basis in order to contribute to the coherence of the whole set.

4.3 Building the framework: From metatheory to theory

In the introduction to chapter 4, I argued that the formalism and concepts introduced in the philosophical/methodological analyses could be used as *tools* in the textual analyses, hence bridging the gap between metatheory and empirical research. Most of the framework has already been constructed; in this section, I expand it further with the aid of the conceptual inventory introduced in the previous section. I discuss additional concepts which will be utilized in the analyses; I am here indebted in particular to ideas derived from Clark (1996). In addition, I revisit certain questions which have been touched upon in what precedes.

4.3.1 Rationalization chains

Rational explanation was discussed extensively above in section 4.2; I first argued that RE is an integral part of philological interpretation, and then demonstrated how formalizations of the logical structure of actions can be employed in the explication of action-types. In the present section, I introduce the notion of *rationalization chains* as another way to apply the concept of RE to construct a tool for analysing actions.

Let us start from the obvious fact that actions are often performed as part of more complex actions. For example, Itkonen (2003) notes that

> [a]ssertions are *defined* to have the purpose of 'indicating facts', but this purpose
> is in general subordinated to the higher purpose (or goal) of informing the hearer,
> which is no longer just a matter of definition; and, in a manner typical of the
> explanatory means – ends schema, the act of informing may in turn serve as the
> means to achieve any number of still higher, context-dependent goals, like
> pleasing one's friends or offending one's enemies. Linguistic intuition proper

pertains to the actions that are lowest in this hierarchy, i.e. assertions, questions, and requests. Those ('higher') actions that can be performed *by means of* assertions etc. no longer come into the purview of linguistic intuition, but of the more general type of agent's knowledge.

<div align="right">(Itkonen 2003: 79; boldface changed to italics)</div>

Many writers have expressed the same basic idea (see e.g. von Wright 1971: 68; Austin 1979: 201).[241] To illustrate, suppose that an agent wants to impress his boss by coming to work very early. He wants to catch the earliest possible bus to his workplace in order to arrive in time. To catch the bus he has to finish his morning routines as quickly as possible, and he therefore prepares his breakfast in advance the night before. This particular action is not intended as a direct means to impress his boss; instead, it is part of a chain of actions whereby the agent believes he will eventually achieve his goal.[242] We could also proceed further the other way and ask why the agent wants to impress his boss in the first place, and so on. His cooking breakfast the previous night could also be replaced with a speech act – for example, if he asked someone else to do it for him.[243] All parts of this chain are of potential interest to the theory of action; however, since we are here primarily concerned with linguistic actions, we may wish to limit our scope to a small part of the chain.

Let us now consider a more concrete example. In 3.2.2 I presented an analysis of a situation where S requests something from H, and illustrated the structure of the interaction in terms of 'steps'. The same example can be represented more strictly from S's perspective, as well as by referring to the ultimate and subordinate goals of the action, together with its results and (intended) consequences. The following chain indicates the goals and the means for achieving them: S wants H to do X (Goal-1). He believes that if he avoids imposing on H (Means-1), H will do X. He believes that he can attain this (Goal-2) by redressing H's face wants (Means-2). In order to achieve this (Goal-3), he chooses to say that he is willing to incur a debt (Means-3). We can present this *rationalization chain* schematically as in Figure 8.

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[241] For the idea of reasoning chains in general, cf. e.g. Grice (1975); Searle (1979: 34); Gumperz (1982: 94); Clark (1996: 147–148, 152–153). On desires 'based on' other desires, see e.g. Brennan et al. (2013: 201).

[242] A similar situation is described in the tale of 'The Old Woman and her Pig'.

[243] The goals formulated in these examples in 'ordinary language' can be further explicated by means of theoretical concepts such as face.

Figure 8.   Example of a rationalization chain. G= goal, M = means.

A rationalization chain is an 'expanded' version of the standard RE schema. If we number each of the levels in Figure 8 starting from the top, we observe that the means at level 1 becomes the goal at level 2. This is because of the principle of 'who wants the end, wants the means', built into RE (see 4.2.2); in other words, the volitional attitude is transferred to the means. If the means is not what von Wright (1971) calls a basic action – a 'surface action', as it were – another level is needed. The chain terminates with a means consisting of a basic (linguistic) action. The representation of the chain in Figure 8 reflects the point of view of S: it begins with a goal, the attainment of which is seen as a problem, and ends in a possible solution (cf. Leech 1983: 36). We can also begin from the 'surface-level' means, and keep asking 'Why?', which is more of a reflection of H's point of view. Incidentally, we may note the obvious connection between these two types of chains and function-to-form vs. form-to-function mappings: a *G-to-M chain* starts from a function and ends in a form, while an *M-to-G chain* starts from a form and ends in a function.

The concept of rationalization chains can be applied in various ways. First, if we continue with the idea of problem-solving, the individual levels can be seen as representing choices when faced with a split in the reasoning path: although each goal may be attained through various means, choosing a specific superstrategy will limit the choices to a set of particular substrategies. We can compare this on the one hand with Brown and Levinson's decision chain for FTAs, on the other to typologies of politeness strategies (see 3.2.2 above). The specific set of choices may also be limited due to an interfering goal. For example, maximizing effectiveness or minimizing effort may be secondary to face-wants or vice versa (cf. Merton 1936: 900). We can thus demonstrate the effect of individual choices or subgoals on the availability of further choices.

Second, comparing several chains provides another way to operate with certain special cases, namely when a particular strategy performs several functions simultaneously, or when two strategies are employed simultaneously for the same function (i.e. at the same level). If we consider example (8) discussed above (i.e. *Est Deus in nobis* etc.), we can say (simplifying the analysis for the present purposes)

that CS is used to establish solidarity with H (i.e. the audience), which is done in order to have H evaluate S positively. It is also arguably the case that the use of a partial quotation itself serves to establish solidarity. These two functions are thus situated at the same level. In order to even employ the quotation in its original form, however, S has to switch to Latin. In other words, it is also the case that CS simply enables S to perform a particular type of action (the particulars of this example will be discussed in more detail below). We can represent the two parallel rationalization chains schematically as in Figure 9:

Using CS for solidarity

G1 positive evaluation by H ⟶ M1 express solidarity

G2 = M1 ⟶ M2 code-switch

Using a quotation for solidarity

G1 positive evaluation by H ⟶ M1 express solidarity

G2 = M1 ⟶ M2 use partial quotations

G3 = M2 ⟶ M3 code-switch

Figure 9.   Parallel rationalization chains.

There are two points to be noted regarding these rationalization chains. First, G2 (which is the same in both chains) is achieved through both CS and the use of a quotation.[244] Second, CS appears in one chain as M2 and in the other as M3; in other words, it has two different functions. The positions of these functions in the chains may indicate the intuitively obvious distinction between them. In addition, it may be noted that although both of them are contingent upon what S intended to achieve, there is another consequence which is not so: *flagging the quotation*. As noted above in 4.2.1, a switch in languages is one of the features indicating that the utterance is a quotation; however, this is clearly a *by-product* of the switch. We can hypothesize that the agent was indifferent to this particular consequence (~G:Y & ~G:~Y) but not oblivious to it (B:(X→Y)); thus we are dealing with a *neutral anticipated consequence* (see Figure 10). Conversely, the reference to *the Poet* could arguably be analysed as an intentional flagging of the quotation; in other words, there are again several actions which simultaneously have the same consequence.

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[244]   See Mäkilähde & Rissanen (2016) for a similar but non-formal analysis of CS and quotations in Cicero's letters.

Figure 10. Rationalization chain for a neutral by-product. The broken arrow represents causation. C = consequence.

At this point, it may be useful to briefly summarize the various dimensions of multifunctionality exhibited by CS. Towards this end, I adopt the notation used by Itkonen (2016: 35) in the description of grammatical meanings in particular (for example in linguistic typology), and suggest a way to apply it to the pragmatic level. Starting from the 'one meaning, one form' principle, or 1M1F, he notes (ibid.) that deviations from it are constituted by cases of 'two or more meanings, one form' and 'one meaning, two or more forms'. Any of these three situations may exist at either the syntagmatic or the paradigmatic level. In our discussion thus far, we have seen (i) that CS serves various different purposes in different contexts (i.e. paradigmatic 2M1F), (ii) that it often serves several purposes simultaneously (i.e. syntagmatic 2M1F), (iii) that other linguistic strategies can also serve similar functions (i.e. paradigmatic 1M2F), and (iv) that sometimes several strategies serve the same purpose simultaneously (i.e. syntagmatic 1M2F).

I conclude this section with a brief discussion of certain aspects of the model of language use developed by Clark (1996). First, this allows me to answer one possible line of criticism, namely that the present framework is too 'speaker-centred'. Second, these aspects can be used to enhance the concept of rationalization chains and to fill in some of the gaps not explicitly covered by the formalism introduced above in 4.2.5. I briefly summarize Clark's main argument, which centres on the conception that "[l]anguage use is really a form of *joint action*" (1996: 3). It is by no means possible to do full justice to the model in this brief overview; here I focus strictly on those aspects which are of central relevance for my argument.

Clark (1996: 18–19) distinguishes between two main types of intentional actions: *individual actions* and *joint actions*. The former are further divided into *autonomous* and *participatory actions*. One of Clark's examples concerns the performance of music: playing a piece solo is an autonomous action, playing a piece together with other musicians is a joint action, and playing one's own part as part of the joint action

is a participatory action (ibid.). The relevant argument is, then, that "speaking and listening […] are participatory actions, like parts of a duet, and the language use they create is a joint action, like the duet itself" (1996: 20). Joint actions occur as part of *joint activities*; a central example is discourse in general. In order to advance the activity in question, the participants have to *coordinate* their actions (1996: 29–36). In joint activities, the participants work to accomplish what Clark terms *joint projects*: each such project is "a joint action projected by one of its participants and taken up by the others" (1996: 191; italics removed). A minimal joint project consists of a pair of actions (i.e. what in the CA tradition has been termed an *adjacency pair*), such as question and answer, or request and compliance; many projects, however, contain at least three parts (e.g. question + answer + evaluation/acknowledgement of the answer) (Clark 1996: 196–209).[245] In the case of a question-and-answer pair, the joint project may be for example "a transfer of information" (1996: 198). In other words, a joint project can perhaps be described as a goal which is to be achieved by means of a joint action. My interpretation of Clark's overall claim is therefore the following: to *achieve* certain things, agents need others to take actions as well. In the context of language use, this means that speakers and addressees need to cooperate. This is arguably the case even in adversarial actions: if S wants to insult H (for example because S wants H to feel bad), S needs to make sure that H understands the insult and interprets it as such – something which S cannot do by himself.[246] Understood this way, Clark's argument is fully compatible with the view presented in my analyses thus far.

I next discuss the notion of *action ladders*, introduced by Clark to describe hierarchical actions, an example being an agent fulfilling his goal of getting a lift to arrive by pressing a button: "Alan presses his finger against the "up" button *in order to* depress "up" button, which he does *in order to* activate the "up" button, which he does *in order to* call an "up" elevator, and so on" (1996: 147). This description is in effect an M-to-G chain. In joint actions we have two connected ladders, one for each participatory action. The levels of action and the two ladders are represented schematically in Table 3:

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[245] Clark (1996: 207–209) notes that multi-part projects can be analysed as pairs of actions which have been 'chained' together (note that this concept of 'chaining' is different from the rationalization chains discussed in this section). The question + answer + evaluation project, for example, consists in effect of two pairs of actions: question + answer, and answer + evaluation. In other words, 'answer' is first a reaction to 'question'; next, 'evaluation' is a reaction to 'answer'. This type of *gestalt-shifting* (or *switching*) is also found at the level of syntax (see e.g. Itkonen 2011: 231–232).

[246] Cf. also the idea of politeness being a game of *quid pro quo*, as discussed above in 3.2.2: the reference to a 'game' in itself already implies coordination and cooperation in Grice's sense.

Table 3. Levels of a joint action. Adapted from Clark (1996: 152–153).

Level of action	Speaker A's actions	Addressee B's actions
4: Proposal & consideration	A is proposing joint project w to B	B is considering A's proposal of w
3: Meaning & understanding	A is signalling that p for B	B is recognizing that p from A
2: Presentation & identification	A is presenting signal s to B	B is identifying signal s from A
1: Execution and attention	A is executing behaviour t to B	B is attending to behaviour t from A

To illustrate the four levels, I discuss in abbreviated form Clark's (1996: 149–153) example, where S says to H *Sit down here* while pointing at a chair. At level 1, S executes certain behaviours (i.e. articulates a certain combination of sounds and moves his hand); at level 2, he presents signals (i.e. certain words together with an indexical gesture); at level 3, he asks that H sit down in the chair; and at level 4, he proposes to H that H sit down in the chair. As can be seen, one distinction between my rationalization chains and Clark's action ladders is that the former describe primarily *the stages of an inference*, the latter *the cotemporaneous aspects of individual basic actions*. The ladder for S's participatory actions could be appended to each rationalization chain once the 'surface level' is reached; in explaining individual actions as part of textual analyses, however, these more detailed aspects can often be taken for granted.

What is particularly useful about Clark's action ladders is that they can be used – together with rationalization chains – in describing different types of failures (Clark 1996: 191, 152–152, 232–234), thereby removing some of the burden from the formalism introduced above in 4.2.5. To continue with the same example: at level 1, H may not notice S's behaviour (e.g. due to inattentiveness); at level 2, H may fail to identify some of S's signals (e.g. due to mishearing a word as something else); at level 3, H may not understand S's intention; and at level 4, H may forbear taking up the proposal. In the present example, we might perhaps say that at the first three levels we find a change-of-state failure, at the fourth an action-as-a-consequence failure.

To sum up: the notion of rationalization chains offers another descriptive tool for analysing cases where the use of one strategy has several consequences (e.g. functions), and where one consequence (e.g. function) is achieved through several strategies. Although the chains probably possess some psychological reality (merely due to the fact that the same is probably true of RE), they should not be taken as representations of a person's reasoning processes *simpliciter*. Rather, they represent how a person *ought to reason*, given a certain case; thus they describe the logical structure of actions and their explanations.

4.3.2   Layering

Since the material for the present study includes not only speeches but drama performances, we have to take into account what Clark (1996: 358–384) calls *layering*, the fact that actions take place at several communicative *layers* (see also e.g. Diller 1997/1998: 507–508; Jucker & Taavitsainen 2013: 21–22).[247] The 'real' or serious actions occur at the bottom layer (layer 1); on top of this layer, the interactants construct another one, where non-serious actions are situated (layer 2). More layers may be added on top of the second one, as demonstrated below (Clark 1996: 354–355). In most cases of drama, we have to account for communication between the dramatis personae (layer 2; within the play), as well as between the actors (or the dramatis personae) and the audience (layer 1). Clark (1996: 365) analyses the layers of drama in a slightly different manner, adding a layer to account for communication between playwright and audience; communication among the dramatis personae, in his view, is situated at layer 3. In the present study, I prefer to treat communication between the playwrights (i.e. presumably the King's School boys) and the audience as situated at layer 1, on a separate *communicative axis*: at this layer, the boys are communicating with the audience through their play and at the same time pretending (together with their audience) that the events depicted are taking place. Another axis (rather than another layer) may also account for communication which takes place when someone reads the play-text. Specific features of language use, such as visual strategies used for discourse organization, are exclusive to this particular axis.

To illustrate the concept of layering, I return to example (5), discussed above in 3.1.3.2. I reproduce part of it here as example (10):

(10)   **Kn[obbs]:** Imprimis for contempt of authority, You are adjudged by the Statute De scandalo Magnatum equorum made anno domini Guilielmi imperatoris octavo, vigesimo quarto die Novembris Quadragintesimoq[ue] to sit in the Town pidgeon holes like a Stock dove until you hatch a brood of better manners – Item for being overtaken with a cup of Nimis, your pennance

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[247]   As noted by Clark (1996: 353), Austin referred to the non-serious use of language as "*parasitic* upon its normal use" (1975: 22). For the most important sources utilized in developing the concept of layering, see Clark (1996: 355). It may be worth emphasizing that I do not, of course, analyse the *Orationes* dialogues as faithful recordings of spontaneous everyday language use. This does not mean that the texts are 'inauthentic': their performance at layer 1 was very much an authentic communicative situation. This also applies to the orations. Furthermore, the philological-pragmatic approach ought to be applicable to language use in general, from spontaneous present-day communication to formal written genres of past millennia. For the issue of 'authenticity' from the point of view of written CS in particular, see also Skaffari & Mäkilähde (2014: 261–262).

is to drink nothing but, fair water as long as the discretion of your Magistrate shall think fitting. Lastly for being a Swearer.

(*Discipuli et Rustici*, f. 291v)

To reiterate: at layer 1 the boys are performing their play to the audience, at layer 2 Knobbs is playing the role of assistant to the Justice of the Peace (whose role is played by Blunt), and at layer 3 the assistant is reading out the verdict (see Figure 11 below). I argued above that the use of Latin would have been an authentic representation of 'legalese', and that the FFIs together contribute to this humorous effect. We can now analyse this situation more formally: at layer 3, Knobbs the assistant engages in situational CS; the longer intrasentential switches in particular are required to refer to the correct statute. In other words, this is a case of *norm-following*. At layer 2, Knobbs the country bumpkin uses Latin in order to bring authenticity to his performance; in other words, it is metaphorical switching. The reason for doing this can be explicated by constructing a rationalization chain and by invoking the notion of face: in order to maintain face as a competent actor, Knobbs has to act in a certain way. Finally, at layer 1, the King's School boys use these same strategies for humour (which can again be explained in more detail in a similar manner), and one particular boy acts in a certain way to reach this goal. It is important to consider all these different layers concurrently, since the type of explanation or function may vary drastically depending on the layer (see also e.g. Harjunpää & Mäkilähde 2016: 189–193; Mäkilähde 2018a: 309–315). In analysing layer 2 (and those above it), the interpretations can be justified at least in part by the reactions of the dramatis personae, adding another level of situational contextualization.

Layer 3
Situation: an assistant producing an utterance
Explanation: CS due to genre-specific norms

Layer 2
Situation: Knobbs playing the role of assistant
Explanation: CS to achieve authenticity

Layer 1
Situation: a boy playing the role of Knobbs
Explanation: CS to achieve a humorous effect

Figure 11.   Layers of action in example (10).

At this point, let us once again return to example (8) and the intersentential switch *Est Deus in nobis*, etc. As pointed out above in 4.2.6, it is not quite clear whether the students had read *Fasti* as part of their studies or whether they had taken the line from a collection of *sententiae*, although it may still be argued that the educated members of the audience would surely have read *Fasti* either during their own grammar school years or later at university. The quotation may also have been familiar to them from some other context, for example from a contemporary text, where it had been used previously. While the solidarity explanation is arguably plausible in many similar cases (see e.g. Mäkilähde 2018a), its coherence in the present case is less satisfactory, due to these uncertainties. As mentioned in the preceding section, however, we can at least point out that it is certainly the case that the switch to Latin *flags* the quotation. Is there anything between these two points of certainty that might be offered as an explanation for the switch? My suggestion is that the primary function of the utterance at layer 2 is *humour*, and that this function would also have been present at layer 1, perhaps even as the primary one. For this explanation, it is of no consequence whether the boys had read Ovid's original or not (although the joke would perhaps work even better if they had); nor does it necessarily depend on them knowing that, in the original context, the topic at hand was inspiration. The humour is created by the juxtaposition of the concrete cold felt by the students and the 'spiritual' warmth mentioned in the poem. This interpretation is supported by the fact that Iemmy's lines begin with another pun: the boys are *all turn'd Quakers* because their *hands quake with cold*. The aptness of Ovid's line – whether or not recognized as such – would surely have been appreciated by the audience. This analysis demonstrates that there are intricate connections between coherence, certainty, and different levels of understanding: the most coherent explanation may be one where we merely understand an action for what it is – in this case the act of quoting a particular author in Latin; when, however, we move beyond this level of certainty, the coherence of our explanations needs increasing support from other, independently justified statements.

4.3.3   Face and identity revisited

The concept of *foreignness-foregrounded items* was introduced in the preceding chapter to clarify how various forms on the continuum between CS and borrowing might be relevant for a pragmatic study of language choice and code-switching. The formal analysis presented above in 4.2.5 can now be used to further clarify the concept. A form may be considered an FFI regardless of whether that is the *intended* or *unintended consequence* of an action. In the prototypical case of CS, we are dealing with the former. In the case for example of unintentionally indicating one's L1 by speaking with a non-native accent, what we are dealing with, depending on

the context, is probably either a *neutral* or *infelicitous consequence* of an action (either *anticipated* or *unanticipated*). A form may therefore be an FFI only from S's or H's perspective, or for example from the perspective of the analyst. These distinctions affect the coherence of the explanations proposed, and therefore need to be taken into account as well.

A problem related to the status of FFIs as intended or unintended has to do with the role of *face* in our explanations of CS-behaviour, together with related notions such as 'identity'. Since face is an omnipresent feature in communication, its relevance for understanding the functions of utterances is high. There is, however, always the risk of extending face-related explanations beyond their limits. As discussed in Chapter 3, the functions of CS may also be related to such aspects as discourse-organization; in addition, CS can sometimes be explained primarily in terms of external causes, such as the existence of particular norms (and these explanation types may also be combined).

To illustrate the limits of certain types or explanations, I discuss two examples drawn from Adams's (2003) seminal study on bilingualism in Roman antiquity. As Adams himself notes, the study is "overwhelmingly about identity" (2003: 751): CS is often explained as expressing for example the writer's or referent's dual identity. Beyond expressing identities, many explanations rely on an idea similar to the notion of CS as metaphorical (in Blom and Gumperz's sense), for example in terms of the symbolism attached to a particular language. The logical structure of such explanations is that of either *intentional change-of-state* or *intentional maintenance-of-state action*. There are many cases where such explanations are convincing; for example, it is clear that the use of Greek in Cicero's letters at least sometimes serves the function of maintaining a specific face for him (Adams 2003: 309–323; cf. Dunkel 2000; Swain 2002; Rollinger 2015; Mäkilähde & Rissanen 2016). Identity, however, is a problematic explanatory device, for the simple reason that while it can be applied to almost all instances of CS, it is arguably the case that not all CS is intended *primarily* to express a specific identity. Furthermore, other types of actions – such as unanticipated consequences, plain slips, or norm-following – may account for certain examples better than the 'basic' intended consequence action type.

I first consider Adams's (2003: 687–724) account of the language use of potters at La Graufesenque in Gaul around the first century A.D. The phenomenon at issue is the use of particular forms of names in lists which indicated who fired what number of what type of pot in the kiln at one time (see Marichal 1988 for the texts). Each entry in the list gives the name of the potter, the type of pot in question, and the number of pots; the entries lack verbs and are not full clauses. The names of the potters derive etymologically from various sources: Celtic, Latin, Celto-Latin, and Greek. The relevant names in this context are those terminating in the Latin *-us* or the Celtic *-os*; names of either origin appear variably with either ending: for example,

Secundus/*Secundos* (Latin), *Tritos*/*Tritus* (Celtic). However, Adams notes that one name, *Vindulus*, appears only in its Latinate form (four tokens in three texts; Marichal 1988: 132–137, Plates 12–14); of particular interest is a list where all other similar names take the *-os* termination regardless of their origin (Plate 12). Adams suggests that Vindulus "was widely regarded as a primary speaker of Latin or as heavily Romanised or as intent on expressing some sort of 'Roman' identity, and insistent on the Latinate spelling of his name" (2003: 705).

This explanation, however, may be at odds with the practical purpose of these texts. Coleman (2015), for example, argues that many analyses overlook the material aspects of the texts, and describes the production activity as "a form of quick writing that was not troubled with proper form or wide-scale reception; rather its concern was legibility for the local craftsmen" (2015: 32). He adds that "[c]ompared to carefully prepared and fully public stone inscriptions, the La Graufesenque receipts were hastily written, quickly discarded, and functioned through and despite limited literacy" (ibid.). If we add these statements concerning the material context of the texts to Adams's account, the explanation arguably becomes less coherent. The lists contain a considerable extent of linguistic variation in general: there are orthographic inconsistencies, abbreviated forms, and possible effects of language contact or simply uncertainty regarding standard written forms (e.g. *acitabula* pro *acetabula*). The text which contains two tokens of *Vindulus* (Marichal 1988: 132–133, Plate 12), for example, includes *Felixx* pro *Felix* as well as a few abbreviated words (e.g. *pann* pro *panna*, *paraxid* pro *paraxidi*). All this evidence cumulatively supports the conclusion that the writers were not concerned with accuracy as long as the information was intelligible. Against this background, it seems unlikely that the writer would have been concerned with matters of linguistic identity, or even with making sure that everyone's name was written fully correctly (cf. *Felixx*).

The above analysis can be made more explicit by pointing out how the RPs used in different explanations can add or detract from the coherence of the full picture. Adams's argument is contingent upon the fact that it would have been rational for the writers to consider identity-related questions instead of saving energy and time in a situation where the texts had to be written quickly, the writers were not skilled, and the texts were not for public display and were discarded after the process was finished. In other words, we are dealing with competing rationality principles (or efficiency vs. face concerns). This analysis shows revealingly that we can disagree about both *the existence of RPs* and *their scope/context of application*. In the present case, there may be all sorts of plausible linguistic explanations for the appearance of the *-us* ending; one possibility is simply that the potter was in fact known as *Vindulus*, not *Vindulos*. This is different from arguing that he wanted to express some specific identity through the spelling of his name; there is in fact no independent evidence that he had any control over the way his name was spelled in these lists. If we want

to argue strongly for an explanation based on identity and the prestige of the *-us* termination, we ought also to account for infelicities such as the above-mentioned *Felixx*, and for the abbreviated names. To make any of the possible explanations (including mere chance) more plausible than the others, we would need to provide further justification or additional considerations to enhance the coherence of this explanation, taking into account the practical function of the lists; otherwise we are merely speculating.

The second example concerns an inscription on a large roof tile, the (functionally) same text having been written in both Oscan and Latin (Adams 2003: 124–125; see Poccetti 1979: 42 for the text). Both texts state that the slave (or other type of servant) of one Herens Sattiis left her mark on the tile when it was being made. The relevant structure consists of the name of the master in the genitive plus the name of the slave (or her title): *Hn. Sattiieís. detfri* (Oscan), *Herenneis Amica* (Latin). The Latin version contains only the praenomen; the Oscan version also contains the nomen, while the praenomen has been abbreviated. A notable feature is the presence of the Oscan genitive ending in the Latin version (presumably pro *Herennis*). Adams argues that "the failure of the Latin writer to Latinise the form strongly suggests that Herennius was perceived as an Oscan speaker. The Oscan form in an otherwise Latin text is used as appropriate to the referent's identity" (2003: 124). He adds that the writer's "care to grant him an Oscan genitive inflection in his name would seem to imply an attitude of deference or accommodation" (2003: 125). The problem with this explanation is similar to the one discussed above. The Latin text contains nonstandard features (*qando* pro *quando*, *tegila* pro *tegulam*); the tile was also clearly not meant to serve as a public monument. Rather than being in any way deferential, the form *Herenneis* may again be simply a contact-induced form; it may be the form which the slave and others used in any case, not because it was deferential but because in the relevant speech-community it was considered the correct form of that name; or it may have been the default form. The writer may also have been bilingual – if it is indeed the slave herself who wrote the text – which would support this interpretation. The form may also have been the consequence of dictation, of contamination due to the form in the Oscan text, and so on. Even if these explanations are still very tentative, they are arguably at least more coherent in terms of the material nature of the text and the presumed linguistic skills of the writer(s), compared to the suggestion that we are dealing with an instance of face-work through the use of an inflectional suffix. It is undoubtedly the case that the use of this ending gives the name an 'Oscan flavour' – i.e. it is an FFI – but according to the interpretation presented here, that would be an unintended consequence.[248]

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[248] Alho and Leppänen (2017) offer a similar explanation for the appearance of the *-(a)es* genitive in Roman brick stamps. They reject Adams's (2003) explanation in terms of expressing the identity of the referent, and argue that the forms were the outcome of

4.4   Summary and prospectus

To conclude, I briefly summarize the main arguments of this chapter. The approach developed here is a combination of philology and pragmatics, with philology conceptualized as forming the empirical and pragmatics the theoretical component of action analysis (or theory of action). In the philological part of the approach, explanations are case-specific and pre-theoretical, focusing on concrete action-tokens. In the pragmatic part, explanations are general and theoretical, focusing on abstract action-types. These two steps in the approach are connected recursively as understanding > explanation > explication, forming a hermeneutic cycle.

The basic method in the philological part is interpretation, based on rational explanation. In rational explanation actions are explained by reference to the wants of the agent, together with the agent's belief that the action will serve as an adequate means towards attaining the want. I argued that a distinction needs to be maintained between wants and pro-attitudes, between wants and intentions, and between instrumental and intersubjectively valid rationality. Rationality principles, which determine the rationality of an action, are applied in RE to particular cases; the pragmatic part of the approach gives rise to generalizations about RPs. As implied in the discussion, the basic methods of pragmatics include explication and classification. Explication was demonstrated for example through the formal analysis of action types. In addition to the tools introduced in the philosophical and methodological analyses, I proposed the notion of rationalization chains as a way of analysing for example multifunctional actions. In addition, I introduced Clark's (1996) concept of layering and discussed its application in the present data. Finally, I argued that explanations by interpretation can be evaluated in terms of coherence, and demonstrated this by examining certain interpretations presented earlier in this study, as well as previous examples of explanations of CS in the work of Adams (2003). In the next chapter, I apply the concepts and tools introduced here to the explanation of individual instances of CS and language choice, as well as to the explication of these explanations.

Finally, I outline how the philological-pragmatic approach is applied in the present study. First, preliminary contextualization has been achieved in terms of the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 in particular, one focusing on the setting, the other on the phenomena being investigated; the end-result is a 'pre-knowledge' or *Vorverständnis*. Second, the philological part of the approach begins with an additional, more particular contextualization by way of macro- and meso-level

long-term language contact, in which interference features had become conventionalized. This situation is different from that discussed here; according to their argument, the *-(a)es* forms would not have constituted instances of code-switching; it is quite possible, however, to analyse *Herenneis* as an Oscan word (i.e. not a Latin word with an Oscan inflection).

analysis of the overall patterns to be investigated, in particular the distribution of the various languages and switches in the manuscript. At this stage, I also apply 'strongly empirical' methods (see Kac 1992) in the form of descriptive statistics; the findings are explained by the method of interpretation as outlined in the present chapter. Third, the philological part of the approach is completed in its entirety through analyses of individual texts and actions; here I explain language choice and address every instance of potential CS in the dataset. This part of the study is, as described above, detailed, particular, and primarily pre-theoretical: each action is explained as fully as possible by seeking to understand it. However, in order to connect the analyses to the theoretical and methodological discussion presented thus far, relevant concepts are applied in the form of 'intermediary' explanations (i.e. between pre-theoretical and theoretical). Fourth, a step is taken towards generalization by way of comparison between CS and other strategies used in the texts. Fifth, the pragmatic part of the approach concludes the analyses by explicating and classifying the explanations applied in the preceding stages.

5   Textual analyses
Explaining language choice and code-switching

My purpose in this chapter is to provide an in-depth analysis of language choice and code-switching in the *Orationes* manuscript, and to test the approach developed in Chapter 4. The analyses are conducted at several different levels according to their relation to the macro-, meso-, or micro-context. At the macro-level, questions relate to why certain languages were chosen for these school performances in general; explanations are connected to issues such as prevalent ideologies, societal or local norms, and linguistic domains. At the meso-level, a convenient point of departure is offered on the one hand by the school performance genre, on the other by the division of the King's School performances according to their occasion, and the four resultant subgenres. At the micro-level, the focus is on individual texts and on particular language choices or switches. Any particular action may be situated in terms of all three contextual levels, while the levels themselves are also interconnected; for example, features at the macro-level may be manifested as objects of representation in the texts (cf. the relevance of the legal domain in examples (5) and (10) above), while features at the micro-level serve to constantly reaffirm or challenge prevailing community norms and expectations. The interrelationships between the levels are shown schematically in Figure 12.

Figure 12.   Levels of context (macro, meso, micro) and their interrelationships.

Chapter 5 is divided into four sections, each focusing on a different level of analysis. Section 5.1 addresses the macro-level, as well as certain general phenomena which occur throughout the dataset: the distribution of languages and switches in the manuscript, the treatment of proper nouns, meta-textual units, and the flagging of switches. Section 5.2 deals with both the meso- and the micro-level by addressing language choice in the four subgenres, on the one hand, and through analyses of individual instances of CS, on the other. In section 5.3, a comparative viewpoint is adopted in investigating, first, how CS and address forms are used together within a single text, and second, how other linguistic and non-linguistic strategies can occupy the same functional space as CS. Section 5.4 moves from interpretation and explanation to explication, presenting a classification of the types of explanation utilized in the analyses.

5.1 The macro-level: General issues

Section 5.1 focuses on macro-level features and other general issues. In 5.1.1, I discuss the distribution of languages and switches in the manuscript in terms of textual sections. I apply here quantitative methods in the form of descriptive statistics, as well as the qualitative methods of the philological-pragmatic approach in explaining the identified patterns. The following three sections present brief accounts of three general phenomena encountered throughout the manuscript in terms of multilingual language use: the treatment of proper nouns, meta-textual units, and the visual and verbal/textual flagging of switches.

5.1.1 Distribution of languages in the manuscript

The first issue to be discussed concerns the main languages of the performances, or what can be termed the 'discoursal matrix languages' of the texts. As discussed in 2.3.1, the texts consist of various sections or parts: prologues and epilogues, orations (in prose or verse), dialogues, and longer verse sections (including verse dialogues). In order to determine the main languages of a performance, I have first determined the main language of each section; most of them have only one. If a set of orations contains separate speeches in Latin and Greek, this section is considered bilingual. If the main language of a dialogue or verse section switches at some point to another language for the duration of several characters' lines, it is counted as bilingual; the same applies to one dialogue (*Discipuli et Rustici*) for which it is impossible to identify a single main language. Code-switching within a text has not been taken into account at this level of analysis, provided that the main language of the discourse in question does not change. Table 4 gives a list of different elements in the texts,

indicating how many performances include a particular element in a specific language.

Table 4.   Number of *Orationes* performances containing different sections in specific languages. N=68; of these, 12 consist only of a title. L=Latin, E=English, G=Greek, L&E=Bilingual Latin and English. Prol=Prologues, Orat.Prose=Prose Orations, Orat.Verse=Verse Orations, Dialog=Dialogues, Epilog=Epilogues. Numbers with an asterisk include 'functional' prologues and epilogues (i.e. ones where their functions are performed by another element in the same textual position).

	Prol	Orat.Prose	Orat.Verse	Dialog	Verse section	Epilog	Plays by Authors
L	51(*55)	52	18	16	12	31(*36)	7
E	3	1	2	22	0	12(*14)	8
G	0	1	7	0	0	0	0
L&E	0	0	0	4	2	1	0

Latin is clearly the dominant language for those elements which 'frame' the performance, i.e. the prologues and epilogues. One of the English prologues occurs in a performance which includes separate prologues in both languages, another within a dialogue; the third has been integrated into the text of *Wine, Beer and Ale*. Most of the English epilogues occur in contexts where they are preceded by another English section (in the case of bilingual dialogues, the main language has switched to English). The exceptions to this are *Arborum Triumphus*, where the epilogue is the only English element in the performance, and *Loyolista et Catharista*, where the epilogue consists of English verse and Latin prose – the verse being again the only English element in the performance. As a main language, English is generally restricted to the dialogues; the number of Latin dialogues, however, is not much lower. Almost all performances include orations in Latin, and although Greek occurs as the main language in the orations more frequently than English, it tends to be restricted to verse. The dominance of Latin becomes even clearer if we compare the numbers of individual orations in each language: 281 in Latin, 8 in Greek.[249] In other words, every Greek oration section consists of only a single oration, while the Latin sections contain a number of speeches between one and fourteen (mean 5.4; median 4.5). The English orations present an anomaly: *Discipuli et Rustici* contains a single short verse oration, while *A World of Options* consists of 21 separate speeches (one of which is in verse). As for the verse sections, they are a rarer element confined for

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[249]   The boundaries between orations are not very explicitly marked, except in those performances where the theme of each separate oration is indicated with a subtitle. My counts are based primarily on the layout: white space between blocks of text has been interpreted as such a boundary. My rationale for this is that, in addition to linguistic or textual cues indicating that the speaker may have changed, in the Lenten performances this is precisely how the individual orations have been separated.

the most part (nine out of thirteen) to the 'riddle contests' of the Lenten performances.

Focusing on the main languages of individual performances, and excluding those cases where we have nothing but the title of a play recorded in the manuscript, the following observations can be made (see Table 5): Latin is one of the main languages in all performances, and is also the only language which appears as the sole main language of a performance (21 instances). In the majority of cases (35 out of 56), however, the main language of a performance is effectively a combination, Latin and English being the most frequent (27 out of 35). It is noteworthy that Gunpowder Plot, Christmas, and Oak Apple Day performances display similar distributions, and thus seem to be – at the macro-level – multilingual to roughly similar degrees. The picture is somewhat different, however, if we consider those texts which consist only of a title. As discussed in 2.3.2, fifteen plays by major authors were performed by the students (see Table 6); in two cases the play has been included in full, having been performed together with 'original' texts, and in one case a prologue and an epilogue are included together with the title (all texts by major authors have been omitted from the following analyses, including the two texts copied into the manuscript in full). It is possible that this was also the case for the twelve performances which consist of nothing but a title: the performances may have included additional elements which have nevertheless not been noted in the manuscript. This suggestion is supported by the fact that some of these are titles of English plays, and there are no other *Orationes* performances which do not include some Latin elements.

Table 5. Main languages of the *Orationes* performances, excluding performances consisting of only a title. N=56. L=Latin, E=English, G=Greek. GP=Gunpowder Plot performances, C=Christmas performances, Lent=Lenten performances, OA=Oak Apple Day performances.

	GP	C	Lent	OA	Total
L	4	4	9	4	21
L&E	9	9	0	9	27
L&G	2	1	0	1	4
L&G&E	2	0	0	2	4

Table 6. Main languages of the plays by major authors in the *Orationes* manuscript. N=15. L=Latin, E=English. GP=Gunpowder Plot performances, C=Christmas performances, Lent=Lenten performances, OA=Oak Apple Day performances.

	GP	C	Lent	OA	Total
L	0	2	5	0	7
E	0	4	3	1	8
Total	0	6	8	1	15

In order to characterize the switching patterns and the distribution of languages in them, I calculated the number of switches in all performances, excluding plays by major authors. The structures included in these counts were in effect insertional *from the point of view of the discourse*; if the language of a performance (between or within sections) changed completely at some point, this was not included in the calculations, since there was no clear unit to be counted. Similarly, a Greek oration surrounded by Latin orations was not counted as a switch in this sense. In some of the more complex plays, a temporary change in the language used by a character during one event was not counted unless the switch occurred within a single utterance. Within the framework of the present study, these do of course count as code-switches, but the numbers presented here only apply to the major type of switching in the manuscript.

As discussed briefly in 3.1.2, problems may arise in analysing certain types of structures. Non-continuous units – fairly frequent in Latin and Greek – pose the most obvious problem; a typical case was discussed in conjunction with example (1), which contained the clause *qui cum* οὐδε γράμματα *sciunt*, οὐδε νεῖν. At the 'surface level', there are two switches to Greek (i.e. two insertions), but these two NPs form essentially a single unit, which performs a single syntactic role (i.e. direct object). Similar problems arise for example with attributes and head nouns, as in the following examples:

(11)   Ἄσπονδος, ut loquuntur, utrinque πόλεμος

'On both sides, *implacable war*, as they say.

<div align="right">(Shrawley and Burnley, f. 17v)</div>

(12)   nisi ἔκδικον illud e cælis ὄμμα prohibuisset

'had that *avenging eye* from the heavens not prevented it'

<div align="right">(The Avenging Eye, f. 424r)</div>

Such units have been counted for statistical purposes as single switches. There are few such examples, however, and they should not skew the numbers in any considerable manner. In the case of lists, all items have been counted separately if the conjunction is in the 'matrix' language (otherwise we have, in Muysken's terms, a single alternational switch). The numbers of switches are shown in Table 7.

Table 7.   Number of discourse-insertional switches in the *Orationes* performances, excluding plays by major authors. N=373. The matrix is the main language of the individual discourse.

MATRIX	INSERTION					
		Latin	English	Greek	French	Other	Total
	Latin	N/A	33	168	1	0	202
	English	131	N/A	4	25	11	171
	Greek	0	0	N/A	0	0	0
	Total	131	33	172	26	11	373

The different groups of switches are the following, in descending order or frequency: Latin > Greek (168 out of 373; 45%), English > Latin (131; 35%), Latin > English (33; 9%), English > French (25; 7%), English > Other (11; 3%), English > Greek (4; 1%), Latin > French (1; <1%). The category 'Other' includes four items in Italian, one in Spanish, one in Dutch, one in 'Old English' (i.e. some earlier stage of the language; see 5.2.5.6 below), and four uncertain ones.

What emerges from these numbers is the following 'hierarchy' of languages: Greek > Latin > English. There are no unambiguous instances of CS within the Greek passages, which may of course to some extent be due to the lower number of Greek passages in general.[250] In Latin discourse, the major language of insertions is Greek. Moreover, although there are surprisingly many switches from Latin to English, all of them can be considered special cases: their functions differ drastically from those of the Greek switches. They are also flagged in a different manner (see 5.1.4 below): in 13 of the 33 cases of switching from Latin to English (39%), the language of the insertion is mentioned in some way, while this is the case in only 12 of the 168 switches to Greek (7%). As for the English discourses, insertions come mainly from Latin; the use of Greek is limited, while French appears as another major source of insertions.

Another way to acquire an overview of switching patterns is to examine their distribution among the various textual sections. These numbers are shown in Table 8 below. Of all switches, 182 (49%) occur in dialogues, 145 (39%) in orations, 16 (4%) in verse sections (13 of which in *Grammaticae Partes II*), and 30 (8%) in prologues/epilogues. If we examine this distribution by also taking into account the

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[250]   The closest example of a possible switch from Greek to Latin I have identified occurs in *Orationes Hyemales* (f. 376r): Ὦ λῦσον, λῦσόνγε, Δεκάνε, με, λῦσον ἔταιρους [sic] / Σήμερον ἔκ τουτων τρὶς πανάριστε κακῶν ('Oh release, release me, Dean, release my comrades, you thrice best, from these troubles today'). The relevant word here is δεκανός, which is indeed a Greek word and the source for Latin *decanus*, but whose meaning in the sense of 'the head of the Chapter' seems to have been borrowed from Latin. One could make the case for this being a Graecized form of the Latin word. If it is, in fact, a switch, its use can be accounted for by a simple norm-based explanation (similar cases are discussed throughout section 5.2).

main language of the section – the 'matrix language' of the switch (I use the term loosely to refer to the current main language of the performance) – a predictable difference becomes apparent: most of the switches in a Latin matrix (133 out of 202; 66%) occur in orations, while most of the switches in an English matrix (152 out of 171; 89%) occur in dialogues. Latin dialogues, on the other hand, contain only 30 switches in total. Most of the switching in orations occurs in prose, not verse, but this may be at least partly due to the disparity in their relative numbers.

Table 8. Distribution of switches among sections in different main languages. Prologues and epilogues here include switching within 'functional' prologues/epilogues.

MATRIX		SECTION						
		Prol	OratProse	OratVerse	Dialog	Verse section	Epilog	Total
	Latin	14	132	1	30	16	9	202
	English	3	12	0	152	0	4	171
	Greek	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	0
	Total	17	144	1	182	16	13	373

As these figures indicate, the picture which emerges from Table 5 alone does not accurately depict the pervasive extent to which multilingualism is a feature of the *Orationes* texts. In all four combinations of main languages (i.e. Latin, Latin & English, Latin & Greek, Latin & Greek & English), it would be possible for switching between languages to be restricted at this macro-level, namely between separate sections or textual elements. This, however, is an almost nonexistent situation. Of all performances consisting of more than a title page, only three do not contain the kind of CS reported in Tables 7 and 8 above: *Anni Tempora*, *Sister Charity*, and *Declamationes de Fauxio et Cromwello*. None of these, however, was a monolingual performance. *Sister Charity* consists of a prologue, an epilogue, speeches, and a dialogue in Latin, and a separate dialogue in English, while *Declamationes* consists of a prologue, epilogue, speeches, and declamations (i.e. orations) in Latin, and one verse oration in Greek. *Anni Tempora* itself consists only of a Latin prologue and verse section, but these were followed by the play *Wine, Beer, Ale* – copied in full in the manuscript – which is not only English but in fact contains eight switches into Latin (i.e. switches which are not included in Tables 7 and 8 and which are not analysed in the present work). In other words, of all 56 performances consisting of more than a title page, not a single one can be considered fully monolingual. Crucially, even if all unclear or 'grey area' cases were excluded, this fact would not change. There are as many as eight performances containing only a single switch, and ten containing only two, but these are always clear cases (see Table 10 in 5.2.1). To sum up: multilingual language use is clearly an important

strategy in the *Orationes* performances, and something which can be said to be characteristic of them.

To understand these patterns of language choice and code-switching, we need to consider in particular the educational context in which the *Orationes* texts were composed and performed. The most plausible explanation for the dominance of Latin is simply that learning the language was the primary purpose of grammar schools. The relative paucity of Greek sections is probably accounted for by the fact that there were fewer boys in the school at any one time capable of composing or performing such texts. As discussed in 2.2.2.3, the 1665 and 1682 regulations contain very little Greek compared to Latin, and the composition of Greek themes and verses belonged only to the uppermost form – a stage which many of the boys would probably not have reached. Whether the make-up of the audience was an additional factor is impossible to state with certainty. Being able to perform an oration in Greek would probably have been a considerable merit for a student, and the inclusion of these sections may thus have served simply to demonstrate their high level of achievement (and, consequently, that the teachers had been performing their duties).[251]

The distribution of languages among the various sections is also explained by the aims of a grammar-school education: one of the main activities was to compose and perform speeches, themes, and verses, primarily in Latin and secondarily in Greek; English seems to have been excluded from this domain. In the *Orationes* performances, English plays a more prominent role in the dialogues, although Latin is also prominent within this text type. There are, again, several possible reasons why English sections were included in the first place. One possibility is that the English parts were often reserved for lower-form boys. If this was indeed the case, it would also explain why several of the English Christmas dialogues refer in particular to basic grammatical lessons which were part of the curriculum in the lower forms, and also why they contain so few Greek insertions. The suggestion about the academic level of the boys is hence coherent with these other facts.

Another possibility is that the English dialogues were aimed primarily at those members of the audience who did not understand much Latin – if indeed any such people were present.[252] This explanation, however, becomes less coherent when we

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[251] It is worth noting, however, that there were separate occasions for examining the school and the achievements of the boys; the speech-day performances were clearly not meant primarily to serve this purpose. The additional speeches at the end of the *Orationes* manuscript in fact include four short orations performed before the examiners on three different occasions: 18 November 1674, 24 November 1676 (apparently one before the examination and another afterwards), and 13 November 1682. The examination system is laid out in the Cathedral statutes (*Statutes*, f. 15v).

[252] There certainly were members of the Church who did not understand Latin, as suggested by the existence of an English translation of parts of the Cathedral Statutes, "to be read yearly to the Quire-men, and such other Members of the same Church, as

consider the fact that 25 performances contained no English sections at all; to this may be added the six additional performances of which nothing survives but the title of a Latin play. Furthermore, the balance between Latin and English sections even in the other performances is not always equal. For example, in *Loyolista et Catharista*, the only English section is part of a bilingual epilogue which begins in English verse and ends in Latin prose. The audience would at this point have had to sit through a Latin prologue, two Latin orations (about four and a half pages combined), and a Latin dialogue – only to hear a meagre sixteen lines of English verse. It does not therefore seem plausible that the English sections were always intended primarily for the linguistically less proficient members of the audience. Finally, even if the purpose of the language choice was to accommodate boys in the lower forms, this may not have always been the case either (for the same reason). The distribution of CS patterns among the four subgenres is discussed in 5.2; the following three subsections focus on certain general aspects of CS in the whole manuscript.

5.1.2   Proper nouns

Personal names and other proper nouns are a problematic category from the point of view of CS: they have unique referents and lack proper semantic content (as opposed for example to epithets), and hence are to some extent 'untranslatable'.[253] For example, the name *Cicero* in an English text is not an unambiguous instance of CS – there is no obvious English equivalent for the name, and its pronunciation would probably follow the norms of English and not those of Classical Latin. If, however, we compare it to such forms as *Tully*, *Ovid*, *Homer*, or *Jerome*, it becomes clear that there is a notable difference between them: the latter names can be modified so as to become FFIs, as *Tullius*, *Ovidius*, *Homerus*/*Homeros*, and *Hieronymus*/*Hieronymos* respectively (in Finnish, for example, there are no separate vernacular versions of these names). Furthermore, many forenames have language-specific variants: for example, *Carolus* (Latin), *Charles* (English), *Kaarle* (Finnish). In highly inflectional languages such as Latin and Greek, modification of a name may also be considered necessary to indicate grammatical relations, a process whereby the form becomes less of an FFI. The numbers of code-switches in Tables 7 and 8 above include some proper nouns referring to people, but for the most part they have not been counted, since in the majority of cases they seem not to have been used as FFIs and do not

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do not understand the Latin Tongue" (Canterbury, Canterbury Cathedral Archives DCc-MB/1/6; *English Statutes*).

[253]   The uniqueness of reference is covered by Matras's specificity and functionality criteria (see 3.1.3.2 above), while lack of semantic content might be subsumed under the operationality criterion (since names are at least not core lexical items).

seem to be 'grey area' cases.[254] Those included in the counts occur without morphological integration, and most of them serve functions which also point to their status as FFIs (cf. Matras's functionality criterion); in some rare cases the forms probably lack integration by mere accident – an interpretation based on the observation that the choice of form does not serve any clear purpose. Nevertheless, even in those cases the forms of course require an explanation of one kind or another.

The functions of switches involving names are discussed in section 5.2; here I focus on general strategies for integrating names into foreign matrices. To begin with, Latin and Greek names within an English matrix are for the most part quite straightforward, since for certain names there existed vernacular variants (such as those mentioned above), while others appear in basically the same form as in their source languages, with no need to integrate the forms into English. The following example can be used for illustration:

> (13) **P[ert]:** […] This invisible ring from a spiritual Giges shall either sheild us from the sight of our triumphal Adversaries: or πόδας ὠκὺς Αχιλλεὺς will slip soe neatly away, that they shall spye out nothing to informe against our 'states, or persons.
>
> (*The Ring of Giges*, ff. 269v–270r)

In (13), πόδας ὠκὺς Αχιλλεὺς ('swift-footed Achilles') has been counted as a switch to Greek, while *Giges* (i.e. Gyges, Γύγης) has not. In the case of non-personal names such as those referring to a specific text (e.g. *Pater nosters*, f. 252v; *O Sapientia*, f. 281r), they have in general been counted as instances of CS, whether they bear English inflections or not. There are some 'grey area' cases of personal names which have not been included in the CS counts, but which are in other ways conspicuous, as in the following:

> (14) **P[auline]:** O Sister Dorcas, you are too quick-sighted (as your name signifyeth) to spye out the faults of others, having your eyes alwaies abroad, never at home amongst yourselves,
>
> (*Pauline and Dorcas*, f. 343r)

The name *Dorcas* in (14) could be argued to constitute an FFI, since attention is drawn to its supposed etymology (i.e. δορκάς 'deer' from δέρκεσθαι 'to see clearly'). Although it has not been counted as a CS in the present study, it is part of the same phenomenal field. The only instance of a foreign name in an English matrix which has been included in the counts is *Nicholas Nemo* (in *Thomas Teltroth*, f. 334r), since

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[254] This accounts for most of the Latin and Greek names in the English texts.

it is used with reference to a non-specific 'Mr. Nobody'; it is not the name of a specific character. When foreign words (e.g. common nouns) appear as names of characters, they have generally not been counted as switches or even FFIs.

When foreign names appear within a Latin text, they are, for the most part, integrated by the addition of a Latin suffix; in other words, they are not treated as EL islands but as mixed constituents, in Myers-Scotton's terms. Many of the recurring ones refer to people connected to either the Gunpowder Plot or the English Civil War, but also to contemporary political figures: examples include *Guido Fauxius, Oliverus Cromwellus*, *Richardus Cromwellus*, *H(e)usonus*, *Hugo Petrus*, *Knevettus*, *Georgius Monk(ius)*, *Thomas Percius*, *Robertus Catesbeius*, *Gerardus*, *Thomas Winterus*, *Iohannes Wrightus*, *Christopherus Wrightus*, *Treshamus*, and *Whitgravius*. In addition, there are names which have straightforward Latin counterparts, i.e. *Carolus*, *Iacobus* and *Elizabetha*, as well as place-names such as *Londinum* (note the spelling), *Westmonasteria*, *Thamesis*, and *Wigornia* ('Yorkshire'). Another, more interesting, group consists of the names of the performing boys. These are confined almost solely to the Lenten performances, where the boys occasionally address each other by name. The system for integrating names is straightforward; we find, for example, *Burnleium* (Burnley, acc.), *Coppinum* (Coppin, acc.), *Crayforde* (Crayford, voc.), *Fauncius* (Faunce, nom.), *Lune* (Lunn, voc.), *Missendene* (Missenden, voc.), *Penkherste/Penkhirste* (Penkherst, voc.), *Smithe* (Smith, voc.), Spratti *(Sprat*, gen.), and *Wriotheslyum* (Wriothesly, acc.). Sometimes only the oblique forms of a name have been modified; for example, *Davis*, *Davisse* (voc.); *Tyler*, *Tylero* (abl., inflected like *puer*); *Hardress*, *Hardresse* (voc.). This may also have been true of *Keyes* and *Knipperdolling* (a German name, occurring in conjunction with the Latinized German name *Phiferus*), which only occur in the nominative. Something of a hybrid is presented by the Latin forms of John Shrawley's (or Shrawlie's; listed as a Victor of 1665) name: *Shrawleius* (nom.), *Shrawleium* (acc.), *Shrawleio* (abl.), *Shrawlie* (voc.). The pattern is perplexing, since the vocative seems to have been formed on the basis of the nominative *Shrawlius*; if this was the case, however, the form should be *Shrawli*. It is possible that the *-ie* ending stands for a high front vowel, but this seems less probable for *-ei-*, which should indicate a diphthong (otherwise *Shrawlius* would have been the expected form). In any case, all of these forms have been considered essentially Latin. When names have been included in the counts reported in Tables 7 and 8, they (i) do not occur in integrated forms, and (ii) serve a specific function in their context.[255] The only exceptions are one instance of *Hardress*, which is unclear, one *Faux* (instead of *Fauxius*) used *metri gratia*, and three cases which are probably mistakes. These are discussed in section 5.2.

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[255]   In other words, in these cases I apply Matras's structural integration and functionality criteria.

It is worth noting that the boys' names are treated inconsistently in terms of the manuscript as a whole. In the Lenten orations, the boys usually address each other by their Latinate surnames but sometimes mention the English version. In the meta-text where pairs of boys are identified, i.e. in the verse sections (usually consisting of riddles), the surnames are provided in their English form. In the Latin list of Victors, the full names are given in their English forms, while in the additional speeches the given names are in Latin and the surnames in English (*Samuele Gibson*, *Edovardo Missenden*, *Leopoldo Finch*, *Guilielmo Brome*, *Guil: Sprat*, *Carolo Hardress*; ablatives). As for why the surnames have not been Latinized in the latter case, it may be pointed out that it would not have been necessary; the given names already carry the required inflectional affixes.[256]

Finally, the only relevant personal names which appear in the Greek orations are Κάρολος, Ἰακώβος (note the placement of the acute), Κρομούλεος, and Φαυξιος. For some reason, the last one always occurs without an accent. Etymologically, the forms are of some interest: Κάρολος is effectively a Graecized variant of a Latin form, Ἰακώβος is a Greek name from which *Jacobus* is derived, while Κρομούλεος, and Φαυξιος are etymologically English (although they may be based on the Latin versions). Κρομούλεος is a surprising form; one would have expected a more direct transliteration of *Cromwellus*, namely Κρόμουελλος. Again, none of these names has been analysed as a switch or an FFI.

5.1.3 Meta-textual units

Meta-text presents a special case of language use in the manuscript, since it is situated on the communicative axis between the manuscript and the reader; the audience present at the original performances would have been oblivious to it (see 4.3.2 above). There are in effect four different types of meta-text in the manuscript: titles of performances, headings of sections, lists of *nomina actorum*, and stage directions. The choice of language for these items is fairly systematic: the title is in Latin in all the performances except when the students performed an English play by a major author (and nothing else) and in *Discipuli et Rustici*; headings and *nomina actorum* are in the main language of the section in question. If a section includes several languages, these units are in the one which occurs first; the exception is again *Discipuli et Rustici*, where the list of *nomina actorum* is in Latin. For stage directions, the system seems to be the following: the directions are in the same main language as the dialogue itself; if the main language of the dialogue is Latin and English, the directions tend to be in the language used by that particular character at the moment. For example, in *A Mender of Soles*, when Heusonus disguises himself

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[256] For a related phenomenon in an early modern atlas (specifically maps), with forms such as *Portland insula* and *Lacus Eagh*, see Mäkilähde (2016).

as a cobbler and switches to English (see 5.2.5.5), his stage directions also switch to English:

(15)   **H[eusonus]:** […] Ad Sutoris asylum confugio. Et hujus sub umbra me sartum, tectumq[ue] dabo. ['I shall escape into the refuge of a cobbler and present myself under this shadow, safe and sound.']   **[The Cobler falls to work**[257]
    Intrat Philom: cum Lictoribus
    P[hilomonarchus]: Adesdum Lictor. ['Come here, constable.']
    […]
    H[eusonus]: I fear the language of the beast; and therefore I'll now betake me to my mother tongue.   **Sings.**

(*A Mender of Soles*, ff. 77v–78r)

The same occurs in the bilingual dialogue of *Certamen Doctrinale*: four students have been conversing in English when a monitor arrives, introduced by the stage direction *Intrat Monitor* (f. 94r), and the dialogue switches to Latin. In *Papistae Iuniores*, the stage directions follow the current language of the dialogue, but they do not occur at the switching points. An exception to this system is found in *The Conquest of Metals*, where a Latin stage direction occurs in the middle of the English prologue (i.e. not the prologue to the performance as a whole but to the dialogue):

(16)   But longer here why doe I stay?
    The Metals come, I must away.

        Exiturus redit. ['Starting to exit, he returns']
    But soft, concerning the Planets I had almost forgot one thing.

(*The Conquest of Metals*, f. 66r)

There are also several exceptions in *Discipuli et Rustici*, where the stage directions seem to follow a system whereby they are in the same language as the character's name, except for Credulio, whose name might be considered Latin (cf. e.g. *Malvolio*). Thus, while the main language for the short initial dialogue is English, its initial stage direction is in Latin (*Intrant tres Scholastici Rurales*, f. 280r), as are the names of the characters (*Primus, Secundus*, etc.) as well as the following stage directions. In the verse section which follows the dialogue (and which is actually part of it), the names are again *Primus* and *Secundus*, and the stage directions are in Latin. The title of the short English verse oration is likewise in Latin (*Oratiuncula*,

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[257]   The lone square bracket is part of the manuscript text. Note that I also use boldface to indicate the use of the script resembling roman type (see 2.3.1 above).

f. 282r), while the title of the English 'prologue' to the 'play within a play' is in English (f. 287r). In effect, either of these two could be considered an exception, depending on whether the supposed system is that all headings are in Latin or that the headings are in the same language as the text itself. In the longer bilingual dialogue (see 5.3.1), the stage directions for characters such as Blunt and Knobbs are usually in English, and those for characters such as Philoponus and Grammatulus in Latin. Praeco (the herald) speaks English, but since his name is a Latin common noun, his two stage directions are also in Latin. There are two instances of a 'clash', namely when Grammatulus and Jacky exit or enter the stage together; here the directions are in Latin. There are also five clear exceptions to this system: *Intrat Gregory sub specie ebrii, et impingit in cathedram* ('Gregory enters, looking intoxicated, and throws himself into the chair', f. 287v), *Componit se ad somnum* ('He [i.e. Gregory] goes to sleep', f. 287v), *Blunt induit* ('Blunt puts on [his robes]', f. 290v), *Blunt discumbit in Cathedra* ('Blunt sits down in the chair', f. 290v), and *Repente expergefactus clamat* ('Suddenly waking up he [i.e. Gregory] cries', f. 292v). A *prima facie* counterexample is also presented by *Discumbunt Senes* ('The elders sit down', f. 286r), but here the noun referring to two characters, Credulio and Trunks, is Latin.

In addition to the above-mentioned type of switching within the meta-text, there are also two stage directions which always occur in Latin: *exeunt* and *Omnes*. Hence *Exeunt Blunt Knobs* (f. 292r) does not present an exception to the above-mentioned system. *Exeunt* usually occurs alone; the only exception – in addition to the one just mentioned – is *After the dance Exeunt* (f. 310r). *Omnes* is used to indicate that everyone on the stage speaks at the same time; no English equivalent is used, although stage directions such as *They all sit down* (f. 473r) do occur.

For the most part, then, the choice of language for meta-textual units is governed by a variant of the principle of isomorphism, or 'one meaning, one form' (cf. 4.2.4 and 4.3.1 above): the same language is used for the meta-text as for the main text, and the stage directions of individual characters tend to be in the language which they use at any given moment. The use of *Exeunt* and *Omnes* can be explained by referring to the norms of theatrical language in general, or to the gap in terminological lexis, or both. According to the gap explanation, *Exeunt* serves as a useful single-word direction to indicate that all characters should leave the stage; the English *Exit* would need to mention the subjects explicitly. The same need is not felt for *Enter* (*Intrat, Intrant*), where the characters need to be listed in any case. This explanation is arguably secondary to the norm-based one, as the problem could be solved by adding *All* (i.e. the English counterpart of *Omnes*) to the direction. More intriguing are perhaps those exceptions mentioned above where a Latin stage direction in an English or bilingual play occurs in an English context. It could be argued that the function of switching between English for the characters' lines and

Latin for the stage directions serves to distinguish these units from each other, as in the following case:

(17) **Kn[obbs]:** Yes they all attend your putting on.   **Blunt induit.**
      Bl[unt]: Here, carry away these every day garments, and summon the Malefactor to appear.   **Blunt discumbit in Cathedra.**

<div align="right">(Discipuli et Rustici, f. 290v)</div>

It should, however, be pointed out that there is no consistent effort to use CS to serve this purpose, as the following examples indicate:

(18) **Gre[gory]:** Yes, if need be. I dare swear it.
          Enter Credulio drunk.
      Cr[edulio]: Theives! Theives! **Eu[genius]:** O here come the old foxcatchers.

<div align="right">(Discipuli et Rustici, f. 290r)</div>

(19) **Jac[ky]:** Will you leave mee, Father?   **He cryes**
      […]
      Cr[edulio]: Farwel once again, my dear Jacky. (**He weeps**.) Farwel, master of dedication.

<div align="right">(Discipuli et Rustici, f. 293v)</div>

More counterexamples can be found in other dialogues, including bilingual ones. For example, in (15) above, the stage direction *Sings* occurs in the middle of Heusonus's English lines. In fact, the principle of isomorphism mentioned above conflicts with the strategy of marking stage directions with a switch in language. More precisely, in the latter case, we are dealing with a different variety of the same principle: different languages are reserved for different textual levels. Of course, in the case for example of *Discipuli et Rustici*, this is in no way consistent: not only does the language of the different elements change, a change at one level does not correlate with a change at the other. It seems nevertheless that there is no other coherent explanation for the exceptions than using CS to highlight these meta-textual elements. We are at least in a position to argue that, although we may not be able to account for them with certainty, highlighting is nevertheless achieved by the juxtaposition of languages; in other words, highlighting the distinction between textual levels is at least a neutral (anticipated) consequence of the choice of language.

It should be noted that while the stage directions in examples (18) and (19) above are not highlighted by CS, they are nevertheless marked by some other means: positioning on the line, an empty space, a change in script, or the use of parentheses. Similarly, the directions in (17) are highlighted not only by the change to Latin but

also by an empty space between the main text and the directions, and by a change in script. In these cases, the script is more upright and the letters thicker, with some changes in the letters themselves, such as the use of a two-compartment 'a'. As noted above in 2.3.1, this script seems in effect to be mimicking roman type (a typeface found in contemporary printed books). Sometimes the type of script does not change but only its size, with stage directions marked in slightly larger letters (e.g. ff. 281v & 286r). There are also other linguistic strategies, in addition to CS, used to foreground these textual elements, such as marked word order, deviant syntax, changes in modality, and marked lexical choices. For example, in *Intrant Philoponus Grammatulus* (f. 282v) the verb is clause-initial and there is no conjunction; in *Fawks exit* (f. 395v) the verb – if understood as English – is in the 'third person imperative'; and in *(Gra: ridet.)* (f. 289r) the name of the character appears in abbreviated form. Flagging these units is thus achieved through multiple means, some visual and some verbal, and in many cases several different strategies are used simultaneously.

5.1.4   Flagging switches: Visual and textual strategies

Code-switching may be used to flag or highlight (i.e. draw attention to) certain linguistic units, but it may also be the case that a switch is flagged by some linguistic or non-linguistic means: a change in script or typeface, colour, underlining, and so on. In the *Orationes* manuscript, the visual strategies for highlighting include mainly those mentioned in the preceding section: positioning text on the page (in particular 'centring'); use of an empty space (i.e. separating a unit from the rest of the text by a horizontal or vertical gap); changing the script (as described above); thickened letters (i.e. 'bolding'); changing the size of letters; bracketing (parentheses, square brackets, curly brackets); and punctuation marks (e.g. the final *Finis* preceded and followed by a full stop). Underlining does not occur, and while there are sporadic instances of a secretary-style script, they are probably slips (in the sense discussed in 4.2.5). What is particularly noteworthy is that these strategies are never used to highlight CS *per se*; instead, they are mainly employed to distinguish between different textual levels, namely text and meta-text. In addition, visual cues are often used to mark verse passages; there are also some occasions where individual words, phrases, or sentences are highlighted. The purpose may have been to indicate that the expressions were to be delivered in a particular way or accompanied by some action, but this remains obscure.

The obvious exception to the lack of visually marked CS is the use of the Greek alphabet; there are only two etymologically Greek words written in the Latin alphabet which have been counted as CS, *Olbion* (f. 81v) and *gry*/*gru* (ff. 166v & 278r) (see 5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.2, and 5.2.2.6). In addition, there are three instances where

only the termination of a word has been written in the Greek alphabet, *hæresi*ως (f. 83r), *hærese*ως (f. 160r), and *mathesi*ως (f. 450r). These have also been counted as switches. They are probably orthographical slips, but it is not clear which alphabet was to have been used for the whole word (in each case, the sigma may in fact be an 's'); the genitive form *-eos* is in any case distinctly Greek (see 5.2.2.1). In most cases, then, Greek forms are foregrounded, but even here it is arguably the case that this is a 'by-product' of following the norms according to which Greek is written, a neutral anticipated consequence. The scribe has thus not employed visual strategies in order to highlight passages in a certain language or switches between them.

Instead of visual flagging, there are, however, several instances where linguistic strategies are employed to highlight a switch. More precisely, what is flagged may be a) the language of a certain expression, b) that the expression is a quotation, c) that it is direct speech, or d) that it is a technical term. Among the 373 instances of CS referred to in Tables 7 and 8, there are 34 instances of flagging the language, thirty of flagging the unit as a quotation/proverb (with eleven mentioning the author explicitly and eight using a generic reference such as *Poeta*), thirteen of flagging it as reported speech, and seven of flagging it as a technical term; in several cases, multiple aspects are flagged simultaneously. The following examples demonstrate some of these strategies: flagging the language in (20) and (21), quotation with generic reference in (22), quotation with author in (23), and reported speech in (24):

(20) quod dicunt anglicè Snip Snap

'which they call in English *snip-snap*'

(*Papistae Iuniores*, f. 108r)

(21) quod Græci ορθογραφίαν vocant; et nos rectè Scribendi scientiam nominamus.

'which the Greeks call *orthography*; and which we call the science of writing correctly'

(*Grammaticae Partes I*, f. 320v)

(22) illa Antiquorum dicta […] Sus Minervam, et Ὄνος πρὸς λύραν.

'those sayings of the ancients [...] a swine [teaches] Minerva, and *an ass before a lyre*'

(*Laeta Britannia*, f. 49v)

(23)   Vetat id Hesiodus noster dum sic præcipit, Μέτρα φυλάσσεσθαι. Καιρὸς δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος.

'Our Hesiod forbids it when he commands thus: *Maintain due measure. Proportion is best in everything*.'

(*Pueri Captivi*, f. 146v)

(24)   That I can only say parce, O Magister! Parce O Magister! ['Mercy, teacher!']

(*Grammaticae Partes I*, f. 319r)

Reasons for flagging a unit which contains switching will be discussed in section 5.2, in conjunction with particular examples. The central point for the present discussion is that, in those cases where the language of a unit is foregrounded, the intended consequence is not to inform the audience of the language of the expression – one assumes that they would have known it. Instead, flagging is used to direct attention to the expressions or to their specific aspects.

A related phenomenon can be seen in example (21): producing a semantic equivalent of the expression in another language. The most obvious means for this is translation, but similar effects may be achieved by paraphrase, explanation, reiteration with a near-synonym (cf. example (22)), and so forth. Diller (1997/1998) refers to such strategies in the context of medieval CS as *support*; the typical case is a Latin expression 'supported' by an English translation or paraphrase. Since the reason for repeating the same semantic content in another language is to aid comprehension, 'support' is in effect a functional category. In the *Orationes* texts, aiding comprehension in this sense seems to be never the case at layer 1 (i.e. between the play and the audience), though it is sometimes so at layer 2 (i.e. between characters). Rather than locating instances of 'support', I have included in a single category those switches which occur in conjunction with any type of unit which expresses or analyses the semantic contents of the switch (or vice versa). In the *Orationes* texts, these include translations, reiterations, and etymologies (which would probably not even count as 'support'). The following exemplify these strategies, translation in (25), reiteration in (26), and etymological analysis in (27):

(25)   Bon jeur [sic] is good morrow in english.

(*Discipuli et Rustici*, f. 289r)

(26)   To goe to school, to what purpose, to use illud Cassianum, Cui bono? ['that maxim of Cassius: to whose benefit?']

(*Certamen Doctrinale*, f. 93v)

(27)   Σῶμα animæ σῆμα est: atq[ue] hinc pro corpore σῶμα

> '*The body* is *the tomb* of the soul; and hence the body is called *sōma*'
>
> (*Grammaticae Partes II*, f. 436v)

All of these switches can be analysed at both of the above-mentioned layers; (25) and (26) occur in dialogues and (27) in a verse section which is also a dialogue.[258] In (25), for example, Grammatulus is talking to Gregory, who only speaks English, and the function of the translation is therefore to aid comprehension, but only at layer 2. These examples serve to demonstrate once again that CS should be considered together with other discourse strategies, both when they occur in the same context and when they are used independently. We will return to the division of labour between various strategies in more detail in section 5.3.

To sum up: the purpose of this chapter has been to describe the *Orationes* texts at a general level. The main conclusion to be drawn from the discussion is that multilingual language use is clearly a central and omnipresent feature of these performances. Some preliminary differences have also been noted regarding the distribution of languages and CS in the texts. The picture seems to be broadly the following: Latin is the main language of orations, while English is reserved mainly for dialogue, and is a somewhat more frequent choice in that context than Latin. Greek sections are rare, but brief switches to Greek are in fact the most numerous category of switching in the manuscript, particularly in Latin matrices; the second largest category consists of switches from English to Latin. In terms of textual sections, the majority of switches occur in dialogues, but the difference between these and orations is not very great. In addition, three types of more specific phenomena were discussed: the treatment of proper nouns (particularly personal names), meta-textual units such as stage directions, and the flagging of switches by visual and verbal strategies. In the following section, I move to the meso- and micro-levels, focusing on the distribution of switches among the four subgenres and on the functions of individual switches.

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[258]   Example (27) is structurally interesting: a single line of Latin verse containing three separate switches into Greek. The surrounding section – which in fact discusses etymology – includes several similar lines, but otherwise this type of switching is not typical of the *Orationes* performances.

5.2 Meso- and micro-levels: Subgenres, performances, switches, choices

5.2.1 Distribution of switching patterns among the four subgenres

A pertinent question regarding the *Orationes* manuscript is whether there are any interesting differences between the four subgenres, and if so whether they might even serve as an explanatory device for some of the identified patterns of language use. In 5.1.1 it was noted that in terms of language choice the Gunpowder Plot, Christmas, and Oak Apple Day performances are remarkably similar, exhibiting comparable numbers of texts in each possible combination of main languages. If we consider the two main matrices in particular, each set includes four Latin and nine Latin & English performances. The Lenten texts are quite different in that there are only Latin performances – even though three of the plays by major authors performed on this occasion were English. Before discussing the distribution of switches between the subgenres, it is worth considering the structural differences between the performances. Table 9 shows the number of different sections in the four subgenres, counting individual orations (excluding moderating speeches, transitions, and other such cases, which are not generally of equal length compared to the majority of the orations), individual prologues, and individual epilogues, together with whole dialogues and verse sections. The numbers are therefore not comparable to those in Table 4, in which the numbers indicate how many individual texts include a particular section.

Table 9.   Distribution of different sections among the four *Orationes* subgenres. GP=Gunpowder Plot performances, C=Christmas performances, Lent=Lenten performances, OA=Oak Apple Day performances. Prol=Prologues, Orat.Prose=Prose Orations, Orat.Verse=Verse Orations, Dialog=Dialogues, Epilog=Epilogues. Numbers preceded by an asterisk include 'functional' prologues and epilogues (i.e. ones where that function is performed by another element in the same textual position).

	Prol	Orat.Prose	Orat.Verse	Dialog	Verse section	Epilog	Plays by Authors
GP	16(*17)	61	13	19	0	18	0
C	15(*17)	64	8	12	3	9(*12)	6
Lent	10	102	0	0	9	7	8
OA	15(*16)	59	5	12	1	10(*14)	1
Total	54(*57)	286	26	43	13	44(*51)	15

The distribution of sections is not balanced. The most important figures are those for the dialogues and prose orations, since those sections contain the majority of switches (see Table 8 in 5.1.1 above). The Lenten performances contain 102 prose orations, while the other three contain around sixty each. There are also no dialogues in the Lenten texts, while the Gunpowder Plot performances contain nineteen, and the Christmas and Oak Apple Day ones twelve each. It may be added that no Oak Apple Day performance contains two dialogues, while three of the Christmas ones and six of the Gunpowder Plot ones do. Furthermore, the number of orations in the Christmas texts is somewhat distorted by *A World of Options*, with its twenty prose speeches and one verse oration in English. In general, however, the main outlier here seems to be the Lenten group, while the Christmas and Oak Apple Day performances are quite comparable, and the Gunpowder Plot performances differ only slightly with regard to the higher number of dialogues.

When the 373 switches referenced in Tables 7 and 8 are analysed in terms of their distribution among the subgenres and the individual plays, some notable differences emerge. Table 10 shows the distributions of raw CS token frequencies together with the mean and median values for each subgenre, as well as the normalized token frequencies (per 1,000 words) for each performance together with the mean and median values for each subgenre[259].

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[259] All switches were identified manually. Total word counts for the texts were derived from the raw transcription data collected as part of the digital *Orationes* edition project. In case of missing transcriptions, approximate word-totals were retrieved by counting the number of folio pages and employing an estimate (based on a random sample) of 330 words/page on average.

Table 10. Distribution of switches among the four subgenres and individual performances. Order=placement of the performance in terms of the 17 yearly cycles. GP=Gunpowder Plot performance, C=Christmas performance, OA=Oak Apple Day performance, N/A=the text consists of only a title. RF=raw token frequencies (total N=373) of switches. NF=normalized token frequencies per 1,000 words. The four highest raw and normalized frequencies for each subgenre are bolded and marked with grey highlighting.

Order	GP		C		Lent		OA	
	RF	**NF**	**RF**	**NF**	**RF**	**NF**	**RF**	**NF**
1	2	1.04	16	1.84	**8**	**1.83**	1	0.38
2	2	0.55	0	0.00	N/A	N/A	2	0.77
3	0	0.00	5	0.88	N/A	N/A	2	0.68
4	3	0.79	13	3.13	N/A	N/A	3	1.01
5	1	0.14	N/A	N/A	**5**	**1.05**	6	1.24
6	1	0.16	**26**	**6.05**	N/A	N/A	1	0.22
7	**12**	**1.65**	20	2.56	N/A	N/A	**9**	**3.13**
8	**7**	**2.04**	4	1.26	2	0.38	6	1.22
9	3	0.47	N/A	N/A	3	0.64	**10**	**2.29**
10	**8**	**1.86**	1	2.87	1	0.23	**10**	**2.98**
11	4	1.04	**54**	**5.78**	4	0.80	6	1.84
12	0	0.00	**22**	**4.38**	N/A	N/A	**10**	**2.62**
13	4	0.78	4	0.52	N/A	N/A	2	0.65
14	2	0.32	1	0.40	**8**	**2.67**	5	2.21
15	2	0.13	N/A	N/A	**14**	**3.42**	N/A	N/A
16	**8**	**1.67**	14	**5.00**	2	0.48	4	1.07
17	**7**	1.29	1	0.32	N/A	N/A	2	0.37
Total	**66**		**181**		**47**		**79**	
Mean	**3.88**	**0.82**	**12.93**	**2.50**	**5.22**	**1.28**	**4.94**	**1.42**
Median	**3**	**0.78**	**9**	**2.20**	**4**	**0.80**	**4.5**	**1.15**

There is considerable variation in the raw frequencies of switches in individual plays, ranging from none to 54 (mean 6.66; median 4). Almost half of the switches in the dataset (181; 49%) occur in the Christmas performances, while the Lenten performances have the lowest number, with only 47 (12%), due simply to the fact that the number of texts is also the lowest.[260] The normalized frequencies are 2.50/1,000 for Christmas performances, 1.42/1,000 for Oak Apple Day performances, 1.28/1,000 for Lenten performances, and 0.82/1,000 for Gunpowder Plot performances; for the whole dataset, the frequency is 1.42/1,000. The dominance of the Christmas performances is also evident in the fact that the texts

[260] It is worth noting that even if the most obvious outlier, *Discipuli et Rustici*, were omitted from the counts, the Christmas performances would still contain the most switches, almost twice as many as the Gunpowder Plot texts, accounting for 39% of the remaining dataset.

with the four highest raw CS frequencies and the four highest normalized ones all belong to this subgenre.[261] These figures, of course, need to be taken *cum grano salis*; the number of texts in each subgenre is fairly low, and the system of counting switches may skew the results. The four Christmas performances which account for the great number of switching in this subgenre are *Pueri Captivi* (26), *Sectiones Horatianae* (20), *Discipuli et Rustici* (54), and *Grammaticae Partes I* (22); in fact, together they contain 122 switches, amounting to 33% of the entire dataset. At least a partial explanation for this may be that these texts present or discuss everyday school life; many of the switches are indeed references to grammar lessons or to school texts in general. While such matters do not belong solely to the Christmas performances, they seem to be in any case more in focus in many of them. In addition to the four performances mentioned above, this is particularly the case in *Certamen Doctrinale* and *Grammaticae Partes II*, for both of which the normalized frequencies are quite high: 3.13/1,000 and 5.00/1,000, respectively. It is no coincidence that grammar and school life should play a central role in those performances, in which the boys plead for a holiday and demonstrate that they have studied hard. The extent to which such qualitative differences in switching patterns occur between the subgenres will be evaluated at the conclusion of the micro-level analyses.

In the following subsections, I analyse individual texts and individual instances of language choice and CS in the four subgenres. Three to five texts in each subgenre have been chosen for more detailed analysis (in most cases ones with the highest raw CS frequencies); a condensed overview will be presented of the remaining cases. These analyses are situated in the philological part of the 'philological-pragmatic approach'; a theoretically oriented analysis of the individual functions and explanations will be presented in section 5.4. The subsections are ordered in the same way as the subgenres in the manuscript, beginning with the Gunpowder Plot performances. In the case of each individual performance, I briefly describe the overall structure of the text, followed by an analysis and a suggested interpretation and explanation of each instance of CS, for the most part in the same order as they occur in the text. Wherever relevant, similar cases from other texts will be addressed at the same time.

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[261] A Kruskal-Wallis H test did not reveal a statistically significant difference between the four subgenres either in raw CS frequencies (χ^2 (3) = 4.440; p = 0.218) or in normalized ones (χ^2 (3) = 6.969; p = 0.073).

5.2.2   The Gunpowder Plot performances

5.2.2.1   *The Papist Wife*

Of all Gunpowder Plot performances, *The Papist Wife* contains the most switches. It also offers a convenient starting point for the micro-level analyses in general, since the switches are quite varied and there are interesting textual problems to be discussed. The text consists of a Latin prologue, six Latin prose orations, a Latin dialogue (between three friars), an English dialogue (between a woman converted to Catholicism, her husband, and a Protestant), and an English epilogue. Each dialogue contains a single switch, in both cases a 'grey area' case; the others appear in the speeches, all but one in the first oration. The speech begins with the speaker noting that there are old sayings according to which perfect good and perfect evil are attained only gradually, over a long period of time (see example (32) below). He then proposes the following counter-argument:

(28)   Ita nimirum majores ante nos nostri. Qui tamen, si jam reviviscerent, errorem agnoscerent suum. Sub uno enim, et unico sceleris prodigio à Romano-catholicis in hujus florentem regni statum excogitato, et histerno die, nisi Deus prohibuisset, perpetrando; omnium, quæ post hominum memoriam acciderunt, facinorum quis σύνοψιν comprehensam non videat?

'So truly [thought] before us our forefathers, who would recognize their error, if only they were now brought back to life. For under that one and only monster of a crime devised by the Roman Catholics against this kingdom's flourishing government – which was to be executed yesterday, had not God prevented it – who would not see *a summary* assembled of all villainies that have ever taken place?'

(*The Papist Wife*, f. 159v)

The single Greek lexeme in (28), σύνοψιν, is clearly an FFI in its written form, but it would have been a 'grey area' case in the actual performance, since the Latinate form *synopsis* was already an established loanword, inflected according to the Greek pattern (i.e., acc. *synopsin*). The Latin form is found for example in various titles of books or book sections, sometimes also in an English context, as in Hoole's version of Lily's grammar: *A Synopsis or short view of the Latine Grammar* (Hoole 1651: 311). The word may be considered in essence a technical term, its use accounted for by 'need-filling' or a 'gap' (cf. section 3.1.3.2 above). The difference between the two is that the former refers to a goal, the latter to a state-description which acts as a causally effective force in the action.

The following switch is also a 'grey area' case, but for a different reason:

(29) Rem aggressi sunt tam tetram sub specioso religionis nomine: ut scilicet rerum potiti, populum, misellum populum à vera pietatis via diverterent, et in inextricabilem erroris, et ἡρεσεως labyrinthum compellerent.

> 'They undertook so terrible a deed under the beautiful name of religion, that when they had seized power, they certainly lead the nation, the poor nation, away from the true way of justice, and forced it into an indescribable labyrinth of error and *heresy*.'
>
> (*The Papist Wife*, ff. 159v–160r)

As with *synopsis*, *haeresis* was a well-established loanword, with a variant genitive in *-eos* (cf. αἵρεσις, αἱρέσεως), and it is similarly unclear whether the form would have been considered Latin or Greek. It is possible that the switch to the Greek alphabet in this context was a slip caused by the ambiguous status of the word, more particularly by its Greek-sounding suffix. In this case – as discussed in 4.2.5 – the switch would not have any particular 'function'; the proper way to account for it would be to apply a non-teleological causal explanation. What complicates the matter somewhat is that the same form also appears in an earlier Gunpowder Plot play, *Loyolista et Catharista*, possibly performed in 1668, in an almost identical phrase:

(30) **C[atharista]:** […] Nam rem aggressi sunt hanc tam tetram, Loyolista, sub specioso religionis nomine. Ut scilicet rerum potiti Populum a vero pietatis tramite diverterent, et in cæcum erroris, et ἡρεσιως labyrinthum compellerent.

> '**Catharist:** […] For, Loyolist, they undertook so terrible a deed under the beautiful name of religion, that when they had seized power, they certainly lead the nation away from the true path of justice and forced it into a dark labyrinth of error and *heresy*.[262]
>
> (*Loyolista et Catharista*, f. 83r)

What makes this overlap more interesting is that the first oration of *The Papist Wife* contains a long stretch of discourse which is in effect an elaboration of an extract from *Loyolista et Catharista*, with lines belonging to each of the titular characters. If the boys did in fact compose the texts themselves, it is possible that one of the

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[262] *Loyolista* and *Catharista* could probably be translated here as 'Papist' and 'Fanatic', respectively. Note that in both examples the sigma could also be interpreted as an 's'.

authors of the original dialogue reworked the material into a speech when *The Papist Wife* was performed some three or four years later (provided that the texts are in the correct order). We know that some of the boys who were scholars at the end of 1668 were still scholars in 1671 or 1672 (*1660–1749 Register*); besides, boys may have been performing even when they were not scholars, and they may also have stayed at the school beyond their time of scholarship. Adding further to the complexity of the matter, the same phrase reappears yet again in another speech; this time in *The Avenging Eye*, which is the penultimate Gunpowder Plot performance in the manuscript. If the order of texts is correct, it would have been performed around 1682, i.e. some ten years after *The Papist Wife*:

(31) Papistici hodie conspiratores rem aggressi sunt hanc tam tetram sub specioso religionis nomine, ut rerum potiti, populum, misellum sanè populum à vera pietatis via diverterent, et in inextricabilem erroris, et hæreseos labyrinthum compellerent.

'On this day, the Papists undertook so terrible a deed under the beautiful name of religion, that when they had seized power, they led the nation, the poor nation, away from the true way of justice and forced it into the indescribable labyrinth of error and heresy.'

(*The Avenging Eye*, f. 429r)

It is noteworthy that in (31) *hæreseos* is written fully in the Latin alphabet. The sentence is mostly based on the version in *The Papist Wife*, although *hanc* only appears in *Loyolista et Catharista*; there are also some further changes, such as the addition of an explicit subject and the deletion of *scilicet*. The surrounding text does not overlap with that in *The Papist Wife*, but there is an interesting similarity in the manner in which both speeches begin. We may compare the following two extracts:

(32) Dictum a veteribus vulgo fuit receptum, Auditores reverendi, Viri ornatissimi, Ad summitatem sive boni, sive mali non nisi gradatim perveniri. Temporis enim diuturnitate, et operandi consuetudine opus esse existimabant ad perfectionem vel boni, vel mali consequendam. Unde illud Poetæ. Nemo repente fuit turpissimus.

'Reverend listeners, distinguished men, a saying was generally accepted by the ancients, that one only reaches the highest good or evil gradually. For they reckoned that a long time and habitual work were needed to attain perfection in both good and evil, whence that verse of the Poet: No-one has suddenly become the most shameful.'

(*The Papist Wife*, f. 159v)

(33) A veteribus vulgo fuit receptum, Auditores ornatissimi, Nullum nefas caruisse exemplo. Sed si Papicolarum hanc audiîssent conjurationem, longe aliter procul dubio hodie censuissent.

'Distinguished listeners, it was generally accepted by the ancients, that no crime is without an equal. But if they had heard of this Papist plot, they would undoubtedly think quite differently today.'

(*The Avenging Eye*, ff. 427r–v)

These examples overlap in the framing of the argument – the point about the ancients being wrong about something – and in the initial phrasing, but the actual argument is in fact not the same. If there is any connection between the two speeches, then, it would seem that the later one has borrowed some phrases or ideas from the earlier one. There is, in addition, one Greek phrase which appears in both speeches, but in different textual contexts (see below). These multiple points of contact suggest a textual relationship, but otherwise these facts still lack a full explanation. One possibility is that the students had access to earlier texts performed in the school – a plausible scenario, since the texts were clearly stored somewhere if they were not copied into the *Orationes* manuscript immediately (as was probably the case). They may thus have been subsequently used as models for imitation. Another possibility is that the phrases are themselves based on some other school material which I have been unable to identify. This may indeed be the case with individual phrases or sentences, such as the one about the 'labyrinth of heresy', but the extent of overlap makes this less likely in the present case.

To return, finally, to the switch in example (29), *hæreseως*: the presence of Greek letters in this particular context may simply be due to copying from the earlier dialogue (or from another text, if the extract was taken from some reading material) – on the presumption, of course, that the written form reflects what was written in the original texts, before they were copied into the manuscript. In example (30), which predates (29), the reason for the switch may also be that the expression was copied from somewhere, although I have not been able to locate any probable source. The only other similar example in the *Orationes* manuscript is a single instance of *mathesiως* in one of the Oak Apple Day plays, *Musarum Fautor* (f. 450r). The reason for suspecting a carry-over from copying is that we encounter some instances of the same practice in contemporary printed books; for example, in a treatise by John Davenant, bishop of Salisbury, printed in 1640, we find not only the form *hæreseως* (1640: 97), but also *hæreseων* and *hæreseωn* for the genitive plural (1640: 153). There are now several different explanations for the occurrence of Greek alphabet in

these *Orationes* texts. One is the above-mentioned 'slip', caused by the fact that the word-form is in these cases considered more Greek than Latin. Another is that the form 'slipped in' when the phrase was copied from somewhere, in which case it would in fact be a neutral unanticipated consequence. Yet another is that the form was copied intentionally because it was considered the correct way to write the word, in which case the explanation would be a norm-based one. Without further information about the context it is impossible to evaluate these explanations further, but we can in any case conclude that the switch in this case probably has no 'function', in the sense of an intended consequence or effect on the reader/listener.

All but one of the remaining switches in the first oration of *The Papist Wife* are brief quotations. The first time these occur, they are flagged with a generic reference:

(34)   Certè ipse Poetarum princeps pænam meritò dedisse existimat eos, et optimo jure brevi vitæ spatio remuneratos, qui in parentes ingrati fuissent Quanto magis qui in publicum patriæ suæ statum noxia sunt machinati. Ille sane cum quendam in ipso ætatis flore ab Ajace trucidatum narresset, qui – οὐδὲ τοκευσι Θρέπτρα φίλοις ἀπεδωκε – statimq[ue] subduxit hac de causa – μινυνθάδιος δέ οἱ αἰων επλετ' – Nemo igitur inficias eat proditorem, et patibulum optimè convenire.

'Truly the prince of poets himself considered those who were ungrateful to their parents to have justly suffered punishment and deservedly compensated with a short life-span; the more those who have plotted harm against the public order of their native land. Indeed, when he had told that Ajax had slaughtered a certain person in the prime of his life, a person who *did not pay back to his dear parents for his upbringing*, he immediately deduced that it was for this reason that *his life was cut short*. No-one would therefore deny that a traitor is fit for the gallows.'[263]

(*The Papist Wife*, f. 160r)

The Greek lines come from the *Iliad* (Hom. *Il.* 4,477–479), a fact which would certainly have been obvious to the audience. Homer was part of the core grammar school curriculum (as discussed above in 2.2.2.3), and the lines may have been familiar to the listeners; the content also points towards Homer, as does the reference to the 'prince of poets' – that is, in the context of a Greek poem; elsewhere the epithet might suggest someone else, such as Vergil. The logic and functions of quotations were discussed in detail in the preceding chapter (see sections 4.2.1, 4.3.1 and 4.3.2);

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[263]   Θρέπτρα may refer to concrete compensation paid to one's parents for their care; translating it as 'gratitude' would emphasize the link to the preceding *in parentes ingrate*. *Patibulum* may also refer to a gibbet. *Narresset* pro *narrasset*.

in this and the following cases, one of the consequences of the change of language is the highlighting of the unit in question. A type of solidarity between performers and audience may also be postulated. In each of these cases, however, a micro-level analysis may uncover why a *particular* quotation was chosen in the relevant context. In example (34), the function of the quotation is to bolster the speaker's argument by demonstrating that Homer agrees with him; it thus serves to enhance the speaker's status. This example demonstrates well how the original meaning of a quotation may be transformed when the boys use it in a new context; in the *Iliad*, the point seems to be rather that Simoeisios did not pay back his debt *because* he was killed by Ajax, not the other way around.

The next switch is not a quotation per se, but it nevertheless has a connection to Homer:

(35)   Quo nihil ab hominibus lethale magis inventum; nihil tam præsentem, tam crudelem affert mortem; nihil humano generi in omnis ævi memoria adeo noxium existit, adeo invisum; immo κατ' ἐξοχὴν meritò ἀνδροφόνος cognominari possit. Ingentem hujus vim, pondo multa autem mille [sic] in locum Parliamentarii Curiæ suppositum devexerunt.

‘Nothing deadlier has been invented by humans; nothing brings such an instant and unmerciful death; nothing in all history stands out as hurtful or as detestable to the human race. Indeed, it may deservedly be furnished with the name *man-slaughtering par excellence*. The enormous force of this, weighing several thousand pounds, they carried beneath the Parliament House.'

(*The Papist Wife*, f. 160r)

Ἀνδροφόνος 'man-slaughtering, murderous' (the Latin noun *homicidium* is provided as a translation in some contemporary dictionaries) occurs several times in the *Iliad* as an epithet of Hector in particular, while κατ' ἐξοχήν is a set phrase similar in function to *par excellence* (or the Latin alternative *per excellentiam*, which was in use in the early modern period), although it can also mean simply 'eminent'; it does not occur in Homer. Since it is preceded and followed in the same oration by quotations from the *Iliad*, the connection is fairly evident, and may also be the reason for choosing this particular term in the present context. The Homeric word occurs two more times in the manuscript, in both cases within a Latin dialogue. The first time is in the following year's Gunpowder Plot performance (provided that the order is correct), *Mercurius*:

(36)   **Fau[xius]:** […] Quo nihil ab hominibus lethale magis inventum est: quo nihil celerius tam præsentem; tam crudelem affert mortem. Tuo suasu ingentem

> hujus ἀνδροφόνου vim, pondo multa quidem millia, in locum Comitiorum
> Curiæ suppositum advexi.

> '**Fawkes:** Nothing deadlier has been invented by humans; nothing brings
> such an instant and unmerciful death faster. Persuaded by you, I carried the
> enormous force *of* this *man-slaughtering*, weighing several thousand pounds,
> beneath the Parliament House.'

> (*Mercurius*, f. 195r)

Although this extract is again clearly related to example (35), there are some changes
worth noting, including the omission of two clauses and the integration of 'man-
slaughtering' (here perhaps 'homicide') into the final sentence, but this time in the
genitive and without κατ' ἐξοχήν. Another important change is the correction of
multa mille into *multa millia* (i.e. from singular to plural). It is of course possible that
the error was not present in the original speech, but it is in any case surprising that it
appears in the text at all. It is worth emphasizing that the surrounding discourse of
(36) does not derive from *The Papist Wife*; the explanation for the overlap may be
along the same lines as that covering the overlap on the one hand with *Loyolista et
Catharista*, on the other with *The Avenging Eye*. Whoever composed the dialogue in
Mercurius must have had access either to the preceding performance or to some
unidentified common source. There is a slight difference between examples (35) and
(36) regarding the function of ἀνδροφόνος/ἀνδροφόνου: in both cases the word can
be considered a term belonging to a specialized semantic field and with specific
connotations, but in (35) there is an additional manifest link to the Homeric context
due to the presence of the longer quotations, while example (36) lacks any such
allusion. The third occurrence of the word is in *Pauline and Dorcas* (f. 341r).
According to its location in the manuscript, it would have been performed some five
years after *Mercurius*; however, text-internal evidence indicates that it may have
been performed one year after *Mercurius*.[264] The occurrence need not be discussed
in detail, since its function is similar to the one in example (36). The dialogue,
however, has been reworked to some extent, in particular by dividing Fawkes's lines
into several utterances and by rephrasing them slightly; it is worth noting that the
text is again not a direct copy of the earlier one.[265]

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[264] This was pointed out to me by Tommi Alho. The speaker notes that 69 years have
passed since the Gunpowder Plot (f. 337r).

[265] For some reason, the phrase concerning the weight of the gunpowder barrels has been
changed to *pondo quidem multo millia* (f. 341r); this may be simply an error. The word
bombard on the same page has not been counted as a switch into English because it is
clearly a slip of the pen; the correct form *bombardæ* is found in *Mercurius* (f. 195r).

The final three switches in the oration are further quotations from the *Iliad*; they occur in close proximity, with a short paragraph between examples (37) and (38):

(37) Illum regem qui, vel ipsa invidia judice, orbi nobilissimum fecerat se ex animo dicere Βούλομ' ἐγὼ λαὸν σόον ἔμμεναι, ἢ ἀπολέσθαι. Illum deniq[ue] regem, qui pro populi sui non solum incolumitate, sed et commodo adeo vigil extitit ut sæpius illud Homeri ipsi in ore fuerit

Οὐ χρὴ παννύχιον εὕδειν βουληφόρον ἄνδρα

Ω λαοί τ' ἐπιτετράφαται καὶ τοσσά μέμηλε.

'That king [they wanted to kill], who – as judged even by the ill-will against him – had made himself famous to the world by saying from his heart *I wish the people rather to be safe than destroyed*. And finally, that king, who not only for his people's safety but also for their profit stood on guard, so that these lines of Homer were often on his lips:

It is not becoming of a man who is a leader to sleep through the night;
to whom an army is entrusted and to whom so great things are a care.'

(*The Papist Wife*, f. 160v)

(38) Nunc enim cum eo loci perventum sit ut sensus, et apprehensus mali deficiant omnem veniæ spem; quo audacius pergerent, immanitate facinoris sibi præscindunt existimantes nunc

Αἰσχρόν τοι δηρόν τε μένειν, κενεόντε [sic] νέεσθαι

'For now it [= their malice] has arrived at the point that the criminal inclination lacks all hope of mercy. Because they proceeded the more audaciously, they cut it [=all hope of mercy?] from themselves by the monstrousness of their crime, thinking now that

It is shameful to wait for a long time and return empty-handed.'[266]

(*The Papist Wife*, f. 160v)

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[266] This passage has proved particularly problematic to analyse, and the translation may therefore be inaccurate. There are several perplexing features in the example. First, *sensus et apprehensus* seems to be the subject of the second clause, which would mean that *apprehensus* is used as a noun. There may be underlying this structure the phrase *sense and apprehension*, but even so it is unclear what it means in the present context (since it evidently does not mean 'meaning'), or why the word *apprehensio* was not used instead. Second, *deficio* would be expected to occur either as an intransitive verb taking the 'possessive' dative (cf. *desum*), or as a transitive verb with *omnis veniae spe* as the subject. Third, *praescindo* lacks an overt object. The gist of the extract seems nevertheless to be that the plotters had reached a point where they would (or could) not abort their plan, and decided to carry on with it in any case.

The first quotation in (37) was originally spoken by Agamemnon (Hom. *Il.* 1,117), the second occurs in a dream which Zeus sent to him (*Il.* 2,24–25). The way the quotations work is not quite the same as in example (34), where the purpose was to bolster the speaker's own argument; here the point is rather to paint a favourable picture of James, as a king who was concerned for his people's safety and whose values could be traced back to ancient wisdom. The connection to Agamemnon may also have been relevant to the choice of quotation. A rather different case is presented by example (38), where the quotation is taken from a speech by Odysseus (Hom. *Il.* 2,298); it is doubtful whether the identity of the original speaker is relevant in the present context. The speaker is of course not aiming at elevating the plotters' status in the same manner as in examples (34) and (37). Here it may therefore be more relevant to focus on the aptness of the chosen quotation, as it explains why the plotters carried out their plan. Again, it should be emphasized that none of these functions is connected to the change of language *per se*, but rather to the utterance as a whole. These few examples have already demonstrated that a 'function' of CS, such as 'marking a quotation', provides only a very superficial description of the total linguistic act; a more fine-grained analysis is required in order to truly understand why this act was performed and how it might have been interpreted.

The other speeches in *The Papist Wife* contain no Greek, but there is a single 'grey area' case of switching into English at the end of the fourth oration, which concludes with a few lines of verse:

(39)   Faux huic nomen erat; fax huic quoq[ue] sola voluptas.
              Et precor ut tales sentiat ille faces.

        '*Fawkes* was his name; fiery destruction also his only desire.
              And I pray that he suffers such flames.'

<div align="right">(The Papist Wife, f. 162v)</div>

As discussed above in 5.1.2, the expected form would have been *Fauxius* or *Fauxus*. The reason for using the form *Faux* here is probably twofold: it may have been used *metri gratia*, while at the same time the form perhaps makes the word-play with *fax* and *faces* more obvious. It occurs only a few times in the whole manuscript, including once in the very same performance in an English context, in the second dialogue (f. 168v, *Faux and Holy Garnet*). I have been able to identify only one other occurrence in a Latin context, in the first Gunpowder Plot performance (f. 3r), again in a poem, and probably used there too *metri gratia* (the form *Fauxius* appears in the

prose speeches).[267] More examples of this type of word-play with names are discussed in 5.2.4.

The lone example of CS in the Latin dialogue of *The Papist Wife* is, once again, a 'grey area' case:

(40) **Jes[uita]:** […] Cum Antagonistæ nostri negotiorum undiq[ue] molestiis obruuntur fluctibus; quæstiones mittemus aliquas, quibus si responsio non datur extemporaria, audacter affirmabimus scripta nostra tantæ nimirum esse difficultatis, ut nemo è Protestantibus rationibus Catholicis vel tantillum, ne gry quidem responderit.

'**Jesuit:** […] Whenever our opponents overwhelm us with a grievous flow of troubles, we will pose certain questions, and if an answer is not given there and then, we will boldly confirm that our writings are truly so difficult, that no Protestant was able to reply even a single *word* to the Catholic reasoning.'

(*The Papist Wife*, ff. 166r–v)

The possible switch in this case is the word *gry* (i.e. γρῦ), indeclinable in both Latin and Greek. Accounting for this choice of words is not particularly complicated; the phrase *ne gry quidem* is in itself a proverbial expression. It is mentioned by Erasmus (*Adagia*, 703), who provides side-by-side the Greek formula Μηδὲ γρὺ φθέγγεται and the Latin *Ne gry quidem loquitur*, together with an explanation of the word itself. It should therefore have been clear to anyone who encountered the expression in that context that the word was indeed Greek. Incidentally, we may note that Erasmus uses the phrase *ne tantalum quidem* in the same context; this phrase has also been integrated into (40) (*tantillum = tantalum*). Adding further complexity to the situation, there are two additional occurrences of *gry* in the manuscript, both in Gunpowder Plot texts:

(41) Non ideo mirum videatur gregem hunc imperitum injuriâ temporis tam miserè dissipatum, οὐδὲ γρὺ literarum vobis dignum attulisse.

'Hence it should seem no wonder that this ignorant herd, so wretchedly dissipated by the harshness of these times, has brought forth *not a single syllable* of literature worthy of you.'[268]

(*Shrawley*, f. 1r)

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267 A similar case is *Eliza* for *Elizabetha* in *The Avenging Eye* (f. 426r).
268 According to this analysis, the verb *videatur* is used here impersonally with the Accusativus cum Infinitivo construction.

(42)   Ab exitio Jesuitarum jam nunc ne gru formidabimus, dum inter nos, atq[ue] illos Oceanus interfluxerit.

'But now we will not be afraid *in the slightest* of the Jesuits' mischief, whilst an ocean flows between us and them.'[269]

(*Iacobus*, f. 278r)

The phrase in (41) is a clear case of CS: not only is the word written in the Greek alphabet but it also occurs with a Greek particle synonymous with μηδέ (for variation in the use of these particles, see example (69) in 5.2.3.1 below). In both (40) and (41), *gry* may be translated as 'syllable', further emphasizing the Greek character of the word, but in (42) it does not fit the context at all. In a sense, then, (41) is perhaps the clearest FFI of the three, and (42) the least clear. The explanation for the unit is nevertheless the same in all three examples; the clearer FFI status of the phrase in (41) does not seem to be of any obvious significance. The phrase is in fact the only Greek switch in *Shrawley* (it occurs in the epilogue); in addition, as mentioned above, there is the English *Faux*. Suggesting that it serves to demonstrate the speaker's knowledge of Greek would not be a very coherent explanation, since it applies much more transparently to such cases as the first speech in *The Papist Wife*, with its numerous Homeric quotations along with some additional Greek phrases.

The final switch in the performance, yet another 'grey area' case, occurs in the English dialogue, in a context where the husband is commenting on the preceding Latin dialogue (see also the following sections for similar examples):

(43)   **Hus[band]:** […] And furthermore the Iesuite told them, that since nether Fire, nor sword, nor Armado could effect their designes: they would resolve upon a healing way of mischief.

(*The Papist Wife*, f. 170r)

Although *armado/armada* was arguably a loanword in English at this point in time, it is probably used in (43) as an FFI. In the preceding Latin dialogue, the Jesuit mentions the Spanish invasion of 1588 (f. 164v), in other words the Spanish Armada, to which the husband is here referring. In fact, the reason for the word choice is precisely this connection, the explanation thus being related to the connotative appropriateness of this particular word (as opposed for example to *fleet* or *navy*). This 'aptness' explanation is again quite different compared to the previous example, since here it is the (original) language of the expression which is relevant for the aptness of the choice; hence the word ought to be counted as an FFI.

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[269]   Cf. *metuere/timere ab aliquo*. The following sentence ends with *à quibus valde timemus* (f. 278r).

5.2.2.2   *Mercurius*

Mercurius consists of a prologue, four orations, a dialogue, and an epilogue, all in Latin. All of the switches are into Greek: one occurs in the prologue, four in a single oration, and two in the dialogue (one of which was discussed in the preceding section). The switching patterns are quite different compared to *The Papist Wife*, in that all of the Greek insertions are individual words or phrases. Example (44) occurs in the prologue:

> (44)   Hinc bonâ vestrâ cum veniâ aggredimur opus diei in die suo: necnon larvam Σὺν Θεῷ evellemus Jesuiticam qua in tantum Christianis imponunt.
>
> 'Hence, with your kind permission, we undertake the work of the day on its proper day: and *with God's help* we will eradicate the Jesuits' ghost which they so inflict upon Christians.'[270]
>
> (*Mercurius*, f. 191r)

The explanation for Σὺν Θεῷ is by and large the same as for *ne gry quidem* above: it is a fixed phrase, here with a meaning similar to *Deo adjuvante*. It seems to have been fairly widespread at the time, occurring for example on the title pages of some contemporary books; it is also used by various Classical authors. In the manuscript it also occurs in one Oak Apple Day performance, *Naked Truth* (f. 307r). There is no need to explain this usage in terms of any kind of symbolism in the language choice, for example as emphasizing the 'Greekness' of Christianity (cf. 4.3.3 above); special terms and fixed phrases are well-known candidates for switch-sites and eventual borrowings.

The single oration which contains a few short Greek insertions is, again, somewhat similar to the initial oration in *The Papist Wife*, since most of the switches occur in a cluster. All of them, however, are quite brief:

> (45)   Nam flagitio quidem nulli nomen inditum invenimus quod ad exprimendam tanti facinoris immanitatem, non ineptum videatur, et rediculum. Fingam tamen vocabulum, prout potero: et internecionem tam subitam, et promiscuam omnibus intentatam appellabo Μικραμεγιστακατωτατυπερταταπανταφλογιζων. Tale etenim futurum erat πῦρ istud Ῥομαιοκαθολικον [sic].

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[270]   It is possible that *qua* is used instrumentally, although it seems unlikely with *impono*; *quam* would make the clause more transparent, but it is unclear whether this is an error or not. Again, the general meaning of the sentence is clear.

'For we have indeed come across no name given to the shameful act which would not seem inept and laughable to describe the heinousness of such a crime. I shall, however, fashion a word, as far as I can: I shall call such a sudden massacre, directed indiscriminately towards everyone, *a minimaximinfimsupremomniconflagration*. For truly such was going to be that *Roman-Catholic fire*.'

(*Mercurius*, f. 193r)

(46)   Quàm inundâsset εἰδωλομανία!

'How *idolatry* abounded!'

(*Mercurius*, f. 193r)

(47)   Hinc per plateas fertur piè tripudiantium chorus, qui vel Heraclytum illum πανδάκρυτον hilarem redderet.

'Hence a crowd of rejoicing people, which would render cheerful even that *weeping* Heraclitus, is led through the streets.'

(*Mercurius*, f. 193r)

The speaker provides a lengthy introduction for the first switch in (45), indicating at the same time the function: to coin a new term to aptly describe the Gunpowder Plot. It is not strictly speaking a pun, but it does count on the one hand as a type of word-play, on the other as a technical term. The switches in (46) and (47) are similar: εἰδωλομανία is a technical term (*idolatria* is also etymologically Greek), also occurring in *Teltroth and the Madams* (f. 248r), while 'making Heraclitus laugh' was a proverbial expression, encountered in several contemporary texts (see e.g. William Clarke's poem in *Britannia Rediviva*, 1660). Why the word for 'weeping' occurs in Greek, however, is unclear; it may have simply been a word encountered in some other context and considered suitable for this context. It seems unlikely that the choice was linked to the fact that Heraclitus was Greek, but without further contextual indications this possibility cannot be excluded either. The second switch in (45) is even more puzzling, since it is not in any sense a technical term; its occurrence may be due to the preceding switch, with a connection between φλογίζων and πῦρ. The type of switching found in this speech is suggestive of a wish to exhibit the linguistic skills of the orator, in this case his knowledge of Greek, even if limited (as compared for example to the first oration in *The Papist Wife*).

The final Greek phrase in *Mercurius* could also be considered a technical term. It occurs in the Latin dialogue section:

(48) **Gar[nettus]:** […] Nam audito semel publica comitia brevi futura Westmonasteriæ; quo rex Jacobus ὁ μακαρίτης, Proceres hæretici (ut nos tum stultè putavimus) Episcopi, unà cum numeroso Generosorum, et Equitum delectu confluxerint: consilium statim inivimus de aris, et focis hîc in Anglia clanculum extirpandis.

'For once the news came that soon there would be a meeting of the Parliament at Westminster, where *the blessed* King James and the heretical (as we at that time stupidly thought) Lords Spiritual, along with a copious selection of the Lords Temporal and the Commons, would come together, we immediately formed a plan to secretly eradicate the hearth and home here in England.'[271]

(*Mercurius*, f. 195r)

This formula is one of the most frequently recurring switches in the manuscript, occurring as many as twelve times in total, in one form or another (for example in the nominative, accusative or genitive). Most of the other occurrences are found in Gunpowder Plot performances: in *Fidus et Faustus Pastores* (f.141v), *Neighbour Catesby* (f. 220r), *Iacobus* (277v), *Pauline and Dorcas* (f. 338r), *Marprelate* (f. 365r), and *The Avenging Eye* (f. 425r & 431v). Four times the term occurs in an Oak Apple Day performance: in *Misomonarchus et Philomonarchus* (f. 29v, with an added adverb, as τοῦ νῦν μακαρίτου, 'the now blessed'); in *Arborum Triumphus* (f. 155r, with an added adverb, as τὸν ἀληθῶς μακαρίτην, 'the truly blessed'); in *Brisk* (f. 240v, again with νῦν), and in *Naked Truth* (f. 306v). It is similar to the Latin *beatus* or the English *late*, being a conventional euphemism for 'dead'. In the *Orationes* texts, it refers almost invariably to James; in *Arborum Triumphus* and *Brisk* it refers to Charles I. The euphemistic function is the reason why the term was adopted into general usage in the first place, but the occurrences in the manuscript may perhaps better be accounted for by a norm-based explanation, since the expression occurs so frequently. It is, in other words, a type of epithet. It might seem perplexing that in (48) Garnet (i.e. the Jesuit priest connected to the Gunpowder Plot) uses the term in reference to James; the reason is that in the dialogue he presents himself as regretting his part in the Plot.

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[271] In the first clause, *audito* is followed by an Accusativus cum Infinitivo construction (i.e. *comitia futura [esse]*). If an ablativus absolutus construction was aimed at (i.e. with reanalysis of *comitia* as fem. sg.), the participle should be *audita*. *Semel* seems to be used here on the analogy of the English *once*.

5.2.2.3   *The Avenging Eye*

The Avenging Eye consists of a prologue, six orations (with a brief song between two speeches), and an epilogue in Latin. The number of switches is almost the same as in *Mercurius*, and the general pattern is fairly similar, with all of the switches being individual lexemes or phrases. Example (49) occurs in the first oration, (50) in the second:

(49)   Hinc, nisi ἔκδικον illud e cælis ὄμμα prohibuisset, hodiernum nefas non tam conceperant, quàm confecerant facillimè.

'Hence, they would have brought about today's crime more readily than conceived it, had that *avenging eye* from the heavens not prevented it.'[272]

(*The Avenging Eye*, ff. 424r–v)

(50)   Nam crimen læsæ majestatis proximum est sacrilegio. Hoc, quæ Dei sunt, improbè furatur, istoc autem est Θεομαχία.

'For high-treason is most similar to sacrilege: here, what is God's is wickedly stolen, and there, we have *war against God*.'

(*The Avenging Eye*, f. 425v)

Although the phrase ἔκδικον ὄμμα is Classical – it occurs at least in the *Batrachomyomachia* (*Batr.* 97) – the concept of an 'avenging eye' is used here with Biblical connotations. In fact, most of the Greek insertions in the performance can be considered terms belonging to the religious domain. The term θεομαχία is slightly different, since it has Homeric connotations, referring to war either against gods or between them. It also occurs as a verb in *Iacobus* (f. 272r; θεομαχεῖν) and *Musarum Fautor* (f. 450r). These examples are nevertheless fairly straightforward. The following, from the second oration, is perhaps even more transparent:

(51)   De quibus hodierno die penitus actum fuisset, nisi παντοκράτωρ ille ἐπουράνιος (verus noster Jupiter, quia verè nobis est juvans pater) imminens, et impendens Angliæ malum in ipso quasi mortis articulo à cervicibus nostris subitò repulisset.

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[272]   It is unclear why the main clause is in the indicative – unless the intended meaning is something along the lines of 'Hence they did not conceive as readily as bring about the crime, which would have taken place today, had that avenging eye from the heavens not prevented it'.

'Regarding which [i.e. regarding our lives and fortunes] all would have been lost today, had that *almighty heavenly ruler* (our true Jupiter, since he is truly a helping father to us) not at once banished the threatening and impending calamity of England off of our necks right at the moment of death, as it were.'

(*The Avenging Eye*, f. 426r)

Again, the Greek phrase itself is unproblematic: both words are Biblical terms. Παντοκράτωρ 'all-mighty' occurs several times in the New Testament, particularly as an epithet of God (see e.g. 2 Cor. 6:18; Rev. 1:8), while ἐπουράνιος 'heavenly' occurs in both Testaments (see e.g. 1 Cor. 15:40, 48–49). The terms could, of course, be familiar to the boys from several different contexts, since in addition to reading the Greek text as part of their studies, they took part in religious activities in the Cathedral, such as attending sermons. The context of the switch in (51) is also of some interest: God is contrasted with another heavenly ruler, namely Jupiter, on the basis of the mistaken etymology (commonly held at the time; the phrase occurs in a number of contemporary texts on various topics) of his name (i.e. *Iuppiter* from *iuvans pater*). A similar allusion, created by the epithet *Optimus Maximus*, is found in the sixth oration, where we encounter another cluster of switches:

(52) Extra noxam, tanquam ἀναμάρτητον, pronunciat. Et deinde cum paterna sua benedictione ad fatale opus dimittit. Sed enim utcunq[ue] proditores versuto satis erant ingenio, et profundâ nimis perfidiâ, dissipatum est tamen impium istorum consilium. Solus nimirum ille opt[imus] max[imus] qui cuncta quæ in cælo sunt, et terris, vel nutu regit, impiis malorum consiliis restitit: necnon cæcas, et abstrusas istorum machinationes, tanquam Θέος ἀπὸ μηχανῆς, in lucem produxit. Ille regnum hoc, ille Jacobum τὸν μακαρίτην; ille Carolum pro Ecclesia pariter et legibus Angliæ martyrem sanctissimum; ille proceres et episcopos: ille (ut verbo omnia) nos omnes hactenus salvos esse voluit.

'He [i.e. Garnet] proclaims them [i.e. the plotters] to be without fault, as if it were, *without sin*. Then, with his fatherly blessing, he sends them to do the deadly deed. But in whatever manner the traitors were crafty enough and deeply dishonest beyond measure, their wicked plan was nevertheless dissolved. Truly that Best and Greatest, who governs everything in heaven and earth by his will, stood alone in opposition to the wicked plans of the evil men, and brought to light their dark and concealed schemes, like *a deus ex machina*. He wanted so much this kingdom; *the blessed* James; Charles, the holy martyr equally for the church and laws of England; lords and bishops; and (to be brief) all of us, to be saved.'

(*The Avenging Eye*, f. 431v)

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The first switch is once more an obvious religious term (cf. John 8:7; ὁ ἀναμάρτητος ὑμῶν 'who among you is without sin'). The context provides an explanation for this choice of words: the reference is to Garnet taking confessions in his role as a priest. The logic behind the use of the expression is therefore in some ways comparable to that of examples (35) and (43) above, where ἀνδροφόνος provides a link to Homer, and *Armado* to the Spanish fleet. The phrase μακαρίτης was discussed in the preceding section. The second switch does not relate to the religious sphere but is instead a proverbial expression, originally a technical term. It occurs four more times in the manuscript, once in each subgenre: in *Crooke and Penkherst* (f. 121r), *Pueri Captivi* (144v), *Nic and Tom* (f. 213r), and *Salisbury* (f. 410v). In *Salisbury*, the phrase is used similarly to example (52), i.e. in reference to God's sudden intervention, while in the other three the references are somewhat different. I present them here for comparison:

(53) **P[ury]:** Vir Scrupulose, liceat mihi in tempus proponere tibi hunc Scrupulum. Nam tu strenuissimus in solvendis muliercularum nodis, et tanquam Θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς, si forsitan obtingat tibi dignus vindice nodus.

'You crooked man, let me for a time set forth for you this crooked riddle. For you are nimble in untying the knots of wenches, and would be like *a deus ex machina*, if you happened to come across a truly Gordian knot.'[273]

(*Crooke and Penkherts*, f. 121r)

(54) Utinam igitur Θεος ἄπὸ μηχανῆς adesset tandem qui auxiliatricem extendens manum nos jam a limbo tanti frigoris, et tenebrarum liberaret!

'If only there was *a deus ex machina* who would extend his helping hand and at last free us from such a cold and dark limbo.'

(*Pueri Captivi*, f. 144v)

(55) Carolus noster potentissimus, tanquam Θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς hodie ad miraculum usq[ue] nos omnes liberavit.

'Our mighty Charles, like *a deus ex machina*, quite miraculously set us all free today.'

(*Nic and Tom*, f. 213r)

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[273] The riddle is addressed to Crooke, and there may thus be a pun in the way Pury addresses him (reflected in my translation). There is in any case a play with *scrupulosus* and *scrupulus*.

Although I have translated the phrase in each example as 'deus ex machina', the exact meaning would be along the lines of 'sudden/unexpected saviour'. In (52) and in *Salisbury* the choice of expression is particularly striking, as the reference is to an actual god being 'like a deus ex machina'; note that except in (54), the expression is always *tanquam* Θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς. Example (53) offers a further contextual link, by way of the phrase *dignus vindice nodus*. Its significance becomes apparent when we consider the following extract from *Sectiones Horatianae* (a Christmas play):

(56) **Disc[ipulus] 4:** Minimè profecto. Comœdia quinq[ue] precise Actus continebit. Nec in una scena ultra quatuor personas inducentur loquentes. Quinetiam quarta rarò loquatur. In nulla autem seu Fabula, seu Historia invocetur Deus, aut Dea; nec intervenisse dicetur, ubi solitis humanis opibus res geri poterit. Iuxta Poetam,

> Neve minor, neu sit Quinto productior actu
> Fabula, quæ posci vult, et spectata reponi.
> Nec Deus intersit; nisi dignus vindice nodus
> Inciderit: nec Quarta loqui persona laboret.

'Indeed not; a comedy shall contain exactly five acts. And no more than four speaking characters shall be brought forth in a single scene, and even the fourth should speak only rarely. Neither a god nor a goddess should be invoked or be said to have intervened in a tale or story if it is possible to handle things by customary human means. According to the poet:

> No less and no more than five acts long should be
> A play which wishes to be requested and repeated once seen.
> Nor should a god be present, unless a problem worthy of him
> Occurs. And a fourth character should not be troubled with speaking.'

<div align="right">(Sectiones Horatianae, f. 177r)</div>

Here one of the students paraphrases and repeats lines from Horace's *Ars Poetica* (Hor. *ars* 189–192). What is relevant is the occurrence of the above-mentioned phrase, *dignus vindice nodus*, and the fact that it occurs in a context where Horace provides advice on the proper use of the 'deus ex machina'. It is therefore probable that example (53) is pointing specifically at Horace's poem; the Greek phrase not only represents a technical term but also serves as an allusion, somewhat similar to quotations. This demonstrates once more the importance of analysing the switches in their total textual context; even the same technical term may serve different functions, depending on the surrounding discourse.

5.2.2.4 *Viper and Asp*

Viper and Asp consists of a prologue and four orations in Latin and one oration in Greek, along with a dialogue and an epilogue in English. The switching pattern differs somewhat from the performances discussed above; most of the switches occur in the English dialogue, while the orations contain only a single switch into Greek:[274]

(57) Et potius quàm inviolata servetur cum hæreticis, semper exclamant γαῖα μιχθήτω πυρὶ.

'And rather than have it [i.e. the Catholic faith] preserved unhurt in the company of heretics, they always shout *let earth mix with fire*.'

(*Viper and Asp*, f. 457r)

The Greek phrase is a proverbial expression, in its full form Ἐμοῦ θανόντος γαῖα μιχθήτω πυρὶ ('When I am dead, let earth mix with fire.'); it is mentioned by Erasmus in conjunction with the Latin equivalent *me mortuo terra misceatur incendio* (*Adagia*, 280); he also mentions its negative connotations, namely an attitude of indifference towards events after one's death. The switch into Greek does not in itself have any interpersonal function; that is performed by the quotation as a whole. The speaker's purpose is to attack the plotters by arguing that they followed a reprehensible principle, making this an FTA. There is a notable difference between this example and (38), where a quotation from the *Iliad*, spoken originally by Odysseus, was used to characterize the plotters. In that case, the quotation itself is neutral; it could equally well be used with positive connotations, while the quotation in (57) refers to something which was generally considered negative, regardless of the context.

The English dialogue takes place between four characters: Fan (i.e. 'Fanatic', a Puritan), Catesby (a Roman Catholic; not the Robert Catesby behind the Gunpowder Plot), Blunt (a Protestant), and Demure (another non-conformist, possibly a Presbyterian). The point of the dialogue is to discuss the various offences of the Catholics and non-conformists, namely the Gunpowder Plot, the execution of Charles I, and the Rye-house Plot of 1683 (the year when *Viper and Asp* was most probably performed). The first switches occur at the commencement of the dialogue, when Fan addresses Catesby twice with the French title *monsieur*:

(58) **F[an]:** O monsieur Catesby, what wind has wafted you hither at these our solemnities? I much wonder that the opprobrious remembrance of this days

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[274] The fifth oration, in Latin verse, contains the names *Phiferus* and *Knipperdolling*, which have not been counted as switches (see section 5.1.2 above).

firework, thath not cross'd your spirit, and banish'd all jollity from your popish breast.

C[atesby]: I haue learn'd, Fan, to take all things well in time of persecution, as well as the Fanaticks doe at Rome. Who for fear of a cruel Inquisition, when they are there, cry out in words Omnia bene! ['all is well'] whilest in heart they curse the Pope, Cardinalls, and all their superstitious trumpery. And wee in prudence have noe such hot, and zealous spirit, as presently, when men cry out Fire! Fire! to buffet fire with fire.

F[an]: And yet monsieur Catesby, wee find by real experience that your zeal is very hot on all opportunities for Englands fatal destruction.

(*Viper and Asp*, f. 459v)

There is no obvious explanation for the choice of *monsieur* in our example. The *Oxford English Dictionary* (*OED* 3, s.v. *monsieur*) mentions three uses which could be relevant here: a) in reference to a Frenchman, b) in reference to a person from another European country, c) as a humorous title. Similarly, Busse (2002: 118–119) notes that in Shakespeare's plays the word is primarily used either to or by a Frenchman, but sometimes in addressing a person from any foreign country, and sometimes ironically. There is nothing explicit in the play which would indicate that this Catesby (perhaps meant to be a relative of Robert Catesby) was French or had arrived from France or from any other foreign country. There may nevertheless be some allusion to Catholic France and to the contemporary political tensions; without any explicit reference to such matters, however, this explanation lacks justification and, hence, coherence. In one Oak Apple Day performances, *Seamen* (see 5.2.5.1 below), the title is used by a Frenchman (also called simply *Monsieur*), and the connection is thus quite clear in that text. Another possibility, perhaps more plausible, is that the title is used here ironically; an interpretation supported by the antagonistic content of Fan's lines. Similar cases occur in two Christmas plays, *Pueri Captivi* and *Discipuli et Rustici* (see section 5.2.3 below), and in one Oak Apple Day play, *The Ring of Giges* (see section 5.2.5.3 below). The use of different address forms in general is discussed in more detail in section 5.3.

The third switch in (58), *Omnia bene*, allows for explanation at several levels. First, as indicated by the flagging with *cry out in words*, the phrase represents reported speech (i.e. what Catesby imagines the Puritans to say when in Rome). It is also a technical term of sorts, used for example in the sense 'nothing to report' when inspecting religious institutions, either by those being inspected or in the reports themselves. The switch is hence being used to mock Fan by pointing out the contradiction in the Puritans' manner of hiding their anti-Catholic opinions when in Rome. It is, once again, not the language choice which achieves this FTA function

but the utterance as a whole. During the same scene, Catesby produces another Latin switch directed at Fan, this time a quotation:

(59) **C[atesby]:** Peace, peace, Fan, and be wise. Nonunquam tacuisse nocet, nocet esse locutum ['One never does harm by being silent; one does harm by speaking']. Tis a demonstrative argument of an unchristian nature to retain old injuries in mind: but a sign of great prudence, and charity not to mention them being done so long agoe

(*Viper and Asp*, f. 460r)

This proverb is found in Dionysius Cato's *Distichs* (*Distich.* 1,12) and in the *Sententiae Pueriles* (Culmann 1639: 24) – both basic grammar school reading material (see 2.2.2.3) – making it likely that the quotation was familiar to the audience. As discussed above (in 4.2.1, 4.3.1 and 4.3.2), familiar references such as these can be analysed as emphasizing a sense of in-group membership (or one type of 'solidarity') between the boys and their audience at layer 1; at layer 2, however, they have more varied functions. Here, Catesby is using the proverb to instruct Fan not to accuse him erroneously of not condemning the Gunpowder Plot and of possibly planning another one (cf. the Popish Plot of a few years before, a fabricated plot meant to cause further antagonism towards Catholics). It is therefore a fairly mild reproach, in other words an FTA performed with redress; what Brown and Levinson (1987: 226) call *generalized advice* (see also Mäkilähde 2018a: 311). Note that what we have here are parallel chains, similar to those depicted in Figure 9 (in 4.3.1 above), as Catesby is also able to attain the same goal by the argument he presents in English; it is in other words an instance of 'syntagmatic 1M2F' (i.e. 'one meaning, two forms' at the same time).

The final two switches are produced by Blunt; the utterance in example (60) is directed at both Catesby and Demure, the one in (61) only at the latter:

(60) **B[lunt]:** […] But, if it did any thing prevail with you, there would be no rebellious consults; nor rumours of civil insurrections: no forsworn Ignoramus juries: no violence in the form of a law: no injurie under pretence of conscience: no beating of our fellow subjects, no murdering in the name of the Lord.

(*Viper and Asp*, f. 461v)

(61) **B[lunt]:** Repent? Truly all your repentant peccavis come too late. But who can beleive that you heartily repent, who by your schism, and faction endeavour the destruction of our King?

(*Viper and Asp*, f. 462r)

To begin with the latter switch, it is similar to Catesby's *Omnia bene* in example (58), since it is both reported speech and a special term (i.e. *peccavi* 'I have sinned'). The whole utterance functions as an FTA (towards H's positive face), asserting that it is too late to show remorse for the execution of Charles I, and that simply acknowledging the erroneousness of the act does not absolve the Puritans (and other non-conformists, presumably) of their guilt. In Goffman's terms, this is a situation where a person forbears the acceptance stage of the corrective process, and moreover in a case where a 'shared face' is at stake; in other words a person's 'social identity' as opposed to their 'personal identity'. The speaker has a similar goal in (60). The switch is also in one sense a quotation, since *Ignoramus* here does not mean 'an ignorant person' but refers literally to the decision put forth by a jury when they decline an indictment based on insufficient evidence; in other words, 'we disregard'. It is thus also analysable as a technical legal term. This part of the FTA is directed especially at Demure, since the phrase *Ignoramus jury* alludes in particular to the incident where the Earl of Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, an Exclusionary, was prosecuted for high treason but the bill was rejected on grounds of insufficient evidence (for this use of the word, see e.g. *OED* 1, s.v. *ignoramus*). It differs only slightly from *peccavis* in example (61), since it is a derogatory term with a specific referent, and would thus have been particularly useful when reproaching people with Whig leanings. The phrase also occurs in an Oak Apple Day play, *Friends to the Cause* (f. 473r), in a similarly antagonistic context. In sum: if the title *monsieur* is indeed used ironically, then all of the switches in the dialogue can be considered FTAs of one type or another.

5.2.2.5   *Papistae Iuniores*

Papistae Iuniores consists of a prologue, two orations, a dialogue and an epilogue in Latin, and another dialogue in Latin and English. The single insertional switch in the performance occurs in the bilingual dialogue, which also contains interesting cases of language choice. The dialogue takes place between four 'junior Papists' – Catesby, Garnet, Percy, and Fawkes – a Protestant, and four constables. The Papists are portrayed as the spiritual successors to their Gunpowder Plot namesakes, conspiring together and devising another attack against the King. The insertion occurs while the Papists are discussing how they should disguise themselves for example as cobblers, labourers, or butchers:

(62)   **P[ercius junior]:** Bene hercle facis. Sed Tonsoris mihi potius arridet officium, quod dicunt anglicè Snip Snap. Atq[ue] hoc mihi maximè placet, quod, dum hæresin præ me fero, me Tonsore omnes utentur hæretici. Quos dum digitis molliter attrecto, tondeoq[ue], occulta seditionis, et discordiæ

semina omnium furtim insusurrem auribus. Idq[ue], uti spero, tam fæliciter efficiam, ut eos paulatim tantis implicem dubitationibus, ut suam tandem rejiciant, nostramq[ue] religionem, tanquam aliud agentes, accipiant

'**Percy Jr:** Damn well done! But more pleasing to me is the part of a barber, which they call in English *snip-snap*. And this is very pleasing to me because as long as I boast about my heresy, all heretics will use me as a barber. While I handle them softly with my fingers and shave them, I will stealthily whisper into the ears of all of them secrets about insurrection and seeds of disagreement. And I will hopefully accomplish this so favourably that I will gradually envelop them in such doubts that they will at last cast off their own religion and accept ours – while aiming at something else, as it were.'

(*Papistae Iuniores*, f. 108r)

This is one of the rare instances of an English insertion in a Latin context where the inserted item is not related to someone's name. The switch may be considered a flagged translation of the word *tonsor*; it is basically an epithet for the name of the profession, imitating the sound of shears.[275] At layer 2, it probably represents playful language use, but as the full example shows, there is nothing in the context which would make this an obvious pun, unlike some other similar instances of humorous language use.

As for those instances where the language of a whole section of the play switches, the first time this occurs is after the Protestant has listened (in secret) to the Catholics devising their plot and has given what is effectively a short Latin oration to the audience on the matter. At this point, Fawkes makes the switch into English:

(63) **F[auxius junior]:** What doth this ffelow mumble to himselfe?
G[arnettus junior]: If you speak to us, S[r], express your mind in our mother tongue. Wee understand not the language of the Whore.
Pro[testans]: Doe you think by these arts to hide, to dissemble your execrable designs? No, I would haue you to understand that wee haue men who watch for our safety as carefully, as you doe for our destruction. For I have discovered your plotts; I know all your counsells, and determinations. Which are soe full of horrour, and malignity, that Heaven would haue seem'd unjust if it had been private to these pernicious counsells had they been unreveal'd.
P[ercius junior]: What counsells, I pray? Surely you are mistaken in our persons.

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[275] The word also occurs for example in Ruggle's *Ignoramus* (*prologus posterior*), although not in reference to shearing but to sounds made by Messe Davy.

> **Pro[testans]:** Noe, Traytours, though yee haue changed your garments, your mindes and persons are not altered.
>
> (*Papistae Iuniores*, ff. 109v–110r)

As becomes evident from the conversation, the Catholics switch to English in order to deceive the Protestant by pretending that they cannot even speak Latin. This is expressed well by Garnet, who refers to Latin as 'the language of the Whore' (cf. section 5.2.5 below for similar instances in the Oak Apple Day performances). The evaluation is particularly interesting because it makes apparent the kind of 'linguistic ambivalence' discussed in section 2.1.2. Oversimplifying matters grossly, it may be said that on the one hand a knowledge of Latin could demonstrate that one was well-educated; on the other, it could also reveal one's Roman Catholic leanings. In Goffman's terminology, the situation is basically one where being able to speak Latin would not be compatible with the faces claimed by the Catholics; they would not fit the roles they attempt to play, those of a butcher, a cobbler, a barber, and so on. Their language choice can therefore be analysed as a defensive move, part of the avoidance process. When the Protestant leaves to find someone to help him question the suspected plotters, the Catholics switch back to Latin:

(64)   **Pro[testans]:** What still deny it? Tell me then most cruell Miscreants what religion you profess?   **P[ercius junior]:** The same as you, S[r].

C[atesbeius junior]: If you are a Protestant.

Pro[testans]: That you may imagine. Tell me then what are the principles of your religion. Perhaps I shall confute you this way.

G[arnettus junior]: That you'll see best, if you will undertake to dispute of any other religion against the Protestants; which wee are ready to the utmost of our weak power to defend.

Pro[testans]: I'm for you there, if yee'll give me leaue to call a Friend of mine, who hath more understanding in another religion then myselfe. Gentlemen, I will returne presently.   **Exit.**

G[arnettus junior]: Abiit? Nihil possit fælicius contingere. ['Is he gone? It could not have turned out better.']

C[atesbeius junior]: At vereor ne nihil infælicius. Nos enim, qui Fanaticorum religioni repugnamus, non possumus eam strenuè defendere. ['On the contrary, I fear that it could not have turned out worse. For we, who oppose the religion of fanatics, cannot promptly defend it.']

(*Papistae Iuniores*, f. 111r)

Language choice for these four characters is thus directly connected to their current roles. Since the content of the Latin utterances is also highly incendiary, the choice

of Latin may further be analysed as a strategy for excluding potential eavesdroppers, although the result is a failure. There is one sequence during the English part of the dialogue where a further switch to Latin might in fact have been expected, namely when two of the Catholics address each other during an aside:

(65)   **C[atesbeius junior]:** Surely our plot is discovered by this prating Fellow
          Aside.
       F[auxius junior]: Cast off these fears. Our counsells shall defend us.
       G[arnettus junior]: Why stay wee here? This is some mad man.
       Pro[testans]: Your audacious words, and presumptuous speeches are enough
       to make a man beside himselfe. But you shall not goe yet.

                                                                   (*Papistae Iuniores*, f. 110r)

In the manuscript, the stage direction occurs in the same line of text as Catesby's utterance; it probably refers to both his and Fawkes's comments, while Garnet clearly speaks in a manner which does not stop the Protestant from hearing him, as shown by the latter's reply. Performing the two utterances as asides fulfils, at layer 1, the function of indicating to the audience that they cannot be heard by the Protestant; at layer 2, it prevents the Protestant from hearing them. Nevertheless, it might have been expected to have these comments in Latin, since the general principle governing language choice for the Catholics in this dialogue seems to be the following: Latin among their own group, English otherwise. One could attempt to explain the lack of a switch into Latin in (65) by arguing that the actors are aiming at realism at level 1; therefore at level 2 the characters do not use Latin in case the Protestant might overhear even a single word they say. This, however, does not seem very plausible; the whole point of asides is that they *cannot* be heard by others, and it would in any case complicate matters excessively; the authors clearly were not aiming at realism with any consistency. More examples of asides will be discussed in the following sections.

As for the Protestant, he follows suit with the language choice of the Catholics – a switch due to necessity, caused by (claimed) lack of competence on the addressees' part. When he returns to the scene with the constables the Catholics escape, and the Protestant delivers his first lines in Latin, switching back to English to address the constables:

(66)   **G[arnettus junior]:** [...] Sed, dum loquimur, adsunt illi præ foribus. Hanc
       igitur perniciem, ut opportunè devitemus, avolemus illico.   **Exeunt.**
       Intrat Protes: cum Lictoribus. ['But while we speak, they are at our door.
       In order to avoid this disaster conveniently, let us therefore flee immediately.
       They exit. Enter Protestant with Constables.']

Pro[testans]: Evaserunt sane, et suo tempore. Nam si prehendissem, docuissem gnaviter quid sit nostri omnium gaudia novis inturbare perfidijs. [...] ['They have escaped sensibly and at a fitting time. For if I had caught them, I would have diligently shown them what comes from disturbing the joys of all of us with new treacheries.']

Lic[tor] 1: Foh! here's a stink indeed. The subtle foxes are gone, but haue left a scent behind them which is worse then that of Gunpowder.

Pro[testans]: Yes yes true enough. For this was the hole in which they lurked the better to consult of, and dissemble their notorious treasons[276]

(*Papistae Iuniores*, ff. 111v–112r)

The constables' language choice is easily explained: there is no choice, since it has not been implied that they know Latin. The Protestant's switch to English is similar to that in (63), necessitated by the competence of the addressee. What remains to be explained is his choice to use Latin (i) in (66), (ii) in his speech preceding the English conversation in example (63), and (iii) when he first notices the Catholics:

(67)   **Pro[testans]:** Quid hominum? quid hoc? Romano-catholicos hos esse suspicor. Summo igitur cum silentio scrutabor quid capiant consilij – Sed cavendum est ne quis me videat.

'**Protestant:** What sort of men are these? What is this? I suspect that these are Roman Catholics. Accordingly I will examine in complete silence what sort of plan they are forming – But I have to be careful that no-one sees me.'

(*Papistae Iuniores*, f. 106r)

Although he addresses the Catholics using second-person pronouns after finally revealing himself, it is unclear to whom he is actually speaking – note the reference to 'mumbling to himself' in (63). It seems in fact to be the case that, on all three occasions where he uses Latin, he is either addressing the audience or producing an inner monologue. This serves to distinguish between utterances directed at other characters and those meant primarily for the audience;[277] the choice of Latin arguably has no specific function at layer 2. The only case where this is directly relevant is example (66), since in the other two cases the main language of the performance has been Latin throughout, and up to the first switch to English by Fawkes, the audience might have expected to see a performance wholly in Latin. Note that for the

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[276]   *Nostri omnium* presumably for *nostrum/nostrorum omnium*.

[277]   A contrary case is presented by stage-whispers, where there are no actual lines for the actor to produce. The audience hears nothing, while the addressee hears everything. Such an action takes place for example in *Marprelate* (f. 370v).

Protestant a knowledge of Latin naturally does not constitute a face-threat. It is not Latin *per se* that is face-threatening for the Catholics, either; its incongruity stems from the fact that their roles as common folk are incompatible with such a skill.

5.2.2.6 Other Gunpowder Plot performances

The switches in the remaining Gunpowder Plot performances fall into roughly similar categories as the ones discussed above; I address them very briefly. First, there are two instances of switching in the context of word-play. The first is a suggestion in an oration that Albion (i.e. England) could be *Olbion* (*Loyolista et Catharista*, f. 81v). This has been counted as a switch (and an FFI), since the allusion depends upon the meaning of the Greek ὄλβιον 'happy, blessed' (cf. e.g. Blount 1661 for the word as the suggested etymon behind *Albion*; cf. also the title of Michael Drayton's 1612 topographical poem *Poly-Olbion*). As in several examples above, this function does not depend on the switch itself but on the content of the word; the switch merely enables the speaker to make the allusion in the first place. It may also be noted that the same utterance contains another instance of similar word-play, where the speaker says that *Anglia* would be placed in the happiest corner (*angulus*) of the world; thus we have parallel chains similar to those in *Viper and Asp* (see 5.2.2.4). The other example (*Garnettus*, f. 31r) is both an instance of word-play and an example of a flagged quotation with an etymological analysis: the speaker says that London was abandoned by its citizens during the Great Fire, and notes that the Greek word for city, πόλις, is derived from the word for 'crowd' (*à multitudine*), presumably οἱ πολλοί – a city without its people is hence not a city at all. In both cases, the function of the play on words may be analysed as enhancing the speaker's positive face by demonstrating his verbal skills, even if these are not instances of 'original' word-play.

Many of the remaining switches are similarly individual lexemes or phrases, in most cases classifiable as technical terms. There are particularly many examples in *Teltroth and the Madams*, which also includes a full oration in Greek. The Greek switches occur in speeches, the Latin ones in a dialogue. To begin with, τυραννίς (f. 248r, 'tyranny') occurs in the same sentence as εἰδωλομανία, discussed above in 5.2.2.2 in conjunction with example (46). The former is rather similar, since it arguably lacks a clear Latin alternative, other than the borrowing of the same lexeme, *tyrannis*, which is inflected according to the Greek pattern, and which could therefore constitute an FFI. It is in any case a technical term belonging to the political domain. It is also similar to σύνοψις, discussed above in section 5.2.2.1, not only in terms of its formal properties but also in being accounted for by a 'need-filling' function. A rather different case is presented by ἀθανάτοιο (f. 249v, 'of the undying'), which in its context refers to God and occurs together with a flagged

translation: *ie immortalis*. While ἀθάνατος is not in itself a special term, it is actually used here as a Homeric allusion, as indicated by the choice of the -οιο genitive (cf. e.g. Hom. *Il.* 1, 530). It is hence similar to ἀνδροφόνος, discussed in section 5.2.2.1.

The remaining switches in *Teltroth and the Madams* are all from the religious domain. The term καρδιογνώστης (f. 250r, 'knower of hearts') is similar to παντοκράτωρ, being a Biblical word referring to God (e.g. Acts 1: 24). The phrase Ἑκὰς ἑκὰς ἔστε *Jesuitæ* (f. 248v, 'begone, Jesuits!') is a modified form of a religious spell (the original form is Ἑκὰς ἑκὰς ἔστε βέβηλοι 'Begone, impure/ profane/unhallowed!'); it is also used in the present context as a form of reported speech, referring to what the boys are crying out together. The total utterance serves to maintain a 'loyalist' face for them, while the choice of this particular phrasing may also be seen as word-play. Finally, Teltroth notes in the dialogue (f. 252v) that *Ave Maries* and *Pater nosters* give one leave to plot against the state and church. Both are obviously names of prayers, with the former perhaps having particularly Catholic connotations (cf. also *omnia bene* and *peccavi* above). In the present context, these references are part of an FTA, as Teltroth is arguing that the Catholic Church tolerates acts such as the Gunpowder Plot.

Beyond this one performance, there is one additional instance which belongs to the same category of religious terminology, namely *Te Deum* (the name of a hymn), which occurs in *Pauline and Dorcas* (f. 344r). This example is particularly interesting because of the contrary functions the utterance has at layers 1 and 2. At the latter, Dorcas is arguing that the Gunpowder Plot was not a morally questionable act because if it had succeeded, the leaders of the Catholic Church would have blessed it, singing *Te Deum*, and removed any guilt from the perpetrators. In other words, Dorcas attempts to defend her own face, while at the same time threatening that of the other interlocutors by pointing out a flaw in their arguments. At layer 1, however, the effect is the opposite: the audience would have condemned this kind of argument; the case is similar to the use of equivocation by caricature Catholic characters.

The last technical term found in the Gunpowder Plot performances is *ipso facto* (*Pauline and Dorcas*, f. 344r), which occurs as part of an argument – unsurprisingly, considering the scholarly connotations of the word, though there are no other particularly learned features in the surrounding discourse. There is in addition one more special lexeme, which, however, does not count as a technical term. In *Marprelate* (f. 371r), the titular character has heard that the Pope has (supposedly) arrived in England, and he comments about this to another character, noting that the Pope has arrived *incognito*. It seems to have been a fairly recent word in English contexts at the time, not occurring before the seventeenth century (*OED* 1, s.v. *incognito*). The word is therefore a plausible candidate for counting as a switch into Italian. It seems to be used in this context as an FFI, since it refers here to a person

associated with Rome. The expression may have been chosen precisely due to its linguistic connotations; after all, there would have been several other alternatives to choose from. It is therefore similar to the use of *Armado* in *The Papist Wife*, as discussed in 5.2.2.1 above.

Moving on to the next category of switches: there are four more Greek quotations, in four different orations. One of these is from Homer (Hom. *Od*. 11, 109): *Deus ille qui* πάντ' ἐφορᾷ, καὶ πάντ' ἐποκούει [sic] (*Teltroth and the Madams*, f. 250v, 'The God who oversees and overhears everything').[278] In the *Odyssey* the lines refer to Helios, but they are clearly well-suited for referring to various other gods as well, such as in the present case the Christian God. Two quotations derive from Hesiod (Hes. *Op*. 101 & 266); the first occurs in *Loyolista et Catharista* (f. 82v): Πλείη μεν γὰρ Γαῖα κακῶν, πλείη δε Θαλάσσα 'Full of evils is the earth, and full is the sea'. The second is found in *Garnettus* (f. 31v): Ἠδὲ [sic] κακὴ βουλὴ τῳ βουλεύσαντι κακίστη 'An evil plan [harms] the planner the worst'. The latter is presented as an instance of generalized advice, as discussed above in 5.2.2.4, although the case is somewhat different from that in example (59), where the advice is directed at a particular person as an FTA. The former quotation (in *Loyolista et Catharista*) is not used to advise anyone, but rather acts as a justification, explaining why the boys are not surprised that there are so many wicked people in the world. As discussed in 2.2.2.3, Hesiod was also part of the basic grammar school curriculum, being one of the main Greek authors to be read besides Homer. The fourth quotation is somewhat exceptional, in that it derives not from a Classical source but from a contemporary one, namely James Duport's (1666) Homeric translation of the Psalms, Δαβίδης Ἔμμετρος (Duport 1666: 27; Ps. 12).[279] The work was intended particularly for use by students in grammar schools and at the universities. The only modification is the addition of a subject pronoun: *Qui* δίδυμον δέ τε ἦτορ ἔχοντες Ἐσθλ' ἀγορεύουσιν, κακὰ δε φρονέουσιν ὀπίσσω 'Who having a twofold heart speaks good things, yet thinks of evil hereafter' (*Iacobus*, f. 277r). The quotation is once again being used for quite a different purpose: it constitutes a deliberate insult directed at the Jesuits. Although all of these quotation can at one level be explained by referring to the desire to show off the boys' Greek skills, there are nevertheless drastic differences between what are arguably their particular functions, ranging from Hesiodic allusions to face-attacks. These particular functions are, to repeat, not achieved simply through CS but by the utterance as a whole, including its contents and context. All of these in combination, together with the purpose (i.e. the function) are what constitute the speech-act.

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[278]   Here ἐποκούει stands for ἐπακούει.

[279]   Duport's text seems to have also been used as the basis for most of the Greek verse orations (Alho forthcoming).

Finally, there are three more switches to be discussed, all of which are special cases. First, the epilogue in *Neighbour Catesby* is in English verse, but it concludes with a further valediction in Latin: *Soli Deo gloria. Vivite. Valete. Et, si placeat vobis, Plaudite* 'Glory to God alone. Live long and prosper, and if you please, applaud' (f. 228v). This seems in effect to be a return to the main metalanguage of the manuscript; the formulae used here are ones which occur quite frequently in the texts. The switch thus flags the transition from the epilogue itself to the conclusion of the performance, somewhat in the same way as the final *Finis* does in the written form. It may even have been spoken by a different person.

Secondly, the long English dialogue in *Salisbury* contains one 'grey area' case of switching to Latin. In one scene (f. 407r), Salisbury receives a letter from Worcestershire and reads it aloud. The text is presented on the manuscript page as though it were an actual letter, with the place and date of composition in the upper-right corner: *Worcest: 8ᵒ November. 1605.* The possible switch here is *8ᵒ*, which has to stand for *octavo*. The explanation is simply that this was one of the conventional forms for indicating a date; there is no need to propose an explanation which in any way refers to the specific connotations of Latin or the identity of the writer. As an example from the same time-period and from a related speech-community, one may compare the dating practices used in the testimonials written (in English) for Lovejoy before his appointment (*Testimonials*, Items 3–4): Samuel Cromleholme (the headmaster of St. Paul's School) writes the date as *Maij 12ᵒ 1665*, while John Goad (the headmaster of Merchant Taylors' School) writes *May 11. 1665*. The testimonial written for Robert Stonehouse (lacking a signature) uses yet a different format: *this eight day of May 1665* (*Testimonials*, Item 2).

Finally, we find the interjection *Pish* in the Latin dialogue of *Neighbour Catesby* (f. 225r). Interjections are a category where switching often occurs in spoken discourse; it is also mentioned in some of the CS function taxonomies (see 3.1.3.2 above). In the present case, the reason for switching may be a gap in the students' competence. A possible Latin alternative would be *phy*, but since it is not mentioned in the lists of interjections or adverbs in Lily's grammar, it may have been unknown to the boys, while none of the other words in the lists is equivalent to *pish*.

To sum up: the switching-patterns found in the Gunpowder Plot performances are quite varied. Many of the switches are individual lexemes or phrases, most of which can be classified as technical terms, originating for example from the domain of religion. Another major category consists of quotations, mainly from Homer and Hesiod. As the analyses demonstrate, an in-depth contextualization allows us to identify differences in how, for example, quotations are used: they may be employed to strengthen the speaker's argument, to enhance a third party's face, to produce FTAs, and so on. Similarly, some of the technical terms or phrases are used because of the existence of a 'gap', while others are used to produce word-play, allusions, or

even insults. It is also worth emphasizing that the functions of language choice in *Papistae Iuniores* were quite different from those of CS in the other performances, suggesting that there may be a connection between the formal and functional properties of such linguistic actions.

5.2.3   The Christmas performances

5.2.3.1   *Certamen Doctrinale*

Certamen Doctrinale consists of a prologue and eight speeches in Latin, as well as a dialogue in English and Latin. The aim of the orations is to establish which of the three resources available to an orator is most important: *natura* ('natural talent'), *ars* ('theoretical knowledge'), or *exercitatio* ('practice'). Separate orations are delivered by characters personifying each of these, along with a moderator. These four speeches are followed by another four, all referring to the three concepts but also pleading for a holiday. The speeches contain only two switches, one of which has been discussed above (in 3.1.2) from the structural point of view. Example (68) occurs in the oration by *Natura*, (69) in that by *Exercitatio*:

(68)   Vos estis filij, at verò albæ, ut inquiunt, Gallinæ; non gnothi, non privigni. Cur igitur vobis desperandum est de eloquentiæ cathedra capessenda? Desunt forsitan Præceptores replicabitis. Adest tamen Εὐφυΐα vobis, aureum, ut ante dixi, eloquentiæ fundamentum.

'You are children, but assuredly children of fortune, as they say; not her bastards or step-sons. Why should you hence despair over seizing the chair of eloquence? Perhaps you will reply that you lack teachers; yet you have at hand your *natural talent*, the golden basis of eloquence, as I said above.'

(*Certamen Doctrinale*, ff. 88r–v)

(69)   Quisquis enim Exercitationem contemnit similis est ijs, qui, cum reptare vix possint, volare tamen aggrediuntur absq[ue] pennis. Aut etiam similis ijs, qui cum οὐδε γράμματα sciunt, οὐδε νεῖν, nec summo aquam pede tetigerunt; tamen sine cortice natare moliuntur.

'For whoever does not value exercise is similar to those who can hardly crawl, yet set out to fly without wings. Or indeed similar to those who know *neither the letters nor how to swim* and have not touched water with the tip of their foot, yet attempt to swim without a piece of cork.'

(*Certamen Doctrinale*, f. 89v)

To begin with (69): the Greek phrase is a proverb found at least in Plato (Pl. *Leg.* 3,689d); it is also mentioned by Erasmus (*Adagia*, 313), together with a reference to Plato (the form is Μήτε νεῖν μήτε γράμματα). Neither of these, however, is the immediate source for the occurrence in the *Orationes* performance, since parts of these particular orations have been adapted or copied from Gabriel Harvey's *Rhetor* (1577), a work consisting of two separate orations on the above-mentioned *natura*, *ars*, and *exercitatio*.[280] The part containing this switch has been adapted with some minor modification, as can be seen from the following excerpt from *Rhetor*:

(70)   Verùm si sine Exercitatione, studio, diligentia, commentatione, instrumentis meis nihil possunt, ne hiscere quidem: sed perinde faciunt, vt ij, qui cùm reptare non queunt, volare tamen aggrediu[n]tur sine pennis: aut etiam ut ij, qui cum οὐδὲ γράμματα sciunt, οὐδὲ νεῖν, quod est Græcis hominibus in prouerbio, nec summo aquam pede vnquam tetigerunt, tamen sine cortice natare moliuntur:

'Truly without practice, study, diligence, careful preparation – my instruments – they cannot do anything, not even open their mouths. Instead, they do as those who are not able to crawl, yet set out to fly without wings. Or indeed those who know *neither the letters nor how to swim* – as a saying among the Greeks goes – and have not touched water with the tip of their foot, yet attempt to swim without a piece of cork.'

(Harvey 1577: 94)

At one level of analysis, the switch in (69) may be explained by reference to the occurrence of the same phrase in Harvey's work, in which case the switch would count as a neutral anticipated consequence of using the work as a source text. It is thus somewhat similar to *hæreseως* (see 5.2.2.1 above), which may have been an *unanticipated* consequence; the cases are different in that the switch in (69) cannot be explained as being due for example to inattentiveness on the part of the person composing the text. The analysis, however, should not end here. At another level, we may ask why this section in particular was copied into the oration, and what effect it may have had on the audience. In order to answer this question, it is useful to first consider what the switch achieves in Harvey's work, in example (70). In his case, the proverbial nature of the phrase is highlighted by the explicit mention of the fact. As with any such sayings, the phrase may emphasize the common ground between the author and his audience; here, however, the particular quotation has been chosen to bolster the argument by way of an illuminating analogy. The case is thus similar

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[280]   For an introduction to the work, see e.g. Wilson (1945: 167–169, 175–179).

to Ovid's *Est Deus in nobis* in example (8): the switch to Greek here 'enables' the use of this particular proverb in its original language. The analysis is basically the same for example (69), although the proverbial nature of the phrase is not mentioned explicitly. The choice of Greek can thus be seen here both as a 'by-product' and as providing discourse facilitation, while the switched unit as a whole enhances the speaker's argument – a function which can also be given a face-centred analysis (see 5.4 below).

Moving back to example (68): the excerpt here is also based partly on a section in Harvey's *Rhetor* (1577: 25). Although the final sentence, containing the switch, does not occur there, the word εὐφυία can be found a few pages earlier (1577: 23; *est in vobis* εὐφυΐα 'there is natural talent in you'). In the *Orationes* example, the word seems to be used as synonymous with *natura*, since *Natura* does indeed at the commencement of the oration claim to be the basis of eloquence (f. 87v). We are thus dealing once again with a technical term. The case, however, is rather different compared to some of the ones discussed above (in 5.2.2); a Latin term was obviously available, and a straightforward 'gap' explanation is therefore not applicable. As my translation indicates, I interpret εὐφυία here as referring to one's 'natural gifts', perhaps more in the sense of Latin *ingenium*. The term (together with the adjective εὐφυής from which it is derived), when used in this sense, has philosophical connotations; it is used for example by Aristotle in both rhetorical and ethical contexts (e.g. Arist. *Rh*. I.6,1362b; *Eth. Nic.* III.5,1114b).[281] Harvey mentions Aristotle several times in his work, making this connection all the more relevant. In sum: the switch in (68) can be accounted for by referring to the status of the word as a philosophical term, but Harvey's use of it in his work is also a contributory element, a causal antecedent.

The remaining switches occur in the dialogue, whose main language is initially English and changes to Latin later on. It focuses on four boys (Iemmy, Dick, Tony, and Mat) discussing on the one hand the harshness of school life, on the other the approaching holiday. The first switch to Latin is the Ovid quotation, discussed several times above in Chapter 4, and more switches follow in close proximity:

(71) **I[emmy]:** Yes yes, he's warm, but wee freeze, and are all turn'd Quakers against our wills God knows. For our hands quake with cold; our teeth chatter in our head; our brains are soe frozen that wee cannot cry out with the Poet Est Deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo ['There is a divine part in us; when it moves, we become warm']. But where shall wee find a Westminsters months sleeping: or a remedy as they say at Winchester; or a fat Ocium as they call it at Eton.

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[281]   For Aristotle's use of the term in general, see e.g. Reeve (2012).

> **D[ick]:** I think, Iemmy, the fat's in thy head: but for the Ocium that must be obtained by our Superiours. With whom I hope Art will haue soe much power, if our Natures cannot prevail, as to grant us a relief from our hard taskmaster, or as they call him in greek Ἐργοδιώκτης ['taskmaster'].[282]
>
> (*Certamen Doctrinale*, f. 93r)

Both Iemmy and Dick mention *ocium* 'leisure' (i.e. Classical Latin *otium*), which is in fact a special term for a holiday, as can be deduced from the present context (I note in passing that the form is also presented here as reported speech). It also occurs in *Pueri Captivi* (f. 147v) and *Grammaticae Partes I* (f. 320r, twice) in English contexts, and several times in the Latin parts of the Christmas performances, sometimes indeed as *pingue ocium* 'a fat holiday' (e.g. in *Contention*, f. 345 v). *Ocium* differs somewhat from the technical terms discussed above, including εὐφυία, since it does not belong for example to any specific occupational domain; rather, it may be regarded as an 'insider term' of the school world. Two different explanations are relevant here: on the one hand, there was apparently a norm, according to which this was the correct word to use in reference to the school holiday. On the other hand, the word functions as an in-group identity marker, a strategy which comes under Brown and Levinson's positive politeness superstrategy 'claiming common ground with H', and hence functions similarly to certain quotations as an indicator of 'solidarity'. It seems coherent to claim that the former explanation accounts for the use of the word, while the latter indicates the consequence of the act – probably an anticipated and felicitous one.

The Greek word Ἐργοδιώκτης ('taskmaster') in Dick's utterance is not a technical term but a humorous nickname or euphemism for the headmaster. It also occurs in *A World of Options* (f. 4v; *assiduus puerorum* Ἐργοδιώκτης 'the unremitting taskmaster of boys'); in *Captivi a Plauto* (f. 255r; *sedulus* Ἐργοδιώκτης 'the zealous taskmaster'); and in *Orationes Hyemales* (f. 377v), each time in a Latin sentence. Another term used at least occasionally in a similar manner is *Priscianus* (e.g. in *A World of Options*, f. 6v; *Hardress and Finch*, f. 259v; *Orationes Hyemales*, f. 378v) – the name of the Roman grammarian, which may also refer metaphorically to grammar in general. The English *Priscian* occurs in example (8), in the utterance preceding example (71), where it refers unambiguously to the teacher. Since such nicknames/euphemisms occur several times, it is probable that Ἐργοδιώκτης was conventional to a degree; it may therefore have functioned as an in-group term, similar to *ocium*.[283]

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[282] Note the reference to *Art* and *Natures*, pointing to the preceding orations.
[283] That the word might have been used to demonstrate the boys' Greek skills (mentioned in Harjunpää & Mäkilähde 2016: 190) now seems implausible (cf. 5.1.1); at least, this

The next set of switches occurs almost immediately after example (71):

(72)   **I[emmy]:** Tis true. But if wee could haue time to play, it would be phisick for our witts, hearts, and backs too, that wee might be fit one day for our Priorums, and Posteriorums in the Academy. To which wee all aspire, but are loth to take pains to fit ourselves for soe happy a translation. To which Dick, I think thou'lt never attain, thou hast such an idle, and blockish pate For thou art altogether in As in præsenti, but knowest nothing of Propria quæ maribus. **D[ick]:** You need not talk of my blockish pate. For I scarse know any one in the Schoole such a Rakehell, and Truant as thou art. Thou'lt doe no thing without the Clavigers come to rouze you out of your bed, and to dragg thee to school as a bear to the stake.[284]

(*Certamen Doctrinale*, f. 93r–v)

Priorums and *Posteriorums* refer to Aristotle's *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics* (i.e. *Analytica Priora/Posteriora*), here more specifically to oral examinations at the university, with questions based on the works (see e.g. *OED* 3, s.v. *priorums*; s.v. *posteriorums*). The Latin genitive in the names originates from a more detailed designation of the works, namely *libri Analyticorum Priorum/Posteriorum* (on this naming practice of Classical works, see e.g. Löfstedt 1959: 134–135). The words have been integrated into English by the addition of the plural suffix; the end result contains in fact double-marking for plurality, Latin pl.gen. *-um* and English pl. *-s*; this is probably not a genuine case of syntagmatic 1M2F, as the former morpheme is analysed as part of the root.[285] Although these forms are not structurally switches, they have nevertheless been counted as such due to their FFI status. They are learned words belonging to the academic domain, intimately connected to a knowledge of Classical literature; in order to even understand their meaning one has to be familiar with early modern university curricula, or at least have knowledge of Aristotle's works. They may thus be analysed similarly to other special terms, regardless of the level of integration or degree of conventionalization.

The following two switches can also be considered terms belonging to the academic domain. Both *Propria quae maribus* and *As in praesenti* refer to specific sections of Lily's grammar, identified according to the first words of the first rule in the section. The former section deals with the gender of nouns, the latter with the

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type of 'showing off' seems to be more the case in CS clusters, as in one of the orations in *Mercurius* (see 5.2.2.2 above), or when referencing ancient authors.

[284]   *Rakehell* = 'rascal'.

[285]   For CS and double morphology in general, see e.g. Myers-Scotton (1993a: 110–112, 115, 132–135; 2002: 91–93).

principal parts of verbs. They begin as follows (the latter example continues with more exceptions to the rule):

(73)   PRopria quæ maribus tribuuntur, mascula dicas:
　　　Ut sunt Divorum; Mars, Bacchus, Apollo: virorum;
　　　Ut, Cato, Virgilius: fluviorum; ut, Tibris, Orontes:
　　　Mensium; ut, October: ventorum; ut, Libs, Notus, Auster.

　　　'Proper nouns assigned to males you ought to call masculine,
　　　As those of gods: *Mars*, *Bacchus*, *Apollo*; of men:
　　　Cato, *Vergilius*; of rivers: *Tiberis*, *Orontes*;
　　　Of months: *October*; of winds: *Libs*, *Notus*, *Auster*.'

(Lily 1672: 12)

(74)   AS in præsenti perfectum format in avi;
　　　Ut, no, nas, navi: vocito, vocitas, vocitavi.
　　　Deme lavo, lavi: juvo, juvi; nexoque, nexui;

　　　'A verb which ends in *-as* in the present tense forms the perfect with *-avi*,
　　　As *no*, *nas*, *navi*: *vocito*, *vocitas*, *vocitavi*.
　　　Except *lavo*, *lavi*; *iuvo*, *iuvi*; and *nexo*, *nexui*;'

(Lily 1672: 53)

As the full examples demonstrate, the phrases would be opaque to anyone not familiar with Lily's grammar; knowledge of Latin by itself is not enough to arrive at the correct interpretation (cf. their translations out of context: 'proper nouns which to males' and '*as* in the present'). Both phrases can in fact refer to a number of different entities: the particular rule in question, this particular section in the grammar book, or this aspect of Latin grammar. For example, when Brinsley, in his *Posing of the Parts* (1615), discusses how students should explain the rules, the phrases refer to the first type (i.e. particular rules). In the case of (73), this is the full rule; the next one focuses on proper nouns referring to females (*Propria femineum* etc.).

On the other hand, when Hoole (1660: 45–47) discusses the division of grammar lessons into separate parts (and, for example, when each lesson should be repeated), he uses these terms to refer to the full sets of rules in the relevant sections. In example (72), Iemmy also uses the terms in this particular sense; the point is that Dick has yet to master even the rudiments of grammar. Apparently, *Propria quae maribus* was to be learned before *As in praesenti* (or at least at the same time); this is the order in which they appear in Lily's grammar, and in which they are often listed in other

sources as well (see e.g. Brinsley 1612: 69); Hoole (1660: 44) also suggests this order. Furthermore, in *Merchant Taylors' School Rules* (1661: 27), it is decreed that a boy ought not to be moved to the first form without knowing *Propria quae maribus*, nor to the second form without knowing *As in praesenti*. A coherent interpretation of Iemmy's comment thus seems to be that Dick has advanced to studying the conjugation of verbs without having yet mastered *Propria quae maribus*. At layer 2, the utterance is an attack against Dick's positive face: this function is achieved not only by these references but in combination with the more straightforward comment about his 'empty and dull head'. At layer 1, the main function of the switches is to create humour. Since, however, they may also be considered in-group identity markers, a type of 'solidarity' is probably also achieved as a felicitous consequence.

The last switch in (72) is *Clavigers*, which probably stands for *Claviger*'s. The literal meaning of the word is 'key-bearer'; it refers to an occupation in which the person also carries keys, for example a caretaker, gatekeeper, jailer, or custodian of a chest. The only mention of 'clavigers' in the Cathedral Statutes (*Statutes*, ff. 19r–v) is in reference to people who held keys relevant to the Cathedral: the Dean, Vice-Dean, and Treasurer. There were also two 'janitors' (*ianitores*), who held keys to the church (*Statutes*, ff. 16r–v). These, however, seem to have nothing to do with the *claviger* mentioned in (72). The term occurs a few more times in the manuscript, in each case in a Christmas performance; based on these occurrences, it seems that the claviger may have been one kind of monitor. The claviger seems in any case to be a student as well, since he is invited by the monitors to give a speech at the end of *Certamen Doctrinale* (f. 94r). Furthermore, in *Contention* (f. 345v), the claviger first addresses other boys as 'fellow students' (*Condiscipuli*), after which a monitor arrives and orders the others to be quiet. Both of them are thus presented as high-ranking students. Furthermore, in *Discipuli et Rustici* (f. 280r), a boy mentions what he would do if either a monitor or a claviger found him fooling around (see 5.2.3.4 below); these supervisory duties are also alluded to in *Grammaticae Partes II*:

(75) Tempora autem qui diligenter non observant, inter seros manè venientes sedulo nimis a Clavigero notantur (Cujus linceos latere oculos perquam est difficile, immo prorsus impossibile)

'But those who do not diligently pay attention to correct times are overzealously marked as arriving late in the morning by the claviger, from whose sharp eyes it is extremely difficult (nay, rather truly impossible) to hide.'

(*Grammaticae Partes II*, f. 434v)

This noting down of absences and misdemeanours is discussed extensively by Hoole (1660: 272–276) as a duty of the monitors. If this interpretation is correct and the claviger was in fact one type of monitor, it still remains unclear how his duties differed from those of the other monitor(s). The key or keys he bore may have been those to the boys' lodgings or to the schoolroom, but this is pure speculation. The last occurrence of the claviger on the stage is in *Pueri Captivi* (f. 144r), where he appears in a short scene adapted from Plautus's *Captivi* (Plaut. *Capt*. 110ff).[286] It may be added, finally, that whenever these characters appear on stage, it is possible that they were not, in fact, the actual monitors/clavigers serving at the moment (perhaps for a week at a time, as suggested by Hoole), but younger boys playing these characters. The use of the term in (72) can in any case be accounted for by a norm-based explanation: this seems to have been the correct word for referring to this particular office.

The next example occurs immediately after (72):

(76) **T[ony]:** To goe to school, to what purpose, to use illud Cassianum, Cui bono? ['that maxim of Cassius: To whose benefit?'] Preferment sleeps in Ladies lapps; and what canst thou get by thy long doating nights studies, unless it be a little Latine, and Greek. And what advantage wilt thou get by that? only thou art a Scholar forsooth; and canst begg in Latine, and Greek. Whenas a Fool, and Smelfeast can gett more by an english Droll; dine, and supp, and be thankt, though he mocks his good master, which feasts him, for his folly. And thinks himselfe happy, because he hath out-fool'd, I will not say outwitted, him.[287]

(*Certamen Doctrinale*, f. 93v)

The Latin switch is structurally intriguing, since it consists not only of a quotation (an elliptical interrogative clause) but of an additional object NP, identifying the quotation as a maxim relied upon by L. Cassius Ravilla (a Roman judge and politician of the second century B.C.). The reason why the NP is also in Latin is that the whole Latin unit is in fact a quotation, taken from one of Cicero's speeches (Cic. *Mil*. 32 or *Phil*. 2,35). The goal of the total utterance is to point out that studying does not pay off; each of the points listed strengthens Tony's argument.[288] Given this background, the use of the Latin quotation is, of course, somewhat ironic. Since it

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[286] The exact same scene from Plautus is also reused in Leonard Hutten's *Bellum Grammaticale* (IV,5).

[287] *Smel-feast* = 'parasite'.

[288] The joke about being able to beg in both Latin and Greek comes from *The Puritan* (I,2), possibly by way of Cotgrave (1655: 170), although the line has been somewhat modified; the original concerns the ability to call oneself a beggar in both languages.

effectively repeats the preceding *to what purpose*, it may have been chosen simply because the quotation was familiar to the students. At layer 2 in particular it is probably an in-group marker, while at layer 1 it may have served to demonstrate the boys' knowledge of literature, as Cicero's speeches were a central part of the curriculum.

The dialogue continues for a few more utterances in English, ending with Dick crying out for *ocium*, at which point the monitor arrives on stage. Here I present a fairly long stretch of the following discourse, since it contains illuminating remarks on language attitudes:

(77)   **D[ick]:** […] And therefore farwell Priscian, and all his trinketts. Ocium! Ocium! Ocium!   **Intrat Monitor.**
Mo[nitor]: Quid vos hîc agitis, Pueri? mihi videmini garrire, et nugas agere. Tacete, vel vos docebo gnaviter quid sit Ocium canere, priusquam à Decano, et Præceptore ocium obtinuistis.
T[ony]: Quæso ne mihi succenseas. Putavi enim Oratores satis lusus a majoribus nostris impetrâsse.
Mo[nitor]: Cur autem anglice loquimini, et non magis de studijs, rebus serijs, et honestis confabulamini? Ignoratis quorum in præsentia adestis? Nulli hîc adsunt, vel potius adesse debent, illiterati.
M[at]: Doctissimi nonnunquam viri nugis, et indoctis stultorum sententijs, hoc præsertim tempore, gaudent. Et præterea hæc nostra garrulitas nihil mali intus habet.
Mo[nitor]: Hoc instar omnium mihi displicet. Et, si Præceptor audiret, væ vestris natibus. Sed quinam docti sunt illi qui vestris confabulationibus tantopere delectantur? fortasse indocti, qui nullam nisi linguam anglicanam intelligunt.
D[ick]: Nos omnes impudentes fuisse fatemur, quod venerabiles hosce auditores tamdiu perturbavimus, cum de rebus magis serijs confabulandum esset. Te autem obsecramus, ut impudentiæ culpam condones. Hoc cum feceris, humillime deprecamur, ut pingue a Decano ocium, quantâ, quam possis, elegantiâ, impetres.

'**Dick:** […]   **Enter Monitor.**
Monitor: What are you doing here, boys? It seems to me that you are just chatting and talking nonsense. Be quiet, or I will show diligently what happens when you celebrate a holiday before receiving it from the Dean and the teacher.
Tony: Please do not be angry with me, for I thought that the speakers had managed satisfactorily to obtain play-time from our seniors.

Monitor: But why do you speak English, and why do you not rather converse about studies, about serious and honest things? Do you not know in whose presence you are? There are – or better, should be – no uneducated people here.

Mat: Even the most learned men are sometimes delighted by trifles and the unlearned ideas of fools, especially at this time of the year. And besides, this prating of ours contains nothing wicked.

Monitor: This displeases me as much as everything. And were the teacher to hear this, woe to your buttocks! But who, pray, are those learned people who are so delighted by your discussions? Probably unlearned men, who only understand the English language.

Dick: We all confess having been shameless because we troubled these reverend listeners for so long, although we were supposed to rather discuss serious matters. But we ask you to pardon our impudence. Having done this, we humbly pray that you would obtain a fat holiday from the Dean with as much elegance as you can.'

(*Certamen Doctrinale*, f. 93v–94r)

To begin with, at layer 2 the monitor's language choice is obviously governed by a norm (which did in fact exist at layer 1), according to which the students ought to use Latin even outside the classroom. The same norm is what dictates the appropriate choice for the four younger boys too, but there is more to be said about this situation. The switch from English to Latin is in fact necessitated by the monitor's appearance and his language choice; the scene therefore depicts an imbalance in power, as a certain individual can dictate the preferred choice of language and hence impose upon other multilinguals. In other words, the monitor's choice is not an instance of a 'we' code, but rather a threat against the negative face of the four boys. The switch from English to Latin is not made by the four boys simply so as to conform to the norm; rather, the goal is to avoid punishment (which would constitute an FTA and entail concrete physical pain). This example may be compared to the damaging use of Latin in *Papistae Iuniores* (see 5.2.2.5 above): while both cases have their own unique aspects, they represent the same general phenomenon. A case similar to that presented here will be discussed in conjunction with *Discipuli et Rustici* (see 5.3.1 below). Finally, the language attitudes exhibited in example (77) are worth noting. Essentially, the monitor is saying that only an uneducated person would not know Latin; furthermore, the use of English is connected here to trivial matters, while Latin is connected to serious ones. Assuming that these comments to some extent reflect the general sentiment at the school, it becomes obvious that while English had gained prestige during the past few centuries, in certain circles its status was not quite at the level of the Classical languages.

5.2.3.2   *Pueri Captivi*

Pueri Captivi consists of a Latin 'introduction', a set of five Latin speeches, an English dialogue, and a Latin epilogue. The 'introduction' is a unique section in the manuscript; it consists of a very short dialogue taken from Plautus's *Captivi* (Plaut. *Capt.* 110ff), as noted in the preceding section. The dialogue takes place between Lorarius and Claviger; at its conclusion the latter leaves the stage, and the prologue begins (i.e. as part of the dialogue). When the speaker of the prologue exits, Lorarius remains on stage and delivers what is effectively another prologue. The first two switches occur in this speech, in a single sentence, as the speaker recounts how the boys have suffered during their studies and nearly gone insane:

(78)   Præpositionibus ὕστερον πρότερον arseverse abutuntur.

       'They abuse prepositions *topsy-turvy arsy-versy*.'

<div align="right">(Pueri Captivi, f. 144v)</div>

The structure is exceptional, since the sentence apparently contains a switch into both Greek and English. The spelling of the English form, which I have interpreted as standing for *arsy-versy*, is atypical. The only other potential interpretation of the word, however, namely a Latin spell for warding off fires – also mentioned in contemporary dictionaries (see e.g. Blount 1661; Coles 1677; s.v. *arseverse*; both include an entry for *arsy-versy* spelled 'arseversie') – would make no sense in the present context. As for the Greek phrase, it would certainly have been encountered by the boys during their studies, since *hysteron-proteron* is a well-known rhetorical *figura* in which the order of events is reversed in their linguistic representation; it is mentioned in some elementary grammar books, such as Busby's (1647: 91; written in the Latin alphabet), although not in the standard versions of Lily's grammar. It is hence amenable to the 'technical term' explanation, applied several times in the preceding sections. Since in the present context both phrases mean 'in the wrong way', the English switch is also a reiteration of the Greek expression. As discussed in 3.1.4.1 and 3.1.4.2, two functions connected to reiterative switching, mentioned in several earlier studies, are emphasis and clarification. It seems unlikely that clarification would have been required in the present context, and emphasis may therefore be what the speaker is aiming at here. The brief oration, however, is quite humorous, and achieving this effect may have been the main motivation for constructing the perplexing utterance.[289]

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[289]   Another possibility is that the boys had encountered this particular English expression as a translation for ὕστερον πρότερον. I have not identified any source where the phrase was translated that way, but the possibility nevertheless cannot be totally ruled out.

The next switches occur at the conclusion of the first actual oration:

(79) Hoc ut concedatur nobis, solum ὑμῖν ἐν γούνασι κεῖται, viri ornatissimi. Nam in vobis tantummodo situm est, nobis, qui disciplinis, et artibus operam damus, feriandi licentiam indulgere. Quod etiam nunc à vobis ut concedatur hîc dum vivitis obnixe petimus valde sperantes ut, additis vestræ vitæ (Quod faxit Deus!) annis pluribus, δὶς καὶ τρὶς iterum, et sæpius idem concedatis.

'That we be granted this, *lies* solely *in your hands*, honoured men. For it rests only upon you to give us, who study the arts and sciences, permission to keep holiday. We request with all our strength that this be granted by you now while you live, and hope vigorously that when you have grown older by many years (may God grant it!), *twice and thrice* again, you will also grant the same many more times.'

(*Pueri Captivi*, f. 145r)

The first Greek switch, ὑμῖν ἐν γούνασι κεῖται (literally 'it rests on your knees'), is based on a formulaic phrase occurring, for example, in the *Iliad* (Hom. *Il.* 17,514; 20,435). It occurs three more times in the manuscript. Two of these instances occur in other Christmas performances, in *Colloquium de Rhetorica* (f. 197r; Ὑμῖν γὰρ ἐπὶ γούνασι χεῖται [sic]; with a different preposition) and *Contention* (f. 346v; ὑμῶν ἐν γούνασι κεῖται; with the more expected genitive instead of the dative). In both cases, the phrase is directed at the audience, with a reference to granting the boys their holiday. The third occurrence is in a Lenten performance, *Crooke and Penkherst* (f. 116v; *Nec enim* σέθεν ἐπὶ γούνασι χεῖται [sic] *omnia* 'For all does not rest upon you'), where the phrase is used in an antagonistic context. The second switch is more obscure, due to its simple form. It seems nevertheless probable that the phrase stands for Δὶς καὶ τρὶς τὸ καλόν 'Good things [ought to be repeated] twice and thrice', which is another proverb discussed by Erasmus (*Adagia*, 149). What is multiplied here is the wish that the audience live long lives (in other words, it does not modify *additis annis pluribus*). For both switches, the same explanation applies as for many of the other quotations: they emphasize the common ground between the boys and their audience. These particular phrases, however, also resemble the case of Θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς (see 5.2.2.3) – a phrase which in fact occurs earlier in the same oration, as noted above – being perhaps closer to fixed phrases than to quotations with a single identifiable source. Furthermore, since there is a clustering of Greek switches in a single speech, they can be analysed at a more general level as a demonstration of the speaker's linguistic attainments (although again not as extensively as in the first oration of *The Papist Wife*).

The third oration contains a single switch into Greek, this time again close to the conclusion:

(80)   Nimium certè ocij non petimus. Vetat id Hesiodus noster dum sic præcipit, Μέτρα φυλάσσεσθαι. Καιρὸς δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος.

'Certainly we do not ask for too much leisure. Our Hesiod forbids it, when he commands thus: *Maintain due measure. Proportion is best in everything.*'

(*Pueri Captivi*, f. 146v)

As the speaker notes, the quotation is from Hesiod (Hes. *Op*. 694). An almost identical utterance occurs in *Contention* (f. 347v), which was probably performed some seven years later (assuming again that the texts are in the correct order); there the quotation occurs at the beginning rather than the end of an oration. This seems to be the only overlap between the two orations, meaning that the case is similar to certain extracts which appear in several Gunpowder Plot performances throughout the years. As for the function of the switch, the case is somewhat more complex than in the previous example, although here too the basic 'solidarity' explanation is valid. I have argued elsewhere (Mäkilähde 2018a: 312) for the following interpretation: the utterance as a whole aims on the one hand at assuring the audience that the boys are only asking for a moderate holiday, on the other at demonstrating that the boys are following the advice of an eminent authority. Both are basically negative politeness strategies (ibid.): the former is a case of 'minimizing R', the latter of 'indicating reluctance'. In addition to this negative politeness aspect, the utterance may also be compared with example (37), where it was implied that King James's values were (partly) drawn from ancient sources. There is thus also a positive self-face-enhancing aspect to the utterance.

The final two switches in the speech section occur in the fourth oration, clustered together similarly to example (79):

(81)   Ita nimirum ociosi ne simus exercemur hic quotidie in Gymnasio πολλα διδασκομενοι πολλα τε πασχομενοι. Quid loquar de prælectionum nostrarum apud præceptorem expositione, examinatione, repetitione? Nam evocati abs illo, Νὴ τὰς Μούσας, quàm accedimus trepidi, quàm aggredimur tremuli. Nisi teneamus enim ad amussim omnia, quis tam recens est qui non sat novit cætera?

'Thus, in order not to be idle, we truly exercise ourselves daily here in the school, *learning a lot and suffering a lot*. What ought I say about the exposition, examination, and repetition of our lessons in front of the teacher?

> For having been summoned by him, *by the muses* how anxious we approach,
> how trembling we begin. For if we do not know everything exactly, then –
> well, who is so green that he does not know what would happen?'[290]

(*Pueri Captivi*, f. 146v)

This is another extract which also occurs elsewhere in the manuscript; it is found in an almost identical form in *A World of Options* (f. 6v; in both cases the diacritics are missing from the first Greek switch), which was probably performed some five or six years prior to *Pueri Captivi*. As with the preceding example, this is the only overlap between the two orations in the two performances. Underlying the first switch is probably the quotation Γηράσκω δ' ἀεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος 'May I grow old always learning many things'. It can be found in the *Adagia* (760), where Erasmus also notes its occurrence in Plato, who attributes it to Solon. The quotation has been reworked here for humorous effect, bringing together studying and suffering, something which is in fact a constant feature in the Christmas performances (see e.g. Mäkilähde, Alho & Johnson 2016: 337–338; Mäkilähde 2018b: 466–468). For the joke to succeed, the audience would of course need to be familiar with the original phrase. The second switch is more obscure, although it is *prima facie* straightforward: it is an interjection and hence a predictable site for CS. Why this particular phrase has been used, however, is unclear, although it may be noted that evoking the muses would be an appropriate strategy in a schoolroom context. As above, the Greek switches also have the general consequence of demonstrating the speaker's academic level, at least to a certain extent.

Moving on to the dialogue, we find here an excellent representation of the switching strategies typical of an *Orationes* Christmas performance.[291] One schoolboy, Dan, encounters seven other boys one at a time, asking them what they aspire to be in the future, and for the most part ridiculing their choices. Most of the switches in the text are produced by Dan, although the first character he comes across, Herb, who hopes to become a clergyman, also produces one switch. The extract in example (82) is situated at the end of their conversation. Example (83) is from the beginning of a conversation with a boy who wants to become a lawyer:

(82) **Dan:** […] Farwel; take heed of Latine. Cave ne titubes, mandataq[ue] frangas ['Be careful that you do not stumble and break your commission'].

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[290] I interpret *hic* adverbially, although there is no circumflex on the word; note that for some reason there are no accents on any of the Greek words either. The passive form of πάσχω is non-Classical; the verb has an inherently passive meaning (cf. Lat. *patior*).

[291] For a list of extracts in the dialogue which have been drawn from Cotgrave (1655), see McEvilla (2016).

> **Herb:** But, Friend, remember, if you miss of your mark – Plus fati valet hora benigni Quàm si te Veneris commendet Epistola Marti ['A moment of benignant fate is of more avail to you than a letter of recommendation from Venus to Mars']. Therefore mock on. I, notwithstanding your scoffs, shall be constant to my first resolves.
>
> (*Pueri Captivi*, f. 147v)

(83) **Dan:** Farwel till then. – But who comes here peeping as if he studied to be an Ignoramus.
Rog: My bent is to the Law the worlds great light.

> (*Pueri Captivi*, f. 148r)

As might be expected, the verses in (82) derive from Classical sources. The first quotation is from Horace (Hor. *epist.* 1,13,19), the second from Juvenal (Iuv. 16,4–5). At layer 1, both switches can once more be analysed as in-group identity markers between the boys and the audience, but at layer 2 an explanation based on 'solidarity' would be quite incoherent. I have elsewhere analysed them as 'claiming authority' (Mäkilähde 2018a: 311), and pointed out that if the context were not a confrontational one, they would be instances of Brown and Levinson's 'generalized advice'. Claiming authority can further be analysed as positive self-face-enhancement, achieved by claiming common ground with a respected person. It is effectively an example of 'sharing' an aspect of one's face with someone else. Since the relevant authors are not mentioned explicitly in example (82), this is perhaps more a case of claiming common ground with 'ancient wisdom' in general. Finally, it may be noted that *mandata* should possibly be taken in the present context in the sense 'God's commandments' – a sense found in the Christian context but not relevant for Horace's original text. This would explain why this quotation in particular was chosen for the scene. The single-word switch *Ignoramus* in (83) may be compared to a similar case in (60), where reference was made to 'ignoramus juries'. Here too the word does not mean 'an ignorant person'; it is probably an allusion to George Ruggle's comedy *Ignoramus* (see 3.1.3.2 above), more precisely to its titular character, who happens to be a lawyer. The expression may hence be analysed as a mild insult.

The next example is particularly noteworthy due to the clustering of several switches of different kinds within a single long utterance, which takes place during a conversation with John, a lover of learning:

(84) **Dan:** Fool, hast thou so much learning, and yet hast forgot that scrap of Grammar Nihili, vel pro nihilo habentur literæ. Adeo ut sub palliolo plerunq[ue] sordido lateat sapientia ['Learning is considered worthless and

good for nothing. It is for this reason that wisdom often hides under a filthy cloak.']. But Scholars imagine any thing Concipiunt æthera mente ['They perceive the heavens in their mind.']. Imagination is their wealth: some of them would be poor else. It is impossible now to doe as Aristotle did once to Alexander: that is to fool great princes out of ten thousand talents to buy books. Nay the Virtuosi, notwithstanding all their miracles, haue not yet alotted to them ten thousand pounds per Annum

> Why art thou then so mad? why dost thou boast?
> Since from all study comes soe little roast.

Rure paterno est tibi far modicum ['You have a moderate crop at your father's farm.']. Get thee thither, and dream noe more of golden mountains. Thou hast wit enough to serve thy own turn. Bene vixit, qui bene latuit ['He has lived well who has hidden well.']. Farwel my pale Philosopher.

<div align="right">(Pueri Captivi, f. 148v)</div>

The extract contains three different types of switches: five main clauses, one PP, and one single lexeme. The shorter switches, *per Annum* and *Virtuosi*, were discussed briefly in 3.1.3.1 above: both were analysed as 'grey area' cases between switching and borrowing. The explanation for their use, however, does not depend on their CS status; in either case, both expressions can be considered special terms, although again more amenable to a norm-based than to a 'gap' explanation. The longer units are all quotations: *Nihili, vel pro nihilo habentur literæ* comes from one part of the school grammar, namely the syntax (Lily 1672: 120), where it is used as an example. *Sub palliolo plerunque sordido lateat sapientia* is a proverb, mentioned at least by Cicero (Cic. *Tusc*. 3,56) and found for example in the *Sententiae Pueriles* (Culmann 1639: 28; slightly different form). *Concipiunt æthera mente* is from Ovid (Ov. *met*. 1,777). *Rure paterno est tibi far modicum* is originally from Persius (Pers. 3,24–25), but a more immediate source is once more the Latin syntax (Lily 1672: 140). Finally, *Bene vixit, qui bene latuit* is again from Ovid, although from a different work than the other quotation (Ov. *trist*. 3,4,25).

This example provides an exceptionally good demonstration of the type of composition which was practised in grammar schools, and which people would later on apply in their other writing (although not perhaps to such an extreme degree): although the phrases have all been borrowed from somewhere, they have been combined in a creative manner. For example, the author draws a connection between the first two quotations, presenting the latter as a consequence of the former. The final quotation repeats the notion of concealment introduced in the second one, while the third quotation effectively rephrases the idea expressed in *Scholars imagine any thing* (which is one of the extracts borrowed from Cotgrave 1655; see McEvilla 2016). At layer 1, these familiar quotations clearly serve as in-group markers, while

at layer 2 Dan seems to be parodying the discourse of a learned person by using an abundance of Latin quotations. The whole utterance hence counts as an FTA towards John's positive face.

The next boy to be encountered by Dan is Charles, who hopes to become a statesman:

(85)   **Dan:** [...] Therefore Γνῶθι σεαυτὸν ['know yourself'] is counsell from Heaven. He that is a Politician is hardly to be trusted.

<div align="right">(Pueri Captivi, f. 149r)</div>

The maxim Γνῶθι σεαυτόν is a common proverb, mentioned by several ancient authors and also discussed by Erasmus (*Adagia*, 595). The function of the quotation is similar to those in example (82), although here the phrase may be used more as generalized advice than as claiming authority, mainly since this is a genuine piece of advice. The relevance of the quotation has been foreshadowed in what precedes, whereas Dan notes that politicians *strive to know others more than themselves* (f. 148v). The same phrase also occurs as a Greek switch in a Latin oration in *Hardress and Fortrye* (f. 445v), though in a more antagonistic context.

The final two switches occur close to each other; the first addressed to Ric, who is interested in travelling, the second to Will, who is considering entering the university:

(86)   **Dan:** Then take heed your experience make you not sad. I had rather haue a fool at home to make me merry, then experience to make me sad, and travel for it too. Farwel monsieur Traveller – Whither so fast?
Will: To Englands Athens, the University that mother of arts & sciences.
Dan: A journey to good purpose if it be ad capiendum ingenii cultum ['to receive education'].

<div align="right">(Pueri Captivi, f. 149r)</div>

The title *monsieur* was discussed briefly in connection with example (58) above in 5.2.2.4; here the choice is perhaps more apt, since it is used in reference to someone who travels to foreign countries. At another level, however, the choice is explained simply by noting that the extract has been adapted from Cotgrave (1655; see McEvilla 2016); the switch is thus a neutral anticipated consequence. The Latin phrase is once again a partial quotation drawn from the syntax of the school grammar. Why it has been chosen here becomes evident when we consider the full phrase in its original context:

(87)   Verbis significantibus motum ad locum apponitur proprium loci in Accusativo; ut, *Concessi Cantabrigiam ad capiendum ingenii cultum*.

'With verbs signifying motion to a place, the place-name is put in the accusative, as *I went to Cambridge to receive education*.'

(Lily 1672: 141)

The boys and their audience would, of course, have immediately recognized the source of the phrase. In fact, to anyone unfamiliar with Lily's grammar, the utterance would in itself be clear, but the reason for switching would remain obscure. When these kind of partial quotations are used, a 'solidarity' function seems to explain the switch at layer 1 particularly well. At layer 2, one would have to assume that the characters are also aware of the original source, but here the main function seems again to be along the lines of generalized advice.

Finally, the Latin epilogue contains a few more Greek switches, all within one sentence:

(88)   Sub vestro nempe benevolorum patrocinio rectè ὀρθογραφεῖν; verè ἐτυμολογεῖν; λόγων διαίρεσιν συνταττεῖν; et quale quale προσωδειν quovis die diligentius docemur.

'Certainly, it is under your patronage that we are diligently taught every day *to orthographize* correctly, *to etymologize* truly, *to arrange the division of words*, and *to pronounce* anything at all.'

(*Pueri Captivi*, f. 149v)

The technical terms referring to the four parts of Grammar (orthography, etymology, syntax, and prosody) are Greek in origin. They are hence straightforward to analyse; the point of the utterance is to say that the boys are being taught all aspects of grammar. It is also probable that λόγων διαίρεσιν has been used as a term in the schoolroom, although I have not located instances of this phrase in the elementary grammars. It may be noted, finally, that both *rectè* ὀρθογραφεῖν and *verè* ἐτυμολογεῖν constitute puns, since the Latin translation for ὀρθογραφία provided in Lily's grammar is *recte scribendi ratio* (Lily 1672: 1; see also below), while the word ἐτυμολογία is explained as follows: *Componitur autem ab* ἔτυμος *verus*, & λόγος *sermo* 'It consists indeed of *etymos* 'true' and *logos* 'speech'', with a further reference to Cicero's translation of the word as *veriloquium* (Lily 1672: 7).[292] For one reason or another, similar puns have not been introduced for the other terms.

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[292]   The puns become more obvious when the expressions are translated quite literally: 'to correctly write correctly' and 'to truthfully truth-speak'.

5.2.3.3 *Sectiones Horatianae*

Sectiones Horatianae consists of a Latin prologue and epilogue, a single Latin oration, a fairly long Latin dialogue, and a shorter English dialogue. Most of the switches occur in the English dialogue, a few in the Latin one, and the following two in the oration:

(89) Tu condiscipulos ex durissimo hoc, si ita loqui licet, literarum ergastulo miserè nimis, heu! nimis diu, et miserè vexatos liberas. Tu captivos redimis, redemptos reficis; refectos deniq[ue] omnium fælicissimos efficis. Iam verò cum Tòν φιλέοντα φιλεῖν jubet Hesiodus: ob tot, et tanta in nos beneficia tua, quibus te laudibus efferemus?

'You liberate schoolfellows from this harsh (if one may say so) penitentiary of learning, where they have been wretchedly tormented for too long, oh too long. You release captives, repair the released, and make the repaired at last the happiest of all. Now, truly, when Hesiod orders *to love the one who loves*: for so many and so great services you have granted us, with which praises shall we exalt you?'

(*Sectiones Horatianae*, f. 171r)

(90) Nullus, ὡς ἔπος ειπεῖν, mensis est in quo lecta non relegimus, audita memoriter non repetimus;

'There is *practically* not a single month when we do not go through again what we have read or repeat from memory what we have heard.'

(*Sectiones Horatianae*, f. 171v)

In (89), the speaker is praising the forthcoming holiday. As he notes, the Greek phrase is a quotation from Hesiod (Hes. *Op*. 353); the point is that the boys should show love for the holiday by praising it, since the holiday is a time which, as it were, shows them kindness. As in some of the other examples above, the present case can be interpreted as an instance of generalized advice; this time, however, the advisee is not another character but the boys themselves. The case is also similar to example (80), where a quotation from Hesiod was used to imply that the boys draw their values from these eminent authors (i.e. it would be a case of face-enhancement). In example (90) the Greek switch is not a quotation but a formulaic phrase, used to soften an expression with an absolute or superlative meaning. The explanation for its use probably ought to be a norm-based one, as in the case of phrases such as *prima facie*, *qua*, or *mutatis mutandis* in academic discourse.

The Latin dialogue takes the form of a discussion between a monitor and four other boys. Most of it focuses on Horace's *Ars poetica*: the students repeat sections of the poem and provide a commentary on each section, with the monitor sometimes asking further questions or helping the boys when they are unable to analyse the text.[293] The text is based on a sixteenth century edition and commentary on Horace by Jodocus Badius.[294] There are two short switches into Greek:

(91) **Dis[cipulus] 1:** [...] Sed Poetria ἐν τῷ μιμεῖσθαι magnopere consistit.

'**Pupil 1:** […] But poetry consists to a great degree *in imitation*.'

(*Sectiones Horatianae*, f. 172v)

(92) **Dis[cipulus] 3:** [...] Tragicos poetas (quibus Τράγος, id est Hircus, erat præmium) ut salibus, et jocis urbanis populum voluptati indulgentem detinerent, Satyras induxisse, ne quicunq[ue] Deus, aut Heros introducatur humiliter, aut nimis altè loquatur:

'**Pupil 3:** […] In order to occupy the people fond of pleasure with the wits and jests of townsfolk, the tragic poets (whose prize was a *tragos*, that is, a goat) brought in satyrs, so that no god or hero would be introduced in a base manner or speak in too lofty a manner.'

(*Sectiones Horatianae*, f. 177v)

The switch in (92) is the simpler of the two to explain: the same excerpt occurs in Badius's commentary (1543: 156r), and at one level of analysis the switch is thus a neutral anticipated consequence. As for the function of the switch – which also applies to the original work – it may be noted that although Horace mentions the goat as a prize (Hor. *ars* 220), he does not refer to it by the Greek word. The addition of the switch serves to draw an etymological connection between the goat and tragic poets, while the reiteration of the term in Latin both connects the comment to Horace's text and facilitates understanding for anyone unfamiliar with Greek. The switch in (91) is less straightforward, since it does not seem to come from Badius. Τὸ μιμεῖσθαι may be considered a technical term similar to μίμησις (cf. e.g. Arist.

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[293] Neither Hoole nor Brinsley mentions *Ars Poetica* explicitly, which may be simply due to the fact that none of Horace's works is mentioned separately in the two books. It is recommended as suitable reading material for gentlemen by Ascham (1570: 20r). It is also mentioned explicitly in, for example, the Dorchester Free School statutes (*Dorchester Statutes*, f. 7v). In general, it was a well-known text in early modern Europe (see e.g. Moss 1999), studied in Britain by Ben Jonson in particular. For Jonson and his interest in Horace, see e.g. Pierce (1981).

[294] This was pointed out to me by Jyri Vaahtera.

Poet. 1447a); although there were Latin terms available (e.g. *imitatio*), the Greek term would probably have been introduced to the students at some point during their studies. It is also possible that the phrase was taken from some particular source, but I have been unable to identify any likely candidate.

The English dialogue consists of a conversation between two boys who have just listened to the Latin performance and are now commenting on Horace's moral message. Most of the switches which occur in the dialogue are lines from the *Ars poetica*, although there are also some quotations from other sources. Example (93) gives the opening utterances of the dialogue:

(93) **Will:** Wee haue had here a long ribble, bibble, bable De arte Poetica ['on the art of poetry']: tedious I believe to the company: and which my mother wit will never reach; much less thy block head, Dan. I had rather be at my cakes, and ale. Efficit egregios nobilis Alla viros ['Noble ale produces excellent men']. And therefore cheer up, cheer up. For this day begins the Scholars Saturnalia. What? droop on a Feast day? Fye, fye. Away with it. Tis wormwood.

Dan: O Will, those usefull rules, which but lately wee heard, doe soe reflect upon my former negligence that I cannot but cry out with that time-abusing Truant, O mihi præteritos referat si Iupiter annos ['oh, if Jupiter gave me back those lost years']! Besides, that Distich of Horace sticks close upon my heart. Namely,

> Qui cupit optatam vitæ contingere metam
> Multa tulit, fecitq[ue] puer, sudavit, et alsit
> ['Who wishes to attain a pleasant goal in life
> Has suffered and done a lot as a boy, sweated and frozen.']

[...]

You, Will, I confess are ever desirous – Vitae contingere metam ['to reach a goal in life']. But I pray what is it, except Sloth, Pleasure, and Rambling. Having quite forgot

> Multa tulit, fecitq[ue] puer, sudavit, et alsit
> Abstinuit vino; atque aliis quæ dicere nolo.
> ['Has endured and accomplished much as a boy, sweated and frozen,
> Abstained from wine, and from other things I wish not so say.']

(*Sectiones Horatianae*, ff. 182r–v)

To begin with, the first switch obviously refers to the longer title of Horace's work, *De arte poetica liber/epistula*; it has, however, been integrated in an interesting manner into the clause by making it dependent on the NP *ribble, bibble, bable*; it may be analysed as word-play. The next switch, *Efficit egregios nobilis Alla viros*,

is a quotation, originating from Richard Brathwaite's *Barnabae itinerarium* (1636), a humorous rhyming verse travelogue also published in English (the phrase appears on the title page). Although the function of the quotation is quite clear – it provides justification for Will wanting to get to his ale and cakes – it is unclear whether the quotation was familiar to the boys from the original work or whether it had occurred in some other source.

The next switches occur in Dan's utterance; all of them are quotations. The first line is from the *Aeneid* (Verg. *Aen.* 8,560), while the other extracts are from Horace (Hor. *ars* 412–414). Although I have suggested previously (Mäkilähde 2018a: 310) that these can be assigned the 'solidarity' explanation discussed above, this is only part of their function. As the full utterance indicates, the Horatian lines have made an impression on Dan, meaning that the quotation serves to convey something about his values, similar to the Hesiod quotations discussed above. At the end of the example, the lines are used to reproach Will – in other words to perform an FTA. It is worth noting that the final verse has been modified from the original, where it begins *abstinuit venere et vino* 'has abstained from sex and wine'; the original form is found in the Latin dialogue (f. 181r).

The next set of switches is produced by Will:

(94)   **Will:** I think soe too. And thy plump cheeks, though they haue noe Ben: Iohnson's belly, nor judicious great head De arte Poetica ['of the art of poetry'], yet give that contumelious slander the lye to their teeth that made it. Sed pono Tigillinum ['But I am describing Tigellinus'].

  Nam galeatum sero duelli
 Pænitet. Experiar quid comedatur [sic] in illos
 Quorum Flaminia tegitur cinis, atq[ue] Latina.
 ['For having put on the helmet, it is too late to regret
 Going to war. I shall try and find out what one may say about those
 Whose ashes are covered by Via Flaminia and Via Latina.']

And therefore I tell thee I am angry with the Poet, whom our ffelows, even ad nauseam usq[ue] ['all the way to the point of sickness'], have canted into peices concerning the Τò πρέπον ['propriety'] of Epick poems, Elegyes, Satyrs, Comedies, and other Whim whams, and trifles.[295]

(*Sectiones Horatianae*, f. 182v)

The first switch is the same as in (93). The next two are both quotations from Juvenal's first satire (Iuv. 1,155; 1,169–171; the first line has been changed from 2.p.sg. imperative to 1.p.sg. indicative); Tigellinus was close to Nero, and in the

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[295]   *Comedatur* pro *concedatur* is probably a scribal error.

poem the gist of this section is that if one writes satire about the wrong people, and those people happen to be alive, they may retaliate violently. This is in effect an insult directed at Dan, but achieved through a conversational implicature, namely by flouting the Maxims of Quality and Manner. This, however, does not soften the FTA but arguably makes it worse. The three verses which follow are from the end of the poem; the point is to assert that it is safer to write satire about people who are long since dead. This quotation serves to justify Will's switching his target from Dan to Horace, as the latter cannot retaliate: it serves not only as face-work (by giving reasons for S's actions) but also links the two pieces of discourse together by a cohesive tie. The next switch into Latin, *ad nauseam usque*, is a formulaic phrase (i.e. amenable to a norm-based explanation), while the Greek τὸ πρέπον is a technical term from the philosophical domain (see e.g. Cic. *off.* 1,93; he translates it with the Latin *decorum*); here its meaning is basically 'what is proper for these subtypes of poetry'. It may be noted that this is another case of 'double morphology', or syntagmatic 1M2F, due to the two articles (*the* and τό); the Greek article has apparently been reanalysed as part of the noun.

The next cluster of switches occurs in the two utterances which immediately follow (94), while the example in (96) is another 'grey area' case, counted here as a switch into French:

(95) **Dan:** Yet, Will, – Ridentem dicere verum, Quid vetat? ['What forbids one to state the truth while laughing?'] – The age, & men must know their faults either by mild, or satyrick penns. And thou being a Truant art a fitt subject for the tartest Satyr. And therefore what canst thou say to that of the Poet, Multa tulit, fecitq[ue] puer, sudavit, et alsit ['He has suffered and done a lot when still a boy, sweated and frozen'].
Will: All that I can say, Dan, is: Multa tuli vapulando; multa feci non faciendo; multum alsi nihil agendo ['I have suffered a lot by getting spanked, I have done a lot by not doing things, I have sweated a lot by doing nothing']. And for this, and other my merits madam Birch, not only a horse-leech; but a coltleech, a boy-leech hath sucked out my bloud. But yet not all my knavish exploits. For according to the Poet
Non missura cutem nisi plena cruoris hirudo
['A leech which will not let go of the skin unless full of blood']
(*Sectiones Horatianae*, f. 183r)

(96) **Dan:** But what wilt thou doe when thou comest to Cambridge, or Oxford being an ignorant dunce?
Will: Troth, Dan, as other dunces doe. For my father made mee a Parson before I was born. And an Advouson was purchased then.

<div align="right">(Sectiones Horatianae, f. 183r)</div>

The first quotation is once more from Horace, but this time from his collection of satires (Hor. *sat*. 1,1,24–25). As can be deduced from the context, the function of the quotation is to provide justification for satire in general – the same function which it has in Horace's text. It is similar to the quotations in (82), where they were used to 'claim authority' and occurred in a similarly confrontational context. The next quotation has already occurred twice in the same dialogue; the implication is the same as in (93), namely that Will has not done any of these things, thus constituting an FTA. Will's reply is meant as a rebuttal, arguing that he has in fact done all these things, although not in the way meant by Dan – *multa feci non faciendo* probably refers to him committing offences by refraining from doing what he ought to have done. At layer 1, Will's reply in particular is clearly used to humorous effect, although at layer 2 it is in Goffman's terms a defensive face-work strategy. The final quotation is the last line of *Ars poetica* (Hor. *ars*. 476), used here to humorously characterize the constant beatings Will receives from the teacher (note the foreshadowing by comparing the teacher's rod to a leech). Finally, *advouson* (see *OED* 3, s.v. *advowson* for spelling variants) here refers to a guarantee bought for Will, whereby he would be given a parish once he graduates from university. It is a technical term and hence amenable to a 'gap' explanation; its choice is also conditioned by the religious domain referred to in the example.

5.2.3.4   *Discipuli et Rustici* (Part 1)

Discipuli et Rustici is structurally the most complex of all the *Orationes* performances, as well as perhaps the most interesting as far as multilingualism is concerned. The performance consists of English and Latin prologues, a short English dialogue, a short bilingual verse section, a very short English verse oration, a long bilingual dialogue, and a Latin epilogue. I discuss the performance in two parts: the main bilingual dialogue is analysed in section 5.3.1, where I comment not only on CS but also on the use of address forms in the play. Here I focus on the rest of the performance, namely the prologues and the epilogue, the verse section, and the shorter dialogue which precedes the main performance. This dialogue is similar to those found in the other performances discussed in 5.2.3, while the longer one is in many ways an outlier. The first switches occur in the English prologue:

> (97)   Wee strictly charge, and command by vertue of a Noun Substantive statute
> which is not, nor ever was seen, felt, heard, or understood. That noe manner
> of person whatsoever, whether of Town, or Country, within the confines of
> this House call'd in latine Domus ['house'], that brings with him a touch of a

little precious thing call'd Bonitas ['goodness'], presume to lay his hand, which in latine wee call, Manus ['hand'], upon any book, or written paper whether Greek, or Latine, unless he be able to understand it by himselfe, and requireth not another man to be joyned with him, to shew him the reason, or signification.

(*Discipuli et Rustici*, f. 279v)

To anyone not familiar with Lily's grammar, the puns in this section will make little sense. The English version of the grammar, beginning with the eight parts of speech, describes the noun as follows: "A Noune is the name of a thing that may be seen, felt, heard, or understood: as the name of my hand in Latine, is *manus*; the name of an house, is *domus*; the name of goodlie, is *bonitas*. [...] A Noune Substantive is that standeth by himself, and requireth not another word to be joyned with him to shew his signification" (Lily 1653; cf. Gwosdek 2013: 161). The whole utterance is an instance of in-group humour, enhancing the face of both S and H (the audience).[296] As for the actual switches, two of them are presented with translations, in imitation of the grammar text. At one level of analysis the switches are 'by-products', since the choice of words depends on the text in Lily's grammar; in terms of function, on the other hand, they can be analysed as facilitating discourse, or making the joke possible in the first place, similarly to the way in which switching languages enables one to produce a quotation in recognizable form (see 4.3.1 above).

The rest of the switches occur in the short dialogue. Most of them are individual lexemes or short phrases, as in the following:

(98) **Sec[undus]:** Soe active a boldness runns through my veins, that I durst now safely presume to leap into my Masters storehouse of rods naked.
Ter[tius]: Bravely spoken. For my own part, if the Monitor, or Claviger should come with a Habeas corpus to arrest the intrincecaliticks of my breeches about a matter of petty lashonye; hang me, if I doe not kick the rogue to Attomes.
Pri[mus]: A poor revenge that. Give him rather the Schoole strapadoe.
Sec[undus]: Noe, noe. That's too easie a punishment. Take such a slave, and first hang him up; then disrobe his podex, then claw his breech with a peice of Qui mihi.[297]

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[296] Cf. the following pun in Thomas Heywood's *A Challenge for beautie* (1636: G1v): "*Bona*. Was she seene? *Cent.* Yes seene, and felt, and heard, and understood, We found her a Noune Substantive", or the following one in *Basileia* (f. 39v): "what will you make of me, but three quarters of a Noun? ha! I can be seen, felt, heard, but I can't be understood".

[297] *Intrincecaliticks of my breeches* = 'the inner part of my trousers' (i.e. the buttocks); *lashonye* = 'remiss'; *strapadoe* = a specific kind of torture.

(*Discipuli et Rustici*, f. 280r)

Apart from *Monitor* and *Claviger*, discussed above, the relevant switches here are *Habeas corpus*, *podex*, and *Qui mihi*. The first, a 'grey area' case, can be analysed as a technical term used due to a 'gap'. The phrase refers to a writ ordering someone to appear before the court; here it is used humorously, in referring to monitors ordering younger boys to report to the teacher for punishment. It also occurs in one Oak Apple Day performance, *A Mender of Soles* (f. 78v), although there with a reference to how one may be released from prison by the writ (*without any hope of a Habeas corpus*). *Podex* is similarly an unclear case, but its function is different: it is used as a euphemism for 'buttocks' and may thus be interpreted as an off-record politeness strategy (see Brown & Levinson 1987: 216).[298] *Qui mihi* is similar to the *Propria quae maribus* type phrases discussed above; it refers to Lily's moral poem (*Carmen de moribus*) appended for example to some versions of his grammar, beginning with the words *Qui mihi discipulus Puer es* ('You, boy, who are my pupil') (see e.g. Lily 1653). The implication is basically that the monitor ought to be spanked with a grammar book, and the reference serves as an in-group joke.

The following extract contains one further 'grey area' case, *Nonplus* 'state of inability' – which probably ought to be accounted for by a simple norm-based explanation – as well as one longer Latin insertion. The longer switch consists of reported speech; the choice of language is the one the boy would have used in the original situation (i.e. in the classroom), namely Latin:

(99) **Pri[mus]:** How now Madcap? How many such slips out of the Schoole can you afford for a Tester?
Quar[tus]: Faith not many. My wits were almost at a Nonplus in making this one.   **Sec[undus]:** Why, man?
Quar[tus]: Why? I haue worne my lipps almost thredbare in kissing my hands that they might keep a mannerly proportion with my leggs: and was fain to screw my face, and gird my neck so long till my very eyes began to piss tears. At last, after many a cringe at a lamentable acclamation of Quæso, Præceptor, da mihi veniam abeundi mictum ['Please, teacher, give me leave to go urinate'], the honest man in black gave me a nodd, and out came Pilgarlick.[299]

(*Discipuli et Rustici*, f. 280v)

[298]   The phrase *disrobe his podex* may have been derived from Ben Jonson's *Every Man in his Humour*.
[299]   *Madcap* = 'reckless person, idiot'; *pilgarlick* = 'poor me'.

The next set of switches is again derived from the grammatical domain, namely from the rudiments of grammar:

(100) **Quar[tus]:** Noe matter. I'll put it to hazard. This martyrdome of books is a great device contra Omne quod exit in um seu Græcum, sive Latinum ['against everything that ends in *-um*, whether Greek or Latin'].

Ter[tius]: Will it not be a brave sport to see the eight parts of speech dance Sallingers round in the middle of a fire?

Sec[undus]: Incomparable. Oh how I shall laugh to see the Masculine and Feminine gender commit fornication one o'th' top of the other without any distinction of Hic or Hæc.

Pri[mus]: 'Twill be wonderfull to hear alsoe what a houling the Interjections of sorrow will keep.

Sec[undus]: Oh! How your Adverbs will swear, and curse, as by Pol, Ædepol, Hercle, and Mediusfidius too.

(*Discipuli et Rustici*, f. 280v–281r)

As we observe, the boys are making puns based on basic grammatical concepts. The first switch is a reference to a rule under *Propria quae maribus*; the phrase refers to words of the neuter gender:

(101) Attamen ex cunctis quæ diximus antè notandum,
Omne quod exit in *um*, seu Græcum, sive Latinum,
Esse genus neutrum; sic invariabile nomen.

'But of all those which we mentioned before it is to be noted
That all which end in *-um*, whether Greek or Latin,
Are of the neuter gender, and hence invariable nouns.'

(Lily 1672: 12)

The point has apparently been to choose some recognizable phrase from Lily; this particular one does not seem to serve the aim better than any other. There is, for example, nothing about neuters or words ending in *-um* which would be relevant in the present context. The topic of gender, however, is continued by another pupil, who jokingly says that when the grammars are burned there will be no distinction between the masculine and feminine, referred to by the two demonstrative pronouns *hic* and *haec* ('this'). Finally, the list of words in the final utterance is found in this exact order under 'Adverbs of swearing' in the English version of Lily's grammar (Lily 1653). It is noteworthy that the switches are only one element of the punning, with other similar jokes made without any Latin insertions (e.g. the interjections of

sorrow, such as *heu* and *hei*, crying out in sorrow). This 'division of labour' between different discourse strategies will be discussed further in section 5.3.

The final switches all involve the same lexeme, this time not derived from the schoolroom context, but functioning again as part of a pun:

(102) **Pri[mus]:** Stay, Tony what day call wee next Thursday?

Quar[tus]: O Sapientia forsooth.

Sec[undus]: I am sorry there is so little of sapientia ['wisdom'] in the world that it can christen but one day in a whole year.

Pri[mus]: Marry whom may wee thank for that but only the fantastical Robinson. Who like an Ass put it amongst his cropear'd Heteroclites. And ever since it wanted its plural number.

Ter[tius]: More knave he. For take my word Sapientia came of a good parentage[300]

(*Discipuli et Rustici*, f. 281r)

The main joke about there being too little wisdom in the world to name more days after it is made fully explicit, but the humour goes beyond this simple observation. *O Sapientia* refers to the first of the 'O' antiphons sung in the last seven days of advent; the date referred to is hence 17 December. This switch is a 'grey area' case, since it is in effect a proper noun. The next two occurrences of *sapientia*, however, are clear cases of Latin, although in the latter one the word is again treated humorously as a proper noun. The heteroclites mentioned by another pupil refer to the part of grammar on irregular nouns titled *De nominibus heteroclitis*, where *sapientia* is listed among words which rarely occur in the plural (Lily 1672: 30). The work is variably attributed to either Rob. Robinson or Thomas Robertson in early modern versions, but these probably refer to the same person.

Lastly, I mention the section following this dialogue (and technically part of it), where two students present verses, one in English, the other in Latin. The section takes the form of six alternating stanzas (ff. 281v–282r; the format is English-Latin-English-Latin-English-Latin): the English stanzas consist of six lines of rhyming iambic pentameter, the Latin of three elegiac couplets – both are, in other words, typical of the language in question, and the alternation is hence not restricted solely to language. This is obviously a poetic device in itself; from a linguistic point of view, the basic explanation for the switching would therefore be the conventions of this particular domain.

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[300]   *Fantastical* = 'irrational'; *cropear'd* = 'which have had their ears cropped as punishment'; *More knave he*, i.e. *more knave than a fool*.

5.2.3.5 *Grammaticae Partes I*

Grammaticae Partes I begins with an English dialogue, followed by a prologue, a set of six orations, a verse section, and an epilogue in Latin. Most of the switches occur in the English dialogue, with a few Greek insertions in the orations. The dialogue is thematically somewhat similar to the one in *Discipuli et Rustici*, as one boy, Sam, complains about the difficulties of learning grammar, while other boys serve in the dialogue basically to set the stage for his rants on particular topics. The first switches occur right at the beginning of the text:

> (103) **J[emmy]:** How now Sam? What all amort ['spiritless']?
> **S[am]:**   Ah, Jemmy, not only amort; but pene mortuus ['almost dead']. For I am almost dead, and buried under the sad thoughts of my tormentor. A thing which is worser then death Grammer, Jemmy, Grammer.
>
> (*Grammaticae Partes I*, f. 319r)

The switches are (*all*) *amort*, a corrupted version of the French *à la mort* (*OED* 2, s.v. *amort*), and the Latin *pene mortuus*. In Jemmy's utterance, the phrase *all amort* is a 'grey area' case, while in Sam's utterance *amort* becomes more of an FFI due to its juxtaposition with semantically equivalent expressions in Latin and English: *amort*, *pene mortuus*, *almost dead*. The reiterative switching is used here to provide iconic emphasis for how tired Sam is (cf. an expression such as *It's done, over with, finished, finito*).[301] As noted above, emphasis is one of the basic functions of reiteration identified in previous research, together with clarification. The French phrase also occurs in *The Ring of Giges* (f. 268v; *allamort*), *Naked Truth* (f. 310r; *all a mort*), and *Thomas Teltroth* (f. 335r); it is in all contexts a 'grey area' case.

Although the following example contains no CS, it sets the stage for the rest of the dialogue, and at the same time reveals crucial information about the composition of these texts:

> (104) **J[emmy]:** Why, Sam, Grammar is of good use; and will teach us to speak, & write well.
> **S[am]:** But I coul'd speak, and write, when I was at Hamburgh; before I came under the torments of Noun, Pronoun, Verb, Participle, Adverb, Conjunction, Præposition, Interjection. Words I think invented to break a poor childs heart. I am sure I had none of those torments at Hamburgh. I was only taught to put Dutch into Latine, and Latine into Dutch without these whimsies of Noun,

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[301]   Example (103) and similar cases of reiterative switching are also discussed in Harjunpää & Mäkilähde (2016: 185–193).

and Pronoun, and the rest, those plagues of a poor Scholar, who cannot abide to speak but naturally, or as our Mothers taught us.[302]

(*Grammaticae Partes I*, f. 319r)

This is a remarkable extract because (as pointed out to me by Peter Henderson; see also *1660–1749 Register*) the Sam in the text must in fact be one Samuel Missenden, who was a King's Scholar at the time, and whose father was most probably another Samuel Missenden, who was part of the Merchant Adventurers in Hamburg. It is quite plausible to suggest that Sam's role was played by himself, and that he was one of the authors, adding comments about his personal experiences. This fact would be fully coherent with the supposition that the boys took a hand in composing the performances, which was the interpretation argued for above.

We encounter the next switches when Sam complains about difficulties in learning the nouns:

(105)   **S[am]:** Fah! Fah! As for Number, though they call it Singular, or Plural, it hath brought upon mee innumerable troubles. And for your Cases, when I consider their signes A, The, Of, To, The, For, From, By, and Than, I am brought to a plain Delirium. That I can only say parce, O Magister! Parce O Magister! ['Mercy, teacher! Mercy, teacher!']
J[emmy]: But, Sam, what think you of the Genders?
S[am]: O Jemmy, They have engender'd so much trouble in my soul, that ingeminating Hic hæc hoc ['this'], I haue brought upon mee such a terrible Hiccough, that I cannot rest, nor sleep in the night. And I must begg the help of some good Doctor, lest I Hic hæc hoc myselfe into worse than nothing. For they still stick in my stomach, and are ready to stiffle mee.

(*Grammaticae Partes I*, f. 319r–v)

(106)   **S[am]:** [...] And my Mother, who alwaies nourished mee with Surrops, white bread, and brown Coken (which in England wee call Gengerbread) I am afraid will never see mee more.

(*Grammaticae Partes I*, f. 319v)

The first switch is framed as reported speech, making it similar to *Quæso, Præceptor* in (99) above. Since, however, the topic is the declension of nouns, and there has already been some punning ('innumerable troubles' caused by the singular and plural numbers), what we have here may be an allusion to the occurrence of *magister* as an example word in Lily's grammar (1653), in both the section on cases and the one on

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[302]   Note that here *Dutch* possibly means 'German' (cf. *Pennsylvania Dutch*); the Merchant Adventurers at Hamburg did, however, have close ties to Holland.

the second declension, an example of the vocative as *o magister*. As for the second switch, *hic hæc hoc*, it is obviously meant to pun on *hiccough*; in both cases, the switch is what enables the joke or allusion to be made in the first place – it is not the language or the switch as such which serves as the source for humour. The word *Coken* in (106) is quite the opposite: here it is the language itself and not the meaning of the word that is relevant. It is not quite clear whether the word is supposed to be German (i.e. *Kuchen*) or Dutch (*koeken*); the translation as 'gingerbread' may suggest a specific type of cake, pudding, or biscuit. Note that for the function of providing a reference to Sam's time in Hamburg, it is enough that the audience recognize the word as an FFI. They would not even have to understand its exact meaning, due to the English translation, which probably serves here to clarify the switch.

The next switches occur when the discussion moves on to verbs:

(107) **Jo[ck]:** But methinks, Sam, the Verb is very easy.

S[am]: Easye doe you call it? Personal, Impersonal. I am sure tædet ['it wearies'] it irketh is all the comfort I haue received yet. As for your Actives, Passives, Neuters, Deponents, and Commons, Multa mihi impegerunt verbera ['they have forced many floggings upon me']. Which I feel yet. As for your Moods, I have oftentimes been in a sad one. The Indicative of my body can shew reasons not false, but true, when they have commanded impossible things, that I have been oftentimes in the Optative mood; and wished myselfe rather a Tinker, than a Scholar; or rather a Musitian that requireth no more latine then Non possum ['I cannot'] to get a Degree of Doctor; and be honoured with a damask gown only for saying Sol La Me Fa Sol La

(*Grammaticae Partes I*, f. 319v)

The phrase *tædet it irketh* is derived as a single unit from Lily's grammar (1653), where it serves as an example of impersonal verbs, together with *oportet.* In other words, we have here another pun. The second switch, *Multa mihi impegerunt verbera*, is not from the grammar book; the most plausible explanation is a pun on the different types of verbs (*verba*) listed here – actives, passives, and so on – and the word *verber* 'lash'. The coherence of this explanation is enhanced by the fact that essentially the same joke appears several times throughout the manuscript, for example in *A World of Options* (f. 5v), *Disputatio de Re Publica* (f. 100r), *Crooke and Penkherst* (f. 117v), *Pueri Captivi* (f. 144v), *Gibson and Ienken* (f. 207v), and *Missenden and Waterman* (f. 236r). The third switch, *Non possum*, is a fixed formula typically used in its plural form *Non possumus*, indicating an inability to do something on the part of the speaker(s). Here it is used as an insult.

The last switches occur at the conclusion of the dialogue:

(108) **J[emmy]:** But what think you of the Participle, Adverb, Conjunction, Præposition, and Interjection?

Sam: I think no better of them then Hui, vah, apagete ['Ho! Ah! Away with you!']

Jo[ck]: Therefore, Sam, I think it vain to talk to thee of Concordance, and governance, who art at discord with thyselfe, and soe far from government.

J[emmy]: But, Sam, be patient a little. Wee hope to enjoy not long hence a release from our troubles, a remedy, and fat Ocium.

S[am]: Say you soe, Boyes?

J[emmy]: But be you quiet, say nothing, whilst our Orators are pleading for our release from this our Purgatory.

S[am]: If soe, then peace: and wee hope to catch a mouse. Retire and be gone in silence. But I am afraid of that old saying Parturiunt montes nascetur rediculus mus ['The mountains are in labour: a silly mouse is born'].

J[emmy]: However let us retire in silence. Perhaps their oratorie may doe us some good, and send us the luck of an happy ocium.

(*Grammaticae Partes I*, ff. 319v–320r)

The first switch is a list of different types of interjections, all found in Lily's grammar (1653); the joke here is that Sam expresses his disdain of the interjections (and other parts of speech) with the aid of the very same units. The example is thus similar to *Cui bono* in (76); both are instances of 'ironic' CS. The two instances of *ocium* have already been discussed above; it may be noted that the phrase also co-occurs with *remedy* in example (71). The switch in Sam's final utterance has been flagged as a generic proverb, but since it is from the *Ars poetica* (Hor. *ars* 139), it would have been familiar to at least some of the students (as well as the audience) from its original context. Its function here is to act as an additional marker of a pessimistic attitude, at the same time providing justification for it. In Brown and Levinson's model indicating pessimism is a negative politeness strategy, but here it is arguably a positive one, since Sam is expressing disagreement with the other boys as to the speakers' possible success.

The remaining switches occur in the orations, where four boys complain about the four parts of grammar: orthography, etymology, syntax, and prosody (cf. example (88) above). Most of the switches are technical terms:

(109) Quot horas, quot dies, quot noctes laborando ad comparandum illud dictu odiosum consumpsi, quod Græci ορθογραφίαν vocant; et nos rectè Scribendi scientiam nominamus.

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'I have used up every hour, every day, every night, working to procure that thing, odious to say, which the Greeks call *orthography*, and we term the science of writing correctly.'

(*Grammaticae Partes I*, f. 320v)

(110) Quorum vim nominum si quis cupiat accuratius introspicere, protinus ad verbi ἔτυμον recurret necesse est.

'If someone wants to accurately examine the sense of these words, it is necessary to go directly back to the word's *etymon*.'

(*Grammaticae Partes I*, f. 322r)

(111) Totum scilicet hunc annum consumpsi Prosodiam discendo. Cujus sanè adeo difficiles singulæ sunt partes, ut Græcos quidem magnopere errare putem, cum ἀπὸ τῆς ᾠδῆς Προσοδίαν appellaverint. A qua nos pueri lamentari, potius, quàm canere didicimus. Aliud verò apud Græcos est verbum a quo hæc Προσοδία veram derivationem accipere jure merito dicatur; nempe πρόσοδος, i.e. congregatio. Credo nimirum hîc omnes Grammaticæ difficultates unà congregatas esse. Hinc quoties me vexârunt tres hujus Προσοδίας divisiones Tonus, Spiritus, et Tempus.

'Namely, I have spent this whole year learning prosody, whose individual parts are truly so difficult that I certainly believe the Greeks to have made a great error when they named *prosody after 'ode'*. We boys have learned from it to weep rather than to sing. There is truly another word among the Greeks from which *prosody* ought justly to be said to receive its true etymology, namely *prosodos*; that is 'assembly'. I believe certainly that all the difficulties of grammar are assembled together here. Hence so many times these three parts *of prosody* have tormented me: accent, aspiration, and quantity.'

(*Grammaticae Partes I*, f. 323r)

In (109), the explanation for the choice of Greek is that the speaker explicitly mentions that ορθογραφία is the Greek term for 'orthography'. In other words, this is a metalinguistic comment. In (110) the case is rather different, as there is no clear Latin alternative for ἔτυμον; hence a 'gap' explanation is here the most appropriate one. The switches in (111) are again different from the other examples. Here the term is indeed flagged as a Greek word, but it serves to highlight the etymological connection between προσῳδία and ᾠδή – note that the former is incorrectly written with an omicron instead of an omega, which in fact makes the humorous etymology

based on πρόσοδος more appealing. In this example, then, the switches serve to facilitate humour, while in the other two examples this dimension is not present.

Finally, there is one puzzling and quite unclear case found in the first oration (on orthography), with the possible occurrence of the Greek neuter article (sg. nom./acc.). The speaker has complained about having to learn the various types of letters (or sounds) and punctuation marks. He then notes that the previous day he fell into a rage, burning all his writing equipment, when he was *laborando rectè ad scribendum illud το Musæ* (f. 321r) 'striving to write correctly that 'the' of the muse'. I am unable to translate the full passage, since my analysis of it is uncertain. The phrase itself is mystifying. The word in the manuscript is clearly το, but the word does not make sense in this context (note, furthermore, that the accent is missing). In the translation I have interpreted *illud* as governing το, *Musæ* thus being its genitival complement. The article can be used in Greek to nominalize practically any other phrase, but if it is meant to be used in this function in the present case, it would nominalize *Musæ*. Even if it is not meant to nominalize, per se, but to serve the same function as quotation marks, this function would already be performed by *illud* (cf. *illud Cassianum* in example 76). If *illud* is meant to govern the following two words, the translation would be 'to write correctly that "το Musæ"' – which is just as opaque as any other interpretation. With no plausible interpretation available, the switch – if it is indeed Greek – remains inexplicable. It is not out of the question that there is an error in the manuscript, but it is also unclear what the amended reading ought to be.

5.2.3.6   Other Christmas performances

As with the Gunpowder Plot performances, the remaining switches in the Christmas performances fit into similar categories as those discussed above. To begin with, I mention the only examples which are the lone representatives in their category, namely the cries of *Vivat Rex! Vivat Rex!* ('long live the King') and *Vivat Rex et Regina! Vivat Rex et Regina!* ('long live the King and Queen'; note the choice of singular in the verb) in *The Conquest of Metals* (f. 70v). These may be considered switching governed by situational norms; alternatively, they may be counted as formulaic phrases, although there would of course have been English alternatives for them.

Several of the remaining switches are identifiable as quotations or proverbs, the Greek ones occurring invariably in Latin contexts, the Latin ones in English contexts (cf. the 'hierarchy' of languages discussed in 5.1.1). The Greek proverbs are ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐσκαμμένα '[to leap] over trenches' and δίς διὰ πασῶν 'twice over everything' (*Colloquium de Rhetorica*, ff. 198v & 200r; note the acute on δίς); both are discussed by Erasmus (*Adagia*, 993 & 163). The former refers in the present context to exceeding one's limits; the speaker notes that this is something he does not want to

do, meaning that the phrase is used as a protective face-work strategy or a negative politeness strategy. The latter proverb refers to someone or something being many times greater than others.[303] The speaker uses it to characterize Cicero, and its function is to enhance Cicero's face (I assume here that even a deceased person has a face in the intersubjective sense). The remaining two Classical quotations are both from Isocrates' speech to Demonicus. In the first case (*Contention*, f. 356v), which occurs in an epilogue, the speaker identifies Isocrates explicitly; the quotation itself is Λῆγε τῶν πόνων […] ἔτι πονεῖν δυνάμενος 'Stop working when you are still able to work' (Isoc. *Ad Dem*. 14). It is used to strengthen the speaker's argument about the boys needing a holiday, and is further emphasized with an added Latin quotation (i.e. without CS) from Horace (Hor. *sat*. 1,1,106): *Est modus in rebus* 'things have their limit'. This is similar to example (80), where a quotation from Hesiod was used to assure the audience that the boys are not asking for too long a holiday: the reference to ancient wisdom softens the request. The second quotation occurs at the end of an oration (*Grammaticae Partes II*, f. 435r), where the speaker promises that, if the boys are granted their holiday, ὢς μηδὲ τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον τηλικαῦτης εὐεργεσίας χαρακτῆρι δύνασθαι λήθην εμποιῆσαι 'even all of time cannot lay in oblivion so great a stamp of kindness' – in other words, the boys will not forget it. The quotation has in fact been constructed by combining two separate clauses from the original (Isoc. *Ad Dem*. 8). There is an interesting flagging and punning going on here, as the boy makes the promise in the following manner: *spondeo vobis fide verè Anglicanâ; non autem Argolicâ licet argolicè* ('I give truly my English word, not a Greek one, although I do it in Greek'). The final Greek example is probably a quotation from the religious domain. The speaker argues that parents also suffer because their sons are so tormented, and then notes the following: *Filius enim* ποίημα τοῦ πατρὸς (*Contention*, f. 347v; 'For the Son is *the work of the Father*'). This probably refers to an argument about the nature of the Trinity. It is hence an instance of word-play in the present context, although it is unclear what the immediate source for the phrase might have been.

Two of the Latin quotations occur in *The Conquest of Metals*. In the first case, one of the metals, Lead, notes of another character, Pewter, that *His mind is alwaies in patinis* ('in the dishes'), while another character retorts: *Ha ha he. A Terence for Lead there. His plumbeous cerebrosity spouts latin* (f. 68v). The quotation has thus been flagged anaphorically both as Latin and as being derived from Terence, which in fact it is (Ter. *Eun*. 816). The quotation is used here as an FTA towards Pewter, and at least at layer 1 as a pun (since pewter is a metal used for pans and pots). The second quotation occurs when Touchstone identifies Gold as the lawful king: *Nihil est præstantius auro* ['Nothing surpasses gold']. *Tis Gold. This is the purum*

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[303]   The phrase has a musicological origin, as διὰ πασῶν by itself refers to an octave.

metallum ['pure metal'] (f. 70r). The first sentence has probably been formed on the model of *nihil est autem praestantius deo* (Cic. *nat. deor.* 2,77), which may have been familiar either from the original Ciceronian source or as a proverb. It can again be analysed at layer 1 as word-play, while at layer 2 it is effectively a face-enhancing act. The following *purum metallum* is not a quotation but a technical term, probably from the alchemical domain, which fits well with the theme of the play. The final proverb is *Astra regunt homines; sed regit astra Deus* (*A World of Options*, ff. 10r–v) 'The stars reign over men, but God reigns over the stars', which occurs in an oration delivered by an astrologer. In all of the English speeches in this performance, the aim is to present a defence of the profession in question; the proverb serves basically the same purpose, implying that the astrologer has access to something akin to divine knowledge.

Another major group of switches consists of terminology, in most cases technical or domain-specific. Most of these occur in the English orations of *A World of Options*. I have identified several extracts in the text adapted from Cotgrave's phrase collection (1655); many of the switches appear in precisely these parts. The Merchant, for example, describes how he trades in articles from all corners of the world, and how he is approached by all sorts of people, mentioning *This Chevaleir*; *t'other Seigniour*; *This Madona*; and *Tother bona Roba* (f. 10r).[304] While these are 'grey area' cases, they have nevertheless been counted here as switches or at least FFIs: the first as French, the others as Italian. The reason is that they are used in a context where travel and foreign goods are the main topic, and the words clearly function to provide an 'exotic' air. At another level of analysis, the choice of words can be explained by the fact that the extract in which all of them occur is derived from Cotgrave (1655: 197); it should be noted, however, that merely identifying the connection to Cotgrave in no way explains the choice of *this extract in particular*. The merchant also refers to *lady Pecunia* (f. 9v), which seems to have been a metaphor for 'money', analysable either as a formula or as word-play. When the same character refers to *queen Pecunia* (f. 10r), however, the phrase may have been derived from Cotgrave (1655: 198), since it appears under the same heading as the extract discussed above.

A similar 'attraction effect' can be seen in the phrase *Aurum potabile* 'drinkable gold', an alchemical term referring to a potion which can heal all ailments. It occurs in an oration delivered by the usurer (f. 15v), in which he expresses his love of money and argues that *aurum potabile* has the above-mentioned power (*Does not gouty greatness oftentimes find ease with Aurum potabile?*). The phrase is found in Cotgrave (1655: 196), and is used here at layer 1 again as a type of word-play; at layer 2, the utterance as a whole is used to bolster the speaker's argument for loving

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[304] *Madona* is a term of address used to Italian women (cf. *Monsieur* above), while *bona-roba* means 'wench' (e.g. *OED* 1, s.v. *bona-roba*).

money. In the preceding oration, the same phrase appears when the brewer argues that he *can by the skill of his Chimistry turn Water into Aurum potabile* (f. 15r). Although here the utterance does not derive from Cotgrave, there is probably a connection between the two occurrences, especially since they occur in consecutive orations. The phrase is once again used for humorous effect, as the brewer claims that ale is a type of magical potion. Another similar case is *Mare mortuum* 'the dead sea' (f. 9r), where the physician may send a dying person, or *his old leaking vessel*. In addition to being an instance of word-play, the extract where the expression occurs is also derived from Cotgrave (1655: 222–223). Another pun, although this time not derived from Cotgrave, occurs when the bookbinder refers to the reading process thus (f. 13v): *untill the Reader come to Mr Finis, who presently puts an End to his reading* (note also the reiteration of *Finis–End*). Finally, a non-humorous switch is produced by the tailor, who notes that he may be employed by *Dives, and rich customers* (f. 12v). Since *dives* means 'a rich man', this is an instance of reiteration. Although the term is associated with its occurrence in the Bible, it probably has no religious connotations here. What is interesting about its form is that the word seems to be used as an indeclinable plural, as its Latin plural would be *divites*, while the form *Diveses* is attested as an English plural (*OED* 2, s.v. *Dives*).

The remaining texts contain two Greek terms. One occurs after the δίς διὰ πασῶν example (see above): the speaker continues to argue that Cicero attained almost a monarchy (μοναρχίαν; *Colloquium de Rhetorica*, f. 200r) in rhetoric. The Latinized version of the term occurs several times in the manuscript; Greek may have been chosen here due to the immediately preceding switch. A similar explanation was suggested for Ῥομαιοκαθολικον in example (45) above. The other term occurs in *Quinque Sensus* (f. 465r), where the speaker, Gustus ('taste'), refers to the 'gluttonous Melanthus' (*Melanthii* ὀψοφάγου; genitive). Although this does not count as a quotation, the expression may derive for example from Aristophanes (Aristoph. *Pax* 802–810). It may be explained by reference either to a 'gap' or to norms (i.e. as the appropriate epithet of Melanthus).

The final category consists of switches related to grammar. The first example comes from the Latin speeches of *A World of Options*, where each speaker discusses one of the eight parts of speech. The Greek switch Βαβαὶ (flagged verbally as Greek) occurs in the oration on interjections (f. 7v) as a reiteration/translation of the Latin *Papæ*, an interjection of wonder or surprise. The joke in the utterance – not linked to the Greek phrase in any way – is the homophony of the interjection *papae* and the genitive/dative of the noun *Papa* 'the Pope', made apparent by a following reference to 'Popelings' (*Papicolis*).

The rest of the switches all occur in *Grammaticae Partes II*, in a verse oration presented by Etymologia (f. 436v). All of the Greek insertions are, predictably,

mentions of words and their etymologies, sometimes explicitly flagged as Greek, sometimes not. For the sake of clarity, I present all the switches under one example:

(112) Rex βασιλεὺς Graecis, et jure ita dicitur illis.
    Nam λαοῦ βάσις ipse sui. […]
    Οὔρανος ut Græcis ὄρανος, nec prorsus ineptè:
    Sic et ὄλυμπος ὅλως quasi λάμπων, dicitur esse.
    Σῶμα animæ σῆμα est: atque hinc pro corpore σῶμα
    Dixêre antiqui Graiorum idiomate clari.
    Παίς ἄπο τοῦ παίζειν, quod ludere lingua latina
    Reddidit; et rectè fit ab illo nomine nomen.
    Παῖσι γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν τοῦ παίζειν βέλτερον οὐδέν.
    Utq[ue] Σχολὴ Græcis id quod feriatio linguæ
    Romanæ gnaris; sic hinc Schola dicta Latinis,
    Iusta laboriferis cedantur ut ocia Musis.

    'King is called *basileus* by the Greeks, and justly they say
    That he is *the basis of* his *people*. [...]
    As *the heaven* is properly said by the Greeks to be *the upper limit*,
    So also *Olympos* is as if *entirely shining*.
    The body is *the tomb* of the soul; and hence the body is called *sōma*.
    The ancient Greeks had a clear saying:
    The word for *child* comes from the verb *to play*; it is translated in Latin
    As *ludere*; and quite appropriately does the word derive from here.
    For nothing is better to a child than playing.
    As the Greeks call *scholē* that which is called holiday by those
    Fluent in the Roman language; hence school is called so by the Latins,
    That the work-bearing muses be granted just leisure.'[305]

                            (*Grammaticae Partes II*, f. 436v)

The function of the individual switches is always the same: to make it possible to even discuss the etymologies in question. This passage illuminates well the problems that arise in attempting to quantify CS: the whole extract takes up only twelve lines, but contains thirteen switches – more than the typical performance as a whole. As for the whole section, the point at layer 2 is simply to provide examples of etymology, while at layer 1 it serves as a demonstration of the boys' attainments.

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[305] It goes without saying that these are folk etymologies, meaning that most of them are incorrect. The verses *sic hinc Schola dicta Latinis, / Iusta laboriferis cedantur ut ocia Musis* have been adapted from Ausonius's *Protrepticus* (Auson. VIII). Ausonius may have been familiar to the boys from their school exercises (cf. Hoole 1660: 144).

To sum up: the majority of the switches in the Christmas performances are either quotations or technical terms. In the Gunpowder Plot performances the religious domain was more prominent, while in these texts the grammar books themselves are clearly a key source. The texts are also quite amusing, and many of the switches serve as humorous references, word-plays, or simple puns. As in the Gunpowder Plot performances, longer quotations and 'insider references' are also used at layer 1 as in-group markers to claim common ground with the audience, while at layer 2 they perform a myriad of functions, such as insulting or bolstering S's argument. One important point to be stressed is that, as in the preceding section, most often the switches themselves have the simple function of enabling one to perform some other act, while the utterance as a whole performs what might more properly be termed the 'main function'. This is particularly the case with switches consisting of a single lexeme or short phrase.

5.2.4 The Lenten performances

5.2.4.1 *Shrawley and Burnley*

The first Lenten performance in the manuscript consists of a prologue, a set of ten orations, three sets of 'enigmatic' verses (i.e. riddles and their answers) by three pairs of boys, and an epilogue. This follows the prototypical format for the Lenten texts (cf. Appendix). The first switches of *Shrawley and Burnley* occur in the prologue:

(113) Quos hic videtis utrinq[ue] Duo sunt exercitus, Regiorum alter, alter Oppidanorum. Ἄσπονδος, ut loquuntur, utrinq[ue] πόλεμος: ἄναιμος tamen, ie sine sanguinis effusione, quanquam ut verè fatear, non absq[ue] sudore.

'These whom you see on both sides are two armies: one of King's Scholars, the other of Oppidans. There is on both sides *an implacable war*, as they say, although *bloodless*; that is, without shedding blood – although, I confess, not without shedding sweat.'

(*Shrawley and Burnley*, f. 17v)

(114) Neq[ue] vos latere potest διαθρύλλητον illud Anceps alea belli.

'And that *common saying* cannot be unknown to you, that the game of war is uncertain.'[306]

(*Shrawley and Burnley*, f. 17v)

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[306] *Anceps alea belli* has been written in a larger script.

Ἄσπονδος πόλεμος in (113) is a proverbial expression, discussed for example by Erasmus (*Adagia*, 2284; see Mäkilähde, Alho & Johnson 2016: 329); it is classifiable here as a technical term rather than a quotation, referring to a war which cannot end in a truce. The Greek ἄναιμος can be explained by reference to an 'attraction effect', since it stands elliptically for the phrase ἄναιμος πόλεμος: the switch highlights the cohesive tie between the units, and hence makes the word-play (if one may call it that) more apparent. The reiteration *ie sine sanguinis effusione* seems to be used, based on its form, for clarification, although it may also be noted that the introduction of the PP *sine sanguinis effusione* ensures that the following *non absque sudore* is structurally more similar to what precedes (i.e. *sine X – non absque Y*). The same Greek phrases also occur in the prologue of another Lenten performance, *Ienken and Lunn*, probably staged around fifteen years after the first one:

> (115) Ecce jam vobis juxta annuam, laudabilemq[ue] Scholæ hujus consuetudinem, descensuri sunt hodie in arenam exercitus duo, Oppidanorum alter, alter Regiorum. Nam ἄσπονδος est inter eos πόλεμος, fuitq[ue] diu: at verò ἄναιμος, ut et semper utrinq[ue].
>
> 'Behold, according to the excellent yearly custom of this school, two armies are about to descend to the arena, one of Oppidans, the other of King's Scholars. For there is *an implacable war* between them, and so it has been for long: but truly *bloodless*, as always on both sides.'
>
> <div align="right">(<i>Ienken and Lunn</i>, f. 379v)</div>

The situation evidently resembles that encountered in connection with certain Gunpowder Plot performances (see 5.2.2 above), where one extract appears in a number of texts over the years. Either the person composing the prologue for *Ienken and Lunn* had access to the earlier texts, or the word-play derives from some unidentified source. The only notable difference in (115) compared to (113) is that the reiteration, together with the joke about shedding sweat instead of blood, is absent. As for the switch in (114), διαθρύλλητον is a non-Classical form, derived from διαθρυλ(λ)έω 'to be commonly reported, to be spread around' (cf. θρυλητός). It is probably used here as a technical term for a proverb. It may be noted that *Anceps alea belli* is not discussed by Erasmus, but the phrase may have been familiar to the boys from a number of sources, as it is in fact a conventional saying. Since the Greek phrase in (113) is thematically similar, both could have been located by a schoolboy collecting sententiae and phrases for a school exercise on the topic of warfare.

The remaining switches occur in the orations. If my identification of the speakers is correct, the first two speeches were delivered by Shrawley and Burnley, the third by Smith, who employs one Greek phrase:

(116) Ecce hîc Shrawleius dux noster fortissimus, qui verè vobis exhibet μέγιστον ἐν ἐλακίστῳ [sic]. Ecce autem illic Burnleium ducis umbram, cincinnis horridum ad extra; intus tamen vel ipso Rheto (quantus quantus sit) timidiorem.

'Behold here our mighty leader Shrawley, who truly displays to you *the greatest in the smallest*. Behold there, on the other hand, Burnley, a shadow of a leader, with rough hair on the outside, yet inside more timid than Rhoeteus himself (however great a coward he may be).'[307]

(*Shrawley and Burnley*, f. 19r)

The Greek phrase is probably derived from Isocrates, again from the speech to Demonicus (Isoc. *Ad Dem*. 40), where 'the greatest in the smallest' refers to a good mind within a human body. Since it refers to an intelligent person, the first part of the utterance (i.e. the first sentence) enhances Shrawley's face, while the second part is an attack against Burnley's face. I interpret *Rheto* here as standing for *Rhoeteo*; Rhoeteus is mentioned in the *Aeneid* as being slain while fleeing in a chariot (Verg. *Aen*. 10,399–404). Once again, it is worth stressing that the switch into Greek does not in itself have any other function than to enable the speaker to employ the expression in the first place; this in turn enables him to attain the main goal of face-enhancement.

The following three examples all demonstrate a peculiarity of the Lenten performances: punning on the boys' surnames. These also constitute some of the rare instances of switching from Latin to English. Each example occurs in an oration by a different boy:

(117) Galeatum serò duelli pænitet. Munitum igitur oportet esse Regulum, qui talem, qualis tu sis, ausus sim provocare. Nominis tui prima quidem syllaba prælium minatur. Nam Warnerus incipit cum illo, quod anglice dicunt Warr.

'Having put on your helmet, it is too late to regret going to war. Therefore it is necessary for this prince, who dares to challenge a person such as you, to be on his guard. Indeed, the first syllable of your name threatens with battle, for Warnerus begins with that which in English is called *war*.'

(*Shrawley & Burnley*, f. 19v)

(118) Non formidabo, Commilitones, sit vel Pons, vel Pontifex qui mihi nunc bellum indicit. Pons nimirum anglice Bridge, viam mihi negat ad victoriam;

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[307] Note ἐλακίστῳ *pro* ἐλαχίστῳ.

'I will not be afraid, Comrades, be it Pons or pontifex who now declares war against me. Truly, Pons – in English *Bridge* – denies me the road to victory.

(*Shrawley and Burnley*, f. 20v)

(119) Hinc Pontem me vocas cum ludibrio. At at scias me velim non a quibusvis nebulonibus (qualis Tu sis, tuiq[ue] similes) impunè conculcandum. Nomen meum anglice Bridge, quod tam joculanter irrides Te nonnunquam impedire poterit in honoris cursu, et currenti ad gloriæ templum fortiter obstare, cum Oratione forsan, vel Carmine, gloriæ causâ, mecum certaveris.

'Hence you call me Pons in jest. Know that I do not wish to be trampled on by just any wretches (such as you, and your kind) without punishment. My name is in English *Bridge* (as you so jokingly mocked me); it will often be able to prevent you from progressing on the path to honour, and strongly oppose your way to the temple of glory, when you contend with me, with a speech or with a poem, for the sake of glory.'

(*Shrawley and Burnley*, f. 21r)

In example (117) *Warner* is reanalysed as *War-ner*; the speaker (probably called Wren) notes how dangerous a battle might be with a person with such a belligerent name. It may be noted that the beginning of the example, *Galeatum serò duelli pænitet*, is a quotation which has already appeared in a previous example above (Iuv. 1,169–170; see 5.2.3.3), its choice being very apt for the present occasion. In the two other examples, the punning on *Bridge* employs two different strategies: in (118) it is first translated into Latin and then juxtaposed with *Pontifex*, while in (119), delivered by Bridge himself, the name is interpreted as a common noun with a very literal sense, and the boy as unwilling to be trampled upon. At both layers 1 and 2, the main function of the switches is thus to enable one to make these jokes, but at the latter there are obviously further differences: in particular, Bridge indicates that he is unhappy with the manner in which the other boy has ridiculed his name (i.e. threatened his positive face), while example (117) arguably involves no FTA whatsoever.

The final switch in the performance, this time again into Greek, is also found in Bridge's oration, a few lines below the previous example:

(120) Interea temporis, Auditores candidissimi, ad vestram humanitatem, tanquam ad asylum confugio, ut sub Achillea vestri favoris πανοπλίᾳ Commilitones nostri Mecum intrepidè pugnemus, omnesq[ue] linguæ latratus, istius præsertim Antagonistæ, facillimè repellamus.

'Meanwhile, most honest listeners, I take refuge in your kindness (as if in an asylum), so that me and my comrades would fight without trembling in the Achillean *armour* of your favour and easily repel all barkings, especially those of this rival of mine.'[308]

(*Shrawley and Burnley*, f. 21r)

Πανοπλία is rather similar to σύνοψις (discussed above in 5.2.2.1), since the Latin loanword *panoplia* was also in common use. Moreover, the Greek dative used here would be practically identical with the Latin ablative;[309] the switch may therefore have been apparent only to someone reading the text. In any case, it is a technical term. The switch may be due to the author (or scribe) being aware of the origin of the word, which is here made even more apparent by the reference to Achilles, whose armour was a concept in itself; the speaker is probably alluding to the scene in the *Iliad* (Hom. *Il*. 16,130ff) where Patroclus borrows the armour, even though the word πανοπλία does not occur in that context. Since the implication is thus that the boys are invincible when the audience is on their side, the total utterance may also be interpreted as enhancing the audience's positive face.

5.2.4.2   *Ienken and Lunn*

Ienken and Lunn contains a prologue, a set of ten orations (including a brief transition between sections), and a short verse section where each of the previous speakers poses one riddle and provides the answer to another. Most of the switches are minor units; two of them were already discussed in the preceding section. The prologue contains one additional Greek switch, the longest unit of CS found in this performance:

(121)   Metuit hîc nemo omnium de vita (Neq[ue] enim est quod metuat) sibi. De victoria verò, gloriaq[ue] (quam vel vita ipsa chariorem et habet, et habere debet magnanimus quisq[ue]) omnes, et singuli certare cupiunt – Ἀγαθὴ δ' ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσι.

'No-one here fears for his life (for there is nothing to be afraid of). Everyone truly wants in his turn to contend for victory and glory (which every person

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[308]   The *iota subscriptum* is written in the manuscript generally as a simple dot; it is also quite often completely absent.

[309]   For the functional interplay between the Latin ablative and the Greek dative in language contact situations, see e.g. Adams (2003: 497).

of noble spirit values and ought to value more than even life itself) –*This strife is good to mortals*.'

<div align="right">(Ienken and Lunn, f. 379v)</div>

This is another quotation from Hesiod (Hes. *Op.* 24); its function is to assure the audience that the 'battle' is only a verbal one and beneficial for the boys. It may be classified among those instances where a quotation is used to bolster one's argument, and/or those serving to imply that the speaker is drawing his values from revered sources (that is, in addition to being an in-group marker). The chosen quotation is quite apt for this function: Hesiod is referring to the type of contention which results in the amelioration of the individual's life or character, as opposed to the type which results in bitter envy and destructive war.

The remaining switches occur in the orations, the three following examples constituting once again puns on the names of the boys:

(122) Neq[ue] timeo tecum aperto prælio certare, Puerule mi, pusille Lune, anglice Lunn; latine verò Lunatice: hoc præsertim nomine, quòd mecum meisq[ue] congredi non formidaveris.

'Neither am I afraid to enter into open battle with you, my little boy, you tiny Lunus, in English *Lunn* – in Latin surely Lunaticus; under this name in particular, since you were not afraid to do battle with me and my fellows.'

<div align="right">(Ienken and Lunn, f. 381r)</div>

(123) Dicunt mei adversarii me esse tantum hominis umbram. Et quia volucris nomen gero, hoc est anglice Fowle, passerem me pipientem, vel regulum avium minimum indecorè nominant. At verò scient aliquando me neq[ue] passerem, neq[ue] regulum, sed aquilam fore; et rostro vel unico meo sardam istiusmodi, anglice Sprat, qui nunc me oppugnat, correpturum illico;

'My enemies say that I am but a shadow of a man. And since I bear the name of a bird – in English, *Fowl* – they disgracefully call me a chirping sparrow or a wren (the smallest of birds). But one day they will realize that I have become not a sparrow or a wren but an eagle, and certainly I will immediately carry away in my unique beak that sardine – in English *Sprat* – who is currently fighting with me.'

<div align="right">(Ienken and Lunn, f. 381v)</div>

(124) Sprattum me dicis esse, latine sardam nullius pretii:

'You say that I am a worthless Sprat – or sardine in Latin.'

(*Ienken and Lunn*, f. 382r)

In (122), the pun utilizes a strategy similar to that in (117), *War-nerus*; here the boy's name, *Lunn*, is analysed as being related to *lunaticus* (here: 'madman'). The English name is probably mentioned to make the pun more apparent, although the Latinate *Lunus* would surely have sufficed by itself. The function of the pun at layer 2 is again to attack Lunn's face. In (123), where the speaker is Fowle himself, the pun is similar to that in (118) and (119), where the name *Bridge* was interpreted as a common noun. The pun is initially part of reported speech, referring to an original FTA committed by other boys, but it is then reinterpreted in a face-enhancing manner, together with a similarly literal interpretation of *Sprat*. At this point, the utterance as a whole is an FTA against Sprat's face – it is implied that he will be easily defeated – but as demonstrated in example (124), Sprat also interprets the pun itself as an insult. I have not counted the word *Sprattum* in (124) as a switch, since the Latinized form of the boy's name is *Sprattus*, not *Sarda*,[310] but this is a 'grey area' case: one could also argue that the word is being used here as a common noun, with an English root and a Latin suffix. Either way, the interpretation has no bearing on its function. It may be noted that in all of the surname puns thus far, the speaker flags the language of the original word or its translation – or both. The goal seems to be to make the structure more transparent, in other words to highlight the fact that the words come from specific languages and that the discussion is situated at the metalinguistic level.

The final two switches are found in Crayford's oration; they are not related to anyone's surname:

(125) Quantum verò ad Syntaxin spectat, isti quidem tum eruditione, tum moribus sunt prorsus ἄτακτοι. Prosodiæ porro tam imperiti sunt, ut, si carmine quid possunt, experiamur, et metra metris reponere inter nos invicem postulemus, isti in omnibus carminum generibus instar σκάζοντων ubiq[ue] claudicaverint.

'As far as syntax is concerned, they [i.e. the Oppidans] are indeed utterly *disorderly* now in learning, now in conduct. Again, they are so unskilled in prosody that if we test their abilities in poetry and ask them each in his turn among us to replace meters with others, in all genres of poetry they limp everywhere in the manner *of scazons*.'[311]

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[310] After Sprat's oration, another boy (called Crayford) calls him *Sardarius* (f. 382r; *mi Spratte, vel potius Sardarie* 'my Sprat, or better, Fisherman).

[311] The second sentence is structurally challenging to analyse; I have interpreted *possunt* as standing for *possint* (being in an indirect question). The *inter nos* in the *ut* clause is

Both Greek switches constitute puns: ἄτακτοι ought obviously to be contrasted with συντακτοί (cf. *Syntaxin* in the same example, which could also be analysed as an FFI in the present context), while σκάζων 'limping' refers to choliambic verse, and is thus also a technical term. In both cases, the switch may nevertheless be analysed as enabling the speaker to produce these puns, while the function of the utterance is to insult the collective positive face of the Oppidans.

5.2.4.3   *Sprat and Cage*

The structure of *Sprat and Cage* is once again the typical one for Lenten performances: a prologue, a set of speeches, a set of enigmatic verses, and an epilogue. This, however, is the only performance in which the speakers are represented by numbers and labelled according to their group (e.g. *1 R[egis alumnus]*, *1 O[ppidanus]*; twelve speakers in total); alternation between the two camps is also organized differently, as the first three orations are by King's Scholars, the following three by Oppidans, after which they alternate, delivering twelve speeches in total. The verse section also exhibits an alternating structure rather than one divided among pairs of boys. After both the orations and verses there is in addition a short section for an 'arbiter', who explains how the performance is to proceed. The first switch occurs in the prologue:

(126)   attamen hoc verbosum, uti spes est, hujus diei prælium, vultu, quo soletis, nunc aspicere dignabimi, tametsi oratiunculæ nostræ παχυτέρα exaratæ sint μούσῃ, et ab elegantiori veterum oratorum stylo prorsus alienæ.

'But regard now this verbose (as one hopes) battle of this day worthy to be watched with your usual countenance, although our little speeches have been written *in a plainer manner* and in one different from the more elegant style of ancient orators.'

The Greek phrase is a proverbial expression, discussed for example by Erasmus (*Adagia*, 38). As the translation indicates, it refers to a plain and simple style, and is thus a form of mild self-criticism. On the one hand, the utterance functions as a negative politeness strategy; on the other, modesty is one form of both defensive and

also puzzling; if the sense of the clause has here been interpreted correctly, one would expect it to be *inter istos/illos*. It seems that the sentence is in any case based on two separate extracts from Vergil (Verg. *Aen*. 9,446; *ecl*. 3,28–29).

protective face-work, ensuring simultaneously that one does not claim for oneself an untenable face or one which the other interactants would be unwilling to maintain. Here again a solidarity explanation is also quite applicable, due to the opaqueness of the expression.

The remaining switches all occur in the orations. Most of them consist of technical terms introduced by the first King's Scholar (probably Sprat):

(127) **1 R[egis alumnus]:** Socrates ille philosophorum optimus istum dijudicat puerum literis esse idoneum, et præmiis dignissimum qui est εὐφυής, μνήμων, φιλομαθὴς, φϊλόπονος [sic], φιλήκοος, ζητητϊκος, φϊλέπαινος. Imprimis εὐφυής puer bono exornatus ingenio, formâ præstanti, et bonâ corporis specie. […] Μνήμων sequitur.

'**King's Scholar 1:** Socrates, the best of philosophers, judges that boy to be fit for learning and worthy of rewards who is *naturally gifted, mindful, fond of learning, industrious, fond of hearing conversations, devoted to inquiry, and fond of praise.* First, *a naturally gifted* boy is equipped with good abilities, an excellent shape, and good bodily appearance. […] This is followed by *mindfulness*.'

(*Sprat and Cage*, ff. 415r–v)

As the speaker indicates, he is listing qualities which Socrates considered necessary for someone who was to be educated as a philosopher in the ideal state (see e.g. Plat. *Resp.* 2,376c; 3,413c–d; 7,535d; note the form of the zeta in ζητητϊκος); the list as presented here does not occur in Plato's work, and is thus not strictly speaking a quotation. Rather, each word may be considered a philosophical term. As the two switches following the long list demonstrate, each term is discussed in turn; in most cases it is further paraphrased or translated into Latin, followed by an explanation of why that particular quality is necessary for a student. The next two speakers cover the remaining terms:

(128) **2 R[egis alumnus]:** Optat etiam noster Socrates φιλομαθῆ, id est maximum eruditionis amatorem. Quid enim si cætera quidem omnia naturæ beneficia jussu suo habeat? Hæc ne flocci pendantur, si amore doctrinæ careat. Non enim ultima, sed summa quidem est fælicitas animum habere studiis gaudentem. Nam absq[ue] eo nullus certè puer optimam doctrinæ laudem unquam consequetur. Ἐὰν ἧς φιλομαθὴς, ἤδη πολυμαθὴς dixit Isocrates. […] Sit etiam puer φϊλόπονος, qui vel maximum in studendo laborem recusare nolet. […] Nimii nimirum somni, omniumq[ue] id genus voluptatum est proprium ἐκτήκειν, καὶ ανυγραίνειν τὸ φρονοῦν.

'**King's Scholar 2:** Our Socrates also prefers *one who loves learning*, that is, a most complete lover of knowledge. For what would it matter if he had all other favours of nature by his command? This would be of no value whatsoever if he did not love learning. For it is not the last but the first fortune to have a soul which delights in studying, as without it no boy will ever truly reach the highest glory of learning. *If you love learning, you will learn much*, said Isocrates. […] A boy should also be *industrious*, or one who does not wish to object to a great amount of work in studying. […] It is a characteristic of too much sleep and all such pleasures *to dilute and liquefy the mind*.'

(*Sprat and Cage*, ff. 416r–v)

(129) **3 R[egis alumnus]:** Adjungitur proximo φιλήκοος. Nam ipsum bene discendi principium est attentè quidem alios auscultare. […] Sit etiam puer ζητητϊκός cui non pudor subrusticus interrogandi quæ nesciat: […] Optandum est deniq[ue] ut detur puer φιλέπαινος quem laus excitet.

'**King's Scholar 3:** *The love of listening to conversations* is closely connected to this. For truly the beginning of learning well consists of listening to others attentively. […] The boy should also be *devoted to inquiry*, a person who is not clownishly ashamed to ask about what he does not know. […] Finally, it is to be desired that one is granted a boy *fond of praises*, who is stimulated by commendation.'

(*Sprat and Cage*, ff. 416v–417r)

Example (129) is more straightforward, as the only switches are the terms themselves (note again the zeta), followed each time by justification and/or clarification. The preceding example requires further comment due to the two longer switches. The first of these, as the speaker notes, is a quotation from Isocrates (Isoc. *Ad Dem.* 18) – once again from the speech to Demonicus; it is used here as further justification why one ought to be a lover of learning, hence bolstering the argument while at the same time demonstrating the speaker's familiarity with this author. The other phrase, occurring at the end of the example, has been adapted from Plutarch's *Moralia* (Plut. *Mor. De Sera* 566a), with a change from indicative to infinitive. The function is once more to bolster the argument; we may note that the choice is again particularly apt, in that it is indeed excessive pleasure that in Plutarch's story is said to be detrimental to the mind.

    The remaining switches occur in the Oppidans' orations; none of them, however, is linked to the terms mentioned above. The first speaker produces one short Greek phrase, repeated:

(130) **1 Op[pidanus]:** […] Antesignanus iste, ut omnibus bene notum est, rarò studiis bonarum artium se totum dedit, quicquid ipsi aliter ogganniant. De eo tamen nunc exclamare ausi sunt Commilitones ejus οὗτός ἐστιν! οὗτός ἐστιν.

'**Oppidan 1:** […] That leader, as everyone well knows, rarely devotes himself fully to studying the good arts, how much ever he may growl otherwise. Yet his comrades now dare to exclaim about him: *This is him! This is him!*'

(*Sprat and Cage*, f. 417r)

To begin with the utterance as a whole, it is obviously an insult directed at the leader of the King's Scholars. The Greek phrase has been flagged as reported speech, and is apparently meant to represent a laudatory comment of some sort. Its precise meaning, however, remains obscure; the reason for switching may have been the fact that the phrase is a quotation, but in its current form it is such a common phrase that the specific source from which it is derived is not immediately obvious. It is possible that in the present context it has Christian connotations, but that is purely speculation.

The next example is also unclear, but for a different reason:

(131) **4 Op[pidanus]:** […] Tu semper hebes, semper mihi Hardress eris.

'**Oppidan 4:** […] You are always dull, you will always be *Hardress* to me.'

(*Sprat and Cage*, ff. 418v–419r)

I suggest that *Hardress* ought to be analysed here as a switch and an FFI, since there seems to be a pun here on *hard* in the sense 'dull, stupid' (*OED* 3 s.v. *hard, adj*, sense I.4). The coherence of this interpretation is enhanced by the occurrence of another pun on the same name, in the following year's Lenten performance:

(132) Sis licet durus, vel durissimus, Hardresse, ut nomen tuum indicat: est mihi tamen non lingua tantum, sed gladius, cujus acies tua viscera quàm facillimè penetrabit.

'You may be hard, nay the hardest, *Hardress*, as your name indicates, yet I have not only a tongue but a sword whose point will most easily penetrate your innards.'

(*Hardress and Fortrye* f. 442v)

The pun in (132) is obviously different from that in (131), but the additional example indicates at least that such punning took place on this name too. While the form in

(132) has not been counted as a switch due to the additional inflexional suffix, it is nevertheless clearly an FFI in this context. These examples provide further illustration of the separation between the formal and functional levels of CS, and the related difficulties in attempting to quantify these phenomena.

The final switch occurs in the last oration:

(133) **6 Op[pidanus]:** […] Nos ne pili pannica eorum verba pendamus, sed contra audentiores eamus. Si mortem minentur nobis, nolumus timere; sed ducem nostrum alacres sequemur, et magnanimi. Ἀθυμοῦντες γὰρ ἄνδρες οὔποτε τρόπαιον ἐστήσαντο.

'**Oppidan 6:** […] As for their ragged words, we shall not value them a straw, but instead go against them the more boldly. If they threaten us with death, we shall not be afraid, but eagerly follow our leader in high spirits. *For disheartened men never raise a trophy.*'

(*Sprat and Cage*, f. 420r)

This maxim is discussed by Erasmus (*Adagia*, 1525), who mentions its occurrence in the *Suda* and originally in Plato (Pl. *Criti*. 108c). While the previous themes might suggest that Plato was in fact the relevant source for the boys, the form of the quotation is closer to that found in the other two works, either of which may have been the source in this case (or, of course, some other work in which the quotation occurs). Once again, the quotation can be analysed as bolstering the speaker's argument, but it can also be interpreted similarly to the Hesiod quotations in 5.2.3: as self-face-enhancement by establishing the boy's values as being anchored to these ancient sources.

5.2.4.4   Other Lenten performances

The most unique category of CS in the Lenten performances – puns on names – is also present in two other texts, each containing two such switches. Here I present the full examples:

(134) Tu interim, cui cognomen Pury, cur semper jactitas Te esse purum, ablatâ scilicet ultimâ syllabâ: potius pur, vel fur.

'Meanwhile you, whose surname is *Pury*, why do you always boast of being pure; of course, with the final syllable removed, preferably *knave* or rogue.'

(*Crooke and Penkherst*, f. 117r)

(135) Interim tamen paratus est mihi Cervus anglicè Buck in jentaculum, macro quidem corpore, pingui autem ingenio, crassoq[ue] sub aere nato.

'Meanwhile, however, a deer – in English *Buck* – has been prepared for me as breakfast, with truly a lean body but a fat head, and one born in a climate which breeds dullards.'[312]

(*Crooke and Penkherst*, f. 119r)

(136) Et tamen non totus occidi, magne vir, ingratiis tametsi tuis. Sed vivo valeoq[ue] tametsi tu; Magne, anglicè Bigg, magna in nos jactitaveris convitia. Tu fateor magnus es: non debes tamen humeris meis inequitare.

'And yet, big man, against your wishes, I am not completely dead. I am alive and well, although you, Magnus – in English, *Bigg* – uttered great insults against us. I confess that you are big, but you ought not to ride upon my shoulders.'

(*Missenden and Waterman*, f. 233v)

(137) Mea res agitur contra commilitones tuos; præsertim contra te, domine Cucule, anglicè Cuckow: sive potius unius soni Poetastrum, qui unicam cantas quolibet die cantilenam. Quam nec amatores, neq[ue] Poetæ cupiunt audire.

'My business concerns your fellow-soldiers, particularly you, master Cuculus, in English *Cuckoo* – or better, a one-note rhymester, who sings the same song every day. Neither lovers nor poets wish to hear it.'

(*Missenden and Waterman*, ff. 233v–234r)

The pun in (134) is linguistically the most complex: *Pury* is first contrasted with the Latin *purus*, which is then reduced to *pur* and finally (through lenition of the plosive) to *fur*. I suggest that *pur* is English, referring to a jack (the playing card) in a particular game (*OED* 3, s.v. *pur, n.¹*). The word is admittedly rare, but the context is here clearly antagonistic, and this seems to be the most coherent interpretation, since the Latin *fur* means not only 'thief' but also 'rogue, knave'. In (135) and (137) we again find the reinterpretation of a name as a common noun, in (136) as a common adjective. In (135) the actual insult consists of the humorous contrast between 'a thin body' and 'a fat mind'; it may be noted that the phrase *crassoque sub aere nato* has been modified from a line by Juvenal (Iuv. 10,50). In (137) the pun is once more in itself an insult, while in (136) the humour is created by repetition

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[312] I have translated this example quite freely.

(*magne vir, Magne*, *magna convitia*, *magnus*): there is nothing face-threatening about the translation itself (i.e. as 'big'), which makes this similar to *Warnerus* in example (117). In all four examples, then, the function at layer 1 is to produce a humorous effect, while at layer 2 all but (136) also serve as FTAs.

In addition to these puns, there are two more humorous instances of switching, both found in the example below:

(138) O Dulmanne tu nimis insulse, ut leguleiorum verbis utar, dashiasti me multis tuis opprobriis, et improperiis. At vellem, Dulmane, memineris nos non boni consulere, id est Take in good part your many perilous scoffs.

'Oh Dulman, you so foolishly *dashiazed* (to use the vocabulary of pettifoggers) me with your taunts and reproaches. But I would like you, Dulman, to remember that we do not excuse, that is, *take in good part your many perilous scoffs*.'

(*Hardress and Finch*, f. 300v)

The word *dashiasti* is remarkable for being the only instance found in the manuscript of integrating an English verb into Latin by the addition of a suffix (the infinitive would be *dashiare*). As the context indicates, this is clearly a marked form, flagged by reference to the language of 'petty lawyers'. *Dulman* refers to a character in Ruggle's *Ignoramus* (cf. 3.1.3.2, 5.2.2.5, and 5.3.3.2 above), an assistant to Ignoramus (the name could well be argued to constitute a switch as well; it is certainly an FFI). One source of humour in Ruggle's play is the use of 'legalese' and CS by the lawyers – something which is obviously at issue in the present example too. The same explanation probably also accounts for the longer switch, which begins with a reiteration of the Latin *consulere*.

Three longer quotations are found in two more performances. The first is *Juxta poetam* Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψευσταὶ, κακὰ θηρία, γαστέρες ἀργαί 'Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, idle gluttons' (*Wakefield and Foche*, f. 258r). The line originates from Epimenides, but the most likely source for the boys would have been the Bible (Tit. 1:12), where the line is quoted in this form. The speaker has flagged the quotation as being from 'a poet', but this fact was probably brought to the attention of the boys when they encountered the section in school. In the present context, the speaker is criticizing his adversaries as being more mendacious than the Cretans, using the quotation to bolster his argument (and hence to aggravate the insult). The other two quotations occur in *Hardress and Finch*, although in different speeches. In the first case (f. 295v), the speaker notes that his opponent gains confidence when he remembers the following line from Homer (Hom *Il.* 1,80): Κρείσσων γὰρ βασιλεὺς ὅτε χώσεται ἀνδρὶ χέρηϊ 'For a king is mightier when he is angry with an inferior

man'. The function is rather different from several cases of such 'positive' quotations, in that the speaker is not attempting to enhance his own face; rather, he only uses it to justify his previous argument. This is in some ways similar to example (38) above, in 5.2.2.1, where a quotation from Homer was used to explain the actions of the Gunpowder Plotters. The second quotation (f. 297r) comes from the same source (Hom. *Il.* 1,225): κυνὸς ὄμματ' ἔχων, κραδίην δ' ἐλάφοιο 'with the face of a dog but the heart of a deer' (i.e. with a stern look but a cowardly heart). The speaker is using it to describe his opponent; an obvious insult.

The remaining switches include one case which is somewhat unclear, between a quotation and a term: ἐλαχιστότερος τῶν ἐλαχιστῶν 'the smallest of the smallest' (*Gibson and Ienken*, f. 206v), used by a speaker to describe himself. The utterance itself is clear, inasmuch as it is an instance of (ritual) modesty, similar to example (126) above. Why the phrase is in Greek, however, is unclear; due to the koine comparative ἐλαχιστότερος, I suggest that the phrase has biblical connotations (cf. Eph 3:8; also Matt. 25:40). Another switch in the same performance (in the preceding oration, f. 206r) is not strictly speaking a term but more properly a metalinguistic unit: the speaker is criticizing his opponent for being unable, even after many days of practice and several repetitions by the teacher, to conjugate ἦν (here probably the 1./3.p.sg.act.ind.impf. of εἰμί 'I am').[313] Here the switch itself facilitates the production of an FTA. Only a single switch occurs in the verse sections (*Missenden and Waterman*, f. 237r), consisting of a humorous etymology for *monachus* 'monk' (identified as Greek in the text), as if derived from μοῦνον ἄχος 'pain alone'. The section has been copied from Theodore Beza's *Cato Censorius Christianus* (see e.g. Summers 2017: 312–313); hence the switch is also an anticipated neutral consequence. Finally, the word τάξιν (acc.) appears in an oration (*Hardress and Fortrye*; f. 443r) in reference to the boys' battle-array; it is a technical term, chosen in the present context perhaps due to the other military allusions and terms which occur in the texts.

To sum up: many of the same categories of CS identified in previous sections are also relevant for the Lenten performances, in particular those of quotations and technical terms. Humour forms a particularly important group of functions in these texts, especially with regard to puns on the boys' surnames – a category specific to this subgenre. Many of the puns involve simply interpreting the name as a common noun or adjective, while in other cases we find reanalyses of the structure of a name and sometimes even more elaborate associations (e.g. in the case of *Pury*). Finally,

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[313] The verb used for 'to conjugate' is here *inflectere*, which means 'to bend' in the literal sense, and has in addition the meaning 'to affix with a circumflex'. It is not out of the question that this last meaning is relevant here, but to make this explanation coherent a relevant occurrence with this meaning ought to be located in the school-books or some similar source.

it is worth noting that many of the utterances discussed here constitute FTAs; this feature is connected directly to the aims and norms of the texts in the Lenten subgenre.

5.2.5 The Oak Apple Day performances

5.2.5.1 *Seamen*

Seamen is a relatively short performance, consisting of only two separate sections: a set of four orations (three in Latin, one in Greek) and a dialogue in English. The first oration also serves as a 'functional prologue', while the conclusion of the dialogue subsumes the role of an epilogue. Although the performance contains the only Greek prose oration in the manuscript, Greek is otherwise used very sparingly; only two short switches appear in the initial oration:

> (139) Atq[ue] in hoc ineffabilem miramur Regis clementiam. Apud quem plus valet illa, quoad fieri possit, injuriarum ἀμνηστία, quam vindictæ memoria. […] Atq[ue] hinc gaudemus quod Rex noster in imperio tam accuratè videat quid tempora, quid opportuna pietas postulet, et clementia: non immemor Principem esse ποιμένα λαῶν, qui tondere gregem solet, non deglubere.
>
> 'In this, too, we marvel at the indescribable clemency of the King, whose *forgiveness* of wrongdoings is stronger (as much as possible) than his memory of vengeance. […] And hence we rejoice that our sovereign King sees so accurately what the times, what due justice demands, as well as clemency, not forgetting that the prince is *a shepherd of the people*, who is in the habit of trimming the herd, not skinning it.'
>
> (*Seamen*, f. 186r)

The first switch, ἀμνηστία, is similar to πανοπλία and σύνοψις, discussed above: the word had been borrowed into Latin as *amnestia*, and in the present context the 'Greekness' of the word is apparent only in the use of the Greek alphabet. As in the above-mentioned cases, the word is analysable as a technical term; the author or scribe may have chosen to present it as Greek based on his knowledge of its origins (i.e. because he considered it to be the *correct* way to represent the word). The expression ποιμὴν λαῶν is proverbial, found in the *Iliad* (e.g. Hom. *Il*. 1,263; 2,85; 2,105; 2,243; 2,254) especially as an epithet of Agamemnon. A similar link between him and an English king occurred in example (38), although there in reference to James I. As for the function of the total utterance analysed here, the aim is to enhance

the face of Charles II, which in turn is a means of showing loyalty to him and thereby affirming the 'loyalist' face claimed by the students and the school more broadly.

The dialogue takes place for the most part between a lieutenant called Brave and three seamen (whose names refer to their ethnicities): Vandunc (Dutch), Monsieur (French), and Taffy (Welsh). The performance took place during the Third Anglo-Dutch War, which is also the topic of the dialogue. The plot is simple: Brave encounters the three men (apparently in a pub or tavern) and converses with them, each of the three being afraid of battle. After a short speech by Brave, a captain called Courage arrives and orders the three men to their ships, concluding the performance with a poem. Perhaps the most interesting feature of the play is that each of the three seamen has a 'stage accent', consisting chiefly of certain conventional characteristics. In the case of Monsieur, these involve fortition of dental fricatives (e.g. *wid*, *dat*, *dey*), voicing of initial /f/ (*vear*, *vollow*), fricativization of initial /w/ (*vich*, *vitches*), devoicing of initial /d/ (*tevills*), sporadic vowel changes (*in > en*, *English > Anglish*), and nonstandard morphology (*catcht*). Vandunc's 'stage accent' involves voicing of initial /s/ (e.g. *zober, zave, zenses*), fortition of dental fricatives (e.g *dat*, *udder*, *tank*, *vid*), fricativization of initial /w/ (*vence*, *veel*, *vat*, *ven*, *vid)*, alveolarization of the palato-alveolar fortis sibilant (*sall*), sporadic vowel changes (*valentier*, *entoxicating*), and nonstandard morphology (*catcht*, *spreaken*). In the case of the Welsh Taffy, we find fortition of dental fricatives (e.g. *ting*, *tinks*, *de*, *dose*, *dey*, *wid*), fricativization of initial /w/ (*vich, vander*), voicing of initial /f/ (*verwell*, *vears*), devoicing of initial /d/ (*tevills*, *tevill*), alveolarization of the palato-alveolar fortis sibilant (*sip*), *her* as a generic pronoun (e.g. *her tinks = methinks*, *Her tells you = I tell you)*,[314] nonstandard morphology (*a driving*, *icleeped*, *a selling*), and special lexis (e.g. *Fader*, *ap* as in *ap Richard*, *ap Thomas*). The same characteristics are found in dialectal representations in printed early modern plays (see e.g. Bartley 1954; Blake 1981: 63–107). It should be noted, however, that none of the accents is fully consistent. Most of the features are also shared by the three characters; in printed plays, they are also found in representations of other dialects/varieties than the three mentioned here. The goal here is arguably to produce 'foreign-sounding' English, not necessarily fully accurate representations of actual accents. As noted above in 3.1.3.3, an accent may also be an FFI; at layer 2 there is no choice by the speakers which needs explaining, while at layer 1 the accents were probably chosen both for humour and to support characterization.

In addition to this more general phenomenon of accents, there are several phrases in the dialogue which have been counted as switches – *Monsieur* by itself has not been counted here, since it is the character's name; neither have the individual dialectal features been included. The first line of the dialogue, spoken together by

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[314] For this feature in particular, see e.g. Bartley (1954: 73–74).

the three seamen, is in French, while another switch later on by Brave is a 'grey area' case (between French and English):

> (140) **Van[dunc] Mon[sieur] Taf[fy]:** Vive le Roy! Vive le Roy! ['Long live the King!']
>
> (*Seamen*, f. 188v)

> (141) **Br[ave]:** Avant Cowards all. What fear a gun, death, or danger?
>
> (*Seamen*, f. 189r)

Although the choice of language in (140) may be linked to the 'foreignness' of the characters, this is a conventional formula similar to *Vivat Rex* mentioned above (section 5.2.3.6). The French exclamation also appears in two other Oak Apple Day performances, *Nic and Tom* (f. 215v) and *Thomas Teltroth* (ff. 334r & 335r; the former in verse followed by a reiteration in English), without any obvious French connotations. In (140), the reason for the seamen to produce this cry is that the dialogue is supposed to take place on the very day of the performance, the King's birthday. Whether *avant* (here either 'onwards' or 'away with you') should be counted as a switch is unclear; it belongs to the same category as expressions such as *imprimis*, *item*, and *amort* (it may be added that, as noted above, interjections are a common locus for both CS and borrowing). It is particularly difficult to determine whether it is used as an FFI in the present context: on the one hand Brave himself is not French, on the other the seamen are foregrounded in terms of 'foreignness' throughout the dialogue. Since there is nothing else to suggest that the choice was here connected to the addressees, it seems more coherent to account for the switch by reference to either a norm or a 'gap'.

In the following example, where Courage has arrived on stage and Brave has asked him to order the seamen back to their ships, we find clear cases of both CS and FFIs:

> (142) **Van[dunc]:** Cods sacrament!   **Mon[sieur]:** O Diabiler! ['Oh devil!']
> **Taf[fy]:** Cotspluterenails, what shall her doe?
> **Cou[rage]:** What? Fight or be kill'd. **Van[dunc]:** O good Memeer ['Sir']!
> **Mon[sieur]:** O pardonna moy, Monsieur. ['Oh forgive me, Sir!']
> **Taf[fy]:** Her Mam will cry to haue her son in firey ships to fry
> **Cou[rage]:** To your respective ships yee villains, or I'll make you. Host see 'em forth coming, or 'twill be to your peril.[315]
>
> (*Seamen*, f. 189v)

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[315]   *Cods sacrament = By God's sacrament. Cotspluterenails* probably stands for *By God's nails* with the added intensifier *pluter* (cf. *OED* 3, s.v. *pluterpositively*).

The French oath is probably supposed to stand for *O Diable* (cf. *Henry V*, IV.5.; *The Merry Wives of Windsor*, I.4*)*; the two other switches, the Dutch *Memeer* 'mister' and the full French clause *O pardonna moy, Monsieur* (cf. *Richard II*, V.3), are similarly transparent enough to be easily understood by the audience. At layer 1, the function of the switches is the same as that of the use of stage accents throughout the play, namely to serve as characterization and a source of humour. It is possible that Monsieur's switch into French for his final two utterances is meant to imply that he lapses into his native language due to distress, but there is little in the context to make this interpretation more coherent; it therefore remains at the level of speculation.

The remaining two switches occur in Courage's final speech:

(143)   And, God being for us, wee'll not doubt to haue
         Our Mare clausum ['closed sea'] made the Dutchmans grave.[316]
         […]

And thus wishing to the most illustrious Duke, the Navy, and myselfe all prosperity: Gentlemen, I bidd you all good night. And with as much latine as a blunt Seaman can express, I take my leave with Longum vivite, & Valete ['Live long and prosper'].

(*Seamen*, f. 189v–190r)

The first switch is a technical term, referring to a part of sea controlled by a particular country and hence not open indiscriminately to all vessels (*OED* 3, s.v. *mare clausum*) – a term which would have referred to a particularly topical concept at the time of the performance. As indicated by the reference to *the Dutchmans grave*, the aim here is at the same time to attack the shared face of the Dutch and to enhance the shared face of the English; this is also the aim of the poem as a whole. Courage also refers to the Dutch by the term *Hogen Mogens* (f. 189v); although I have not included the term in the CS counts reported in 5.1.1 and 5.2.1, it is probably used here as an FFI. The second switch consists of a variation of a phrase appended to several of the *Orationes* texts, signalling simply the conclusion of the performance (note also the metalinguistic comment concerning the character's limited Latin competence); the relevant explanatory entity would thus be some type of norm (perhaps a custom). Since the utterance refers to the play, it fluctuates between layers 1 and 2: the switch in language can also be analysed as marking this switch in layers (i.e. Latin is used as the framing language for the performance). This marking, however, is not achieved through CS alone: the speaker addresses the audience directly (*Gentlemen*), and notes explicitly that he is about to leave the stage.

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[316]   Note the conservative pronunciation of the vowel in *grave*, evident from the rhyme.

5.2.5.2   *Brisk*

Brisk consists of two Latin prologues, a set of five Latin orations, an English dialogue, and an English epilogue (apparently spoken by one of the characters in the dialogue). While it is one of the three Oak Apple Day performances (along with *The Ring of Giges* and *Thomas Teltroth*) with the highest number of switches, some of the switches occur more than once in the performance. To begin with, the orations contain only two short Greek phrases: one is νῦν Ὅ μακαρίτης, discussed above in 5.2.2.2; the other occurs in the preceding speech:

(144)   Captus est tandem, proh dolor! regum optimus; quem protinus σαρκαστικῶς irrident barbari canes

‘Finally they captured – oh the pain – the best of kings, whom the barbarous dogs immediately mock *bitterly*.’

(*Brisk*, f. 240v)

As in the ‘grey area’ cases between Greek and Latin discussed above, there would have been available a Latinate alternative from the same root: *sarcastice*. The switch differs from previous examples, such as σύνοψις or *haereseως*, in being unambiguously Greek even in its spoken form. There is in fact a word-play involved here: σαρκαστικῶς is derived from σαρκάζειν (as is σαρκασμός), whose meaning is ‘to tear off flesh, to bite’, whence the metaphorical extension ‘to speak bitterly’ (see e.g. *OED* 1, s.v. *sarcasm*). In (144), both the literal and the metaphorical meanings are evoked: mockery is ‘biting’ metaphorically, dogs are so literally.

The dialogue consists of a conversation on religious and political topics between four characters – Clod, Brisk, Malevolo, and Careless. Similarly to *Seamen*, one of the characters has a ‘stage dialect’: Clod, who is basically a clown character, uses ‘rustic’ south-western features, mainly specific vowel variants (represented by *a > o* in particular) and lexical choices (e.g. *i’foith = in faith*). As above, the reason for the choice (at layer 1; there is no choice at layer 2) is both to create humour and to characterize Clod. The first switch, a recurring one, occurs in the first lines of the dialogue:

(145)   **Cl[od]:** Sauve you, good monseiur Brisk. I haue known you alwaies brisk, and bonny: but never more brisk, and bonny then to doy. I perceive by their latine tolking of Chorles, and Chorles, they keep to doy a solemnity. I poor mon being ignorant brought my corn to town for the Miller:

(*Brisk*, f. 243v)

What is particularly striking about *monsieur* (or *monseiur*) is that it recurs three more times in the dialogue, twice spoken by Malevolo (ff. 245r & 245v) and once by Careless (f. 246r; as *Monsieur*); each time it is used in addressing Brisk.[317] It is unclear why this happens, as Brisk is not presented as French; nor is there anything to suggest that these uses are ironic. My suggestion is that this is at least in part a 'by-product': all of the characters' names occur in printed early modern plays (see Berger, Bradford & Sondergard [1998] 2006); Brisk is presumably based on Fastidious Brisk, a courtier in Ben Jonson's *Every Man out of his Humour*. Brisk's name refers to his being a gallant or a fop; furthermore, in Jonson's play, he is addressed fourteen times as *monsieur* (as opposed to e.g. *master*, which is used in reference to him but not when addressing him). It is possible that the King's School Brisk also wore fine clothes – Clod calls him *bonny*, which may here mean either 'happy' or 'beautiful' – and was supposed to represent in his appearance an archetypal character similar to Fastidious Brisk, although he does not act in the same manner; in fact, he seems to have been cast as the 'moderate royalist/protestant', a character-type found for example in many of the Gunpowder Plot performances. If the choice of address form, as suggested here, is nevertheless connected to the above-mentioned archetype, the occurrences of *monseiur/monsieur* may be explained as a neutral anticipated consequence of conformance to a (perceived) norm.

In addition to the single switch, there is another feature in (145) which deserves further comment: the humorous *latine tolking of Chorles*, which refers to the preceding orations. The same joke occurs in the Oak Apple Day performance of the previous year, there with two switches into Latin:

(146) **N[ic]:** O stronge! Tom, what a woundy deal of gibble gobble is here? What reeks they keep about Rāx.
T[om]: They tolk much of Carōlus & Carōlus. But I think 'tis a Christmas carol. For I do'nt understand it no more then the Pope of Rumm.[318]

(Nic and Tom, f. 214v)

The two rustics, Nic and Tom, use the same stage dialect as Clod in *Brisk*, and although it is implied in (145) that Clod does not understand Latin, the point is made even clearer here, first with Nic's corrupted *Rāx* (for *Rex*), next with Tom's confusion about *Carolus* and Christmas carols. At layer 2 the switches are merely reported speech, while at layer 1 they function both as jokes and to characterize the rustics (cf. *Discipuli et Rustici* in 5.3.1 below). These differ from the puns in the Lenten performances in the sense that they are intentional only at layer 1; at layer 2

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317 Brisk is addressed twice as *M^r*, once as *S^r*, and once as *Captain* (by Careless; Brisk reciprocates by using the same term).

318 *Reeks = reaks* 'pranks' (*OED* 3, s.v. *reak*), but here probably 'riotous celebration'.

they are infelicitous unanticipated consequences (since the rustics obviously do not *intend* or *wish* to appear foolish).

A single Latin phrase is also produced by Malevolo, once more a 'grey area' case:

(147)   [**Malevolo:**] And all these things must not only be tolerated, but owned cum Privilegio ['with license']. Against which all powers ought to stand watchfull upon their guard

(*Brisk*, f. 245r)

The phrase *cum privilegio* is perhaps most familiar from title-pages of printed books, where it signifies that the printer had a license to print a work subject to a monopoly (the Bible in particular); it is, in other words, a technical term. Malevolo has been complaining about the Puritans and their wish to change certain aspects of the state religion. The reference to *cum privilegio* thus refers in (147) to making Puritanism the only officially sanctioned form of Christianity – something to which Malevolo objects. A similar reference is found in *Nic and Tom*, where a Papist proclaims the following:

(148)   Wee'll doe more in private, and Secreto ['in secret']
        Then all Fanaticks with their Privilegio.

(*Nic and Tom*, f. 217v)

We may note here the addition of *Secreto*, probably chosen simply to enable the rhyme with *Privilegio*. The phrase *cum privilegio* also appears in *Thomas Teltroth* (f. 335v), where Teltroth refers not to Puritanism but to various dissenting sects, as well as in *Discipuli et Rustici* (f. 288r), where it refers to an alcohol license (see 5.3.1 below).

The remaining switches are produced by Brisk, two of them in a single longer utterance:

(149)   **Br[isk]:** [...] And under God there is committed to him [i.e. to Charles] the staff of Bonds, as well as Beauty. Beauty hath love in it to unite dissenting spirits. Bonds are strong cords to bind; where loue, and indulgence cannot prevail. According to that old versicle
            Verba ligant homines, taurorum cornua funes.
            ['Words bind people, ropes the horns of oxen']
        [...] But see; here comes Careless. Care not, Malevolo, what he saies. For he'll be merry whether King, or noe King. Reign King, or Kesar, all is one to him:

whether Breeches or Unicorne be uppermost: whether Church or Kirk thrive, He is Jack Careless still.[319]

(*Brisk*, ff. 245r–v)

The Latin phrase is a proverb, used here to bolster (or clarify) Brisk's argument, namely that more drastic measures are needed when mercy by itself does not suffice; the preceding part about the two staffs is a biblical reference (Zech. 1:7). The boys may have indeed encountered the proverb in a religious context; it does not occur in the phrase collections mentioned in preceding sections. The other possible switch in (149) is *Kesar* (i.e. *Kaiser*), which is of Scandinavian and German origin (see *OED* 3, s.v. *Kaiser*). It is a 'grey area' case, particularly because the collocation with *king* is conventional; the same pair of words also appears in the epilogue (f. 246v), and in *Thomas Teltroth* (f. 334r). In the present context the word may have foreign connotations by allusion to rule under a foreign power; the following pair *Breeches or Unicorne* possibly refers to Commonwealth and Scottish rule, respectively (see e.g. *OED* 2, s.v. *breech*; s.v. *unicorn*; cf. the subsequent phrase *Church or Kirk*).

5.2.5.3 *The Ring of Giges*

The Ring of Giges consists of a Latin prologue and epilogue, a set of four Latin speeches, and an English dialogue. The first switches occur in the initial oration:

(150) Sinè nimirum imperio nec domus ulla, nec Civitas, nec hominum universum genus stare, nec rerum natura, nec mundus ipse, multo minus vera religio, consistere potest: dum inter Fanaticos, atq[ue] Papicolas quod libet, licet. Hinc oraculum videri potest illud Philosophi Τὸ μὲν ἄρχειν, καὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι, οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμφέροντων, præsertim in principatu.

'Truly, without authority no house, no state can persist, neither the whole human race; nor can the nature of things exist, nor the world itself, much less true religion; while among the fanatics and Popelings, whatever they please is allowed. Hence that observation of the philosopher may seem like a divine announcement: *To rule and to be ruled is not only necessary but beneficial –* especially in a state.'

(*The Ring of Giges*, f. 265r)

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[319] *Bonds* and *Beauty* have been written in a slightly larger script.

(151) ut tam Regi obsequantur, quàm Deo, qui Regem tam ad miraculum usq[ue] nobis hodie reddidit, secundum nemini, præterqueam Deo. Non itaq[ue] imprudenter clamat Philosophus Ὁ βασιλεὺς ὁ Θεὸς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων.

'so that they [the Britons] submit to the King as to God, who miraculously restored the King to us today, next to no-one but God himself. Accordingly, it is not without foresight that the philosopher declares: *The king is a God among humans*.'

(*The Ring of Giges*, f. 265v)

In both examples the speaker notes that the quotation derives from 'a philosopher';[320] in (150) this refers to Aristotle (Arist. *Pol*. 1,1254a). This, however, is not the immediate source of the quotation, as the whole extract has been copied from the *Politica* of Justus Lipsius (1589: 29–30);[321] this is fairly clear, since the Latin sentence which begins the example is also found in Lipsius (it is a quotation from Cicero; *leg*. 3,3), immediately preceding the quotation from Aristotle (Lipsius provides references throughout). The rest of the oration also contains several parts derived from the same work. At one level, then, the inclusion of the Greek quotation is a neutral or felicitous anticipated consequence of using Lipsius as a source. At another level, the quotation serves to bolster the speaker's argument concerning the necessity of having a king. The same extract, with minor changes, also appears in an Oak Apple Day oration probably delivered some four years later:

(152) Sine nimirum imperio nec domus ulla, nec civitas, nec gens, nec universum hominum genus stare potest, neq[ue] rerum sanè natura, nec mundus ipse. Τὸ γὰρ ἄρχειν, καὶ αρχεσθαι, οὐ μόνον συμφεροντων εστιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν αναγκαιων.

'Truly, without authority no house, no state, no clan, neither the whole human race can persist, nor indeed the nature of things, nor the world itself. *For to rule and to be ruled is not only beneficial but necessary*.'

(*Theoeides*, f. 388r)

The situation is similar to certain ones discussed in preceding sections: the similarity may be due either to using Lipsius as a source or to the availability of the earlier oration as a model. The quotation in (151) similarly derives from Lipsius (1589: 33),

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[320] Cf. *the Poet* in example (8), and *Poeta* in examples (56) and (159).
[321] Hoole (1660) mentions the letters and speeches of Lipsius at the beginning of his work, as recommended auxiliary reading for boys in the highest form.

who attributes it to Plato.[322] The phrase does not occur in the *Republic* in this form; it probably refers to the idea of the 'ring of Gyges' (see Pl. *Resp.* 2,359d–360c; cf. 8,568b), which granted its wearer the power of invisibility and made him ἰσόθεος 'equal to the gods'. As in the preceding case, the quotation is used to bolster the speaker's argument, in particular with reference to the King's divinity. At the same time, the utterance also serves to further enhance Charles's face, thereby enabling the boys and the whole school to maintain their own 'loyalist' face.

Two more switches occur in the other speeches, in both cases consisting of the same phrase:

(153) Fuit nuper illud tempus in quo, O nefas! οἱ πολλοὶ, et ut ita dicam, fæx Romuli solium occupârunt.

'There was not a long ago that time when (oh the horror!) *commoners* and – so to speak – the dregs of Romulus occupied the throne.'[323]

(*The Ring of Giges*, f. 266r)

(154) Neq[ue] placet illi tam horrendi nominis persecutio, quam οἱ πολλοὶ metuunt.

'Neither does it please him to persecute the members of such a terrible sect, something of which *the masses* are also afraid.'

(*The Ring of Giges*, f. 268r)

Οἱ πολλοί is originally a technical term, but when used negatively, it has either learned or upper-class ('elitist') connotations. It is in fact used somewhat differently in the two examples: in (153) it is used as an FTA (perhaps more in the sense of 'riff-raff'), as indicated by the juxtaposition with *fæx Romuli*. In (154), however, it seems to refer to 'common folk' in general, with no obvious negative undertones.

The rest of the switches occur in the dialogue, which consists of conversations between Rightway (a Protestant) and three dissenters: Totide (a Quaker), Pert (an Independent; i.e. a Congregationalist), and Hothead (a Presbyterian):

(155) **P[ert]:** My friends, you have heard a long bedrole against us Nonconformists. But let them bawl what they can against us wee weigh them not a rush. This invisible ring from a spiritual Giges shall either sheild us from the sight of our triumphal Adversaries: or πόδας ὠκὺς Αχιλλεὺς ['the swift-footed Achilles'] will slip soe neatly away, that they shall spye out nothing to

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[322] Lipsius (1589: 33) and others translate the quotation as *rex, deus quispiam humanus est* 'a king is some human god'.

[323] On *faex Romuli*, cf. (Cic. *Att.* 2,1,8).

informe against our 'states, or persons. My friends, all is well that ends well. But, respice finem ['consider the end'] as the Hebrew hath it.

<div align="right">(The Ring of Giges, ff. 269v–270r)</div>

(156) **R[ightway]:** Oh ho! Haue I caught you, Monseiur Pert? Where is now your spiritual, and invisible ring? Where is now πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεὺς ['the swift-footed Achilles']?

P[ert]: Friend, I pray be quiet, and persecute an obedient Saint no more. I protest the Laws take away some scruples are very just, and very good. But Summum jus summa injuria ['The highest justice, the highest injustice'] as the Artists haue it.

<div align="right">(The Ring of Giges, f. 270v)</div>

Although the reference to the ring of Gyges contains no switching, it deserves further comment. The preceding orations, together with the fact that there seems to be a connection to Plato's *Republic* in *Sprat and Cage* (see 5.2.4.3 above), might suggest that the notion was familiar to the boys from this work in particular. It was, however, a commonly used trope; the phrase itself occurs in contemporary works belonging to several different genres (e.g. plays and sermons). In the present context, it is used in reference to covert religious activities. The Greek phrase, which occurs in both examples, is a common epithet of Achilles in the *Iliad* (e.g. Hom. *Il.* 1,58; 9,196); it is not, however, a typical quotation, but more properly a conventional formula. Since Pert compares himself to Achilles, the act can be interpreted as self-face-enhancement, while Rightway uses it with an obvious ironic undertone, hence as an FTA. The Latin phrase *respice finem* is a common proverb used in at least two different senses; here it is used as encouragement, or 'generalized advice'. The Latin quotation in (156) is mentioned for example by Cicero (Cic. *off.* 1,33), but it is also a common proverb, also discussed by Erasmus (*Adagia*, 925, where he refers to several sources in addition to *de Officiis*). Here it is being used in its customary sense, referring to injustice caused by too strict an adherence to laws, to bolster Pert's argument. Finally, Pert's flagging of the Latin quotations – misleading at best – is possibly meant to convey a humorous effect by demonstrating that he is not as well-versed in literature as he pretends to be. If this is the correct analysis, then the flagging constitutes an FTA against his own positive face (though only from the audience's perspective), since this is in effect a *failure* combined with an infelicitous unanticipated consequence.

5.2.5.4   *Thomas Teltroth*

Thomas Teltroth consists of a Latin prologue, a set of six orations (five in Latin, one in Greek), and an English dialogue, which includes a 'functional epilogue'. The orations contain three instances of switching into Greek, two of these occurring within a single sentence in the fourth speech:

(157)   Quis enim nescit in supremi Regis salute summam etiam populi salutem contineri. Βασιλεὺς ut ἔτυμον verè significat populi fundamentum est. Sine quo populi salus miserè corruisset.

'For who does not know that even the highest well-being of the people depends upon the well-being of the supreme King. *The king*, as its *etymon* correctly indicates, is the basis of his people.'

(*Thomas Teltroth*, f. 332r)

The term ἔτυμον appeared above in example (110), while the supposed etymology for βασιλεύς was mentioned in example (112) (see 5.2.3.5 and 5.2.3.6). Here, the explanation of the etymology is less explicit, relying on the common ground between the speaker and the audience, which makes the reference an in-group marker. The reason for referring to the etymology in the first place, however, is once again to bolster the speaker's argument concerning the importance of the King's well-being. The same reference, with slightly different wording, also occurs in another Oak Apple Day performance (probably staged two or three years after *Thomas Teltroth*):

(158)   Rex nimirum, ut græcè dicamus βασιλεὺς, fundamentum totius regni à sapientibus non immeritò vocatur.

'Truly, wise men justly call the king – or *basileus,* as we say in Greek – the basis of the whole kingdom.'

(*Theoeides*, f. 388v)

In both examples, the presence of the Greek term makes the reference more straightforward and accessible; it can thus be analysed as facilitation, just as switching facilitates the recognition of allusions in general. The complexity of the example can be illustrated by considering it briefly in terms of the concept of rationalization chains (see 4.3.1), with the following chaining of goals and means: G1 = bolster the argument, M1/G2 = allude to a well-known etymology, M2/G3 = use a term which makes the etymology transparent, M3 = switch to Greek. The 'solidarity' created by the in-group reference can in turn be analysed either as a separate chain with a different G1, or as a 'by-product chain' (see Fig. 10 above),

where the branching into this additional consequence takes place at the level of M1/G2.

The third switch occurs in the fifth oration:

(159) Hinc optimè cecinit Poeta, qui neglectis omnino cæteris gubernationum generibus prudenter exclamavit - Εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω, εἷς Βασιλεὺς

'Hence excellently sang the Poet, who, having completely disregarded other forms of government, sagaciously declared: *Let there be one ruler, one King*.'

(*Thomas Teltroth*, f. 332v)

This refers to the *Iliad* (Hom. *Il*. 2,204–205), where the lines are spoken by Odysseus. Since Lipsius was mentioned in the preceding section, it is worth adding that this quotation too occurs in his work, close to the references discussed above (1589: 33). There is, however, nothing else to link the quotation to his work in particular. Furthermore, a longer version of the same reference occurs in an earlier Oak Apple Day performance (probably performed some nine years earlier), this time with a more explicit mention of Homer:

(160) Meritò igitur Homerus (damnatis omnibus præ Monarchia Rebus-pub[licis]) præclare cecinit   Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη, εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω
Εἷς βασιλεὺς.

'It is with justification, therefore, that Homer (having condemned all other state-systems in favour of monarchy) admirably sang:
       It is not good to have many rulers. Let there be one ruler,
       One king.'

(*Disputatio de Re Publica*, f. 101r)

Lipsius does not provide the longer quotation; thus at least (160) has not been directly copied from him. In both examples, the quotation serves once more to bolster the speaker's argument, in this case regarding the superiority of monarchy to other systems of government. It is notable that the context in the *Iliad* is not political; there are no references to other forms of government. This demonstrates aptly how quotations in the *Orationes* performances could be taken completely out of their original contexts to serve new purposes, something which is also true of examples (151) and (152).

The dialogue contains the remaining switches, most of which have already been dealt with above (the phrases are *Vive le Roy*, twice; *Kesar*, *all amort*, and *cum Privilegio*). There are four characters, each named once more according to their

temperament or 'humour' – Frolick, Zeal (a Puritan), Indifferent, and Teltroth; the topics covered in the discussion are political and religious. The following example is a 'grey area' case, occurring in Frolick's opening lines:

(161) **Fro[lick]:** O my good neighbours, I cannot but be brisk, and frolick for the good words which have flowed from these ingenious youths, who are sensible of the damage of noe government. And as little respect the tumultuous government of the herd, and people, as the Rump Parliament, those beasts without heads; who being various in their opinions cannot but err as to the supream safety, giving their judgments for private ends This for Himselfe; That for his Cousin; That for Nicholas Nemo; Another for I know not what, but never for the publick good.

(*Thomas Teltroth*, f. 334r)

The possible switch in question is the name *Nicholas Nemo*, an unclear case precisely because *Nemo* is used as a proper noun. The rationale for counting it as a switch is that this is more properly analysed as a fixed phrase, a title which refers to a nonexistent person (i.e. 'Mr. Nobody'). It thus alludes to the questionable practices of members of the Rump Parliament, while the utterance as a whole consists of insults directed at them.

The final switch is produced by Teltroth, when he replies to Zeal's comments on 'the Covenant' (i.e. the Solemn League and Covenant, which resulted in prescribing Presbyterianism in England):

(162) **Tel[troth]:** […] So conscientious were they, that they thought a gaping Presbyter only to be satisfied with a gudgeon. Which made the godly Disciplinarian cry out

Impius hæc tam culta novalia miles habebit?

Barbarus has segites?

['Some wicked soldier will possess these so well-cultivated lands?

A barbarian these fields?']

For I must tell you that sometimes for his own purpose he will vouchsafe to use the language of the Roman beast.[324]

(*Thomas Teltroth*, f. 334v)

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[324] *Segites* pro *segetes*. *Disciplinarian* is here synonymous with *Presbyterian*; a *gudgeon* is a species of small fish.

The Latin lines are derived from Vergil (Verg. *ecl*. 1,70–71),[325] but they can also be considered a fixed expression, used in reference to a threat of conquest by a foreign nation or other such event. Here, however, the lines are reported speech, or more properly what Teltroth imagines a Presbyterian would have said – rather similar to *Omnia bene* in example (58). The quotation basically serves two functions at layer 2. One is to bolster Teltroth's argument, according to which the Presbyterian system caused harm; the other is more complex, and is linked to the subsequent reference to 'using the language of the beast' (cf. 5.2.5.5 below) – an allusion to extreme attitudes towards the use of Latin in religious contexts. The quotation is thus also a form or mockery through irony, in other words an FTA. Since Teltroth is arguing against Zeal, the whole utterance is an FTA against the latter's positive face.

5.2.5.5   *A Mender of Soles*

A Mender of Soles consists of a Latin prologue and a single oration, as well as a Latin-English dialogue. The case is similar to *Papistae Iuniores* (see 5.2.2.5 above; probably performed the following year) in that the number of insertional switches is low, but the dialogue includes interesting cases of language choice. One of the insertional switches (*Habeas corpus*) has already been discussed above in 5.2.3.4; the other occurs in the prologue:

> (163)   Et proinde nobis etiam Puerulis gratâ repetentibus memoriâ tam fælicem hodie cum Regni, tum Ecclesiæ, velut à mortuis, ἀνάστασιν, necessarium jubilandi negotium incumbit.
>
> 'And therefore it is incumbent upon even us boys with a grateful memory to recall today the happy *resurrection* – as if from the dead – of both the kingdom and the church.'
>
> (*A Mender of Soles*, f. 74v)

Ἀνάστασις is formally similar to both σύνοψις and τυραννίς, discussed above, in having been borrowed into Latin and being inflected according to the Greek model. In other words, only the fact that the word is written in the Greek alphabet highlights its status as an FFI. The word is a religious term, referring in particular to the resurrection of Jesus (the word occurs several times in the Greek version of the New Testament). In addition to this norm-based explanation, the term arguably brings to bear its religious overtones, thus providing face-enhancement for Charles and the relevant institutions – a central goal of the Oak Apple Day performances.

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[325]   Hoole Mentions the Eclogues as suitable reading material for several different forms (1660: 178 and *passim*), as does Brinsley (1622: 61).

The dialogue is superficially similar to that in *Papistae Iuniores*; this time, we have three characters plotting together: Heusonus (i.e. John Hewson, one of the people who signed Charles I's death warrant), Loyola, and Misomonarchus (also called Misanax). A fourth character, Philomonarchus (also called Philanax), comes across them, and they have a brief exchange of words; thus far the dialogue has been in Latin. Philomonarchus says that he has to leave and addresses the audience, informing them of his intention to fetch constables to arrest the plotters. Loyola and Misomonarchus escape, while Hewson disguises himself as a cobbler (one of the actual professions of John Hewson), after which Philomonarhcus arrives with the constables:

(164) **P[hilomonarchus]:** Sequere, et jam ostendam – Ecce Lictor. ['Follow me and I will show you – Look, constable!']

L[ictor]: Quid hoc? Sanè quidem insanis, Nemo hîc quisquam nisi Sutor calcearius ['What? Surely you are insane. There is no-one here but a shoemaker.']

P[hilomonarchus]: Cæteri quidem aufugerunt. Iste tamen sibi, et sedi suæ constat impudens fallaciarum artifex ['The others have indeed escaped, but that shameless master of deceits remains unchanged and unmoving.']

H[eusonus]: I fear the language of the beast; and therefore I'll now betake me to my mother tongue.   **Sings**.

Fortune my foe why doest thou frown on me?
And will thy favour never better be?
Wilt thou, I say for ever breed my pain?
And wilt thou not restore my joyes again?

P[hilomonarchus]: Hic unoculus est iste Husonus, exagitator Regum, subagitator Sororum; eum rapiamus illico ['This one-eyed man is that Hewson, a tormentor of kings and a ravisher of sisters; let us seize him instantly.'] – Sir traytour, I am glad I've caught you singing in plain English. Are not you He whom but ere now I found spouting nothing but Latine with your Comrade the Iesuite concerning a Toleration?

H[eusonus]: Alack, and well a day. S^r, You see me at another occupation I am a Cordwinder, and mender of Soles.

P[hilomonarchus]: A goodly mender of souls! Nay in troth rather a marrer of souls

(*A Mender of Soles*, f. 78r)

The pattern we find here is exactly the same as in *Papistae Iuniores*. Hewson's switch into English is in accordance with the face he attempts to claim for himself; as he himself notes, using Latin would be incongruous with the line he is adopting.

Philomonarchus follows along with Hewson's choice – again, like the Protestant in *Papistae Iuniores*; he similarly points out the former's use of Latin moments earlier, a fact which forces Hewson out of face (in Goffman's terms). It is worth noting, once again, that competence in Latin is not in itself being presented as a questionable attribute; in fact, both Philomonarchus and the constables have spoken Latin thus far, switching into English at this point and for the rest of the dialogue. Here we may also note the pun on *soles*, as well as Hewson's comment about being a *Cordwinder* (i.e. a cordwainer, 'shoemaker'), since this is also referenced in another Oak Apple Day performance, together with a switch from Latin into English:

(165)　**[Husonus:]** Et puto nos quos anglicè dicunt Cordwinders, fune anglice with a cord miserè strangulatum iri.

'**Hewson:** And I believe we, who are called *cordwainers* in English, will be taken miserably to be hanged *with a cord* (as is the English expression).'

(*Cromwellus et Furiae*, f. 130v)

In this play (probably performed two years after *A Mender of Soles*), the speaker is once again Hewson himself. At layer 1, the pun on *cord* may have been considered humorous, while at layer 2 it is quite macabre. The reason for switching into English is the same as in the case of the puns in the Lenten performances: to enable the joke in the first place, or to make it more apparent.

5.2.5.6　Other Oak Apple Day performances

As with the other subgenres, the remaining switches in the Oak Apple Day performances can be grouped under fairly straightforward rubrics. To begin with, there are several technical terms or fixed phrases, the Greek ones occurring in Latin contexts, the Latin ones in English contexts (cf. the 'hierarchy' of languages discussed above in 5.1.1). Several of the Greek terms are used as descriptions or epithets of Charles II or his father. These include ἀντίδοτος 'remedy' (*Laeta Britannia*, f. 49v), τοῦ πάνυ 'the excellent' (*Naked Truth*, f. 306v; in reference to Charles I), εἰρηνοποίω 'peace-maker' (*Theoeides*, f. 386v; dative), and Θεοείδης 'godlike' (*Theoeides*, f. 387r). In the last-mentioned case, the speaker notes that it is the highest-ranking epithet used by Homer; the second to last, on the other hand, has biblical connotations (cf. Matt. 5:9). All of these have an obvious face-enhancing function. Christian connotations are also discernible in the phrase πλαστοῖς *scilicet* λόγοις 'as it were, *false words*' (*Musarum Fautor*, f. 451v; cf. 2 Pet. 2:3), used in reference to non-Royalists. A more technical term is πολιτείαν 'form of government' (*Disputatio de Re Publica*, f. 102r; accusative), occurring at the conclusion of a

dialogue between characters advocating different forms of government. Similarly technical is the term ἐγκυκλοπαιδία 'encyclopaedia' (*Musarum Fautor*, f. 450r; i.e. εγκυκλοπαιδεία), the Latin form of which is *encyclopaedia*; the form found here is closer to the Latin than to the original Greek form. The term occurs in an oration where the speaker says that during the Puritan rule the 'encyclopaedia' in the sciences and arts – in other words the 'learning which encompasses the whole field' – consisted of *Disce mori* 'learn to die'. In the final Oak Apple Day performance, a character advises Nonconformists to act in secret, mentioning the possibility of an outsider observer becoming privy to their discussions, *as if he had some Nuncius inanimatus at command* (*Friends to the Cause*, f. 474v). *Nuncius Inanimatus* is the title to an early-seventeenth-century book by Francis Godwin, a work which sets out to describe communication over great distances. Finally, one performance contains a dialogue in which the Latin *ergo* occurs twice, to create a humorous effect. I present the example in full:

(166) **Pu[rifie]:** Yes truly. For wee have learn'd this true Delemma from our London logicians.   Men are Papists that are Conformists

You are a Conformist. Ergo

You are a Papist.

No[nconhate]: Ergo you are a Coxcomb, Mʳ Purifye. As wee are not fooles to be Pope-ridden:

(*Naked Truth*, f. 309v)

In the case of Purifie, his use of *ergo* is due to a domain-specific norm, while Nonconhate repeats the word with an ironic overtone. The repetition here serves as though to tie the comment back to what Purifie said; in both cases the utterances themselves are insults, but the switches do not directly contribute to this aim.

Five of the remaining switches are quotations, proverbs or proverbial expressions. To begin with, a rather long quotation is found in *Disputatio de Re Publica* (f. 99v), in a section where three characters – Philomonarchus, Philaristarchus, and Philanarchus – debate over different forms of government. Philanarchus argues in favour of democracy, anticipating possible objections to people's ability to govern themselves by quoting Isocrates: Τοὺς μ' γὰρ ἰδίωτας ἔστι πολλὰ τὰ παιδεύοντα, καὶ μάλιστα μεν τὸ μὴ τρυφᾶν, ἀλλ' ἀναγκάζεσθαι περι του βίου καθ' ἑκάστω ἀγωνίζεσθαι τὴν ἡμέραν. Ἔπιθ' οἱ νόμοι, καθ' οὓς ἕκαστοι πολιτευόμενοι τυγχάνουσιν ἔτι δ' ἡ παρρησία, καὶ τὸ φανερῶς ἐξεῖναι τοῖς τε φίλοις ἐπιπλῆξαι, καὶ τοῖς εχθροῖς ἐπιθέσθαι ταις ἀλλήλων ἁμαρτίαις.[326] 'For many things teach people in their private lives, and especially not living luxuriously but being

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[326]   Ἔπιθ' pro ἔπειθ'.

forced every day to deliberate over their livelihood. Then the laws, by which they each take care of their civic lives, and in addition the freedom of speech, and the license for friends to openly chastise and for enemies to openly attack each other's faults'. The quotation, from the speech to Nicocles (Isoc. *Ad Nicoc.* 2–3), belongs to the 'bolstering an argument' category discussed extensively above.

In *Laeta Britannia* (f. 49v), the Greek expression Ὄνος πρὸς λύραν 'an ass in front of a lyre' occurs together with the Latin *Sus Minervam* 'the pig [teaches] Minerva'; both are discussed by Erasmus (*Adagia*, 40, 335, 3047), and the speaker identifies them as 'old sayings' (*illa Antiquorum dicta*). He notes that he is almost dissuaded from speaking when he remembers the phrases; in other words, they are used to convey reluctance – a negative politeness strategy and a form of ritual modesty. Expressing modesty is also the reason for the speaker of the epilogue in *Theoeides* (f. 389r) to claim that the boys have spoken ὥς ἀν δυναίμεθα, καίπερ οὐκ ὡς ἀν βουλοίμεθα 'to the best of our abilities, although not to the best of our wishes'. I have not been able to identify a source with the exact phrasing found here, but it was probably based on some variation of a proverb discussed by Erasmus (*Adagia*, 743). Finally, the English dialogue in *Oldway and Rightrule* (f. 363r) contains a Latin quotation together with a conjunction and an address-term: *Sed amicè Nos hac a scabie tenemus unguem* 'But friend, we hold the fingernail away from this itch'. The quotation derives from Martial (Mart. 5,60,11); it is used as an indirect means to suggest that the characters abandon their current subject, thus serving as an off-record politeness strategy.

The remaining switches do not form a homogeneous group of their own. The Latin dialogue of *Cromwellus et Furiae* contains three instances of English names in their vernacular form: *Huson* once (f. 130v; vocative) and *Fleetwood* twice (ff. 130r & 130v; nominative and vocative). These are almost certainly 'slips' (whether by the author or the scribe); they occur together with the correct Latin forms, and there is nothing in the context to suggest that they are used as FFIs. The same dialogue also contains one instance of switching into French (f. 129v): *ut gallicè caneret Ie offende! ie peccavi* 'so that he will cry out in French *I have committed an offence!* that is, I have sinned'. The phrase is again 'imagined' reported speech, placed by Cromwell's ghost in the mouth of an unidentified poet who has insulted him. The utterance serves as an FTA: preceding this example is a list of tortures Cromwell wants to inflict on the person. The final example is a unique case of switching into an earlier form of English. In the English dialogue of *Oldway and Rightrule* (f. 361v), a Quaker says to the other characters: *I think yee are all wood* ['mad']*; that is to say in old English mad*. The word *wood* still existed at the time as a regionalism (*OED* 2, s.v. *wood, adj.*), but the flagging of it as *old English*, and the fact that the 'stage dialect' for Quakers contained obsolete words, together suggest

that it is used here as an archaism. At layer 1 the switch serves to characterize the speaker, while at layer 2 it is a straightforward FTA.

To sum up: the main categories of switching in the Oak Apple Day performances are similar to those identified in the preceding sections. Quotations are used on several occasions to bolster a speaker's argument, while a feature which makes this subgenre similar to the Gunpowder Plot performances is the use of religious terminology. The most unusual category of switching was identified in connection with various 'stage accents'; it is not, however, restricted to the Oak Apple Day performances, as we will see in the next section. As suggested in 5.2.1, there are indeed qualitative differences between the switching patterns in the four subgenres, although such macro-categories as quotations and technical terms are common to all of them. In the next section, CS will be viewed briefly from another perspective by comparing it to other discourse strategies.

5.3   Elaboration: CS as a discourse strategy

At this stage in the philological part of the analysis, explanations for individual instances of language choice and CS have been proposed by interpreting actions (i.e. explanation by understanding). The explanations have thus far been primarily pre-theoretical descriptions, although steps towards theoretical explanation have already been taken at various junctures. Here I continue the process and refine the explanations by comparing CS to other strategies, in terms of both form-to-function and function-to-form mappings. In 5.3.1, I focus on the longer dialogue section of *Discipuli et Rustici*, analysing on the one hand language choice and CS, on the other the use of address forms, in order to arrive at a better understanding of how CS is both similar to and different from other strategies. I examine two separate levels: the play as a whole (e.g. the default choice of language/address form), and individual actions. In 5.3.2, I present a brief overview of other strategies used in the *Orationes* texts for functions similar to those achieved via CS.

5.3.1   *Discipuli et Rustici* (Part 2): Code-switching and address forms

The longer dialogue in *Discipuli et Rustici* is one of the most complex plays in the *Orationes* manuscript, and is by far the most diverse with regard to language choice and CS. It also includes a wide-ranging cast of characters, of varying social standing and occupation. In addition to analysing all the switches and language choices in the play, my aim here is to determine whether and to what extent linguistic and social variables are connected, with the former used as a means of characterization. In order to better understand the role of language choice in the present context, I also analyse

other similar strategies, in particular the use of address forms. I begin with a description of the dramatis personae and the plot of the play; I then go on to discuss the main language choice for each character type, variation in address form usage, and the functions of individual switches.

The play contains the following 'sets' of characters: Eugenius, Philaster, and Grammatulus (*discipuli*, 'students'); Blunt and Knobbs (*rustici*, 'rustics'); Credulio and Trunks (*senes rustici*, 'elderly rustics'); Jacky (*filius Credulionis*, 'Credulio's son'); Gregory (*servus Credulionis*, 'Credulio's servant'); Philoponus (*ludimagister*, 'school-master'); and a crier (*Praeco*). The plot of the play, in brief, is as follows: while the headmaster is away on an errand, the students are planning to perform a play but have run out of actors. The two rustics have come to watch the performance, and the students recruit them to play parts in their performance. Meanwhile, Credulio has come to enter his son at the school, and when he meets Grammatulus he asks the latter to examine the boy. Grammatulus leaves to show Jacky around the school, while the elderly rustics and the two other students watch the beginning of their performance, consisting of a short speech by Praeco (with whom the students have a brief exchange) and the Prologue (a character not listed among the dramatis personae). At this point, Credulio's servant Gregory arrives – drunk – and falls asleep. Credulio and Trunks set off to apprehend the 'thieves' who have stolen Gregory's senses; they are accompanied by Eugenius and Philaster, who inform the elderly men that the perpetrators are called 'Ale' and 'Tobacco'. Grammatulus returns with Jacky, wakes Gregory up, and has a brief exchange with him before Eugenius returns, followed by the drunken Credulio, who falls asleep in turn. The next scene consists of a 'play within a play', where Blunt plays a Justice of the Peace and Knobbs his assistant (i.e. we have two additional character types), while Trunks is accused of not raising his hat when he meets Blunt (while Trunks was drunk). The three students and Gregory also take part in the performance, although they do not play specific characters. Throughout the performance, it is implied that neither Trunks nor Gregory is aware that what is taking place is merely a play. At the conclusion of the 'play within a play' Credulio wakes up and Philoponus returns, being shocked to find his school in disarray. He has a conversation with Credulio about Jacky's education – in particular about the costs, which Credulio considers too high; the performance concludes with Credulio coming to terms with Philoponus: Jacky stays at the school to receive his education, while Credulio makes his exit.

In terms of the social stratification models discussed by Nevalainen (1996: 58–61), it seems most appropriate to divide the characters into three groups based on their depictions in the play (cf. Nevala 2004: 20–23): 'upper' (the Justice of the Peace), 'lower' (Blunt, Knobbs, Praeco), and 'middle' (everyone else). This division is not based solely on social rank but also on the overall power relations (as depicted) and level of education. Furthermore, this division reflects only the relative ranking

of the groups; for example, as noted in Chapter 2, many of the King's Scholars were the sons of gentlemen (and hence of 'high' rank), but here it is more relevant to establish a separate group for the Justice of the Peace. In addition, in analysing dyadic relationships between characters or groups of characters, variables such as familiarity and individual power relations (i.e. Brown and Levinson's D and P values) need to be taken into account: the headmaster, for example, has power over the students, Credulio over Jacky and Gregory.

In terms of linguistics variables, we may first consider the languages available to the various characters. The only characters who are competent in Latin are the headmaster and the three students. For them, Latin is indeed not only the 'default' choice in most situations, but also the norm-conforming one (due to the language policy of the school). The distribution of address forms, on the other hand, is more varied. The forms I have analysed are of two types. The first is the choice between *thou* and *you* forms for the 2.p.sg. pronouns (subj. *thou*, *you*; obj. *thee*, *you*; poss. *thy*/*thine*, *your*/*yours*), which represents a case of T/V pronoun usage (see Brown & Gilman 1960). The second is the choice of various nominal address forms. I have included in this category both *direct address* and *terms of reference* (see Nevala 2004: 95–96); the latter are included only when the person referred to is either a *side-participant* or a *bystander* (see e.g. Clark 1996: 14–15) – in other words, when the referent can hear S, and this fact is common knowledge between S and the referent. The categories used are based on those in Nevala (2004), with slight modifications to account for this particular dataset (for the sake of clarity, I do not consistently retain the original spellings in reporting the occurrences of address forms). The categories are as follows: *first name* (FN; e.g. *Philaster*); *last name* (LN; e.g. *Knobbs*, *Credulio*); *kinship term* (KT; e.g. *cousin*, *father*); *friendship term* (FT; *friend*); *title* (e.g. *Mr*, *Sir*); *occupational term* (OT; e.g. *scribe*, *clark*, *fellow-scholar*, *schoolfellow*); *generic term* (GT; e.g. *man*, *fool*, *lout*, *people*);[327] *modifier* (Mod; e.g. *noble*, *grave*, *ignorant*); and *possessive* (Poss; *my*). In the descriptions given below, brackets indicate optional elements.

As for the pronouns, *you*-forms are by far the more frequent, with 203 tokens vs. 29 of the *thou*-type. One of the *thou*-forms is used by Credulio to address the Prologue, two by Gregory to address – apparently – a chair into which he stumbles when he first arrives on stage. Excluding these instances (since neither the Prologue nor the chair addresses any other character), *thou*-forms are used by five and addressed to eight out of nine character types. Their distribution is shown in Table 11.

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[327]   Generic terms include all NPs which do not conveniently fall into any other category (e.g. *chip of* [sic] *the old block*, *piece of learned hypocrisie*, *froggs of Helicon*, *Foxcatchers*).

Table 11. Distribution of T/V forms in *Discipuli et Rustici*. Y = *you*, *your*/*yours*; T = *thou*, *thee*, *thy*/*thine*. R=Rustici, D=Discipuli, S=Senes rustici, L=Ludimagister, G=Gregory, P=Praeco, F=Filius (Jacky), JP=Justice of the Peace, Ser=Servant.

		Addressee									
		R	**D**	**S**	**L**	**G**	**P**	**F**	**JP**	**A**	**TOTAL**
S p e a k e r	**R**	Y5,T6	Y8,T2								Y13,T8
	D	Y9,T1	Y6	Y18		Y17,T1	Y10,T4	Y2	Y6		Y68,T6
	S		Y9	Y14	Y14,T1			Y2,T7	Y10		Y49,T8
	L			Y11							Y11
	G		Y8	Y10,T1					Y1		Y19,T1
	P		Y1								Y1
	F			Y1							Y1
	JP		T1	Y13		Y4				Y9,T2	Y26,T3
	Ser			Y9					Y6		Y15
	TOT	Y14,T7	Y32,T3	Y76,T1	Y14,T1	Y21,T1	Y10,T4	Y4,T7	Y23	Y9,T2	

When addressing each other, the two *senes rustici* use exclusively *you*-forms; nine out of thirteen nominal address forms used in these situations are of the type (Mod) + Title + (FN) + LN, in other words most typically *Mʳ Trunks* and *Mʳ Credulio*. During the conversation between the *senes* (mainly Credulio) and Philoponus, *you*-forms are used predominantly (see below for a discussion of the sole *thou*-form), together with more formal address forms: the ones produced by Philoponus are all of the type (Mod) + Title, in most cases *Sʳ*, while two of the four produced by the *senes* are *Sʳ*. In other words, these are symmetrical dyadic relationships, characterized by the employment of negative politeness strategies (cf. Brown & Levinson 1987: 250). The two *rustici*, on the other hand, use *thou*-forms six out of eleven times in their intragroup communication. Of the ten nominal address forms they use to each other, five are of the type (Mod/KT/FT) + LN.[328] Notably, they never employ titles in addressing each other; compared to the *senes*, this is a case of a symmetrical dyadic relationship characterized by positive politeness. The highest proportion of *thou*-forms to *you*-forms (seven to two) occurs when Credulio addresses Jacky (i.e. in an asymmetrical relationship with high P(S,H) and low D), while all seven nominal tokens are of the type (Poss + (Mod)) + NN/KT (e.g. *my good Child*, *my dear Jacky*). When any character addresses the Justice of the Peace (i.e. in an asymmetrical relationship where both P(H,S) and D are high), they use only *you*-forms, while the fifteen nominal tokens are all of the type (Mod) + Title, in most cases *your Worship*. The Justice of the Peace is also the only character who uses *sirrah*: twice to Trunks, three times to Knobbs (his assistant); the form implies a high P(S,H) value.

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[328] One of these five contains an initial Poss element.

As these few examples demonstrate, choice of address forms is clearly one of the ways in which the different character types are distinguished from one another. As with language choice, however, the 'default' choice is only one aspect of the phenomenon; individual instances of address choice can be used for various functions. An example of this is provided by the way the students address Gregory: of the nine nominal forms, four are of the type (Mod) + Title, one of Title + FN; the forms include *noble S^r*, *your Worship*, and *Monsieur Gregory*. As will be shown below, these are clearly ironical choices, used as FTAs.

Moving on to individual examples: the first switch occurs during the scene where the two *rustici* have arrived to watch the performance and Eugenius is delivering a brief monologue (to the audience) in Latin:

(167)   **Eu[genius]:** Juno Lucina, fer opem! Nostra intus laborat Scena: et periculum est ne vel abortiva pareret, aut deformis aliquid monstri in lucem protruderet, tam miseram patitur pariendi difficultatem ob hoc unicum. Et, ni fallor, maximè sollicita est, ne expectationibus vestris injuriam faceret. (Intrat Philaster) Quod si – ['Juno Lucina help us! Our play is in labour, and there is a danger that she delivers the child prematurely or pushes out into light some misshapen monstrosity, so wretched difficulty she suffers due to this singular thing. And if I am not mistaken, she is very anxious about doing injustice to your expectations. (Enter Philaster) But if –'
Phi[laster]: Quod si ['But if'] – Put on your hat my submissive peice of learned hypocrisie. I marvel what makes you soe humble this morning.
Eu[genius]: Phil, welcome. What news bring you?

<div align="right">(Discipuli et Rustici, f. 283v)</div>

As noted above, the default language choice for the students in their intragroup communication is Latin: throughout the play, when there are no other participants in the conversation, the students speak Latin.[329] I have suggested elsewhere (Mäkilähde 2018a: 310–211) that Philaster's switch indicates a low D-value, where the relevant aspect of D relates not to the two boys' shared educational background but to their personal friendship; in the former case, the appropriate 'we-code' for them would be Latin. It is worth noting that the two address forms used here – the nickname *Phil* and the mock-impolite *my submissive peice of learned hypocrisie* – are also of a low D-value variety, thus increasing the coherence of the explanation of the switch.

The scene takes a turn when Eugenius informs the audience that the play has been cancelled, at which the *rustici* protest vehemently. The boys switch to Latin for a brief exchange during this conversation:

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[329]   For participants vs. non-participants, see e.g. Clark (1996: 14–15).

(168) **Ph[ilaster]:** Faith, Honestyes, our intentions were to shew you some sport. But wee are crossd in our unlucky Stage.

Bl[unt]: Stage? what creature's that? A man, or a Woman?

Eu[genius]: Common to both. Although for the present it wants Actors of either Sex.

Bl[unt]: Heark thee, my pretty Barne. If shee be a woman, and handsom too, let mee act with her. Shall I?

Kn[obbs]: And me too, good Boy.

Eu[genius]: Audin, Philaster, quàm liberam nobis pollicentur operam? Quid si ducamus in proscenium, unde mox Actores prodeant suâ saltem ineptiâ plausibiles? ['Do you hear how freely they offer their service to us, Philaster? What if we were to lead them on the stage, whence they would soon appear as plausible actors – at least in terms of their ineptitude?']

Ph[ilaster]: Prout se res habent nostræ introducamus. ['As our situation is this, let us lead them in.']

Bl[unt]: Nay latine mee noe more then I latine you? For verily I kenn it not. My Grandmother good old soul died long before I was born.

Eu[genius]: Suppose shee did. What then?

Bl[unt]: Therefore I haue skill only in my Mothers tongue

(*Discipuli et Rustici*, ff. 284r–v)

The main purpose of the switch is arguably to prevent the *rustici* from understanding what is being said; it is thus a form of *exclusion*. As discussed above in 3.1.4.2, there are different types of exclusion, depending on its aim; in other words what goal it serves in a rationalization chain. In the present context, the reason for excluding Blunt and Knobbs is to *avoid* producing an on-record FTA: the content of the utterances is thus at issue. Finally, if we continue further in our analysis of the rationalization chain, the reason for avoiding the FTA is to ensure that the *rustici* will cooperate, thus allowing the boys to satisfy their primary goal: staging their play (i.e. the 'play within the play'). An additional consequence of the switch is that Blunt and Knobbs realize that they are excluded from the conversation – an FTA against them. It is not clear from the context, however, whether they consider it rude that the boys are speaking Latin; Blunt only makes it known that the *rustici* do not know the language (in Goffman's terms, this is a reinterpretation of their face, part of the corrective process). It may be noted that, in addition to their not knowing Latin, the extract contains other elements which emphasize the status of the *rustici* as 'clown' characters, namely the use of dialectal or archaic forms (*verily*, *kenn*, *Barne*) as well as the confusion between *grannam* and *grammar* – a joke which also occurs in the following scene. At layer 1 these features serve to characterize Blunt and Knobbs,

while at layer 2 the mistake in particular is an FTA against Blunt's positive face, although one to which he and Knobbs are oblivious.

The next few switches occur in the scene where Credulio and Trunks first arrive on stage. Credulio has explained that he is contemplating entering Jacky at the school, making him *a Scholard*; the 'rustic' nature of these characters is foregrounded, *inter alia*, by minor mistakes such as this. Furthermore, they do not seem to value extensive learning, especially since it is costly:

(169) **Cr[edulio]:** Marry that's a blessed happiness your children can have their destruction for nothing. My purse I fear will not reach soe deep.

Tr[unks]: Why not, man? You must doe, as wee doe, plead for your freedom Sub forma pauperis ['as a pauper']; and make a lamentable face; and say you are a very poor man. Charity will be charity still.

<div align="right">(Discipuli et Rustici, f. 285r)</div>

We may note first *destruction* pro *instruction,* a humorous mistake repeated in the final scene of the play (see below). The phrase *sub forma pauperis* refers to the principle of being exempt from paying for something due to poverty; it is hence analysable as a technical term. At layer 2, the switch can be accounted for simply by reference to this fact (a norm-based explanation), while the utterance itself is a form of advice. At layer 1, the switch itself does not perform any additional function; the utterance as a whole is used to maintain a particular face for these characters, namely one in which learning is not valued highly. The same type of face-work continues throughout the scene, particularly when Grammatulus arrives on stage. He talks to himself briefly, wondering where Eugenius (whom he has been ordered by the teacher to remind about writing a letter) has disappeared to. At the conclusion of Grammatulus's monologue, Credulio addresses him:

(170) **Gra[mmatulus]:** [...] Suo nimirum periculo abest. Ego in portu navigo. ['He is absent at his own risk. I am safe.']

Tr[unks]: Nay I thought wee should have him in his latines instantly

Cr[edulio]: And verily he is a wonderous ready scholard at it. Young gentleman, may I presume to spur you a question, or two?

Gram[matulus]: Mene, si placet, alloqueris? aut num quid me vis, obsecro? ['Are you talking to me, please? Pray, do you want something from me?']

Cr[edulio]: Immò ego vult habere aliquid res, dic latinè with you ['Nay, I wants to do some business, say in Latin: *with you*'].

Tr[unks]: Out, Mʳ Credulio, out, all to be out. You have forgotten those toys long since.

Cr[edulio]: Why truely to my knowledge I have not look'd on my Grannum these twonty good years.

Gra[mmatulus]: I am confident therefore in my hopes, Grave Sʳ, you will excuse the rudeness of my answer. Our schoole statutes confine me to noe other dialect.

Cr[edulio]: Marry that's a good Statute indeed. Upon condition my son Jacky could doe half soe much, would I had never a pair of breeches to my what? – Dic latinè ['say in Latin'] art, Child.

Jac[ky]: Nominativo hæc ars ['in the nominative haec ars, 'this art''], Father.

Cr[edulio]: Would I had never a pair of breeches to my art in dic latinè then. But, Sʳ, let me intreat your courteous pains to examine this child of mine whether as yet he be fitting for your society.

(*Discipuli et Rustici*, f. 285v)

If we focus first on the perspective of Grammatulus at layer 2, his choice of Latin for both the soliloquy and the reply to Credulio are explained by his explicit mention of the school statutes (cf. 2.2.2.3 above). This choice is hence norm-governed, reflecting Gumperz's category of situational CS; however, it also threatens Credulio's negative face, as he would be expected to likewise switch to Latin at this point. He does indeed switch, but the Latin he produces is incorrect and inelegant; hence an infelicitous consequence of this choice is that his positive face is 'damaged', at least in the eyes of Grammatulus, whose language choice also implies that he expected his interlocutor to understand Latin. At layer 1, the function of the incorrect Latin is to produce a humorous effect and to characterize the *senes rustici* as 'clown' characters similar to Blunt and Knobbs. In his Latin utterance, Credulio also produces a switch into English: the phrase *dic latinè* is used here to indicate that he does not know how to say *with you* in Latin; it is thus due to a gap in his competence. Credulio's switch to Latin is effectively a gambit whereby he is attempting to claim a particular kind of face for himself – in this case, someone who knows a little Latin – and he considers the utterance he produces a satisfactory means to this end. From the point of view of Grammatulus (as well as the audience), however, this is an irrational action, in that it is based on an RP which they do not share, or which they do not believe to exist (see also Mäkilähde 2018a: 305). Since Credulio is unable to attain the intended goal by the chosen means, the action is a failure. This is confirmed by the next utterance by Trunks, as well as the one by Credulio himself (note also the dialectal *twonty*).[330]

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[330] Lutzky (2012: 245) suggests that *marry* is used in early modern drama as a linguistic feature of the lower social ranks. This seems to be on the whole the case in *Discipuli et Rustici* as well, provided that both the *rustici* and the *senes rustici* are analysed as 'lower rank' characters: of the thirteen tokens found in the whole performance, three are

Although Credulio's face is damaged during the exchange (in other words, he can no longer claim it without conflict with his previous actions), it would be a mistake to analyse this consequence as having been intended by Grammatulus. When the latter switches to English, he uses several negative politeness strategies: apologizing, giving reasons, and using the reverential address form *grave S^r*.[331] It is only at layer 1 that Credulio is intentionally made to look foolish. Whether this is also the aim of the final part of the example, however, is somewhat unclear. Credulio uses the same phrase as above, *dic latinè*, asking Jacky to translate *art* into Latin, which the latter then does. In Credulio's next utterance, *art in dic latinè* should thus be replaced by Jacky's translation, namely *ars* – a pun on the English *arse*.[332] It is not clear, however, how this exchange is to be analysed at layer 2; for example, it may be the case that Credulio intentionally avoids saying *arse* by making his son utter the (nearly) homophonous word, in which case this would be a case of euphemism (for face-maintenance). It is also possible, however, that the audience is meant to understand the pun as a mistake on Credulio's part (in other words an infelicitous unanticipated consequence). Both explanations involve certain problems, detracting from their coherence: in the former case this display of linguistic competence does not accord well with the characterization of Credulio thus far, while in the latter case it is hard to specify what Credulio is attempting to achieve by translating *art* into Latin. At layer 1, however, the situation is quite clear: the primary aim is simply to enable the production of the pun for a humorous effect.

The next example occurs immediately after the preceding one, as Jacky is allowed to exhibit his Latin skills:

(171) **Gra[mmatulus]:** The conscience of my own weakness pleads a deniall. Yet your request for once shall be my command. Fellow-scholar, in hopes of our better acquaintance, what was the last lesson you learn'd?
Jac[ky]: Fælix quem faciunt aliena pericula cautum. ['Fortunate is the person whom the perils of others make careful.']

produced in the shorter dialogue by the *scholastici rurales*, one by Philaster, one by Praeco, two by the *rustici*, and six by the *senes rustici*.

[331] For the reiterative aspects of the exchange, see Harjunpää & Mäkilähde (2016: 188–189).

[332] Recall that for the purpose of counting the number of switches in each play, insertions were considered from the point of view of the 'discoursal matrix' of the section in question. From this point of view, Credulio's *dic latinè* and Jacky's *Nominativo hæc ars* are Latin insertions within an English matrix. From a syntactic point of view, however, the main language of the clause in both cases is arguably Latin, containing the English switches *art, Child*, and *Father*. This example demonstrates well the difficulties encountered in attempting to report any comparable counts of CS.

> **Cr[edulio]:** Nay you must not cry, Jacky. God wot, S^r, he is of a very tender justification, poor child, soe he is.
>
> **Gra[mmatulus]:** His tears argue him of a good nature. Come, Schoolefellow, how construe you that line?
>
> **Jac[ky]:** Fælix cautum Philip the wise man of Gotham, et and aliena my Uncle Allen faciunt outface men pericula with pudding slices.
>
> **Gra[mmatulus]:** An exquisite construction. And what part of speech is aliena?
>
> **Jac[ky]:** My uncle Allen, S^r.[333]

(*Discipuli et Rustici*, ff. 285v–286r)

Jacky's first utterance is a proverb, which occurs in Lily's grammar in the section on the concord of relative pronouns (Lily 1653; see also Gwosdek 2013: 194); it is also mentioned by Erasmus (*Adagia*, 1239). While this proverb is not the same type of conventional phrase as *Propria quae maribus* or *As in praesenti*, it effectively points to this particular section in the grammar, and would be familiar to Jacky's interlocutor from precisely this context, in its Latin form. The rest of the Latin elements in (171) are merely 'mentions' of the words in question (i.e. they are used metalinguistically),[334] while Jacky's switches into English are used to translate the words. His analysis of the sentence is, however, damaging to his face (from Grammatulus's perspective, not from that of the *senes rustici*; note here also the difference between face and identity as outline in 3.2.3), as he demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of the words he is translating (for the translation of *pericula* as *with pudding slices*, cf. *OED* 3, s.v. *pudding-prick*). It is possible that the actor has used here a more heavily 'English' pronunciation to make the jokes more apparent (e.g. monophthongization in *cautum*; diphthongization or fronting/raising of the initial vowel in *faciunt*), but there is nothing in the text itself to indicate this; this suggestion therefore remains at the level of speculation. At layer 1, the function of the whole exchange is once more to create humour.[335]

At the end of the scene Grammatulus and Jacky exit, while Credulio and Trunks sit down to wait for the commencement of the 'play within the play'. At this point Eugenius and Philaster return, talking to each other in Latin. Next, Praeco arrives to announce, in English, the forthcoming play, after which the two boys switch to English in order to have a short conversation with him; their choice is dependent on

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[333] Note the dialectal *God wot*.

[334] For both use vs. mention and metalinguistic statements, see e.g. Lyons (1977: 5–13).

[335] This picture fits well within the broader genre of Restoration comedy, in which humorous depictions were employed to draw a sharp distinction between the elite and the less civilized (e.g. Schiller 1956: 695–696). Learning and its importance for social class are also important themes in other early modern dramatic texts, such as the *Ignoramus* (see e.g. Ryan 2013).

Praeco's presumed language competence. The following example takes place at the end of this conversation:

(172) **Eu[genius]:** Nay, if your wits grow soe tart to abuse your best friends, Adjeu.

Præ[co]: Sweet master, my lungs are at your perpetual service.   Exit

Eu[genius]: Mirum est, Philaster, animadvertere appetitus hominum inexplebiles. Quorum (quasi tot furiis impulsi) mores flagitioso cuivis opprobrio mancipatos prostituunt, dummodo rem faciunt sibi, et opes congerant ['It is wondrous to regard, Philaster, the insatiable desire of humans, who (as if incited by so many passions) set up their morals for sale to whatever shameful disgrace, as long as they make money and gather wealth.']

Ph[ilaster]: Eo scilicet dementiæ plerosq[ue] mortales adigit fames auri inexplebilis, ut lucro potius suo, quàm nomini, aut moribus consulant ['Indeed, an insatiable hunger for gold drives very many mortals so far into madness that they consider their profit more than their reputation or morals.']

Tr[unks]: Now my little froggs of Helicon, what news brought yonder wide-mouth'd Cryer? Is there any sport neer hand to be seen?

Eu[genius]: Why goodman You did your bash beard hang after sportfull recreation?

Tr[unks]: Yes for all you, Sawcebox, Methinks a little modesty would better become your beardless chin

Eu[genius]: If my chin be beardless tis like your crown.

Ph[ilaster]: Apage, apage inutiles scommatum tuorum facetias. Non enim verecundam, mihi crede, ingenuitatem arguit, tam venerandi capitis canitiem maledictis diminuere. ['Away, away with your useless jokes. For believe me, it does not demonstrate a modest and noble demeanour to clip the grey hair of such a venerable head with abuses.']

Eu[genius]: Fateor. Proin hortamini acquiescam tuo. ['True. I shall hence assent to your urging.'][336]

(*Discipuli et Rustici*, f. 287r)

To begin with, the *Adjeu* of the first utterance has been counted as a switch into French, although the form is obviously a 'grey area' case; it is a conventional leave-taking formula and hence arguably a borrowing. In the present context it seems to be used as an FFI, probably with some irony (cf. the case of *monsieur* in some of the

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[336] *Hang after* here = 'desire'. *Bash beard* probably pro *bush beard*. *Sawcebox* = 'an insolent person, one who makes insolent remarks' (see e.g. *OED* 1, s.v. *saucebox*). In Eugenius's first reply to Trunks, I interpret *goodman You* as a vocative construction (i.e. one could separate it by commas).

other plays).[337] A more noteworthy feature in the example is the pattern exhibited by the boys, where they switch to Latin for their intragroup exchanges. In this context, it is Latin which serves as their 'we-code', as opposed to English as above in example (167). Although similar switching was encountered in the scene where the boys had an exchange with Blunt and Knobbs, in this example the goal is not to exclude anyone. While the first Latin utterances are apparently meant as criticism of Praeco, who has complained about his low income, he has already left the stage and is unable to hear the comments. In the second case, the utterances do not constitute an FTA against Trunks. On the contrary: the preceding English exchange between Eugenius and Trunks is antagonistic, while Philaster's criticism of Eugenius is an FTA against the latter. It thus seems the most coherent option to analyse these switches as indicating solidarity between the students (thereby also softening Philaster's criticism by way of positive politeness).

The next switch occurs towards the end of the following scene, when Gregory arrives and falls asleep:

(173) **Cr[edulio]:** Honest Gentlemen, if there be one spark of charity in you, tell me what presumptuous theives haue thus riffled my mans understanding
Ph[ilaster]: They that haue a license cum privilegio ['with privilege'] Ale & Tobacco. Who by a pleasing stealth first drown our purses, then our wits.

(*Discipuli et Rustici*, f. 288r)

The phrase *cum privilegio* was discussed above in 5.2.5.2, in connection with example (147); it is a technical term, appended here to the broader *with license* (i.e. it refers to having a monopoly on something, not merely a license in general). Here the phrase obviously refers to an alcohol license, but note that Ale and Tobacco are presented as the ones in possession of it (the structure would otherwise be different); this is appropriate to the scene, since they are treated as if they were actual people. At layer 1, the function of the utterance as a whole is to create a humorous effect; at layer 2, the boys' aim is to mislead the *senes* into getting drunk and unwittingly serving as actors in their play.

When the other characters leave the stage, Grammatulus arrives with Jacky and notices the sleeping Gregory. The scene that follows includes instances of CS along with noteworthy choices of address forms. In the first example, Grammatulus addresses the audience:

(174) **Gra[mmatulus]:** […] Proh Jupiter hic homo sesquipidali somno obrutus est. Tales mehercle ronchos gerit, quales scrofæ solent puerperæ. Mirum est si

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[337] Pahta and Nurmi (2009: 44) similarly analyse *adieu* as CS in their study of Charles Burney's correspondence (latter half of the 18th century).

non in somnum hîc se composuit, ut edormiret crapulam. Plane siquidem videtur mihi cervitiali sepultus tumulo. Cui (vestræ modò arrideant aures quibus dicatum volui) hoccine inscribatur Epitaphium. ['By Jove, this man has sunk into an extremely deep sleep. He snores like a sow giving birth, by Hercules. Most probably he went to sleep here to sleep off his drunkenness, since he certainly seems to me to have been buried under a mound of beer, to which (provided that your ears, to whom I will announce this, are favourably disposed) this epitaph shall be inscribed:']

> Dead, yet not dead, loe here one lies.
> A man that sees not yet hath eyes.
> Sick, and yet well, under one breath
> Who in vapour catch'd his death.
> One deadly poor, yet wants noe wealth
> Whose sickness come by drinking health.
> Thus this conceited monster sunk
> Who lives, and yet sits here dead drunk.[338]

(*Discipuli et Rustici*, f. 288v)

The switch to English co-occurs with what amounts to a form of reported speech or quotation, although in this case of an imaginary kind. Related cases were discussed in conjunction with examples (58) and (162) above (in 5.2.2.4 and 5.2.5.4). Although it is not clear why English is here considered the appropriate language for the epitaph, a norm-based explanation seems in any case to be the most coherent one; the utterance implies that Grammatulus thinks that the epitaph would in fact be written in English. In general, switching to the original language of a quotation might facilitate comprehension on the part of the addressee, as well as constituting a rational action in terms of the principle of least effort. In the present case, however, neither of these explanations seems coherent: the epitaph would obviously not be familiar to the audience, and switching languages here in fact *violates* the principle of least effort. If we conceptualize the example in terms of Grice's maxims, the following seems to be the case: the speaker is faced with a clash between the Maxims of Quality and Manner, in other words between on the one hand uttering what S considers to be the more accurate form (for whatever reason), on the other following the principle of isomorphism (i.e. 1M1F) in the choice of language. Hypothetically, S might well have chosen otherwise had he judged the latter maxim the more

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[338] *Sesquipidali* pro *sesquipedali* (used here metaphorically). *Cervitiali* pro *cervisiali*. The clause within the brackets is puzzling; I have interpreted *quibus* as pointing towards *aures* and *dicatum volui* as lacking the object and the infinitive *esse*. It is unlikely that *quibus* was meant to stand as a dative object to *arrideant*, as there is no plural noun to which it might refer.

important one in the situation; without more information as to the context, one can only speculate about the reasons for preferring to follow one maxim over another.

At the conclusion of Grammatulus's speech, Gregory stirs in his sleep; the following example takes place immediately after (174):

(175) **Gre[gory]:** Nay speak them over again. I did not hear them. I am fast asleep.
Gra[mmatulus]: Proh fidem Apollinis! Quàm insulsus hic est asinus, qui etiam in somno se dicit vigilem. Quin expergiscere quisquis es; expergiscere. ['For Apollo's sake! What a silly ass is this man, who even in his sleep claims to be awake. Nay, wake up whoever you are, wake up.]
Gre[gory]: Pray mind your own business, and leave mee to my rest. I'll not drink one drop more soe I wo'nt.
Gra[mmatulus]: Necessum est ut hominem propria alloquar dialecto. ['I must address the man in his own language.'] Come, drowsie Lout, rise upon your feet to goe back to your master.
Gre[gory]: Tobacco? Hang all such wicked Tobacco; such wicked smoak.
Gra[mmatulus]: Bon jeur is good morrow in english. How does your worship after your sleep?

<div align="right">(Discipuli et Rustici, f. 289r)</div>

Grammatulus's first utterance contains an insult, but the choice of Latin is clearly not meant here as the type of exclusion found in example (168) above; this would not be a coherent explanation in that Grammatulus attempts to wake Gregory up in Latin, implying that he expects Gregory to understand it (cf. the first encounter with Credulio above). The insult, however, is not directly addressed to Gregory; in fact, it may have been intended to be heard only by the audience. Grammatulus's switch to English is due to the same reason as the earlier switch to English in his conversation with Credulio: it is what makes communication possible in the first place.[339] In terms of Clark's levels of joint action, the problem is located at level 2. It may be noted that there is some incongruence in the overt politeness of Grammatulus's utterances. The bare imperative command – an FTA towards Gregory's negative face – is combined with an insulting address form, which amounts to an FTA towards his positive face. In the following utterance, however, we find the reverential (i.e. negative politeness) form of address *your worship*, which, as mentioned above, is used in addressing the Justice of the Peace. The more reverential form is obviously used sarcastically, making it likely that the *Bon jeur* at

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[339] For the reiterative aspects of the example (including the pun on *to goe back to* and *tobacco*), see Harjunpää & Mäkilähde (2016: 187).

the beginning of the utterance can be explained the same way.[340] The translation and flagging of the phrase further add to the coherence of this explanation, as these actions imply that S presupposes that H would not understand the phrase.

The scene continues with Gregory telling Grammatulus of his dream about a man without head or tail, whereupon Grammatulus laughs and Gregory takes exception to this, noting that *You scholards doe soe mock us poor Country fellows* (f. 289v). At this point Eugenius arrives and Grammatulus switches into Latin to address him, continuing the pattern discussed above. Eugenius is finally reminded of the task he was supposed to complete and asks Grammatulus to help him, although promising nothing in return except his thanks. The following example begins with Grammatulus's reply:

(176) **Gra[mmatulus]:** Apage sis. Nequam es nebulo. ['Away with you; you are a worthless rascal.']
Eu[genius]: What? Monsieur Gregory repossess'd of his senses? Welcome noble Sʳ, thrice welcome to yourselfe again. How does old father Morpheus with all his leaden attendants?
Gre[gory]: Morpheus! Who's that? A man with a head, or without a head?
Eu[genius]: Cannot you tell that did see him?
Gre[gory]: Nay if I see him twas when my eyes were shut. And then I am sure he had neither head nor tail.
Eu[genius]: Audin Grammatule? Utinam fata mihi concederent posse mutari in talem hominem. Neutiquam ego tuas mendicarem gratias ['Do you hear that, Grammatulus? If only it was granted to me by the will of the gods to be able to change into such a man, I would not beg for your favours.']
Gra[mmatulus]: Qui sic? ['How so?']
Eu[genius]: Rogas, ineptule? Nam quid ego Præceptoris verba metuerim cui nulla esset cauda? ['Do you not get it, you fool? What need would I have to be afraid of the teacher's words, if I had no tail?']
Gre[gory]: Gentlemen, pray doe you know where my master Credulio is?
Eu[genius]: Yes. Pray down your Mary bones, and be thankfull for soe carefull a master.[341]

(*Discipuli et Rustici*, ff. 289v–290r)

Again, the same pattern continues in the students' intragroup vs. inter-group language choice. As in example (172), the switch back to Latin does not function

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[340] Following Haiman (1998: 18–20), the act might more accurately be termed a 'put-on', since it is arguably only the audience and not Gregory who ought to understand the insincerity of the act.
[341] Morpheus is the god of dreams.

primarily to exclude Gregory, as there is nothing in the content of the following utterances that would necessitate this. A norm-based explanation is fully adequate to account for the switch, especially since the pattern has already been firmly established. It is worth noting that following a pattern – although at one level of analysis explained simply by reference to norms – also counts as face-work, namely face-maintenance. There are, however, further consequences of these switches to be noted. First, Gregory does indeed become excluded from the conversation, but there is nothing in the extract to indicate that this would constitute an FTA towards him. Second, since the pattern has been established, the switch highlights the simultaneous change of addressee; this is also relevant at layer 1. This addressee selection, however, is not achieved through CS alone but also through the use of the 2.p.sg. verb form and the vocative (*Grammatule*). Furthermore, although there are no additional stage directions at this point, the actors probably also signalled the change in the participant constellation with non-linguistic means, such as positioning and gaze-direction.

The following scene, consisting of the 'play within a play', contains some brief Latin switches. Most of these occur in the extract discussed extensively as example (5) in 3.1.3.2, and further as example (10) in 4.3.2. To summarize, Knobbs uses a few Latin phrases when playing the role of an assistant to the Justice of the Peace; the action is accounted for at layer 3 with a norm-based explanation (i.e. using legal Latin in an official capacity), at layer 2 with a face-related explanation (i.e. attempting to play the role as well as possible), and at layer 1 with a reference to humour, similar to the use of Latin in Ruggle's *Ignoramus*. Some of the phrases used in the extract recur within the scene: for example, *a cup of Nimis* (which may be considered either a technical term or a euphemism) is mentioned two more times. The term is introduced by Trunks, who admits that his being drunk was the reason for not raising his hat in meeting Blunt; the term is then repeated by the latter (f. 291r). There are two further instances of switching during this scene:

(177) **Kn[obbs]:** Imprimis you Iohn Trunks of Longhose in Yorkshire are here indited for runing a tilt with your hat on against Mr Abraham Blunt of Sharpshire Justice of peas and beans. Item you are here indited for being F.O.X.T. drunk. S.P.I.NN.E. card, well put together make you a compleat drunkard. And lastly you stand here guilty for being a presumptuous Swearer without spelling.

(*Discipuli et Rustici*, f. 291v)

(178) **Tr[unks]:** Gratias! gratias! ['Thank you, thank you!'] I humbly thank your Worship.

(*Discipuli et Rustici*, f. 292r)

In example (177) the charges against Trunks are listed, and the terms *imprimis* and *item* would later reoccur in example (5), when sentence is pronounced. In example (177), there is no additional 'legalese Latin' to provide a humorous effect, which is instead achieved through other means. In addition to the pun on *peace* and *peas*, the inability of Knobbs and Blunt to spell correctly is also a source for humour. The former had previously asked the Justice of the Peace how to spell *drunkard*, which Blunt rendered as in example (177), in other words by reanalysing the word into the components *drunk* and *card*, and then providing the spellings for a synonym of the former and a semantically related word for the latter (see *OED* 2 s.v. *fox*, *v.* 2.a; s.v. *card*, *v.¹*). When Knobbs asks about the spelling of *swearer*, Blunt reproaches him and does not provide any help – hence the above *without spelling*. Throughout the scene, then, a major source of humour is the way in which a high-status person and his assistant perform actions incongruous with the faces they claim. What makes the situation more complex, however, is the presence of an additional communicative layer. If this part of the performance was situated solely at layer 2, in other words with boys at layer 1 acting out the roles of a Justice of the Peace and so on, the humour would be simply of the kind described above. In the present case, however, the humour is also created by the fact that the *rustici* are playing the parts of the fools, as they do this not by skill but quite accidentally, as foreshadowed in example (168) above; in other words, from their perspective, the humour created at layer 2 seems to be an infelicitous unanticipated consequence. As for example (178), it occurs after Blunt has dismissed the case against Trunks. Although the Latin expression is a formula in the same way as *vivat* (see section 5.2.3.6 above), it is not conventional in an English context. Since Trunks does not attempt to present himself as a learned man, the choice here may instead be due to a perceived degree of formality in the use of the expression (cf. *Deo gratias*), which makes it part of face-work.

The remaining switches all occur during the final scene, when the teacher arrives on stage, beginning with a monologue and then addressing the other characters:

(179) **[Philoponus:]** Numen testor, Apollo, tuum! Quænam intemperiæ nostram agunt scholam? Quid sibi velint ignoti subselliorum incolæ? Quid cathedræ barbatâ graves reverantiâ? Bone Jupiter! itane fatis comparatum est; ut, quos ego hinc abiens reliqui impuberes, tam citò maturescerent, ut jamjam a pueris illico nascerentur Senes? Philaster, quis malus Genius literariam hanc adeò turbavit familiam? ['Apollo, I call you to witness! What in the world is this madness that has stirred up our school? What is the meaning of these strangers occupying the benches, or the chairs full of bearded dignity? Dear Jove! Has fate so arranged that the boys whom I left here as youths have matured so

quickly that already they have instantly grown from boys into old men? Philaster, what evil spirit has thrown this school of ours into such a disorder?']

Ph[ilaster]: Nobis, si placet, libris incumbentibus venerunt. ['If you please, they arrived when we were devoted to our books.']

Philo[ponus]: Qui, malum! venerunt, impudens? ['Damn it! Who arrived, you impudent boy?']

Ph[ilaster]: Isti qui tibi præ oculis sunt Senes. ['Those elderly men in front of your eyes.']

Philo[ponus]: Et quid tandem apud me fuit negotii? ['And what business did they then have at my school?']

Eu[genius]: Nescio. Nisi quod senior ille, prout mihi narravit Grammatulus, filiolum tuæ lubens discplinæ committeret. ['I do not know, except that – as Grammatulus told me – the old one over there wanted to commit his little boy to your instruction.']

Philo[ponus]: Compellabo, ut sciam. Senes, ipsa salus vos sospitet. Num quis è vobis colloquium expetivit meum? ['I shall address them to find out. Elders, may the goddess of salvation herself preserve you. Now which one of you desired a conversation with me?']

Tr[unks]: You are deceiv'd in us, godfather Black-coat. Speak to your children in latine. Wee are good old boyes in English.

Philo[ponus]: Lepidi sunt, ni male conjicio, et festivi admodum Senes. Proin quo magis fruar, alloquar, ut intelligant ['If I am not mistake, they are agreeable and quite pleasant elders. Therefore I will be the more delighted to speak in a way which they understand.']. Gentlemen, 'tis my happiness to see you soe merry within my libertyes.

(*Discipuli et Rustici*, ff. 292v–293r)

It was already established during the first scene of the play that the teacher and the boys address each other in Latin. As opposed to the interaction among the boys, the use of Latin here arguably serves no 'solidarity' function. First of all, this is a conflict situation, and Philoponus addresses the boys in an antagonistic manner. Secondly, here the boys switch to Latin of necessity, as speaking English would presumably result in punishment – as in the scene with the monitor in *Certamen Doctrinale* (see 5.2.3.1 above). Since the boys are effectively ordered to switch from English back to Latin, we are dealing with an FTA towards their negative faces. With respect to the interaction between the teacher and the *senes rustici*, the pattern is the same as in example (175) above: S presumes that the language choice is appropriate to the situation, H rejects the choice and indicates why the choice is not appropriate (in Clark's terms, there is a problem at level 2 in the action ladder), and S switches languages to enable the interaction to take place. At this point the shift in power-

balance becomes even more apparent, as the teacher switches back to Latin in order to address Eugenius:

(180) **Tr[unks]:** Mr Credulio, one of this Gentleman's scholars took the boyes examination, and thought him fitting for the Schoole

Philo[ponus]: Nostin tu quis partes anticipavit meas Hujus examinando filiolum? ['Do you know who took up my duty in examining the little boy of this man?']

Eu[genius]: Ni fallor, Grammatulus. Quocum ego non ita pridem deambulantem vidi puerulum. ['If I am not mistaken, it was Grammatulus, with whom I saw the boy walking a little while ago.']

Philo[ponus]: His approbation gives mee content.

(*Discipuli et Rustici*, f. 293r)

As in example (176), there is no need to exclude anyone from the conversation by switching languages; the switch is instead accounted for by reference to the language norms of the school. Although it is again a 'by-product' of the switch that the *senes* are momentarily excluded from the conversation, it may be noted that this example differs from the previous ones in terms of the cohesive ties maintained between the utterances of Trunks and Philoponus (i.e. *one of this Gentleman's scholars – His*; *thought him fitting – approbation*; cf. Auer's concept of double cohesion discussed in 3.1.3.3). There is no obvious category in Brown and Levinson's model accommodating such an act, although disregard for cooperation – which would *prima facie* be the case here, in that the *senes* do not understand Latin – threatens H's positive face (Brown & Levinson 1987: 67). It is arguably the case that highlighting the relevance of one's actions vis-à-vis the current aim of the exchange indicates that one is not disregarding H's wants; thus we can analyse this as an instance of positive politeness.

During the rest of the conversation, Credulio's 'rustic' identity is highlighted through multiple strategies, such as dialectal forms (e.g. the voicing of the initial sibilant in *zoft* and *Zamplers*, f. 293r), his reluctance to pay the allotted fee for Jacky's education, and his mistakes, such as the reference to 'destruction' instead of 'instruction'. There are also two additional instances of switching during this scene:

(181) **Cr[edulio]:** Favour mee noe favours. Lett him but read well, and sbell well, and say dic latinè ['say in Latin'] when he cannot speak latine, 'twill satisfie mee. […]

(*Discipuli et Rustici*, f. 293r)

(182) **Cr[edulio]:** Starling, or noe Starling: I'll point you quarterly two Marks.

Ph[iloponus]: English, or Scotish?   **Cr[edulio]:** English or Scotish? Noe matter for that

Ph[iloponus]: Scotish are but two shillings three pence per Quarter. O Dii immortales! Scire volunt omnes, mercedem solvere nemo. ['Oh, immortal gods! Everyone wants to have knowledge, no-one to pay the price.']

Cr[edulio]: Nemo mee noe Nemos. I'll point thee no more.

Ph[iloponus]: S^r, not to spend words in vain I will have Forty shillings starling per annum. Or take away your son as you brought him hither.

(*Discipuli et Rustici*, f. 293v)

The phrase *dic latinè* was encountered above in example (170), where it occurred three times. In (170) the phrase was 'used', while here it is only 'mentioned', so it counts as reported speech. As in many previous examples, the switch into Latin does not in itself serve any function beyond enabling S to produce this reference; the reference itself, or more properly the action of asserting that S is in favour of a type of behaviour which other characters (and the audience) would find less than admirable, is what sustains a particular face for Credulio (again, not a particular *identity*). The other strategies contributing to this effect are also displayed in the examples: the incorrect form *sbell* in (181) – although it is unclear how this was reflected in pronunciation – and Credulio's reluctance to part with his money in (182). These, however, are 'strategies' only at layer 1, where presenting Credulio as a comical character is the intended effect; at layer 2, the same effect would be an infelicitous unanticipated consequence.

Philoponus's first switch consists of an exclamation together with a quotation from Juvenal (Iuv. 7,157). At layer 2, this can be analysed as criticism, in other words an FTA towards Credulio's positive face. Since Credulio presumably does not understand what Philoponus is saying, however, the switch is analysable as an off-record politeness strategy, through violation of the Maxim of Manner. To clarify: the quotation functions as an FTA, while the switch in language functions as redress. At layer 1 the quotation may also be analysed as a 'solidarity' strategy, since it emphasizes the shared values of the educated members of the audience. Credulio's *Nemo me noe Nemos* utilizes a structure which he also uses in (181), namely the *X-V-imp. me no X-N-pl.* construction (cf. *But me no buts*), and the structure itself contains a repetition of *nemo* from Philoponus's preceding utterance. Again, the switch is necessitated by the aim of repeating something; it is not even necessary for Credulio to understand what the word means. At layer 1 the main function would probably be to create a humorous effect, similarly to the way the same construction is used in other works. At layer 2 the function of the utterance as a whole is to rebuke Philoponus's demands; the *thou*-form may signal a momentary minimization of courtesy (although the coherence of this explanation would require further sources

of justification). Finally, *per annum* belongs to the same category of 'grey area' cases as *imprimis*, being a technical term; it is not used here as an FFI, and a norm-based explanation is thus sufficient to account for it.

Summing up: the analysis presented here demonstrates the importance of considering CS and language choice as part of a larger 'system' of pragmatic devices, or what Gumperz termed discourse strategies. It is also worth emphasizing that this particular performance differs drastically from the other *Orationes* performances in terms of the extent of CS and language choice related primarily to face and identity. Different character types are defined at least partly in terms of the languages or linguistic varieties available to the characters, as well as the address forms which they use to address others and which others use to address them. In other words, linguistic variables are connected to (perceived) social variables, and this indexicality may in turn be employed in face-work (at several communicative layers). At a general level, it is possible to identify patterns such as the student characters using Latin for intragroup communication, or the 'rustics' using forms which coincide with positive politeness strategies, namely *thou*-forms and first names. The picture which emerges from an examination of these distributions, however, is only partial; a more detailed analysis of individual instances of language use is needed to explain any unexpected findings at the general level (such as the reverential address forms directed at Gregory). Moreover, the analyses demonstrate how multiple strategies can be used to achieve a particular function at different times (i.e. paradigmatic 1M2F; see 4.3.1), how multiple strategies can be used together to achieve a particular function (i.e. syntagmatic 1M2F), and – particularly due to the complexity of layering found in *Discipuli et Rustici* – how a single strategy can achieve multiple functions, of various kinds, at a time (i.e. syntagmatic 2M1F).

5.3.2   Other discourse strategies: A brief overview

To conclude the textual analyses, I focus very briefly on the dimension of paradigmatic 1M2F by illustrating how strategies beyond language choice and CS are used in the performances in some of the main functions discussed in the preceding sections. To begin with, perhaps the most obvious strategy is the use of quotations *without* CS. As might be expected, quotations from authors included in the core school curriculum often occur without the need to switch languages. The following two examples are fairly straightforward; the first occurs in a Christmas performance, the second in a Gunpowder Plot performance:

(183) Optimè Plutarchus ocium appellavit condimentum laboris.

'Plutarchus put it well when he called leisure the seasoning for work.'

(*Orationes Hyemales*, f. 378r)

(184) Vos autem, quicunq[ue] estis, et ubicunq[ue], Pacis perturbatores publicæ, revocate Vobis in memoriam decantatum illud Poetæ. Fælix quem faciunt aliena pericula cautum. Et hujus memineritis rebellionem tentaturi. Qui non ante cavet, post dolebit.

'But you disturbers of public order, whoever and wherever you are, recall these words of a poet: fortunate is the person whom the perils of others make careful. And may you be mindful of this when you attempt a rebellion: Who does not beware at first, will be sorry later.'

(*Garnettus*, f. 34r)

In (183), the speaker refers to Plutarch's work on the education of children (Plut. *De Lib*. 9c); in another performance, the boys explicitly mention that they have read it (see below). In this case, the function is to bolster S's argument (that the students need a holiday) and to indicate that the boys draw their values from ancient authors – both cases of face-enhancement. In (184), the first quotation is a familiar one, as it occurred in example (171) in the preceding section. The final sentence in the example is also a quotation from Lily's (1653) grammar, occurring in the section on adverbs. In this case, both can be analysed at one level as instances of generalized advice, at another as creating 'solidarity' between the boys and their audience by referring to common ground. Similar examples were mentioned in preceding sections, and the number could be multiplied many times over.[342] It may be added that rather than using quotations, straightforward statements to the effect of having read particular works can also be used to demonstrate the speaker's learning, as in the following example from one of the Christmas performances:

(185) **[Discipulus 1:]** Imprimis verò quatuor orationes Marci Tullii Ciceronis in Catilinam summa cum diligentia etiam, atq[ue] etiam percurrimus.
Dis[cipulus] 2: Et post tot sudores, et nocturnas lucubrationes, tametsi periculosissimæ habentur, post tot, tantaq[ue] verbera, quæ nobis certè miserrimis quotidie inferuntur, ingratiis sane nostris, insignem Lucii Flori historiam de bello Romano, magno cum labore tandem perlegimus.

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[342] For additional examples, see e.g. Mäkilähde, Alho & Johnson (2016); Mäkilähde (2018b). For the importance of considering quotations both with and without CS in a single dataset, see also Mäkilähde & Rissanen (2016).

Dis[cipulus] 3: Et tres Isocratis orationes. Unam scilicet ad Demonicum, et duas ad Nicoclem; necnon Plutarchi libellum illis adjunctum[343] de puerorum institutione legendo percurrimus. **Mon[itor]:** Quosnam verò legistis Poetas? **Dis[cipulus] 4:** In Homero evolvendo, atq[ue] ediscendo bonas horas collocavimus.
Dis[cipulus] 5: Et Horatii odas, Epodas, Satyras, Epistolas, librum deniq[ue] de Arte Poetica pro modulo nostro diligenter investigavimus.

'**[Student 1]:** First, we have truly gone through the four speeches by Marcus Tullius Cicero against Catiline again and again most diligently.
Student 2: And after such labours and nocturnal studies – although they are thought to be the most perilous – after so many such lashings, which are brought daily upon us (truly the most wretched things), against our wills of course, we finally read through the distinguished history of the Roman wars by Lucius Florus with much hardship.
Student 3: And three speeches by Isocrates, namely one to Demonicus and two to Nicocles. And we also read through Plutarch's little book on the education of children, which is attached to these. **Monitor:** And which poets have you read?
Student 4: We have spent a good deal of hours reading out and learning (by heart) Homer.
Student 5: And we have investigated diligently the odes, epodes, satires and epistles of Horace, and finally his book *On the Art of Poetry*, to the best of our abilities.'

(*Sectiones Horatianae*, ff. 172r–172v)

It is worth noting that many of the texts mentioned here have appeared in previous sections as sources of quotations.

Another major group of switches discussed in the preceding sections consisted of various types of word-play, such as puns. As the following four examples demonstrate, the same types are also found in monolingual contexts. The first two examples are from a Christmas performance, the other two from Gunpowder Plot performances:

(186) **Jo[ck]:** But what think you of the Declinations, Sam, or as wee call them the Declensions?

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[343] These texts were printed together in England in the 16th and 17th centuries, e.g. Isocrates & Plutarch (1638), although the text mentioned here, located in the *Moralia*, was probably not written by Plutarch. In the above-mentioned edition, the texts are in Greek without translations.

S[am]: In good truth, Jack the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth have brought such a declination upon my body, that I decline I fear into a Consumption.

(*Grammaticae Partes I*, f. 319v)

(187) **S[am]:** [...] There is a name of a thing that they call Noun, which would to God I had never heard, felt, or understood.

(*Grammaticae Partes I*, f. 319r)

(188) **G[arnettus junior]:** Noe, S[r], I hope not. For wee are poor innocent men.
Pro[testans]: Innocent perhaps, when the first syllable is taken away.

(*Papistae Iuniores*, f. 110r)

(189) **B[lunt]:** [...] And yet you profainly canonize the actors for their impious assault. As for this days powder treason see in Romes catalogue S[t] Garnet, S[t] Winter, S[t] Wright.
F[an]: S[t] Wright? S[t] Wrong rather. For it would have gone wrong with us had they rightly effected their intended mischeif. One would have thought Winter's name should have caused him to have been cooler, and not soe hot on a design of so hellish fire.

(*Viper and Asp*, ff. 460v–461r)

In example (186) we have the familiar case of a grammatical pun – one of the staples of the Christmas performance subgenre. In this case, the pun does not require any specific knowledge of Latin grammar. A related category consists of jokes combined with grammatical references, such as the one encountered in example (187), where the joke depends on knowing that a noun is defined in Lily's grammar as something one can see, feel, hear, or understand. As discussed above in 5.2.3.4, in conjunction with example (97), the same joke occurs in the shorter dialogue of *Discipuli et Rustici* (as well as in other contemporary plays). The other two examples represent cases where a pun functions as an FTA; example (189) further includes the type of punning on names occurring mostly in the Lenten performances.

Finally, it may be recalled that the philosophical and methodological analysis presented in Chapter 4 espoused an interpretation of the philological-pragmatic approach in terms of 'action analysis' and the related 'theory of action'. It is therefore worth considering whether some of the functions achieved through CS are also achieved through non-linguistic means. This topic was already touched upon in 5.1.3 and 5.1.4, in connection with stage directions and the visual highlighting of units. I conclude the present section by moving beyond verbal actions (and to an extent, *beyond the page*), to bodily actions. To begin with, it may be recalled that there were

several examples of exclusion through CS in the longer dialogue of *Discipuli et Rustici*. There are also several non-linguistic means towards this end, such as whispering and 'asides':

(190)   **Mar[prelate]:** What doe you think me Jesuitiz'd, and that I use equivocation? I say I will not tell, if it be nether murder, nor treason. {Spanish whispers in his ear}
M[arprelate]: The Pope!   **Sp[anish]:** Tis soe.

(*Marprelate*, ff. 370r–v)

(191)   **So[ber]:** [...] One of the twelve Apostles you know had a Devil.
M[arprelate]: (Aside) The man speaks ingeniously, and true. Charity thinks noe ill. Why then should I say all are bad, because some few dare to be wickedly inclin'd – Pray, why doe you suffer images in your Churches, and not forbid the people worshiping them?

(*Marprelate*, f. 372r)

In this performance, Marprelate is a 'fanatic', to whom the other characters – Shift, Spanish (Catholics), and Sober (Protestant) – decide to teach a lesson in credulity, by deceiving him into believing that the Pope has arrived in England (in reality, the 'Pope' is Sober in disguise). In both examples, the aim at layer 2 is to prevent others from hearing what is said; in (190) this would include passers-by, in (191) the three other characters.[344] The reason for the exclusion in (190) is the volatility of the message in terms of possible concrete harm which could befall the Catholics, while in (191) the risk is one of losing face. A similar case was discussed above in 5.2.2.5 in conjunction with example (65), where the 'junior Papists' had a brief 'aside' about the possibility of their plot having been revealed to the Protestant eavesdropper.

To illustrate another case, an FTA can also be achieved through non-linguistic means, as in the following example from the same performance:

(192)   **M[arprelate]:** I thank your Holiness. {He bows to kiss Sober's feet, who runns over his back. They laugh. Sober **pulls off his disguise. Two run to help Mar: up.**}
M[arprelate]: Murder! Murder!   {They laugh}

(*Marprelate*, f. 373r)

This example occurs after Marprelate has been successfully converted by Sober. Note that there are in fact multiple FTAs here: physical violence and laughter.

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[344]   It may be noted that Marprelate does not achieve his goal, as the other characters hear him anyway – a case of failure.

Laughter had the same consequence above in *Discipuli et Rustici*, when Grammatulus was amused by Gregory's account of his dream. Physical actions may also be attacks against another person's negative face, as for example when Fawkes is arrested in some of the Gunpowder Plot performances. In addition to these two functions of exclusion and FTAs, bodily actions in the preceding analyses also contributed towards such functions as addressee selection (by positioning and gaze, presumably) and humour (e.g. by stumbling when drunk).

To sum up the discussion thus far: the textual analyses have demonstrated that CS and language choice are indeed important strategies in the *Orationes* performances, ranging across the macro-level of language choice for separate sections, the meso-level of language choice for individual subgenres, and the micro-level of individual choices in particular utterances. As discussed at the end of each major section under 5.2, CS is used to achieve various functions, but most of these fall into clearly identifiable categories even at the pre-theoretical level. The present section has further demonstrated that although CS is an important strategy in these texts, it is only one of many linguistic and non-linguistic strategies used to achieve certain functions. Up to this point, the discussion has remained mostly at the level of explanation by interpretation; in the next section, the focus moves on to explication.

5.4　Explaining CS: Explication and formal analysis

The explanations utilized in the philological part of this study seem to refer primarily to three types of entities: *consequences*, *causal antecedents*, and *further actions/forms* (see Figure 13 below). Functions proper, which make reference to "the purpose that an act serves or a goal that it attempts to achieve" (Mäkilähde 2018a: 299 fn. 2; see Chapter 4 above), belong to the first group. Actions, however, can also have other types of consequences, anticipated/unanticipated and neutral/felicitous/infelicitous – in other words, various types of 'by-products'. Conversely, in explanations referring primarily or exclusively to causal antecedents (i.e. state-descriptions such as p or T-expressions such as $pT{\sim}p$), CS itself is seen as the consequence. The antecedents themselves can be of various types. For example, as discussed above in 3.1.4.1, the existence of a particular norm may in itself explain an action. If the action to be explained is not characterized by any kind of *normative pressure* (von Wright 1971: 147–151) which would be contingent upon these causal antecedents, it follows that the action as a whole is *unintentional* or there is no action at all but merely an event; examples included certain types of slips, involuntary movements, and psychological priming. Explanations referring to causal antecedents may therefore be either teleological (Itkonen's 'non-nomic causality') or causal (Itkonen's 'nomic causality'). Finally, many of the explanations refer to actions/forms whose use or occurrence is enabled by CS, and which in turn have

their own consequences. This category includes for example quotations and word-play. A central argument in the present study is that all these different entities, and hence the different types of explanation, should be taken into account in action analysis and theory of action, here represented by the philological-pragmatic approach.


Figure 13.   Schematic chart of entities used in explaining linguistic actions.

I comment briefly on certain aspects of the above-mentioned three entities. First, explanations which focus on consequences and those which focus on causal antecedents can be connected in a variety of ways. Most importantly, in the case of intentional actions, an explanation referring to a cause may be reformulated as one referring to a corresponding consequence and vice versa, since RE represents a causal model of action. An instance of CS, for example, may be explained on the one hand by noting that it bolsters S's argument (reference to a consequence), on the other by noting that S wanted to bolster his argument and believed that CS would be a means towards this (reference to causal antecedents). The relevant causal antecedent may also be some other type of entity; 'gaps', for example, are causes while 'gap-filling' is a function. This type of correspondence is lacking both in non-teleological causal explanations and in explanations referring to unintended consequences. Second, the consequences of actions may themselves serve as causal antecedents for further events (cf. 4.2.5 above). Third, as discussed in the analyses, more general principles may also be used to account for particular actions or functions; examples include the principle of isomorphism, the principle of least effort, and Grice's maxims. These general principles in effect explain why agents adopt volitional attitudes towards certain goals in general; they operate at a 'higher' level of explanation. Fourth, reference to further actions or forms 'suspends' a teleological explanation, formulated as an M-to-G rationalization chain, before reaching a G which would count as a sufficient explanation for the original action. While it is clear that these further actions and forms (e.g. quotations, terms) are not

functions proper, they are indeed consequences of the action under analysis.[345] In fact, it is worth noting that references to these actions as such count as genuine explanations in a very general sense: we have achieved a better understanding of an utterance when we have identified it for example as a quotation from a particular source, a technical term, or reported speech. In some cases, our knowledge of the context may be too limited to achieve a coherent explanation beyond this level.

The main connections between the three types of entities mentioned above are also depicted in Figure 13. They can be further clarified in terms of the notion of rationalization chains introduced in the previous chapter, in 4.3.1. First, as noted above, a consequence may be achieved either directly by CS, or indirectly when CS merely enables one to perform some other linguistic action or to use some other linguistic form/strategy/structure, which is again used for particular ends. In other words, the goal of switching languages is to enable one to perform linguistic action X, and X is used to achieve goal Y. Second, consequences may have further consequences without an intervening level of 'surface' action (i.e. a recognizable linguistic action or form). In some cases, the connection between these consequences resembles entailment (i.e. conceptual or logical necessity) rather than ordinary causation. For example, if an action bolsters S's argument, it ought by definition to enhance the face he claims: if the other interactants accept the first consequence as a public fact, then, *ceteris paribus*, they ought also to accept the other consequence. If, on the other hand, an action excludes H from the interactional situation, it does not necessarily follow that H loses face, as discussed in conjunction with example (176) above in 5.3.1. Third, explanations pertaining to different layers are also connected to each other, since consequences at layer 2, for example, are contingent upon actions taken at layer 1.

I next discuss the explanations utilized in the textual analyses in more detail. I have determined for each case separately which type of explication best serves the present purpose; formalism is not an end in itself, and it has been dispensed with whenever the categories are fairly transparent. I first focus on the direct consequences of language choice and CS, go on to discuss causal antecedents, and conclude by addressing other actions/forms and their consequences (i.e. the indirect consequences of CS). A taxonomic representation of the categories arising from the explication of consequences is shown in Figure 14 (note that argumentative consequences were only indirectly achieved through CS; they are discussed in connection with quotations below).

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[345] In other words, the object of the agent's volition is not the further action or structure *itself*, but *to (be able to) use the form* or *perform the action*.

Figure 14.   Typology of consequences identified in the textual analyses.

To begin with, many of the functions and other consequences are connected to face and face-work. It was argued that sometimes the choice of language, dialect, or other linguistic variable was used for *characterization*. This is a distinctive function in the present dataset, since it depends on the presence of at least two layers. As argued above, in analysing language 'choice' we need to take into account that there may not be any choice available to the agent at the layer above the one at which the characterization takes place (in most cases it takes places at layer 1; in the 'play within a play' in *Discipuli et Rustici*, it takes place at layer 2). This function can be defined simply as face-work intentionally directed at the relevant agent's face at one of the upper layers.[346] This is in effect a more 'macro-level' function, as it is not necessarily the consequence of any one linguistic action in particular. When a character is first introduced, characterization takes the form of a change-of-state action; subsequently, similar characterization may consist of maintenance-of-state actions. In other words, characterization is often a recurring consequence.[347] In the present dataset, characterization by language choice or CS was sometimes found to serve the purpose of creating a *humorous effect*. This is in a sense a 'mid-level' consequence, since it is always used for some further end, in our case perhaps primarily to delight the audience, which would satisfy their positive face-wants, in other words enhance their positive face (since jokes can also be used as positive

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[346]   As noted above in 3.2.3, I here adopt a broad understanding of face-work, as covering actions which in a particular context affect face in any way.

[347]   I have not analysed characterization as a separate action because it cannot be described in terms of any clear formal properties (as opposed for example to quotations and terms, which are not solely functional labels). For the same reason, I would analyse Diller's (1997/1998) concept of support as a consequence.

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politeness strategies; see Brown & Levinson 1987: 124).[348] In the present case, then, humour achieved directly by CS is for the most part a feature of layer 1. Additional aspects of humour will be addressed below.

In *Papistae Iuniores* and *A Mender of Soles*, one goal of switching languages was *deception*: claiming a face different from one reflecting the agent's identity and not damaging to the agent. This can be analysed in Goffman's terms as defensive face-work as part of the avoidance process. A related example in *Certamen Doctrinale* saw the students switch from English to Latin to *avoid punishment* (for the logic of such actions, see von Wright 1971: 147–148): this consequence can similarly be analysed as an instance of defensive face-work. However, since in the particular example discussed above the boys have been caught speaking English and are reprimanded for this, the switch to Latin, in Goffman's terms, is part of the corrective process, namely the 'offering' phase (i.e. following the 'challenge' phase).

One function which is also sometimes analysable as defensive face-work is *exclusion*: an action has this consequence if it prevents someone either from detecting a message or from comprehending it. As discussed at some length in both the theoretical review and the analyses, there are different types of exclusion; more precisely, exclusion is a consequence which can have further consequences of various types. First, when it serves to save S's own face, it is analysable as defensive face-work as part of the avoidance process. Second, when it serves to avoid an FTA towards a side-participant or an overhearer (for these participant types, see Clark 1996: 14), it is analysable as protective face-work. Third, it may produce an FTA towards another person's positive face. In the present dataset, this occurred only as an infelicitous anticipated consequence (one type of 'by-product'); in a different context, however, it could also be the main function of exclusion. A similar complexity occurs with *solidarity*, a function which I have analysed extensively elsewhere, defining it as follows: "An act has the function of establishing solidarity iff (i) it implies a low D-value between S and H through shared membership in a social group, and (ii) at the same time enhances the positive face of both S and H" (Mäkilähde 2018a: 308; see 4.2.1 above). In terms of the more general explication scheme presented here, condition (i) could be analysed as the immediate consequence of the relevant linguistic action, condition (ii) as the consequence of (i). In this case, the connection represented by (i)→(ii) is not an instance of entailment (cf. Mäkilähde 2018a: 308). Although solidarity can be seen, again, as a fairly 'macro-level' function of CS and language choice in the performances, in example (172) it served specifically to soften an FTA, making it a positive politeness strategy (i.e. softening the FTA was its intended consequence). All politeness strategies in

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[348]   Note that here the success of the action depends crucially on H's mental states, not on any public facts about H's face.

Brown and Levinson's model count as protective face-work as part of the avoidance process in Goffman's model.

Another related case is *euphemism*, which, however, does have certain distinctive properties of its own. Conventional euphemisms can be analysed more properly as separate linguistic forms; *podex* in example (98) might be included in this category. If we are not dealing with a conventional euphemism, it seems more appropriate to analyse the switch as having a euphemistic function. Euphemisms are mentioned by Brown and Levinson (1987: 215–216, 222–223, 226) as off-record politeness strategies, achieved by violating the Maxim of Relevance (via association clues), Quality (via metaphors), or Manner (via vagueness). In other words, by using a euphemistic expression, S *forbears* to use a particular form which would have been expected in terms of the Maxims, and instead uses a form which either has less serious negative connotations or makes them more obscure. In addition to being analysable as protective face-work, euphemism may also be used for defensive face-work; such a case was mentioned as a possible explanation for Credulio's avoidance of uttering *arse* in example (170). It is indeed a noteworthy feature of many face-work and politeness strategies that they combine active change-of-state forbearance and active maintenance-of-state action, in other words $f_a(pT{\sim}p)$ & $d_a(pTp)$.

Showing off refers in general to instances where S demonstrates his linguistic abilities (e.g. by being able to speak a certain language or being able to translate something) and hence either enhances or maintains his face.[349] The latter applies to situations where being able to demonstrate these abilities is something required or expected of S in terms of his current face. As argued above in 5.2.2.6, this would be a more 'macro-level' explanation for the inclusion of Greek passages in certain performances in general, although it needs to be emphasized that this is not a sufficient explanation for most individual switches. If S is unable to demonstrate abilities as expected by others, we have in essence a *self-inflicted FTA towards S's positive face*, which leads (if not corrected) in Goffman's terms to *S being in the wrong face* (i.e. his face is 'damaged'). Two slightly different examples were discussed in 5.3.1: in example (170) Credulio fails to speak correct and elegant Latin, while in (171) Jacky fails to translate and analyse a sentence correctly. In both cases, face-damage is not the function of the switch but an infelicitous unanticipated consequence. Sometimes the choice of language also constitutes an intentional or unintentional *FTA towards H's negative face*, namely when the choice puts pressure (for whatever reason) on H to switch languages (see 5.3.1 for examples).

Another main category of consequences relates to the textual level of language use, or discourse structuring. Those achieved directly by CS include *flagging or highlighting units*, *marking textual levels*, and *highlighting a change of addressee*.

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[349]   It is not here implied that 'showing off' would be considered inappropriate in general.

The common feature in each case is that a change in language makes a change in something else more salient, including its presence and/or its borders. As noted in the analyses, in this dataset flagging a specific unit (quotation, reported speech, or technical term) was for the most part a neutral anticipated consequence of CS, not the intended consequence. In marking the textual levels – in our case text vs. meta-text – there seem to be two competing versions of the 1M1F principle which the author(s)/scribe(s) may have followed. One interpretation of the principle for this context would suggest that the language used for the main text should also be used for the meta-text, in particular that the language used by a character should also be used for that character's stage directions; this is illustrated in example (15). The other interpretation suggests that one language should be used for one textual level: for example English for the main text and Latin for the meta-text. The only clear instance of highlighting a change of addressee was example (176), and even there it was not CS alone that produced this consequence. It could be objected that highlighting or even *indicating* a change of addressee should not be grouped with the other two types of marking; the similarities, however, are quite striking: both in marking textual levels and in highlighting a change of addressee, the switch in or choice of language indicates who is communicating with whom and when.

Another main category of consequences concerns the use of CS for *stylistic effect*. One example of this (discussed at the end of 5.2.3.4) was the use of switching to create *parallelism* for *poetic effect*. In this case, we could analyse the stylistic effect as the further consequence of a textual function, since parallelism is one means of foregrounding (see e.g. Short 1996; cf. 5.1.3 above). As noted in the brief analysis, the occurrence of the parallel structure can be explained by reference to the conventions of the genre, which belong to the causal antecedents of the action (upon which the action is contingent via normative pressure). Another type of function mentioned in 5.2.3.6 is the use of switching to give an utterance an 'exotic' air; this is in effect one type of *allusion*. William Irwin (2001: 293) defines allusion as "a reference that is indirect in the sense that it calls for associations that go beyond mere substitution of a referent. An author must intend this indirect reference, and it must be in principle possible that the intended audience could detect it". Furthermore, those "intertextual connections readers make independent of authorial intent" he calls *accidental associations* (2001: 294). The difference between the two, in other words, is that allusions in Irwin's sense are intended consequences of actions, while accidental associations are unanticipated consequences – they may be felicitous, infelicitous, or neutral. Prototypical instances were discussed in the analyses as being achieved for example by the use of quotations or domain-specific terms (see below); in the present case, however, the choice of language alludes to a specific country or to 'foreignness' in general (i.e. the forms clearly function as FFIs). If allusion is understood as a 'mid-level' consequence, its further consequence could be analysed

as the forming in H's mind of an associative relationship between some entities. If the allusion is successful, this consequence is entailed for at least some H (for successful and unsuccessful allusions, see Irwin 2001: 292). Clever allusions may in turn serve to show off S's skills, and since a successful allusion presupposes the presence of specific information in S's and H's common ground, it may also serve to establish solidarity.

The final main category could be termed *capacitative*, as CS serves here to make it possible for S to do something else. One major consequence is to *enable the use of X*, where X is a linguistic form/structure/strategy, or, from another perspective, to *enable doing X*, where X is a linguistic action (cf. e.g. 'to use a quotation' vs. 'to quote'); the forms or actions enabled by the use of CS are discussed in more detail below. This particular function can be further explicated by reference to more general principles: using a form which is *more familiar to S* accords with the principle of least effort. In fact, rather than 'doing', the action can be interpreted as forbearing: if *~pTp* stands for 'the quotation is translated into another language', the action in question can be represented as $f_a(\sim pTp)$. On the other hand, using a form which is *more familiar to H* and hence less obscure can be analysed as adhering to the Maxim of Manner. The other functions in this category are ones whose place in an explanation could just as well be taken by causal antecedents: if there is a gap in *H's competence*, S may need to switch languages to *facilitate communication*; if there is a gap in *S's competence*, S may need to switch to *fill the gap*. Note that *filling a semantic gap* was connected in the present dataset specifically to the use of technical or otherwise 'special' terminology; this is not necessarily always the case, as discussed above in 3.1.4.2. Finally, in making domain-specific choices – situational switching, in Gumperz's terminology – the speaker chooses a language in order to *conform to norms* (particularly rules, customs, or prescriptions). As noted in the analyses, this explanation seems to be particularly informative when applied at the macro- or meso-levels, but there are also instances where switches at the micro-level are sufficiently accounted for by such an explanation. In the longer dialogue of *Discipuli et Rustici*, for instance, some switches were explained by reference to the norms governing language use at King's School, while in example (39) explanation by reference to *metri gratia* is a subtype of a norm-based one.

I next briefly discuss the second type of entity used in the explanations: *causal antecedents*. Beyond the volitional-epistemic complex included in RE, the most obvious examples are the above-mentioned *gaps*, *lack of competence*, and *norms* (i.e. norms other than RPs, such as rules, customs, or prescriptions); corresponding concepts are included in many of the function lists and taxonomies discussed above in 3.1.4. Another well-established one is *triggering*, which in the present study was used only in explaining a switch or a choice of term as being due to an *attraction effect*: in section 5.2.3.6, this referred to the salience of a form caused by an earlier

occurrence. In example (113), however, it referred to salience caused by perceived ellipsis (note that here one also needs to refer to rules of language). In some cases, a switch in language or alphabet was explained as being due to a *slip* (formalized in 4.2.5), caused by a momentary *lack of attention*. In others the switch was seen as the *consequence of some other intentional action*, but lacking any intentional consequence itself. The main context for this explanation was one where copying of text had taken place, as in example (29). Finally, an explanation by reference to *default choice* is again explicable in terms of the principle of least effort; as noted in the analyses, there is a distinction between default and norm-conforming choices, although both explanations may apply at the same time.

I move on to the third entity applied in the explanations: *further linguistic actions/forms*. These include *quotations*, *reported speech*, *terms*, *repetition/ reiteration*, *etymology*, *word-play*, *names*, *metalinguistic units*, and *interjections*. To begin with, *quotations* from ancient or contemporary works form a major category in terms both of their raw frequency and of their functional complexity. Most of their functions and other consequences were face-related. Similarly to language choice and CS by themselves, quotations were also used for solidarity and to show off. In addition, modified quotations were sometimes used for a humorous effect (the consequence of which was to delight the audience and to show off). In addition, quotations were used to *bolster S's argument*, which is in effect a face-work strategy whereby S enhances or attempts to maintain his face by showing that his actions or beliefs are correct/rational/appropriate. There were two ways in particular in which quotations were used to achieve this function: *claiming authority* and *justifying S's actions/beliefs*. In the former case using the quotation implied that an eminent authority agreed with S, while the latter took the form of providing a logical explanation for something. The latter function in particular could more properly be placed in a category of *argumentative consequences*, concerning the logical (as opposed to textual) form of the message; these in turn may have face-related consequences. It should be noted that bolstering S's argument could also serve as a positive politeness strategy when it occurred in conjunction with an FTA (cf. Brown & Levinson 1987: 128–129). *Indicating values* is a close relative of the argument-bolstering function, as it is basically a form of face-enhancement achieved by reference to particular values. While in many cases the function was more particularly to *indicate S's values*, there were instances where it was used to *bolster* or *enhance a referent's face* instead, in particular when the referent was the King. This is a prime example of a case where a quotation is used for an allusion which in turn has the face-related consequence. *Indicating modesty* is analysable as both defensive and protective face-work, and may also serve as a negative politeness strategy (see Brown & Levinson 1987: 185). *Generalized advice* is mentioned by Brown and Levinson (1987: 226) as one form of the off-record politeness strategy

of *overgeneralization*; when it functions as a politeness strategy, it is directed at H and occurs in conjunction with an FTA. In example (89), the advice was directed at S; in this case, it seems more appropriate to analyse the function as the above-mentioned argument-bolstering (with the 'by-product' of indicating S's values).

Quotations could also be used as *FTAs*, more particularly to *criticize* or *parody* someone; both are directed at H's or the referent's positive face (see Brown & Levinson 1987: 66). As can be seen, the dataset shows both overlap and division of labour in the sets of face-related consequences achieved directly by CS and indirectly via quotations. These relationships are depicted in Figure 15 below. Finally, the only non-face-related consequence of quotations mentioned in the analyses was an instance of *cohesion* in example (94), falling under the rubric of textual functions.


Figure 15. Euler diagram of face-related consequences of CS and quotations.

Another major category is that of *terms*. These are often best accounted for by domain-based explanations (e.g. by reference to customs); connections to specific domains are also made salient when the terms provide allusions to a particular author (e.g. Homer) or topic (e.g. warfare, religion). The 'aptness' explanation offered in conjunction with example (43), where a connection was made between a concept and a language, is also one type of allusion. In example (163) an allusion to Christ was explained as bolstering or enhancing the referent's face (Charles II in this case), while in (120) an allusion to Achilles was explained as *enhancing H's face*. Terms could also be used as FTAs towards the addressee's positive face, either when they were intrinsically derogatory or when terms such as *Monsieur* were used ironically (cf. parody above). Finally, although the use of in-group terms was explained by reference to norms, their use also has the consequence of establishing or emphasizing

solidarity between S and H, similarly to the use of quotations. The same explanation accounts for the use of nicknames such as Ἐργοδιώκτης.

Reiteration or *repetition* was used in some cases for *emphasis*, which is based on iconicity (see e.g. Anttila 1989: 13–18; Clark 1996: 156–159); this may be classified as an argumentative function (the corresponding textual function is highlighting). The same is true of *clarification*, where the meaning of the reiterated phrase is made more transparent for the addressee. Reiteration could also serve to facilitate communication in case of a gap in H's competence, to create a cohesive tie (within one discourse) or an allusion (to another discourse), to enable word-play (see below), and – with an ironic tone – to produce an FTA, as in example (166). As noted above, reiteration could also occur straightforwardly as translation, where the function of the translation was to 'show off' S's linguistic skills. Under repetition we can also categorize example (180), where anaphoric reference was used in switching back to the language of interaction to *indicate the relevance of S's action* – another argumentative function, achieved in this case via a textual one (namely cohesion). Furthermore, as noted in the analysis, indicating relevance served further as a positive politeness strategy (cf. Brown & Levinson 1987: 128–129).

The consequences achieved via *etymology* have all been covered above. They include allusions, clarification, bolstering S's argument, and enabling word-play. Similarly, while the main explanation for switching with *names* is a norm-based one, mentioning names can also be used to enable word-play, or to make it more apparent. Humour is the entailed consequence of *word-play*, but in the present dataset puns were also used to produce FTAs. A form related to quotations, *reported speech*, referred in the analyses only to cases where the source was not a specific work or text; it could also be classified together with quotations in a more general category. The main consequences of reported speech were humorous effect, characterization, bolstering S's argument, and FTAs. Finally, the explanation for switching as the production of *metalinguistic comments* and *interjections* counts as a norm-based one. The overlap between the face-related consequences of some of the forms discussed here is illustrated in Figure 16 below.

Figure 16. Euler-diagram of face-related consequences of word-play (WP), reiteration (R), etymology (E), and reported speech (RS). The sets are: *WP*={FTA, Humorous effect}; *R*={FTA, Humorous effect, Indicate relevance, Showing off}; E={Humorous effect, Showing off, Bolster S's argument}; RS={FTA, Humorous effect, Bolster S's argument, Characterization}.

To sum up: the three explanatory entities applied in the analyses were consequences, causal antecedents, and further linguistic actions/forms. The consequences could be categorized fairly clearly into the following groups: face-related, textual, argumentative, stylistic, and capacitative (see Figure 14 above). The most varied of these categories was – unsurprisingly – the one covering different types of face-work. These can be further classified into a separate taxonomy, where the supercategories cover four types of face-work (see Figure 17 below): *enhancing* (e.g. solidarity), *defensive* (e.g. deception), *protective* (e.g. generalized advice), and *disruptive* (i.e. different types of FTAs). As can be seen, there is considerable overlap between the taxonomies presented here and those discussed in section 3.1.4.2; at least the categories mentioned by Gumperz (1982), Grosjean (1982), and Appel and Muysken (1987) can be classified fairly straightforwardly according to the same principles. An in-depth formal analysis of the functions and explanations proposed by other researchers would allow a systematic comparison of the various models; this, however, is beyond the scope of the present study.

Figure 17. Typology of face-related consequences identified in the textual analyses. Politeness-strategies can be analysed as protective face-work. R=Referent.

At this point, we have completed the final stage of the philological-pragmatic approach. The process, however, does not end here. Having gone through the first level of understanding, explanation, and explication, the next step is to continue the hermeneutic cycle towards understanding language choice and code-switching by applying the approach to other datasets and other linguistic phenomena. When the final stage is reached once more, we will be in a better position to evaluate the explications and classifications, and to refine them accordingly.

6 Discussion

In this chapter, I place the study and its results in their broader context. I begin in section 6.1 by discussing the main findings and their implications. In section 6.2 I address the relevance of the present study on the one hand for researchers working on CS in historical texts, on the other for those working in the field of historical pragmatics. Finally, in section 6.3 I conclude the discussion by suggesting some possible steps to be taken in future research.

6.1 Summary of findings

I summarize my findings by answering the eight research questions established at the beginning of this study. I begin with those related to the broader question, *Why do several languages occur in the Orationes texts?* The first question to be answered was, *How are the different languages distributed in the Orationes manuscript and what explains these patterns?* In searching for patterns, I focused only on those performances which contained other sections in addition to the title (N=56). The main languages used in the performances were as follows: Latin (N=21), Latin & English (N=27), Latin & Greek (N=4), Latin & Greek & English (N=4). Most of the performances, in other words, were multilingual at the macro-level. In order to quantify CS, I counted and classified all instances of 'discourse-insertional' switching (N=373), which was the most frequent type of CS in the dataset: language-wise, the most important categories consisted of switching from Latin to Greek (45%), English to Latin (35%), Latin to English (9%), and English to French (7%); there were no switches from Greek to other languages. Most of the switches occurred in dialogues (49%) and orations (39%); most of the switches in a Latin matrix occurred in the orations (66%), most of those in an English matrix in the dialogues (89%). I suggested that the numbers reflected a 'language hierarchy' (Greek > Latin > English), and explained the patterns as being due (i) to the focus on Latin in grammar school education, (ii) to the fact that Greek was only studied in the upper forms, and (iii) to the English parts being reserved for boys in the lower forms. In terms of the four subgenres, the Christmas performances contained the highest number of switches, in terms of both raw frequency (49% of tokens) and normalized frequency (2.50/1,000 words). Since four of the Christmas performances accounted

for a third of all switches in the dataset, I suggested that the numbers reflected a qualitative difference between the subgenres, namely a more extensive focus on everyday school life in the Christmas performances, resulting in the particularly frequent use of quotations and terms from grammar-books and other basic school material.

The second question to be answered was, *Why do the individual switches occur in their particular contexts, and what are the different ways of explaining them?* This question was answered in the philological part of the study by explaining all individual instances of CS in the dataset. Overall, the findings indicated that multilingual language use is an important strategy in the *Orationes* performances. Explanations of individual switches displayed considerable variation, ranging from errors and genre conventions, through discourse organization and highlighting, to face-work and characterization. In all four subgenres, quotations and terms were particularly important CS categories. In the Gunpowder Plot performances, religious terms and quotations from Homer and Hesiod were particularly important; in the Christmas plays, concepts and quotations from grammar books as well as humorous in-group references were frequent; in the Lenten performances, puns on names formed a distinctive category; in the Oak Apple Day performances, in addition to religious terms and argument-bolstering quotations, we also encountered the use of stage-accents for purposes of characterization similarly to CS. Comparative analysis also showed that CS shared many functions with other strategies, including the use of address forms and of quotations without a change in language, visual highlighting, and bodily actions. In some cases, CS was used in conjunction with these other strategies to achieve particular goals.

In the pragmatic part of the study I answered the third research question, *How can the explanations for code-switching be explicated and classified?* I proposed explications of the explanations by applying (i) concepts introduced in the theoretical review and (ii) the new analytical tools developed for the present study in the philosophical and methodological analyses. In particular, the analyses and formalizations of action-types were used to distinguish between three types of explanatory entities: consequences, causal antecedents, and further actions/forms. I analysed the explanations and classified them first according to this tripartite division. Next, consequences were classified into face-related, textual, argumentative, stylistic, and capacitative. Face-related consequences were further classified according to a four-way division between face-work types: enhancing, defensive, protective, and disruptive. The other actions/forms referred to in the explanations were quotations, reported speech, terms, repetition/reiteration, etymology, word-play, names, metalinguistic units, and interjections; their consequences were also explicated and classified. Finally, causal antecedents

included (in addition to the volitional-epistemic complex inherent in rational explanation) such factors as gaps, lack of competence, and norms of various types.

The fourth research question was, *How do the findings relate to the socio-historical context of the texts?* First, we may consider their relevance for understanding how the *Orationes* texts were composed. To begin with, in explaining individual switches, dozens of quotations were traced to their origins, including for example William Lily's Grammar, Horace, Vergil, Ovid, Juvenal, the *Disticha Catonis*, and *Sententiae Pueriles* for Latin; Homer (especially the *Iliad*), Hesiod, Isocrates (especially the speech to Demonicus), and Plutarch for Greek; and Erasmus's *Adagia* and religious material such as the Bible for both. In other words, the recurring quotations reflect our existing understanding of the curriculum at the King's School in particular and in the early modern period in general. In addition, I identified a number of cases where the texts relied more heavily on or were copied from particular sources, such as Gabriel Harvey, Justus Lipsius, and Theodore Beza. Finally, I also detected textual connections within the manuscript, as elements or sections from earlier performances could be reused in later ones. While similar observations have been made in earlier research, the present study is the only extensive analysis of the *Orationes* texts thus far. These findings offer further support for the claim that the students themselves took part in composing the texts, which seem to be the product of the type of activity which for example Hoole (1660) recommends for composing themes and orations: locating useful passages in various sources, copying them into a commonplace book, and using them creatively in new contexts. It is also worth adding that if my identification of separate orations in the texts is correct, they are on the whole short enough to have been composed by a schoolboy in the upper forms. These texts may thus serve to provide rare first-hand information as to the composition of grammar school exercises, as well as the possible attainments of grammar-school boys in the seventeenth century.[350] They should therefore be of particular interest to grammar-school historians in general.

Second, we may consider the relevance of the findings for our understanding of the broader socio-historical context of early modern Britain. It is clear that this corpus is a prime example of the extensive multilingualism of the Early Modern English period, in terms of both societal and individual multilingualism, as well as of the roles of the individual languages in the society. In fact, Schendl's (2015: 245) contentions – that "medieval literary code-switching is an apt expression of a multilingual society" and that "it is highly likely that in such a complex linguistic situation, spoken code-switching must also have been a frequent multilingual strategy" – are also applicable to the present study (*mutatis mutandis*). The macro- and meso-level analyses demonstrated that the three main languages used in the texts

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[350]   Cf. e.g. London, British Library Add MS 4379; *William Badger's Exercises*; and London, British Library Lansdowne MS 1180; *School Exercises*.

exhibit certain patterns, connected to such factors as domains, genres, and the 'language hierarchy'. Domain-related switching at the micro-level further reflects the linguistic setting; for example, the role of Latin in the fields of science, religion, law, and administration. In addition, the political and religious context of the Restoration, together with a 'linguistic ambivalence', is reflected in the texts, for example in the plays which explicitly or implicitly comment on the possible Papist connotations of Latin.

The second set of questions posed at the beginning of this study was related to the broader question, *What is the philosophical and methodological basis of the philological-pragmatic approach?* The fifth specific question to be answered was, *What are philology and pragmatics, and what is their relation to one another?* I suggested a way of conceptualizing both types of research from the perspective of action analysis and theory of action: philology as the analysis of concrete action-tokens, pragmatics as the analysis of abstract action-types. In this conceptualization, philology takes the form of explanation by understanding, pragmatics the form of understanding by explanation. In the philological-pragmatic approach, these stages are connected by way of a hermeneutic cycle, where we move from understanding through interpretation to explication.

The sixth question to be answered was, *What are the basic methods of philology and pragmatics, and how are they applied in practice?* I took as my point of departure the suggestion put forward in earlier research, that the basic method of philology is interpretation, especially in the form of close reading. In analysing the concept of interpretation, I suggested certain ways of defining it in relation to empathy, *Verstehen*, re-enactment, and rational explanation. I further argued that the basic methods of philology and pragmatics could be clarified in terms of their position vis-à-vis rationality principles: in the first stage (philology), RPs are applied in the explanation of particular action-tokens, in the second stage (pragmatics), generalizations about these RPs are formulated by way of explication and classification.

The seventh question to be answered was, *How do we explain actions, and how can these explanations be evaluated?* By analysing and formalizing different action-types, I proposed a reinterpretation of the role of different explanations in philology and pragmatics: in addition to functions proper, explanations should also account for various other types of consequences of actions (anticipated/unanticipated and neutral/felicitous/infelicitous) as well as for various types of causal antecedents. In identifying the basis for evaluating such explanations, I took as my point of departure a suggestion put forward in previous research to the effect that 'coherentist explanations' are an unavoidable part of the human sciences. I developed this argument further by suggesting ways of understanding coherent explanations within

our present context, and by demonstrating how the notion of coherence could be used to evaluate explanations.

Finally, I set out to build bridges between the two major parts of the study by answering the eighth research question: *How can we connect philosophical and methodological analyses to empirical ones?* On the one hand, philosophical and methodological analyses were used to inform framework-building; in particular, the choice of suitable methods and their correct application. On the other hand, I proposed that explications of central concepts could be used as tools in the empirical analyses. In particular, I developed descriptive tools, in the form of extended formalism, for analysing action-types, as well as notions such as rationalization chains. These were then applied in the empirical analyses to clarify, explicate, and classify explanations.

6.2 Relevance of the present study for other researchers

Here I briefly note how the findings of the present study may be of relevance on the one hand to researchers interested in 'historical CS', on the other to those working in the broad field of historical pragmatics. First, the CS patterns identified in the present study have several parallels in other domains, genres, and text-types from roughly the same time period. For example, we may consider the functions of CS identified in the studies by Pahta and Nurmi (2011) on Late Middle English and Early Modern English religious texts, by Nurmi and Pahta (2012) on epistolary writing by women in 1400–1800, and by Tuominen (2018) on sermons in 1640–1740; overall, they are comparable to many of the explanations arrived at in the present study. I suggest that these findings indicate that, at least in case of educated people, these strategies were acquired already at the grammar school level: students would encounter CS in their school books and other material they read and employ it in their own compositions, especially in the form of quotations and technical terms. Those who advanced to the university level would obviously continue using these strategies, and might even produce new materials for schoolboys to encounter, or they might become teachers themselves. In order to understand the roots of multilingual language use in the Early Modern English period, we should therefore pay close attention to linguistic practices in the grammar schools.

Furthermore, beyond the Early Modern English period, we may again note various points of common ground with studies focused on the medieval period.[351] For example, the hypothesis presented above is supported by a strikingly similar argument put forward by Fletcher (2009: 56–59): he suggests that the multilingual

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[351] The need for such diachronic comparisons has been mentioned already by e.g. Schendl (1996: 61).

writing style of the Late Middle English period (attested in a variety of genres and text-types), or more precisely the competence to write in such a style, can be connected to multilingual educational practices. In addition, we may note that 'learned' multilingualism in general is a phenomenon which has characterized English contact with Latin for centuries. As noted above, specific categories of CS may be connected to this type of bilingualism in particular, such as the use of Classical quotations and technical terminology. Similarly, if we broaden the perspective even further, we may note extensive parallels in other societies, including ancient Rome: functions comparable to those discussed for example by Adams (2003) are also found in the present dataset. Considering these parallels makes it possible to detect more general patterns of language use which are connected to similarities of context, and demonstrates that these linguistic situations, and the practices manifested in the attested texts, are not in fact unique to any particular place or time. In other words, detecting such patterns contributes to an integrated account of the phenomenon.

Second, in terms of the whole field of historical pragmatics, the main contribution of the present study has been to propose a more detailed understanding of what it is in fact that we do. There are currently many different fields, paradigms, and approaches, all of which seem to contain the same basic core, and whose philosophical and methodological bases seems to be essentially the same. It was one of the main arguments of the present study that the philological-pragmatic approach is able to capture this shared essence. Most importantly, whatever terms one may wish to apply to the type of research one conducts, the approach developed in the present study offers a model for combining philology and pragmatics.

6.3 Suggestions for future research

Several aspects of the present study offer avenues for further research; I suggest briefly what might be the next steps in terms of the main focal points of the study. First, while the textual analyses were extensive, they have only scratched the surface: several of the individual texts need to be analysed as extensively as *Discipuli et Rustici* was here, and the use of other strategies should be compared more comprehensively for example to CS. Fundamental questions about the manuscript, such as the authorship of the texts, the method of composition, and the contexts of performance, also need to be answered conclusively. The present study has provided a convenient starting point by proposing various arguments for future research to evaluate.

In terms of language choice and CS, further steps should be taken towards an integrated account of the phenomenon. The manner in which this is to be done, I suggest, is a comparative approach, making use of data from a variety of socio-

historical settings, media, genres, and text-types. We are currently at a stage where such studies have become feasible, due to the number of individual studies addressing these issues. The present study has hopefully contributed towards this project by offering both an approach and a model for application, testing, and further refinement.

Finally, the philosophical and methodological analyses offered here should be supplemented by more in-depth studies dealing with the particular issues discussed. The formalism developed for analysing action-types, for example, should be extended to cover more ground, such as the notions of 'norm-conforming' and 'trying'. In addition, expansions need to be introduced in the form of other modal logics, to account for a broader range of more individuated action-types. Similarly, the method of 'evaluation by coherence' deserves further development, for example by formalizing more clearly the concept of 'speculation', and the varying degrees to which our explanations need to rely on it.

In more general terms, the present study has argued for an integrative and generalist approach, where different perspectives are seen as complementing, not excluding, each other. In addition, I have attempted, as it were, to 'rehabilitate' several classic theories and approaches by reinterpreting and combining them. In particular, the philosophical and methodological analyses can be considered a defence of traditional philology, as the most fundamental representative of the human sciences.

7 Conclusion

The present study had two general aims. The first was *to explain why people use multiple languages within a single discourse, and why they choose to use a particular language in a particular setting*. To achieve that aim, I developed a philological-pragmatic approach and applied it to my dataset in order to understand and explain both particular action-tokens and general action-types. My conclusion was that multilingual language use could be explained in terms of three different entities: consequences of actions, causal antecedents, and further actions/forms. The consequences, and thus the functions, of switching between languages could be classified into five basic categories: face-related, textual, argumentative, stylistic, and capacitative. These taxonomies sufficiently accounted for the observed patterns of language use.

The second aim of the study was *to demonstrate the feasibility and usefulness of combining philosophical and empirical research.* Towards that end, I conducted a philosophical and methodological analysis of the philological-pragmatic approach, constructed an explicit framework on the basis of the analysis, and tested it by applying it in the empirical analyses. My conclusion was that a basis for the approach was constructed by reinterpreting philology and pragmatics from the perspective of action analysis and theory of action: philology as the study of concrete action-tokens (interpretation), pragmatics as the study of abstract action-types (explication and classification). Through application, the approach was found to be suitable and fruitful.

In demonstrating the feasibility and usefulness of combining philosophical and empirical research, I hope to spark interest in further research on these themes. There are advantages in such combinations, both for those interested in purely philosophical and methodological questions and for those interested in purely empirical questions. It is to be hoped that these philosophical and methodological questions continue to be investigated also by those of us for whom they have practical implications: scholars and scientists who strive to understand human actions.

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Appendix
List of the *Orationes* performances

The tables below list the *Orationes* performances, divided into the four subgenres. Each entry indicates (i) the location of the text in the manuscript in terms of relative order, (ii) the folio numbers, (iii) a short title used in the present study, and (iv) the sections the performance contains, together with the main language(s) for each section. Note that the sections are listed in thematic order, not as they appear in each text. P=Prologue, O=Orations, D=Dialogue, V=Verse section, E=Epilogue, A=Play by major author (copied in full into the manuscript), T=Play by major author (only the title recorded in the manuscript), Lat=Latin, Eng=English, Gr=Greek. Asterisks indicate 'functional' prologues and epilogues.

Appendix Table 1. The Gunpowder Plot Performances.

Order	Folios	Title	Sections and languages
GP1	1r–3v	*Shrawley*	P(Lat), O(Lat), E(Lat)
GP2	31r–36r	*Garnettus*	*P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Lat), E(Lat)
GP3	54v–61v	*Sister Charity*	P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Lat), D(Eng), E(Lat)
GP4	80r–86v	*Loyolista et Catharista*	P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Lat), E(Eng&Lat)
GP5	103r–114r	*Papistae Iuniores*	P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Lat&Eng), D(Lat), E(Lat)
GP6	134r–143r	*Fidus et Faustus Pastores*	P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Lat), D(Eng), E(Eng)
GP7	159v–170r	*The Papist Wife*	P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Lat), D(Eng), E(Eng)
GP8	191r–196r	*Mercurius*	P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Lat), E(Lat)
GP9	219r–228v	*Neighbour Catesby*	P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Lat), D(Eng), E(Eng)
GP10	247v–253v	*Teltroth and the Madams*	P(Lat), O(Lat&Gr), D(Eng), E(Lat)
GP11	271v–278v	*Iacobus*	P(Lat), O(Lat&Gr), E(Lat)
GP12	311v–318r	*Declamationes de Fauxio et Cromwello*	P(Lat), O(Lat&Gr), D(Lat), E(Lat)
GP13	337r–344v	*Pauline and Dorcas*	P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Lat), D(Eng), E(Lat)
GP14	364v–373v	*Marprelate*	P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Eng), E(Eng)
GP15	390r–412v	*Salisbury*	P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Eng), E(Lat)
GP16	423v–432r	*The Avenging Eye*	P(Lat), O(Lat), E(Lat)
GP17	454v–462v	*Viper and Asp*	P(Lat), O(Lat&Gr), D(Eng), E(Eng)

Appendix Table 2. The Christmas Performances.

Order	Folios	Title	Sections and languages
C1	4r-16r	*A World of Options*	P(Lat), O(Lat), O(Eng), E(Eng)
C2	37r-47r	*Anni Tempora*	P(Lat), P(Eng), D(Lat), *E(Lat), A(Eng)
C3	62v-72r	*The Conquest of Metals*	P(Lat), P(Eng), O(Lat), D(Eng), E(Eng)
C4	87r-94r	*Certamen Doctrinale*	P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Eng&Lat)
C5	115r	*The Cheats*	T(Eng)
C6	144r-149v	*Pueri Captivi*	*P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Lat), D(Eng), E(Lat)
C7	171r–183v	*Sectiones Horatianae*	P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Lat), D(Eng), E(Lat)
C8	197r–201v	*Colloquium de Rhetorica*	P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Lat), E(Lat)
C9	229v	*Amor in Labyrintho*	T(Lat)
C10	254v–255r	*Captivi a Plauto*	P(Lat), E(Lat), T(Lat)
C11	279r–294r	*Discipuli et Rustici*	P(Eng), P(Lat), O(Eng), D(Eng), D(Lat&Eng), V(Eng&Lat), E(Lat)
C12	319r–327v	*Grammaticae Partes I*	P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Eng), V(Lat), E(Lat)
C13	345v–356v	*Contention*	P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Lat), E(Lat), A(Eng)
C14	374v–378v	*Orationes Hyemales*	*P(Lat), O(Lat&Gr), *E(Lat)
C15	413v	*The Female Prelate & The Spanish Fryar*	T(Eng)
C16	433r–437r	*Grammaticae Partes II*	P(Lat), O(Lat), V(Lat), *E(Lat)
C17	463–468r	*Quinque Sensus*	P(Lat), O(Lat)

Appendix Table 3. The Lenten Performances.

Order	Folios	Title	Sections and languages
L1	17r–25r	*Shrawley and Burnley*	P(Lat), O(Lat), V(Lat), E(Lat)
L2	48r	*The Example*	T(Eng)
L3	73r	*Bellum Grammaticale*	T(Lat)
L4	96r	*Priscianus Vapulans*	T(Lat)
L5	116r–124v	*Crooke and Penkherst*	P(Lat), O(Lat), V(Lat), E(Lat)
L6	150v	*Senile Odium*	T(Lat)
L7	184v	*Valetudinarium*	T(Lat)
L8	202r–210v	*Gibson and Ienken*	P(Lat), P(Lat), O(Lat), V(Lat)
L9	230v–238v	*Missenden and Waterman*	P(Lat), O(Lat), V(Lat), E(Lat)
L10	256r–264r	*Wakefield and Foche*	P(Lat), O(Lat), V(Lat), E(Lat)
L11	295r–304v	*Hardress and Finch*	P(Lat), O(Lat), V(Lat), E(Lat)
L12	328v	*The English Senile Odium*	T(Eng)
L13	357v	*Fraus Honesta*	T(Lat)
L14	379v–384v	*Ienken and Lunn*	P(Lat), O(Lat), V(Lat)
L15	414v–421v	*Sprat and Cage*	P(Lat), O(Lat), V(Lat), E(Lat)
L16	439r–446v	*Hardress and Fortrye*	P(Lat), O(Lat), V(Lat), E(Lat)
L17	469r	*The Valetudinary*	T(Eng)

Appendix Table 4. The Oak Apple Day Performances.

Order	Folios	Title	Sections and languages
OA1	26r–30r	*Misomonarchus et Philomonarchus*	P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Lat), *E(Lat)
OA2	49r–53v	*Laeta Britannia*	P(Lat), O(Lat&Gr), *E(Lat)
OA3	74r–79r	*A Mender of Soles*	P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Lat&Eng)
OA4	97r–102r	*Disputatio de Re Publica*	O(Lat), D(Lat), E(Lat)
OA5	125r–133r	*Cromwellus et Furiae*	P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Lat), V(Lat&Eng), E(Eng)
OA6	151v–158v	*Arborum triumphus*	P(Lat), O(Lat), E(Eng)
OA7	186r–190r	*Seamen*	*P(Lat), O(Lat&Gr), D(Eng), *E(Eng)
OA8	211v–218r	*Nic and Tom*	P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Eng), E(Eng)
OA9	239v–246v	*Brisk*	P(Lat), P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Eng), E(Eng)
OA10	265r–270v	*The Ring of Giges*	P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Eng), E(Lat)
OA11	305v–310v	*Naked Truth*	P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Eng), E(Eng)
OA12	329v–336r	*Thomas Teltroth*	P(Lat), O(Lat&Gr), D(Eng), *E(Eng)
OA13	358v–363v	*Oldway and Rightrule*	P(Lat), O(Lat), D(Eng), E(Lat)
OA14	385v–389r	*Theoeides*	P(Lat), O(Lat), E(Lat)
OA15	422v	*The Royalist*	T(Eng)
OA16	447v–453v	*Musarum Fautor*	P(Lat), O(Lat)
OA17	470r–477r	*Friends to the Cause*	P(Lat), D(Eng), E(Lat)

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