

From Semantics to Pragmatics

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Tutkielmassani käsittelen semantiikan ja pragmatiikan välistä erottelua. Karkeasti ottaen semantiikalla tarkoitetaan tutkimusalaa, joka käsittelee ilmaisujen kirjaimellista merkitystä, mitä ilmaisuilla eksplisiittisesti ilmaistaan sekä lauseiden totuusehtojen muodostamista. Pragmatiikan alaan lasketaan perinteisesti kuuluvan ilmaisujen ei-kirjaimellisen merkityksen tarkastelun, mitä ilmaisuilla implisiittisesti välitetään sekä lauseiden ei-totuusehdollisen sisällön tarkastelun. Esittelen tutkielmassani kaksi teoriaa: David Kaplanin teorian indeksikaaleista ja demonstratiiveista sekä Robert Stalnakerin teorian siitä, miten väittämä vaikuttaa kontekstiin. Tutkielmani keskeinen kysymys on, miten semantiikan ja pragmatiikan välinen erottelu ilmenee Kaplanin ja Stalnakerin teorioissa. Mainittakoon, että kumpikaan teoria ei ensisijaisesti pyri vastaamaan asettamaani kysymykseen. Kaplanin tarkoitus on osoittaa, että indeksikaalisille ilmaisuille voidaan luoda semantiikka. Stalnaker pyrkii puolestaan esittämään, miten välttämättömät a posteriori identiteettiväitteet voivat olla informatiivisia hänen kehittämän kaksiulotteisen semanttisen teorian mukaan. Erilaisista päämääristä huolimatta sekä Kaplan että Stalnaker ovat varsin tietoisia erottelusta semantiikan ja pragmatiikan välillä, mikä ilmenee erityisesti luvussa 4.

Tutkielmani lähteet ovat David Kaplanin artikkelit ”Demonstratives” (1989a) ja ”Afterthoughts” (1989b) sekä Robert Stalnaker teos *Context and Content* (1999), joka sisältää tutkielmani kannalta keskeisimmät artikkelit ”Pragmatics” (1970/1999b) sekä ”Assertion” (1978/1999d).

Asiasanat: semantics, pragmatics, indexicality, context, presupposition, two-dimensional semantics, pre-semantics, metasemantics

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1. Introduction

For long there have been ongoing disputes regarding the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. The usual rather crude way to characterize the distinction goes something like this. Semantics is concerned with the literal meanings of expressions, what is explicitly expressed with expressions and providing truth conditions for sentences. While the subject matter of pragmatics, being the more nebulous one, is focused on non-literal meanings of expressions, what is implicitly conveyed with expressions and non-truth-conditional content. The distinction echoes the rivalry held between two opposing camps of philosophers in the 20th century: *formalists* and *anti-formalists*. The former group of philosophers, which also goes by the name *ideal language philosophers*, is commonly associated with Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Rudolf Carnap and Alfred Tarski. They held rigorous logical analysis and truth in high regard. Whereas the latter group of philosophers, the so-called *ordinary language philosophers*, most notably J. L. Austin, Peter Strawson and Paul Grice, emphasized the use and expressive power of natural language.

The rivalry between ideal language and ordinary language philosophers can be characterized by a methodological preference over either formal or natural languages in philosophy. The ordinary language tradition was driven by a motivation to examine how language is used in different contexts. By examining the use of words, the philosophers hoped to discover meanings of expressions and furthermore, what can be done with words. In his posthumously published work, *How to Do Things with Words* (1962), J. L. Austin highlights that there is a lot more we can do with language in addition to merely stating or describing things. For instance, we may use language to promise, to bequeath, or to marry someone. In Austin's view, this *performative* aspect of language had been neglected or ignored at the time because performative expressions were treated the same way as statements of facts. He calls this negligence *the descriptive fallacy*. (Austin, 1962, pp. 1-3.)

Arguably Bertrand Russell was among the philosophers that Austin had in mind of committing the descriptive fallacy. For in the formalist tradition, truth and reference played a more significant role than those performative features of language Austin was so interested in. This is evident in especially Russell's famous article "On Denoting" (1905) which fittingly depicts the methodological characteristics in the formalist tradition. In the article, Russell introduces his influential theory of descriptions in which he indicates how definite descriptions such as "the king of France" can be analyzed to an underlying logical structure in which the description does not occur. Russell goes on to demonstrate how his theory can solve, for instance, the problem of negative existential statements and it can also maintain the law of excluded middle.

However, not all were satisfied with Russell's theory. For instance, Strawson famously argued in his article "On Referring" (1950) that there were instances of definite descriptions, or more precisely, *uses* of definite descriptions that Russell seemed to have ignored. (Strawson, 1950, p. 328.) To put it briefly, the debate about definite descriptions between Russell and Strawson depicts well their different approaches in philosophy. Russell's approach was more formally oriented and abstract when compared to Strawson's view, which is focused on how expressions are actually used in discussion. Subsequently, based on the work of Russell and Strawson, Keith Donnellan and Saul Kripke made major contributions to the discussion on definite descriptions. In addition to Russell and Strawson, the role Paul Grice is also significant in especially Kripke's thinking and in the discussion between formalists and anti-formalists.

In fact, Grice played an interesting role in the rivalry because he is part of the both traditions. As François Recanati puts it "Grice is a special case, for he had, as he once said, one foot in each of the two camps" (Recanati, 2004, p. 1). Grice was also one of major figures whose contributions to the discussion on semantics-pragmatics distinction has been enormous. Particularly his distinction between *what is said* and what is conveyed or *implicated* by an utterance of a sentence helped to shed light on what is semantic and what is pragmatic. The conceptual framework construed

by Grice provided an attractive way to treat seemingly ambiguous expressions¹. For Grice thought that we do not necessarily have to posit ambiguity on the semantic level when we encounter an expression that is potentially ambiguous, rather, there are pragmatic ways to account for the phenomenon. Grice's view about ambiguity relates directly to a controversy between formalists and anti-formalists on the relation between logical connectives and their natural language counterparts. However, before introducing Grice's way to treat ambiguity, consider a contrasting view of Strawson's. In his *Introduction to Logical Theory* (1952/2011) Strawson argues that there are different uses for logical connectives which are not captured by standard truth functions. For instance, consider the following example.

(1) "He drove a car and he broke his hand."

Formally we may represent the sentence as $p \ \& \ q$ and since classical logic allows us to change the places of the conjuncts by the law of commutativity of conjunction, we get logically equivalent $q \ \& \ p$. But if we were to apply this law to (1), we would get

(1') "He broke his hand and he drove a car."

which arguably Strawson would not deem to be logically equivalent to (1). This is because it is natural to interpret the car drive to precede the breaking of a hand (1) but not in (1'). Thus, Strawson argues that the natural language expression "and" functions occasionally quite differently from its logical counterpart "&". (Strawson, 1952/2011, p. 80.) Strawson's claim seems to be intuitively appealing; surely (1) and (1') are not equivalent. The intuitive difference results from the temporal order of the sentences. Strawson maintains that the order of the sentences may be relevant to the truth-conditions of the compound. (Strawson, 1952/2011, p. 81.) What Strawson seems to be claiming is

¹ If an expression is ambiguous, it has more than one meaning. Consider the word "bank". It might mean, for instance, a financial building or a side of a river. Thus, "bank" is semantically ambiguous. (Korta & Perry, 2020, §5.)

that there are different uses of the word “and” which make it ambiguous. Therefore, the view he sets forward violates classical logic by allowing different truth conditions for the connective &.²

Grice proposes an alternative way to account the phenomenon raised by Strawson by distinguishing what is said from what is conveyed or *implicated* by an utterance of a sentence.³ According to the Gricean theory of conversation, what is said by someone strongly depends on the conventional meanings of the words of an utterance of a sentence. Although occasionally to fully determine what is said, one must consider the referent of an expression, the time of an utterance and disambiguation of ambiguous expressions. To capture what a speaker wants to convey with his use of words, Grice introduced a technical term *implicature*. The behavior of implicatures is closely connected to a group of conversational maxims and a cooperative principle which states that “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (Grice, 1989, p. 26).⁴ To put it briefly, these maxims are about people’s expectations on how other people act in a conversational situation; violation of a maxim or the cooperative principle may result in generation of a conversational implicature. (Grice, 1989, pp. 24-28.)

Therefore, one might derive, for example, the following conversational implicature from (1) – “First he started driving *then* he broke his hand”. Since implicatures are something conveyed or implicated by utterances of sentences they are generally placed in pragmatics. Whereas what is said by an utterance of a sentence falls within semantics. Although Grice is not explicit about this, the semantics-pragmatics distinction is usually thought to follow these Gricean lines. Anyhow, what Grice pointed out is that we may hold on to the normal truth-functional behavior of connectives

² See also Recanati (2004, pp. 154-158) in which he makes similar remarks about Strawson’s view on logical connectives and Grice’s criticism of it. He also provides an interesting criticism of the arguments of Grice.

³ This should not be confused with logical implication because implicatures do not logically follow from the sentence uttered.

⁴ Grice introduces four maxims (quantity, quality, relation and manner) and number of submaxims which can be found in (Grice, 1989, pp. 26-29).

and account for the seemingly ambiguous expression with implicatures. The Gricean approach to ambiguity is crystallized in his *Modified Occam's Razor*: "Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity" (Grice, 1989, p. 47). In other words, senses or linguistic meanings should not be posited when we are to choose between two otherwise equally desirable options.⁵

The debate between formalists and anti-formalists has indicated that, on the other hand, there were and still are strong commitments to maintain rules of classical logic. Grice, though commonly associated with the ordinary language tradition, was in favor of maintaining classical truth functions of logical connectives. While, for instance, Strawson was eager to muddy the waters and allow some departures from the classical rules of logic. The last phrase of his "On Referring" fittingly says that "Neither Aristotelian nor Russellian rules give the exact logic of any expression of ordinary language; for ordinary language has no exact logic" (Strawson, 1950, p. 344).

Eventually the rivalry held between formalists and anti-formalists faded, much due to the impact of Grice. Moreover, Grice's distinction between what is said and what is implicated has played an enormous role in philosophy in as well as in linguistics. However, what was significant about this rivalry is that it helped to shape the subject matters of semantics and pragmatics. As François Recanati puts it, the ordinary language tradition gave birth to the contemporary pragmatics, whereas the formalist tradition influenced the emergence of formal semantics. (Recanati, 2002, pp. 1-2.)

Despite the influence on the part of ordinary language tradition, the field of pragmatics was still seen in the 1960's as, to use Yehoshua Bar-Hillel's famous expression, *pragmatic wastebasket* (Bar-Hillel, 1971). Bar-Hillel's choice of words is understandable since the common

⁵ To briefly return to the debate between Russell and Strawson about definite descriptions, along these lines Saul Kripke argued against Keith Donnellan's distinction between referential and attributive uses of description. Kripke thought that it is not methodologically plausible to assume that the distinction should be explained by appealing to ambiguity. Thus, he favored a pragmatic explanation to deal with the phenomenon introduced by Donnellan. See Kripke's "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference" (1977) and Donnellan's "Reference and Definite Description" (1966).

method at the time in classifying different phenomena of language to semantics and pragmatics was to throw everything that semantics cannot explain to pragmatics. This indifference towards pragmatics was also noted by Robert Stalnaker who writes:

Until recently, pragmatics – the study of language in relation to the users of language – has been the neglected member of the traditional three-part division of the study of signs: syntax, semantics, pragmatics. The problems of pragmatics have been treated informally by philosophers in the ordinary language tradition, and by some linguists, but logicians and philosophers of a formalistic frame of mind have generally ignored pragmatic problems, or else pushed them into semantics and syntax. (Stalnaker, 1970/1999b, p. 31.)

Stalnaker fittingly depicts the prevailing attitudes at the time. He then goes on to argue that the subject matter of pragmatics can be treated as rigorously as formal semantics (Stalnaker, 1970/1999b, p. 31). In fact, Stalnaker was not alone with this idea since, for example, David Kaplan eagerly used such formal methods as model theory and set theory in his work on at least seemingly pragmatic phenomenon. Gradually with the application of formal methods, pragmatics became less nebulous and more systematic discipline.

In this thesis I am going to introduce two influential two-dimensional semantic theories in the semantic-pragmatic literature; one developed by David Kaplan and the other by Robert Stalnaker. The guiding question of this work is that how these theorists distinguish semantics from pragmatics. How does the distinction appear in their theories? Interestingly, the theories of or focus contain intriguing similarities yet also distinctive differences. To point out, Kaplan and Stalnaker both have had significant influence in the realms of semantics and pragmatics. The structure of the thesis is the following. First, I shall introduce Kaplan's theory of indexicals and demonstratives. In the following chapter, Stalnaker's assertion theory is presented. Having outlined these two, I move on to examine metasemantic themes in the works of Kaplan and Stalnaker. Hopefully, this will clarify the differences in the respective two-dimensional frameworks. Finally, in chapter 4.3, I will address

the question how semantics-pragmatics distinction is manifest in the writings of Kaplan and Stalnaker. The main bibliographical works this thesis relies on are Kaplan's "Demonstratives" (1989a) and "Afterthoughts" (1989b) as well as Stalnaker's *Context and Content* (1999).

2. Kaplan's theory of indexicals and demonstratives

Indexicality roughly means that the referent of an expression changes from one context to another. Consider, for instance, the expression "I". When I, the speaker, utter this word it refers to me and if someone else would utter it, the referent would be different. Some indexical expressions, nowadays labelled as *demonstratives*, need an accompanying demonstration to determine their reference; *that* and *there* being the most obvious ones. When I utter "That man is my teacher", it may be quite difficult to understand of whom I am referring to if there is no way to distinguish the relevant man from, say, a group of men. Thus, pointing or some other demonstration is needed to individuate whoever it is that I am referring to.⁶

Kaplan developed a semantic theory and a logic for indexicals and demonstratives. His work indicated that a certain group of context-sensitive expressions can be treated in the realm of semantics in a model theoretic way. The expressions he had in mind were group of adverbs, such as *today*, *tomorrow*, personal pronouns, such as *I*, *you*, demonstratives like *that*, *there*, and adjectives such as *actual* and *present* among others. (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 489) The theory construed by Kaplan is based on the following principles:

Principle 1 *The referent of a pure indexical depends on the context, and the referent of a demonstrative depends on the associated demonstration.*

⁶ Of course, it easy to come up with cases where no demonstration occurs yet it is plain obvious who is the referent. For example, suppose I utter "That child is loud", when there is a child crying. It is rather obvious of whom am I referring to, assuming there are no other loud children nearby.

Principle 2 *Indexicals, pure and demonstrative alike, are directly referential* (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 492).

The first principle states that the reference of pure indexicals, such as *I*, *now* and *here*, is fixed in the context of utterance while a demonstrative needs an accompanying demonstration, such as pointing, to determine its reference.⁷ The second principle states that indexicals and demonstratives refer directly without a mediation of, say, Fregean *Sinn*, which is traditionally regarded as a description that determines the designatum. Both principles will be elaborated as we proceed.

One of the great realizations of Kaplan was that to construe a semantic theory for indexicals, we need two dimensions of meaning. Nowadays this kind of approach to semantics is labelled *two-dimensional* and it has also been used for other purposes than that of Kaplan's as we will see in chapter 3. But what does it mean to have two dimensions of meaning? To first survey the basics, in regular one-dimensional semantics, or possible worlds semantics, expression's semantic value is an intension, "a function that assigns an extension to the expression 'at' every possible world" (Schroeter 2019, §1.1). For instance, the expression "Donald Trump" is assigned as its extension the relevant individual in different possible worlds, that is, Donald Trump. (Schroeter, 2019, §1.1.) The way proper names are associated with their semantic values, can be rather conveniently explained in accordance with possible world semantics, however, indexicals are somewhat peculiar expression that seem to require two dimensions of meaning; their semantic value cannot be merely an intension but a two-dimensional intension that takes into account modal aspects of expressions.

Suppose I, the speaker, utter "I am happy" and "Kalle is happy" (about me). In both cases, "I" and "Kalle" designate me. But we would not say that "I" and "Kalle" are synonymous expressions because, for instance, Donald Trump could utter "I am happy" and "I" would here

⁷ Subsequently, in his "Afterthoughts" Kaplan changed his mind with respect to the role of demonstrations in determining the reference of a demonstrative. He came to think that instead of demonstrations, the determination is secured by directing intentions which are intentions to refer to a certain referent. Demonstration is merely a manifestation of directing intention. (Kaplan, 1989b, p. 582.)

designate Donald Trump and not Kalle.⁸ The possibility that the expression “I” may be used to designate different persons in different contexts seems to be crucial in construing a semantic theory for indexicals. On the one hand, we have intuitions for something that stays constant with respect to indexicals, but on the other hand, there is something that varies depending on who utters the expression.

How does two-dimensional semantics explain our differing intuitions regarding indexicals? In Kaplan’s theory our intuitions are captured by two semantic values that expressions have which are known as *character* and *content*. Character is a rule that determines the content of an expression in a context. According to Kaplan, it is also what might be called the linguistic meaning of an expression type. On the other hand, contents are assigned for expressions and, for instance, content is what is said in different contexts. (Kaplan, 1989a, pp. 500-505.) Let us clarify the relation between character and content with an example. Consider the previous sentence “I am happy” uttered by me. The linguistic rule or character of the sentence determines its content which depends on who is the one who utters it. Therefore, because I am the one who utters it, the content assigned to our sentence is:

<Kalle, being happy>

If, however, Donald Trump also utters “I am happy”, what stays same with respect to our sentences is the character, or the linguistic meaning, but what is different is the content or proposition expressed.

But what if we are interested in the truth of the sentence? In this case, we may evaluate the content of the sentence in different *circumstances of evaluation*. They can be characterized as counterfactual situations and in more familiar terms as *possible worlds*, whereas *the context of utterance* is the actual situation where the utterance is made, that is, the situation in which Kalle utters “I am happy”. Context may be represented by n-tuple of parameters usually consisting of at least

⁸ The example I used is slightly modified from the one in (Schroeter, 2019, §1.1).

agent, place, time and a possible world. However, Kaplan is sympathetic for other parameters as well. He writes “Context *provides* whatever parameters are needed”⁹ (Kaplan, 1989b, p. 591).

Let us return to our question concerning the truth of the content of our sentence. If the context of utterance and the circumstance of evaluation are the same, the truth value of the sentence in context (or proposition¹⁰) is easily determined. Hence, if Kalle is happy in the context of utterance, then the proposition expressed is true. Nonetheless, in a different circumstance of evaluation the proposition might be evaluated as false because in another possible world Kalle might be sad instead of happy. In this case the context of utterance and the circumstance of evaluation would not coincide.

Kaplan’s theory contains interesting technical features that I find important to present. The basic intensional operators used in possible world semantics, such as \Box , \Diamond , are allowed in Kaplan’s semantics. They operate on content. For instance, $\Box P$ says that it is necessarily the case that P and $\Diamond P$ says that it is possible that P. But could there be operators on character? What would this mean? In other words, could there be operators that change the context of utterance instead of the circumstance of evaluation? Kaplan strongly denies this. He calls this kind of operators “monsters begat by elegance” (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 510). To illustrate what we are examining, consider the following example of a purported monster uttered by me.

(2) In some context it is true that I am hungry.¹¹

How is (2) monstrous? One may take (2) to be true if there is in any context someone who is hungry. But what Kaplan says is that it is only the actual context of utterance that is relevant for the truth of (2). Thus, “In some contexts it is true that” is the purported monster because it tries to shift the actual context. Kaplan points out that this would violate Principle 2 which states that

⁹ Kaplan’s open-endedness to other parameters will be briefly examined in chapter 4.3.

¹⁰ Kaplan identified what is said by an utterance of a sentence with its semantic or propositional content (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 500). In his view propositions are structured which means that they consist of entities that correspond to the constituents of a sentence. However, his view about propositions is not part of his theory. We may as well hold some other view about what propositions are and still be able to adapt theory of indexicals to that. (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 494.)

¹¹ I slightly modified Kaplans example in (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 510).

indexicals and demonstratives are directly referential. Direct reference is the reason why “I” picks out whoever it is that utters “I” in the actual context. More theoretically expressed, indexicals always take primary scope which means that monsters cannot meddle with character. (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 510.)

But what exactly does it mean for an expression to be directly referential? Kaplan writes that “I intend to use *‘directly referential’* for an expression whose referent, once determined, is taken as fixed for all possible circumstances, i.e., is taken as *being* the propositional component” (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 493). As Principle 1 states, the reference of indexicals and demonstratives depends on the context of utterance. When the reference is then fixed in a context, it stays same in different circumstances of evaluation. In addition to this, more should be said about what “direct” in “direct reference” means. According to Kaplan, it applies to the relation between an expression and its referent. Because there is no propositional component, such as a description, between an expression and its referent as a medium, the relation is direct. (Kaplan, 1989b p. 569.)¹²

The reader familiar with the work of Saul Kripke will probably notice a connection here with Kaplan’s notion of direct reference to Kripke’s notion of *a rigid designator*. What is the relation between the two? Kripke’s view on rigid designators is that ‘a designator *d* of an object *x* is *rigid*, if it designates *x* with respect to all possible worlds where *x* exists, and *never designates an object other than x with respect to any possible world*’ (Kaplan, 1989b, 569)¹³. To further clarify Kaplan’s view, he thinks that all directly referential expressions are rigid designators in the sense that they designate the same object regardless of whether that object exists or not.¹⁴ (Kaplan, 1989b, pp. 569-571.) Thus, the difference between the two is that Kripke remains neutral whether a rigid designator designates

¹² This picture is in contrast with the Fregean view that *Sinn* (or sense) of an expression determines its *Bedeutung* (designatum).

¹³ Kripke clarified his view in a letter to Kaplan.

¹⁴ In his “Afterthoughts”, Kaplan calls an expression that express this kind of rigidity *obstinately rigid*. In his view, obstinate rigidity applies to all directly referential expressions. However, some obstinately rigid expressions are not directly referential. (Kaplan, 1989b, p. 571.)

an object in a world in which the object does not exist while Kaplan – regarding directly referential expressions – does not. Furthermore, Kaplan thinks that all directly referential expressions are rigid, but the opposite does not hold. (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 497.) Anyhow, because the referent of “I” is *actually* me in (2) its referent is fixed as me for all possible circumstances and the purported monster cannot change the referent to anyone else. Thus, the parameters that represent the context of utterance play a significant part in determining the content which we may evaluate in different possible circumstances.

However, one might wonder how come Kaplan includes a possible world as a parameter of context. The other parameters (speaker, place, time) are rather understandable; it is easy to imagine that referents of different expressions are fixed relative to parameters consisting of speaker, place and time. How could they not? But for which expression reference is fixed relative to a possible world? Consider the following utterance of a sentence:

(3) It is possible that in 10 years the person who is actually at the moment the president of Finland is a woman.

Kaplan treats “actually” as an indexical which is also a modal operator. Because indexicals are directly referential, the actuality operator always takes us back to the actual world. Thus, despite the prefix “it is possible that” or “in 10 years”, the person who is actually the president of Finland designates whoever it is that is actually – on 4.3.2020 – the president of Finland, that is, Sauli Niinistö. What (3) is saying is that it is possible in 10 years that Sauli Niinistö is a woman. Regardless of what we think of this possibility, this is how Kaplan thought actuality operator to function and moreover, the role of possible world as contextual parameter is crucial in his theory because of sentences like (3).

One interesting result in Kaplan’s logic of demonstratives is that the logical formula $\phi \rightarrow \Box \phi$ is not a valid rule of inference. The result is interesting because from the fact that ϕ is a logical

truth it does not follow that $\Box\phi$ is one. Consider the utterance of a sentence “I exist” uttered in different situations. After a brief reflection one might realize that whenever it is uttered it will produce a truth. Nonetheless, it cannot be a necessary truth because it is not necessary that *I* (Kalle) exist. For it could have been the case that I was never born, and in the future, there will be a time when I will not exist. In a nutshell, it seems that whenever “I exist” is uttered, it produces a truth, but it cannot be a necessary truth. How can this difficulty be resolved? According to Kaplan, contexts should always be proper ones – unlike circumstances of evaluation – which means that the parameters of context represent the actual situation where the utterance is made (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 509). In this way “I exist” is a logical truth while “Necessarily I exist” is not. This is because we may evaluate the sentence “I exist” in circumstances where I no longer exist. Moreover, it becomes evident why $\phi \rightarrow \Box\phi$ is not valid rule of inference in Kaplan’s logic. Here again we may see the important difference between a context of utterance and a circumstance of evaluation, and the distinction cannot be stressed enough.

According to Kaplan, his theory belongs to semantics. The claim is hardly surprising because we have been constantly discussing of a semantic theory of indexicals and demonstratives. However, one might wonder how this can be because we are considering distinct utterances of speech acts in a context. However, this supposition is not in fact true. Kaplan emphasizes that it is not *utterances* but *sentences-in-a-context* (or occurrences of sentences) which are investigated in his theory. This is because *utterance* is a notion of theory of speech acts while *sentences-in-a-context* are examined within semantics. The reason why Kaplan puts emphasis on this distinction is that we want to evaluate several premises and a conclusion in the same context of utterance, and this can be done with *sentences-in-a-context* but not with *utterances*. (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 522, 546.) For *utterances* take time and it may occur that the premises of an argument turn out false in the middle of the process of uttering that argument. (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 546.) For logical reason, this is to be preferred.

We have now given a brief outlook of the theory developed by Kaplan. It is by no means all-embracing. The aim has rather been to provide a certain picture on how to treat context-sensitivity

in a formal way. In a nutshell, this is how Kaplan's theory assigns semantic values to expressions and produces truth conditions. Character of an expression assigns contents for expressions in a context which consists of n-tuple of parameters. Content is then evaluated in different possible worlds for a truth value. Indexicals and demonstratives are directly referential which means that they refer without mediation of a Fregean *Sinn*. Actuality operator always takes us back to the context of utterance and there are no operators on character.

To point out, in Kaplan's semantic theory every expression has a character and a content. Thus, the division to two semantic values is not solely a feature of indexicals. Although, there is a significant difference between indexical expressions and non-indexical expressions concerning character-content distinction; indexical expressions have a context-sensitive character that produces different contents in different contexts. However, once the content is fixed in a context, it stays same in different circumstances of evaluation. Whereas non-indexical expressions have constant or fixed character and content in a context, but in different circumstances of evaluation their content may vary.¹⁵ (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 506.)

Behind Kaplan's theory there is a certain picture how expressions are connected to their semantic values. The picture is called *the causal theory of reference*¹⁶ (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 562). The basic idea behind it is that names are connected to their referents via a historical or causal chain of communication. The origin of a name begins with an initial introduction or *baptism*, as Kripke called it, of a name. Subsequently, the name is passed on from one individual to another as in a chain. When I then speak of, say, "Aristotle", I refer to whoever it is that the name originated from. The reason why I bring Kaplan's view about the origin of names to our attention is that we will briefly consider the taxonomic place of the causal theory of reference within Kaplan's work, in chapter 4.

¹⁵ This depends on which expressions we are considering. In the case of proper names, circumstance of evaluation does not change their content but, for instance, the content of a definite description may change in a circumstance of evaluation.

¹⁶ However, especially in his "Afterthoughts", Kaplan also uses the expression *historical theory or picture of reference*.

In a summary, the theory of indexicals and demonstratives turned out to be rather elegant and systematic. Kaplan was able to tame the chaotic nature of indexicals with an ingenious formal machinery and point out that a semantic theory can be provided for them. What makes Kaplan's theory special is, among other things, the method of *double indexing* which means that an expression is evaluated against two indices: the context of utterance and the circumstance of evaluation. In addition to this, the two-dimensions of meaning represented in the character-content distinction are now regarded to be essential for accounting the behavior of indexicals. To use Scott Soames's words "In Kaplan's benign sense 'we are all two-dimensionalists now'" (Soames, 2007, p. 44).

3. Stalnaker's assertion theory

Having outlined Kaplan's theory, we turn to Robert Stalnaker's assertion theory first introduced in his influential article "Assertion" (1978/1999d). His theory is also two-dimensional but significantly different from Kaplan's. The differences between the two will become evident as we proceed. Nonetheless, to point out a single underlying feature, Stalnaker did not share the same motive that Kaplan did which was to account context-sensitivity in a formal way, although he was interested in how content of a sentence is affected by context. Rather, Stalnaker's theory emerged as a reaction to some of the arguments raised by Kripke in his classic *Naming and Necessity* (1972/2013). Particularly Kripke's conclusion that there are necessary a posteriori truths, such as "Hesperus is Phosphorus", with two rigid designators designating the same object, was troubling for Stalnaker because if one endorses the view that propositions are sets of possible worlds, there is only one necessary proposition, and also there is a conflict in taking the goal of rational inquiry to be in locating the actual world-state within possible world-states which are compatible with what one knows. (Soames, 2007, p. 84.) These points mentioned by Soames will be addressed during our investigation of the assertion theory.

In “Assertion” Stalnaker creates a formal framework which is used to represent a conversational situation. Although, we occasionally discussed themes relating to pragmatics in the previous chapter, it was yet more or less a semantic story told. Stalnaker’s theory is more pragmatically motivated and, for instance, the influence of Grice is clearly distinguishable in his work. Stalnaker adopts Gricean strategy of explaining facts about conversation with general assumptions made by speakers about the purposes of the conversation (Stalnaker, 1999a, p. 16). That is, like Grice, he also considers conversation as a mutual enterprise guided by maxims.

In Stalnaker’s theory, the notion of proposition is one of the key concepts. Whereas Kaplan’s view on propositions is structured, Stalnaker holds the other major view about propositions. He regards them as sets of possible worlds which are ways to represent the world. According to this view, propositions are individuated based on their truth values in different possible worlds. In a way this is very convenient. We just need to examine in which possible worlds proposition is assigned the value T and in which it is assigned the value F. However, the disadvantage that follows by this, is that all necessary propositions are equivalent because they are true in the same possible worlds. Think about it, if we identify propositions with truth conditions then propositions which are true in every possible world – the same worlds – must therefore be identical. Consequently, there is only one necessary proposition that is known a priori. The result is highly unintuitive and Stalnaker was aware of it. He admits that there might be something more to the content of a statement in addition to its truth conditions, but truth conditions are something common or shared by all notions of proposition. (Stalnaker, 2001, p. 144.) We will not pursue that deeply to the discussion on the metaphysics of propositions within our investigations. What is noteworthy is that this conception on propositions has some serious flaws one should be aware of.

The notion of proposition relates directly to the notion of *context* in the assertion theory. Stalnaker thinks that context can be represented by a set of propositions which are *presupposed* by the participants in a conversational situation. The set of presuppositions is also called *the common*

ground of the participants, that is, what they presuppose that others know. (Stalnaker, 1999d, p. 84.) The function of context is two-fold. First it contains the resources to determine what is said and secondly, it is a set of possibilities to distinguish between speech acts. (Stalnaker, 2014, pp. 24-26.) The first function has essentially to do with determining referents of, for instance, context-sensitive expressions. The second function is connected to an underlying goal or purpose of eliminating different possibilities from the context set to understand what is said in various situations. The goal is then to find out what the actual world is like and what it is not like. (Stalnaker, 1978/1999d, pp. 85-86.)

According to Stalnaker, context may be either defective or non-defective. A defective context is a context in which participants of a conversation do not share the same presuppositions. Though it may be that certain presupposition may never be relevant or considered in a conversation, this still renders the context as defective. If a context is non-defective, the participants of the conversational situation share the same presuppositions. (Stalnaker, 1978/1999d, p. 85.) According to Stalnaker, it is a common goal to strive towards a non-defective context or to put it in his words “Since communication is the point of the enterprise, everyone will have a motive to try to keep the presuppositions same” (Stalnaker, 1978/1999d, p. 85). The influence of Grice is here again made present.

To point out, Stalnaker thinks of presuppositions as information taken for granted in the common ground. (Stalnaker 1978/1999d, p. 84) If I speak to my friend about what Sauli Niinistö has done lately, I presuppose that my friend knows who Sauli Niinistö is. If my friend is bewildered and does not know of whom I am speaking of, the common ground is not in fact what I thought it would be like. Furthermore, if I know that my friend does not know who Sauli Niinistö is, what I try to do by talking about Sauli Niinistö, is to bring new information to the common ground. Let us examine the following example by Stalnaker on how assertion and context interact.

Imagine that I say to O’Leary that “You are a fool” and let us take it that he indeed is a fool. O’Leary perfectly well understands my utterance of a sentence, but he disagrees with me. While Daniels, who is also included in the conversational situation, mistakenly thinks I am speaking of him. I myself do not think that Daniels is a fool whereas O’Leary thinks he is. Anyhow, suppose that Daniels is not a fool. (Stalnaker, 1978/1999d, p. 80.) My utterance can be represented in the following matrix.

	I	O’Leary	Daniels
I	T	F	T
O’Leary	T	F	T
Daniels	F	T	F

The matrix is used to represent a *propositional concept*, which is “a function from possible worlds into propositions” (Stalnaker, 1978/1999d, p. 81). To keep in mind, the vertical axis is used to represent possible worlds in their roles as contexts while on the horizontal axis we have possible worlds as functions of arguments. From the horizontal lines one may read what is said in different contexts of the worlds. Since my horizontal line is the same as O’Leary’s, we may agree that what is said is the same with respect to our contexts. Whereas, the fact that my vertical column is the same as Daniels’ indicates that me and Daniels agree on the truth values of what was actually said by me and what Daniels thought was expressed. (Stalnaker, 1978/1999d, p. 81.)

Our example also exemplifies an interesting correspondence between the utterance and the truth value it is assigned. On the one hand a proposition represents the way that the world is. Let this be the first kind of correspondence. If a proposition represents the state of the world correctly, it is a true proposition. Whereas a second kind of correspondence is evident particularly when Daniels is mistaken on what is said. To keep in mind, he is mistaken about what is said, not about the truth value of what is said. Thus, if the facts are different truth value may differ. (Stalnaker, 1978/1999d, p. 80.)

The role of an assertion is to change the context set by eliminating possibilities and bringing new information or propositions to the context set. (Stalnaker 1978/1999d, pp. 86-87.) For instance, by uttering “You are a fool” to O’Leary, what I try to do with my assertion is to exclude the proposition from the context set that “O’Leary is not a fool”. But what if we have no possibilities to eliminate? Suppose I assert a statement that is true in every possible world. Therefore, it seems that my assertion would not exclude any possibilities. In fact, this relates to the problem about necessary a posteriori statements which Kripke made well-known in *Naming and Necessity*.

How can Stalnaker explain the informativeness of necessary a posteriori statements which do not exclude any possibilities? Let us find out. Consider the utterance of a sentence “Hesperus is Phosphorus”. Here we have an identity statement with two rigid designators. Imagine that I utter the sentence to David and Robert who (unlike me and David) does not know that “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” designate the same entity, the planet Venus. However, Robert has heard that Hesperus is a planet we see in the evening whereas Phosphorus is the planet we see in the morning, yet he still does not know that they are identical. We may represent the conversational situation with the following matrix. Let us say that *I* is the actual world where we are in. *R* is the world Robert takes to be actual and *D* is the world David thinks is actual.

	<i>I</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>D</i>
<i>I</i>	T	T	T
<i>R</i>	F	F	F
<i>D</i>	T	T	T

We may notice that the horizontal lines of the actual world and the world David considers as actual, are the same. Whereas the horizontal line of the world Robert thinks as actual, is false. In every horizontal line of the matrix a necessary proposition is expressed. How can we then explain the informativeness of identity sentences? Stalnaker associates informativeness with contingency, but it seems there is no contingent proposition expressed. According to Stalnaker, in this case it is the contingent *diagonal proposition* (it cuts through the matrix from the top left to the

bottom right) that is expressed by the speaker. He characterizes it in the following way: “In general, this is the proposition that is true at i for any i if and only if what is expressed in the utterance at i is true at i ” (Stalnaker, 1978/1999d, p. 81). In other words, the diagonal selects the worlds in which the context of a possible world and the world match. The goal of my assertion is to indicate that the world is not what Robert thought it to be like.

One might wonder that how come the diagonal proposition is expressed by my assertion. An explanation is provided by group of principles which are pragmatically motivated:

1. A proposition asserted is always true in some but not all of the possible worlds in the context set.
2. Any assertive utterance should express a proposition, relative to each possible world in the context set, and that proposition should have a truth-value in each possible world in the context set.
3. The same proposition is expressed relative to each possible world in the context set (Stalnaker, 1978/1999d, p. 88).

The first principle guarantees that necessary sentences are informative because Stalnaker identifies informativeness with contingency and there is always at least one possible world in the context set where the proposition asserted is false. While the second principle states that propositions cannot lack a truth value. So, there are no truth value gaps. The third principle is an interesting one and connected to our earlier examples. In fact, Stalnaker introduces the following operator \dagger called “the dagger” which assigns the diagonal proposition to the horizontal line. Considering the “Hesperus is Phosphorus” case, we receive the following matrix.

	<i>I</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>D</i>
<i>I</i>	T	F	T
<i>R</i>	T	F	T
<i>D</i>	T	F	T

Now the third principle is satisfied because the same proposition is expressed in each possible world in the context set. One might still be a bit puzzled on how the principles are pragmatically motivated. The idea is simply that they enable the recognition of intentions. We can read from the matrix what different people *think* the world is like and what it is *actually* like. By informing participants in a conversation about what the actual world is like, all those possible worlds in the context set that do not accord with the information are eliminated.

It is important to point out that Stalnaker does not suggest that in some possible worlds it is not necessary that Hesperus is Phosphorus when the names “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” are used, as in the actual world, to designate the planet Venus. Rather, the case is that in some possible worlds the names are used with entirely different semantics because the astronomical facts are different. (Stalnaker, 2006, p. 295.) Thus, Stalnaker’s theory maintains Kripke’s thesis about rigidity, though if I understood it correctly, it only applies to the worlds in the context set.

At the time when Assertion was published, Stalnaker thought that his apparatus can model contingent a priori truths. The horizontal lines would express contingent propositions whereas diagonals would express necessary a priori truths. (Stalnaker, 1978/1999d, pp. 83-84.) However, subsequently Stalnaker came to reject and perhaps regret this claim, and it is not hard to see why. Consider that we are not sure what does the sentence “ $5+3=8$ ” express. Let us say that perhaps we do not know which number base is being used. Therefore, I may be mistaken in presupposing in some contexts that “ $5+3=8$ ” expresses a truth. For, say, in octal number system “ $5+3=8$ ”¹⁷ is false. Therefore, we would get a contingent diagonal and our matrix would not express an a priori truth. (Stalnaker, 2006, p. 302.)

¹⁷ In octal base, $5+3=10$.

4. Metasemantics, semantics and pragmatics

As we have seen, Kaplan and Stalnaker both use two-dimensional semantic frameworks to formulate their views and it is not a surprise why. In the case of indexical expressions, it seems that we need a two-dimensional theory to account their peculiar, context-sensitive, nature. Kaplan construes such a theory. Whereas Stalnaker applies the two-dimensional framework to represent a conversational situation where some of the participants are mistaken on what is said or the truth value of what is said. He argues that this provides a way to explain informativeness of necessary a posteriori statements. Despite the similarity in adhering to a two-dimensional semantic framework, the theories of our focus do differ significantly from one another.

In the following sub-chapters, we will firstly examine metasemantical themes underlying Kaplan's theory of indexicals. Secondly, we will consider how exactly Stalnaker's two-dimensional theory differs from that of Kaplan's. Thirdly, our focus is placed on the primary question of the thesis – how is the distinction between semantics and pragmatics present in the work of these theorists? The metasemantical themes, we take on in chapter 4.1, have to do with taxonomical questions about the placement of historical chain picture and the mechanisms of direct reference in Kaplan's theory. We will briefly examine some of the issues these taxonomical questions may raise, for example, in connection to proper names. By introducing these matters, the reader will be provided with a better picture of the semantic theory of Kaplan with its underlying metasemantical themes.

In subchapter 4.2 we address the question how Stalnaker's interpretation of the two-dimensional framework differs from Kaplan's which will hopefully illuminate the different ways to apply the two-dimensional framework. Furthermore, we will see that Stalnaker's interpretation of the framework serves a similar function to Kaplan's pre-semantics. The purpose of chapter 4.2 is not to evaluate which theory is better because the theories of our focus are construed to explain different phenomena.

In chapter 4.3 we will move on to the question how the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is present in the works of Kaplan and Stalnaker. Even though interests of our theorists were mostly on other matters, such as context-sensitivity and informativeness of a posteriori identity statements, neither Kaplan nor Stalnaker is oblivious of the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. In his work on indexicals and demonstratives, Kaplan is not that explicit about how the distinction should be drawn, yet the distinction is still there and furthermore, in his subsequent paper “The Meaning of Ouch and Oops” (2004)¹⁸ he is more explicit about it. We will briefly examine what he has to say about the distinction in this article. Whereas Stalnaker discusses more explicitly semantics and pragmatics in “Assertion” but moreover in his “Pragmatics” (1970/1999b), an early article of his which focuses on to carve out a subject matter of pragmatics. Particularly, we will discuss Stalnaker’s pragmatic treatment of presupposition which is a central aspect of his assertion theory.

4.1 Kaplan on pre-semantics and metasemantics

Kaplan makes an interesting distinction in his “Afterthoughts” between semantics and metasemantics. He wonders whether the historical chain theory or picture belongs to semantics or to metasemantics. Kaplan asks “Does the theory state a semantic value of proper names, or does it rather tell us the basis for determining a semantic value for a proper name?” (Kaplan, 1989b, p. 574). Because Kaplan thinks that the semantic function of a proper name is exhausted by its referent, he places the historical chain theory to metasemantics. According to Kaplan’s view, metasemantics tells us how to discover the meaning of a proper name but not what it is. However, if the historical chain theory were to give a meaning for a proper name, we would place it into semantics. (Kaplan, 1989b, p. 574.) Thus, the question about the placement of historical chain theory has implications to the

¹⁸ There are two different versions of this paper. One unpublished version is written by Kaplan in 2005. The other is transcribed by Elizabeth Coppock of a lecture held by Kaplan in UC Berkeley on 24th of August in 2004.

semantics of proper names. As a direct reference theorist, it is rather understandable that Kaplan desires to keep historical chains apart from semantics on a metalevel.

What about the mechanisms of direct reference behind indexicals and demonstratives? Do they belong to semantics or metasemantics? As we remember, the character of an indexical determines its referent relative to a context of utterance. Kaplan points out that if we were to regard the character of an indexical to belong to metasemantics, this would mean that indexicals were ambiguous. Intuitively this is not that plausible, as Kaplan remarks, and I agree with him because this would make indexicals similar to proper names. (Kaplan, 1989b, p. 574.) To listen to our intuitions, there seems to be a clear difference between indexical and proper name expressions. For indexicals, we may more or less state their meaning, or character rule, but in the case of proper names there seems to be no such easily stateable meanings. Kaplan comes to conclude that character of indexicals belongs to semantics and in other words, the mechanisms of direct reference are part of semantics.

Now, although Kaplan places the mechanisms of direct reference to semantics, more needs to be said about what is this about. What needs to be clarified is the place of these mechanisms within semantics. For according to Kaplan, there is still a problem concerning the order of different semantical notions because the mechanisms of direct reference take place before notions of truth and denotation. (Kaplan, 1989b, p. 575.) This is because directly referential expressions fix the referent to be the same in every circumstance of evaluation. Whereas denotations of definite descriptions may differ from circumstance to another and the notions of truth and falsehood are in turn after a proposition is determined. Therefore, because of this order in operation of different semantical notions, Kaplan places the mechanisms of direct reference to “the bottom layer of semantics”¹⁹.

¹⁹ I found the expression *bottom layer of semantics* misleading since I initially thought that Kaplan here speaks of *pre-semantics*. Moreover, the introduction of the term *metasemantics* in “Afterthoughts” increased my confusion since I was not sure what is the relation between it and pre-semantics.

(Kaplan, 1989b, pp. 575-576.) Therefore, we have the following order in semantic operations: mechanisms of direct reference, denotation, and truth.

More should be said about Kaplan's conception of semantics because there is an underlying level of explanation yet to be presented in his work of indexicals; this is what he calls *pre-semantics*. The term is introduced in the last chapter of "Demonstratives" in which Kaplan presents some remarks on proper names. By coining the term, Kaplan makes division of labor between semantic and pre-semantic tasks. We have already considered semantic tasks, but what are pre-semantic tasks? These tasks have to do with determining which expression of which language is uttered. (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 559.) For instance, I may utter a vocable "Hi" and it is a pre-semantic task to determine which word, if any, was uttered. It could have been the English expression used when one greets a person, or it could have been an accidental sound I make. The factors that help the pre-semantic determinations are, for instance, behavior, mood, and intonation of the speaker (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 559.) These are all highly pragmatic matters present in the context of utterance. Therefore, one might wonder why is not pre-semantics pragmatics? What is Kaplan's need to stay within semantic boundaries?

Let us approach these questions with the following example. Suppose I utter to my friend "Tapio published a new article". At first my friend may be puzzled about who is it that I am referring to. For instance, I might refer to my philosophy teacher or my old high school teacher. In both cases the words uttered are the same but there is a difference in what is said. Obviously, it is the case that different proposition is expressed when "Tapio" refers to different individuals. I might use "Tapio" to refer to my old high school teacher or my philosophy teacher. In both cases what is pragmatically conveyed is the same but what is semantically expressed is different.

How do we then account the fact that expression "Tapio" instantiates this kind of variance of reference which is not pragmatically explained? We have at least two options. First, we may take "Tapio" and other proper names to be like indexical expressions. In different contexts

“Tapio” is used to refer to different individuals or objects and there is a rule which determines the reference. As Joseph Almog points out in his article “Semantical Anthropology” (1984), in this case the historical chains of reference are part of the rules of reference (character) which means that the chains have a semantic role. (Almog, 1984, pp. 483-484.) Second option is to take “Tapio” to be ambiguous and explain how the name is identified by a disambiguation process that takes place in pre-semantics. In this case the interpretation process would be close to the following: pre-semantics tells us which expression “Tapio” is uttered, and the output of pre-semantics is an input to semantics in which the reference of the name “Tapio” is fixed and then the output of semantics is an input to pragmatics. According to this latter view, proper names are not indexicals and in fact this is also Kaplan’s view. (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 562.)

Based on this picture, pragmatics comes in when we already have an interpreted sentence and it is not part of the interpretation process of proper names. In this case we may lighten the workload of semantics by endorsing a view that proper names are ambiguous, and it is a pre-semantic task to identify which name is in question.²⁰ To point out, it has been more common to treat proper names as ambiguous than as indexical. Perhaps this has to do with the fact that proper names, though also commonly held as rigid or directly referential, do not seem to be like indexical expressions. As already remarked, indexicals have rather easily stateable rules to determine their references²¹ but with proper names we cannot express such rules. What is the character of “Aristotle”? Of course, there are those who argue for indexical view.²² See for instance (Recanati 1993).

To recapitulate, Kaplan claims that the mechanisms of direct reference belong to semantics because they associate expressions with semantic values. This is based on the idea that we

²⁰ I would like to thank Joseph Almog and Tapio Korte for their help with pre-semantics and philosophy of language in general.

²¹ The reader may, I take it, rather easily state such a rule for the expressions *I*, *now*, or *today*.

²² My purpose has not been to argue that names are ambiguous or indexical. This presentation would have been far too insufficient for that. Rather, the reason why these two options are briefly considered is that we will get a more accurate conception of Kaplan’s view on pre-semantics and its relation to semantics.

cannot place these mechanisms in metasemantics since this would combine the rules of reference with historical chains. In result the names would be indexical like which is not that plausible, at least in my opinion. Furthermore, it is important to point out that the mechanisms of direct reference operate before denotations and truth values are assigned, according to Kaplan's picture. The semantical tasks are preceded by pre-semantic tasks, such as, disambiguation of ambiguous expressions and generally which expression is uttered.²³ What is important to notice is that there are underlying metasemantical questions about how expressions are connected to their referents in Kaplan's semantic theory. These questions have to do with placement of historical chain theory, mechanisms of direct reference and indexicality of proper names. What is accounted in metasemantics has consequences on what is accounted in semantics.

4.2 Stalnaker on metasemantics

The distinction between semantics and metasemantics is adopted by Stalnaker. In his article, "On Considering Possible World as Actual" (2001) Stalnaker uses the same distinction to contrast two different interpretations of the two-dimensional framework. Let us briefly contrast Kaplan's semantic interpretation to Stalnaker's metasemantic one. This will also hopefully clarify the relation between character and propositional concept. I find it easier to discuss these distinctions with the following terminology of David Chalmers'. He introduces the terms *primary intension* and *secondary intension* which can be characterized as types of meanings or functions. Primary intension of a concept depends on a which world turns out to be actual. In this case it can be said that we consider a world to be actual. Whereas the secondary intension is determined when we consider a world as counterfactual which requires that we have first fixed the reference in the actual world. (Chalmers, 1996, pp. 56–60.)

²³ One might wonder what is the relation between pre-semantics and metasemantics? That is a good question since Kaplan places the historical chain theory or picture to pre-semantics in "Demonstratives" (Kaplan, 1989a, pp. 562-563) and to metasemantics in his "Afterthoughts" (Kaplan, 1989b, p. 574). However, this question is beyond the scope of our present inquiries.

For instance, in the actual world “salt” picks out the substance that has the chemical structure NaCl. But suppose that in a possible world w_2 the chemical structure of the substance that has salt like properties is ZYX. When we consider w_2 as counterfactual, and “salt” is fixed to designate NaCl in the actual world, the substance with the chemical structure of ZYX is not salt. Whereas if we consider w_2 as actual, “salt” designates ZYX in this and all the possible worlds. (See Chalmers, 1996, p. 60.)²⁴ To recapitulate, the difference between primary and secondary intension is that when we consider a world as actual, what we do is that we consider the primary intension of an expression. For this we are interested in how the actual world turns out. We ask what the chemical structure of salt in the actual world is? While when we consider a world as counterfactual, the actual world is fixed, and what we are interested is that what does “salt” designate in some counterfactual world. In this latter case we are interested in what is the secondary intension of the expression. But notice that when we consider a world as counterfactual, first we determine the primary intension of a concept in the actual world, then we determine the secondary intension in different possible worlds. If we take “salt” to be a rigid designator, it designates the same substance in all the possible worlds. This means that the secondary intension of “salt” is always NaCl. (See Chalmers, 1996, pp. 56-60.)

But how does this distinction between primary and secondary intension amount to the distinction between semantic and metasemantic interpretations? The difference between the latter two is best exemplified how the primary intension is determined. Kaplan regards natural kind terms to have a constant character which means that no matter in which context we utter “salt”, it always designates NaCl. In Kaplan’s semantic interpretation, character, which is the meaning of an expression type, corresponds to the primary intension whereas the secondary intension corresponds to content. To recall, it is character that determines content. However, Stalnaker’s metasemantic interpretation reverses the order of explanation between primary and secondary intension. (See Stalnaker, 2006.) For in the possible world w_2 the substance that has salt like features, like taste and

²⁴ I modified his Putnam inspired example a bit.

structure, has the chemical structure of ZYX. Because of facts about the world, the utterance token “salt” has the meaning that it has. In this case, the secondary intension, or content, determines the primary intension, that is, a propositional concept. It is important to point out that in this second case the primary intension is not a meaning of an expression type, rather, it is a function that takes as arguments possible worlds and the value of the function depends on the meanings of expressions and context of use (Stalnaker, 2001, p. 149).

Thus, we have two different ways how the primary intension is determined. In the first case the primary intension is determined by character of the expression “salt” as used in the actual world. Whereas in the second scenario, the contingent facts of the world determine the secondary intension or content in some possible world. From this the primary intension is derived. Because of different facts in different possible worlds, expressions may have different meanings in different possible worlds. (Stalnaker, 2001, p. 149) In a summary, character and propositional concept are both two-dimensional intensions but propositional concept should not be identified as a meaning of an expression type, like characters.²⁵ Rather, propositional concepts are determined by utterance tokens in a context (content) (Stalnaker, 1999, p. 122). Whereas, character is a rule that determines the content of an expression.

4.3 Semantics and pragmatics

The metasemantical themes we have so far covered will hopefully have clarified different ways to use two-dimensional framework. We shall now consider how the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is present in the works of Kaplan and Stalnaker. Let us approach the topic by considering the notion of *context* present in both theories. Kaplan’s view is that a context is an abstract object that can be represented by a list of parameters while Stalnaker regards context as

²⁵ Kaplan explicitly states that “Character applies only to words and phrases as types, content to occurrences of words and phrases in contexts” (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 524).

a set of presuppositions which constitutes the common ground of the participants. There is an interesting relation here between our two notions of context. In a way Stalnaker's context contains Kaplan's context. He writes "Since the relevant contextual parameters must be available, and presupposed to be available, they will be incorporated into the speaker's presuppositions, and so will be represented by the set of possible situations that constitute the context set" (Stalnaker, 1999a, p. 10). However, it should be noted that Stalnaker's context is a cognitive notion, and it is possible that the speaker may be mistaken on what the actual contextual parameters are. His presuppositions may be false. To clarify, Stalnaker's notion has to do with people's beliefs about what is presupposed in a conversational situation, and this also includes the relevant agent, time, place of the utterance.

Kaplan's context takes as parameters agent, place, time and a possible world. To recall, Kaplan was sympathetic to other parameters as well. As is pointed out by Kasia M. Jaszczolt in "Context: Gricean intentions vs. two-dimensional semantics" (2012), this raises question about how can we place such open-ended parameters to semantics and, moreover, what do we count as a parameter? (Jaszczolt, 2012, p. 86.) Jaszczolt is worried that Kaplan's willingness to allow more contextual parameters in the index does not go along with the idea that context is merely a semantic notion. She writes "It is not clear how, for example, the memory of past experience that is used in the process of intention recovery can be regarded as a parameter on a par with, say, agent, time, location and world" (Jaszczolt, 2012, p. 86). If I understood Jaszczolt correctly, she is worried that Kaplan's willingness to allow parameters that require recognition of speaker's intention to determine what is said will mix semantics with pragmatics and furthermore this shows that Kaplan's semantic notion of context as such is insufficient.

As one might notice, Stalnaker's context is dynamic and it seems to play a pragmatic role in the conversation, whereas Kaplan's context is fixed, and it is a semantic notion. In Stalnaker's model the common ground of the participants in a conversation is always changing. For instance, we may add or exclude information from the context set by, say, making assertions or some other speech

acts. As noted in the chapter 3, the purpose of an assertion is to shrink the context set in order to find out what the actual world is like. While in Kaplan's theory indexicals and demonstratives are assigned semantic values relative to objective parameters of context. To recapitulate, Stalnaker's context seems to be more epistemically construed than Kaplan's context, which is essentially metaphysical and not an epistemic notion.

Stalnaker's idea of context is connected to his notion of presupposition. It is an interesting feature in his theory, regarding semantics and pragmatics, to treat presuppositions as a pragmatic instead of as a semantic phenomenon. For long the consensus was that presuppositions should be treated semantically. (Stalnaker, 1999a, p. 7.) Stalnaker defines the semantic conception of presupposition as the following "A proposition that P presupposes that Q if and only if Q must be true in order that P have a truth-value at all" (Stalnaker, 1974/1999c, p. 48). For instance, the sentence "The President of Finland has grey hair" presupposes that there is a President of Finland and asserts that he has grey hair. For "The President of Finland has grey hair" to be true, it must be true that there is a President of Finland. This seems rather simple.

What about the pragmatic conception of presupposition? Stalnaker emphasizes that it is not the function of sentences, propositions nor speech acts to make or have presuppositions, rather, it is persons who make them. (Stalnaker, 1974/1999c, p. 50). This is central for the pragmatic conception of presupposition. According to this view, presupposition is seen as a propositional relation rather than as a semantic relation. To recall, Stalnaker thinks that propositions which are presupposed by the participants of a conversation form a common ground for the participants to work with. What is then presupposed in a conversation can be represented by a context set. As one might notice, in Stalnaker's theory, the notions of context, proposition and presupposition are closely intertwined together. Although Stalnaker argues for pragmatic conception of presuppositions, he claims that the two conceptions of presupposition should not be seen to be in conflict. (Stalnaker, 1970/1999b, p. 38.) What I think is important to realize is that we do not have treat presupposition as

a semantic relation, rather, it can be given a pragmatic interpretation which fits naturally to Stalnaker's theory.

But where does this all fit in with respect to semantics and pragmatics? Unlike Kaplan's theory, Stalnaker's theory is also a theory of pragmatics. He uses matrices to represent speech acts uttered in contexts. He then shows how an utterance of a speech act can be given different truth values depending on the words uttered, how the world is and how it is thought to be like. In Stalnaker's theory semantics and pragmatics are closely knitted together. To recall, when an assertion is either true or false on every horizontal line, the contingent diagonal proposition is expressed by the speaker. This reinterpretation process is guided by conversational maxims. Therefore, pragmatics plays an essential role in explaining informativeness of necessary a posteriori statements.

The explicit boundary issue between semantics and pragmatics is one of the topics Stalnaker discusses in his early article called "Pragmatics" which anticipates the themes subsequently present in "Assertion". In fact, Stalnaker introduces an early version of the two-dimensional framework in this article. Furthermore, the goal of this paper was to show how methods of formal semantics can be used to treat some of the problems of pragmatics. According to Stalnaker, semantics is concerned with the study of propositions which, as one might recall, are used to represent truth conditions. It is a central problem of semantics to determine truth conditions for sentences. The truth value of a statement depends on what was said and what the world is like. Stalnaker also remarks that propositions can be studied in abstraction from a certain language and a linguistic act. He concludes that semantics is concerned with the study propositions. However, sometimes we need to consider contextual features when matching sentences with propositions. This is where pragmatics, which is characterized in the following way, steps in. (Stalnaker, 1970/1999b, pp. 32-34.)

Pragmatics is the study of linguistic acts and the context in which they are performed. There are two major types of problems to be solved within pragmatics: first to define interesting kind of speech acts and speech products; second, to characterize the features of the speech content

which help determine which proposition is expressed by a given sentence (Stalnaker, 1970/1999b, p. 34).

The first of the major problems has to do with analysis of illocutionary acts, made famous by J. L. Austin, which I believe Kaplan would also deem to belong in pragmatics based on his comments on utterances belonging to a theory of speech acts. The second problem is basically what “Assertion” is all about. How does context affect content of an utterance of a sentence? This has to do with indexicality and, more generally, context-dependence. What Stalnaker has in mind here is that occasionally contextual features are required to determine a full-fledged proposition. For instance, when I say, “Everybody is failing the class”, the relevant domain of the quantifier “everyone” needs to be satisfied in to determine which proposition is expressed. Is it everybody in the course or everyone in the world? It is the context which tells us the answer. This is what Stalnaker has to say of the role of the context in the process of determining the content and the truth value of a proposition:

The syntactical and semantical rules for a language determine an interpreted sentence or clause; this, together with some features of the context of use of the sentence or clause determines a proposition; this in turn, together with a possible world, determines a truth value (Stalnaker, 1970/1999b, p. 36).

The picture put forward looks a lot like the one by Kaplan. We need to consider the context of utterance and possible worlds to know what was said and whether what was said is true. Some features of context are needed to determine, say, the referents of certain expressions or the relevant domains of quantifiers.

To recall, Kaplan’s theory of indexicals and demonstratives is a semantic theory, and this leaves out pragmatics. However, we may still make some remarks on what Kaplan includes in semantics and what is left out. Most interestingly, his theory shows that semantics can be provided for indexical expressions, that is, by distinguishing between two semantic values and a context of

utterance from a circumstance of evaluation, we may explain systematically what stays constant and what varies regarding indexical expressions. This means that in the case of indexicals, their reference is determined by semantic rules and not by pragmatics. Context is treated as a set of parameters relative to which indexicals are assigned their semantic values before pragmatics takes in. As Stalnaker, Kaplan too considers it a semantics task to assign truth values for sentences. In Kaplan's theory truth of a sentence is evaluated in different circumstances of evaluation. Context plays a semantic role in determination of content of sentences. In a nutshell, indexicals, context and assignment of truth value are in the semantic territory.

What about pragmatics? We remember that Kaplan's theory is to account occurrences of sentences and not actual utterances, however, as Korta and John Perry remark, we may apply Kaplan's theory to actual utterances of sentences – that is speech acts. We may take pragmatics to begin with what is conveyed by utterances of sentences. In a way this can be thought to fit quite well with the Gricean theory of conversation. First there are pre-semantic tasks such as disambiguation of ambiguous expressions after which semantics take the conventional meanings of expression, characters, along with the context of utterance to constitute what is said. From this truth-evaluable content we may derive implicatures.²⁶ (Korta & Perry, 2020, §2.2.2.)

In his later work “The Meaning of Ouch and Oops” (2004) Kaplan reflects his earlier work on semantics of indexicals and demonstratives. Initially he regarded his work as continuing the semantic methods of that time. However, he also states that “Some years ago, it occurred to me that the analysis of indexicals in *Demonstratives* could be seen as the scientific realization of the Strawsonian semantics of use” (Kaplan, 2004, pp. 2–3). What Kaplan means by this is that he came to see similarities with his semantics for indexicals with some of the ignored semantic phenomena such as with epithets, diminutives, nicknames and ethnic slur terms. He came to realize that for these

²⁶ The relation between Kaplan's theory of indexicals and Gricean theory is, however, beyond the scope of our inquiries.

kinds of expressions one should not look for meaning but for use, or to be more precise, – conditions of use. Therefore, Kaplan made a distinction between *Semantics of Meaning* and *Semantics of Use*.²⁷
²⁸ (Kaplan, 2004, pp. 2–3.)

But what is this distinction about? Kaplan’s idea is that there are some expressions we may rather easily say what they mean, for instance, if someone were to ask me what does “February” mean, my answer would be something like “it is the second month of the year”. But for some expressions, we cannot say that effortlessly what they mean. How would one state what “hello” or “alas” means? Kaplan’s answer would be to look for the conditions of use for such expressions instead of meanings. For example, we may say that “hello” is commonly used when people meet one another and “alas” is used when something unpleasant occurs. Whereas the Semantics of Meaning provides meanings for expressions, the Semantics of Use provides us with use-conditions for some expressions.

An underlying question here is that what do we want from a semantic theory? For, as Kaplan points out, if we want a semantic theory to assign meanings for every expression, we are in trouble. This would leave out indexicals and such expressions as “hello” and “alas”. Rather, if we take it that semantics assigns meanings and use-conditions, we may hold on to the idea that semantics can accommodate these use-conditional expressions. Kaplan seems to regard the dominant forms of semantic theories defective in that they cannot provide meanings for these use-conditional expressions. Because of this the tendency has been to discard them to the pragmatic wastebasket. Kaplan writes:

²⁷ The capitalization is intended by Kaplan.

²⁸ The idea to look for conditions of use for an expression was central in the ordinary language tradition, as Kaplan points out. (Kaplan 2005, pp. 2-4.)

I believe that the tendency to banish a wide variety of semantic regularities (including those of indexicals) to the netherworld of ‘pragmatics’ has been a direct consequence of the fact that the dominant forms of semantic theory are unsuitable for these expressions. (Kaplan, 2005, p. 6.)

Perhaps, we should follow Kaplan and pay more attention to those expression our dominant forms of semantic theories fail to account. So how should we draw the line between semantics and pragmatics? This is what Kaplan explicitly says of the distinction.

So here is how I draw the line. Regarding semantics: There are the linguistic conventions that determine the *semantic information* encoded in words and phrases. Semantic theory studies such conventions. There are also certain *social practices*, which are a different kind of convention, that are specific to linguistic behavior: days on which to pray, the prohibition on asking questions of the Queen, and the like. The latter *presuppose* the conventions that determine the semantic information. Insofar as *Pragmatics* is concerned with convention, it is in the study of specifically linguistic social practices. (Kaplan, 2005, p. 32.)

What Kaplan is saying is that there are social practices that presuppose linguistic conventions that determine semantic information. It seems to me that the distinction Kaplan draws here seems to follow the traditional lines according to which semantic is concerned with conventional meanings of expressions while pragmatics is the study of linguistic social practices.

The goal of this chapter has been to outline how the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is present in the works of Kaplan and Stalnaker. To briefly summarize our findings, Kaplan construes a semantic theory which distinguishes between semantics from pre-semantics. In a pre-semantic level, words are identified, and this is where historical chains are placed. In semantics, reference is fixed, and truth values are determined. This means that, indexicals and demonstratives are to be accounted in semantics, not in pragmatics. Furthermore, Kaplan distinguishes between Semantics of Meaning and Semantics of Use. He then goes on to argue that wide list of expressions,

such as epithets, diminutives and slurs, which are commonly treated to belong to pragmatics can be treated in semantics, that is, if we take it that conditions of use are part of a semantic theory.

Stalnaker adopts Kaplan's distinction between semantics and metasemantics and explains how his view differs from Kaplan's with respect to how the primary intension of an expression is determined. While Kaplan's view is that the primary intension, which he calls character, determines the content of an expression in different possible worlds, Stalnaker reverses this picture and states that primary intension, a propositional concept, is derived from a secondary intension. This is because Stalnaker's interpretation of the two-dimensional framework is metasemantic and Kaplan's is semantic. The pre-semantic determination of words is based on the external facts of the different possible worlds.

In Stalnaker's work, the connection between semantics and pragmatics is best seen in when one examines how assertion and context interact. The role of assertion is to shrink the context set by eliminating possibilities which do not obtain. Context is a set of presuppositions which forms the common ground of the participants in a conversation. Presupposition is given a pragmatic interpretation which means that it is a propositional relation held by participants of a conversation. In Stalnaker's theory, context is a dynamic, pragmatic notion that changes when new information is added to the context set. Likewise, the reinterpretation process that is guided by pragmatic maxims is essential in Stalnaker's work. In a nutshell, semantics is the study of propositions and pragmatics is occasionally needed to determine which proposition is expressed.

5. Conclusion

For now, let us summarize what we have so far covered. Our investigations began with a brief historical outlook on the semantics-pragmatics distinction and it became evident that it is closely connected to a discussion often shown in an antagonist manner between formalists and anti-

formalists. Formalist preferred the use of formal methods in analyzing philosophical problems, whereas anti-formalists were more interested in the analysis of use of language. Particularly the impact of Grice to the discussion on semantics and pragmatics became clear. His distinction between what is said and what is conveyed or implicated by a sentence was seen to bring balance to the discussion on what is semantic and what is pragmatic. Subsequently methods from formal semantics, such as model theory and set theory, were applied to problems of pragmatics which were previously ignored or mostly treated by anti-formalists.

In chapters 2 and 3, two famous theories in the analytic tradition were introduced; one of which was developed by David Kaplan and the other by Robert Stalnaker. These theories became the focus of our interest, and particularly the semantics-pragmatics distinction apparent in both of them. Kaplan's aim was to provide semantics for indexical expressions which he established with his division to two semantic values: character and content. In addition to this, the distinction between the context of utterance and the circumstance of evaluation plays a significant part in the theory. Kaplan argues that indexicals and demonstratives are directly referential and, furthermore, they always take the primary scope, which was seen when actually-operator was introduced. This is because these expressions get their reference in the context of utterance and no operator can change this. Therefore, Kaplan's asserts that there are no monsters that change the context of utterance. Furthermore, in his logic for indexicals it is shown how we can maintain such logical truths as "I am here" but not "Necessarily I am here" which are intuitively the correct results.

Stalnaker wanted to provide a way to account for the informativeness of necessary a posteriori statements which Kripke made so famous. These statements were troublesome for Stalnaker because he wanted to explain informativeness with contingency. To recall, the goal of assertion is to diminish the context set which consist of possible worlds which can be used to represent speaker's epistemic position. Necessarily true statements do not exclude any possibilities. How can then necessary a posteriori statement be informative? Stalnaker's answer is that in these cases where

it seems that nothing informative is said by a sentence, a reinterpretation process takes place which is based on pragmatically motivated principles or maxims. In this case, it is the contingent diagonal proposition that is conveyed by the speaker.

In the fourth chapter, our focus was directed to the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. Thus, the question of how the distinction is made by Kaplan and Stalnaker, was explicitly addressed. Firstly, we explicated Kaplan's distinction between semantics and metasemantics. The distinction was made to answer the question about where we should place the historical chain theory or picture – to semantics or to metasemantics. In “Demonstratives”, historical chains are placed in pre-semantics, which can be characterized as a level of explanation in which word identification occurs. This is where disambiguation of ambiguous expressions takes place. However, in his “Afterthoughts”, Kaplan places the historical chain picture to metasemantics. As far as I am aware of, Kaplan does not explicitly address what is the difference between metasemantics and pre-semantics.

As is pointed out in the text, it should be mentioned that the role of pre-semantics is significant for Kaplan. This is where it is identified which name “Aristotle” is expressed. Historical chains take us to the Aristotle in question. Because Kaplan thinks that the meaning of a proper name is simply its referent, historical chains are placed in pre-semantics or metasemantics. In result, proper names homonymous, which I find important to point out since Kaplan does not think them as indexical. If the chains were to be regarded as part of the semantics of names, indexicality would expand to proper names as well. By investigating these metasemantical issues, we have hopefully given a better picture of what Kaplan thinks of semantics as well.

Kaplan's view on semantics can be characterized in the following way. Semantics is concerned with formulating truth-conditions for sentences, which means that occasionally sentences need to be relativized to the context of utterance. In addition to this, mechanisms of direct reference operate in semantics after which, say, denotation of definite descriptions are assigned and of course

truth values are assigned in semantics as well. In his “Meaning and Use”, Kaplan is sympathetic to a view according to which semantics covers expression we can give conditions of use. Thus, he extends his semantic view on indexicals and demonstratives to account for such ignored phenomena as epithets, diminutives, nicknames and ethnic slur terms. In Kaplan’s view, semantics deals with semantic information (conventional meanings) of expression whereas the realm of pragmatics deals with utterances, speech acts and linguistic social practices. It was pointed out by Korta and Perry that we may combine Kaplan’s semantics with Gricean pragmatics, though this was not fully elaborated within our investigations.

Stalnaker labels his two-dimensional view metasemantic and it is contrasted with Kaplan’s semantic view. The idea behind this distinction is that Kaplan’s theory tells us what semantic values are while Stalnaker’s theory tells us what the basis is, or facts, for expression to have certain semantic values. The difference between these two pictures was made evident when we contrasted two different ways how primary intension is determined. According to Kaplan’s semantic interpretation, primary intension, or character, determines secondary intension, that is, the content of expression whereas according to Stalnaker’s metasemantic interpretation, the secondary intension or content of an expression token determines the primary intension that is a propositional concept. By introducing this difference on how the primary intension is derived in these different theories, I intended to demonstrate different ways to use the two-dimensional framework. The theories, though methodologically similar, are made to explain rather different phenomena.

Stalnaker’s theory is a theory of semantics and pragmatics. The reinterpretation process that is based on conversational maxims has its roots in the work of Grice. If a maxim is violated, the diagonal proposition is one that is expressed. However, if there is no violation of a maxim, the content expressed by an utterance of a sentence, the semantic content, can be read from each horizontal line of the matrix. Stalnaker adopts a pragmatic interpretation of presupposition which is seen as a propositional relation instead of as a semantic relation attributed to sentences or propositions.

Presuppositions are held by people and not by sentences or propositions, according to him. However, Stalnaker does recognize the semantic notion of presupposition and, moreover, he claims that we can work with both notions. The idea to introduce a pragmatic notion of presupposition is that it rather well explains epistemic positions of participants in a conversation.

To recall, what is presupposed by the participants in a conversation is called the common ground. We can make assertions and other speech acts to change the common ground. Furthermore, we might find out that the common ground is not what we thought it to be like. Because context is always changing in the assertion theory, it is a dynamic, pragmatic, notion for Stalnaker. Like Kaplan, Stalnaker too considers the role of context to be significant in determining which proposition is expressed, but unlike Kaplan, Stalnaker uses context to represent epistemic positions of the participants of a conversation. According to Stalnaker, semantics is the study of proposition which has essentially to do with matching sentences with propositions and assigning them truth values. Pragmatics is the study of linguistic acts in context and occasionally pragmatic or contextual factors are required to determine with proposition is expressed.

As was pointed to me by Joseph Almog, the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is not merely about classifying linguistic phenomena to different categories. A lot has to do with what one initially wants to explain. I have been constantly emphasizing that the theories of Kaplan and Stalnaker are motivated by different ideas. The way Kaplan thinks about the semantics of indexicals, has consequences on what he thinks about the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. In fact, because indexicals, and proper names too, are directly referential in Kaplan's theory, they are placed in semantics. Moreover, the pre-semantic level of explanation is required to disambiguate ambiguous expressions, but furthermore, to explain how words are connected to their referents. What is then placed in semantics has also consequences on what is placed in pre-semantics as well.

Likewise, Stalnaker argues how necessary a posteriori statements can be explained by his theory and consequently, he introduces a picture in which semantics and pragmatics closely interact. Pragmatic maxims are utilized to explain informativeness of seemingly uninformative statements. Furthermore, the metasemantic picture is made to answer what is the basis for expressions to have certain semantic values, not what those semantic values are. Therefore, the distinction between semantics and pragmatics depends too on the underlying goals of our theorists. Of course, I do not claim that Kaplan and Stalnaker completely disregard the distinction and merely observe what comes of it, according to their theories. I take it that both of them did have the distinction in mind in construing their respective theories.

During our investigations, our aim was more descriptive than critical in that two theories were presented and their relation to semantics and pragmatics was examined. There were some remarks on possible flaws or shortcomings in our theories, for example, Kaplan's open-endedness to parameters which seem to require pragmatic demand to determine what is said. This would enmesh neat placement of context to semantics, which he tries to maintain. Besides this, Kaplan's theory has trouble explaining the informativeness of a posteriori identity statements with proper names in them. Concerning Stalnaker's theory, it seems that it does not provide a plausible way to model a priori truths as was seen in chapter 3. In addition to this, Stalnaker's view that propositions are sets of possible worlds was shown to be problematic because in result there is only one necessary proposition which is known a priori.

Despite these worries, the two theories presented here are highly influential in the semantic-pragmatic literature. They have provided us new ways to examine problems that puzzled formalists and anti-formalists. In a summary, Kaplan argues that seemingly pragmatic phenomena, indexicality, can be provided a semantic theory, whereas Stalnaker demonstrates how a two-dimensional theory with pragmatic maxims can be utilized to explain the informativeness of necessary a posteriori statements. Kaplan's theory of indexicals and demonstratives is still held as

most well-known example of semantic theory for indexicals whereas Stalnaker's assertion theory is still widely discussed and it is used to account for different linguistic phenomena.

There is especially one fascinating topic to conduct further investigations, although it does not directly apply to the distinction between semantics and pragmatics, that is, pre-semantics. One might examine what is the role of pre-semantics in semantics? Is it merely a level of explanation used to do disambiguate ambiguous expressions? What then becomes of semantics? On the other hand, historical chains could be placed in pre-semantics. Then again, we may ask, what then becomes of semantics? Pre-semantics could be investigated by contrasting Fregean view with a direct reference view because these views differ significantly with respect to the role of pre-semantics. Thus, I hypothesize that the distinction between semantics and pre-semantics could be a fruitful topic for further investigations which would likely have its implications to the realm of semantics and pragmatics as well. This, however, is a whole new topic.

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