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Global Trends in Local Contexts: the Finnish Embassy in Paris, 1956-1990.[2]

Abstract:

A group of recent publications have reflected on the way the diplomatic machineries of small states have adapted to recent changes, upgraded engagement with global questions, reached out to experts and private actors, and increased organizational flexibility. This article aims to participate in this discussion. We will draw on Cristina Archetti's insights in her study of the localized practices of foreign correspondents in order to inform a presentation of changes in the Finnish diplomatic representation in Paris. The case study suggests that the drivers of local evolutions are to be looked at not only in global trends but also in the interplay between the characteristics of the Finnish diplomatic network, the specificities of the country of residence, and wider political, cultural and commercial structures. The article makes the case for a localized, contextualized, fine-grained approach to the influence of global trends.

Keywords: Finland, France, Cold War, diplomatic practices

One of the most interesting recent trends in International Relations studies has been the strong renewal of scholarly interest in diplomacy and diplomats. As cultural studies, ethnography, anthropology, historical research, and IR theory have rediscovered the role of diplomats and consuls (e.g. Sending, Neumann & Pouliot 2015: 1-28; Lequesne 2017: 1-29; Weisbrode 2014; Neumann 2012), changes and evolutions in diplomatic practices have also been analysed in policy-related reports, drafted to look at recent times and illuminate the path ahead in an era of technological change, interconnection, and fragmentation (Hocking, Melissen 2015; Hocking, Melissen, Riordan, Sharp 2012). Small states and their diplomatic machineries have received a degree of attention in these publications, with special emphasis put on the ways they have been able to recently adapt. Considering that small states are not just "great powers writ small"

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[2] Apart from sources mentioned, this piece is based on a number of interviews with civil servants in the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The author would like to thank all interviewees for their time. Archival documents have been retrieved from the Finnish MFA's archives and Finland's National Archives (NA). Unless otherwise noted, the details related to the history of the Finnish embassy in France come from Clerc 2017.

(Rothstein 1968, 1; Ingebritsen, Neumann, Gstöhl 2006), Milan Jazbec (2010) for example has described an environment in which their diplomacy has had to upgrade, engage with global questions, reach out to experts and private actors, and increase organizational flexibility.

Based on archival research and meant as an exploration of the role and functions of the Finnish embassy in France from the 1950s to the 1980s, our contribution is not a theoretical reflection *per se*. It is however informed by theoretical considerations and wishes to participate in the debate illustrated by Jazbec's article. If Jazbec describes recent changes affecting the behaviours of small states in a uniform fashion across a variety of contexts, our approach to the same question is different and draws from Cristina Archetti's use of Bruno Latour's actor-network theory as a way to "re-localize" the global practices of foreign correspondents (Archetti 2014). Emphasising Latour's insight that structural effects are always being produced *somewhere*, we consider that a context-dependent method, open to the connections between places, people, and practices, can help us understand how global trends manifest in a myriad of localized variations. Using the Finnish embassy in France as a case study, we will also test the idea that the changes and evolutions described by Jazbec are actually older than what his article suggests. Due to their semi-corporatist social models emphasizing broad-based decision-making (Kettunen 2004), their lack of resources, and long traditions of outreach with foreign audiences through propaganda, public diplomacy or networking (Clerc, Glover & Jordan 2015), small Nordic states could indeed be seen as especially prone to emphasize organisational flexibility, cooperation between private and public, and outreach to foreign audiences.

Building on these insights, our article will aim at re-situating the Finnish embassy in France, not only in the global evolutions of European diplomatic practices, but also in the local context of Paris as a diplomatic city and the national context of Finnish diplomacy and Finnish representations abroad.

The Finnish embassy in France after 1946

Created in 1919, the Finnish legation in France was one of a handful of representations established by Finland in the aftermath of its December 1917 independence. However, with the Paris peace conference over, the legation's importance tended to fluctuate with the ebb and flow of Franco-Finnish relations. Finland was and still is largely peripheral to French foreign policy, while France only remotely shaped Finland's geopolitical environment. The Paris legation developed into a window to the world for Finland, a training ground for young diplomats, and a stage where a newly independent country born in the unclear circumstances of the war could present itself as a worthy European state. In 1939-1940, the Winter War provided an exception, when French

public opinion supported Finland in its fight against the USSR: the embassy had then for a few months the important task of supporting France’s enthusiasm for the Finnish cause and channelling it (partly successfully) into political action (Clerc 2011). In June 1940, the legation had to follow the French government in its flight from Paris, and settled in Vichy, the headquarters of Marshall Philippe Pétain’s collaborationist regime. The post stayed there until the late months of 1944, when the Finnish government recalled its personnel. In the difficult conditions following the liberation of France and the reestablishment of bilateral relations, the legation was recreated only in the last months of 1945.

The first ambassador to recreate the post stood in stark contrast to the professional diplomats who had led the legation since 1919. Johan Helo, who stayed in Paris from 1945 to 1956, had been a prominent member of Finland’s peace opposition during the war. Imprisoned in 1942, he had come back in grace with the end of the conflict and moved in late 1944 from his gaol to a ministerial post in Juho Kusti Paasikivi’s government. But the man wasn’t appreciated in Helsinki, where he appeared as a divisive figure, and posting him to Paris was essentially a way to promote him out of sight. Paris in 1945 seemed like the harmless capital of a former great power, weakened by years of occupation and internal strife. In this context, Helo found little time or interest for developing his post. In his memoirs, Heikki Brotherus described the legation in the early 1950s as a collection of individuals, everybody doing their own work without much coordination from an ambassador either absent or moody, focusing on hedonistic pursuits amongst the French elite, and largely forgotten by Helsinki (Brotherus 1985). One would have to say however that there was little substance in 1950s French-Finnish relations, and especially little in which the legation might have had a role. The 1946 Paris peace conference, during which Finland was considered as a vanquished nation on the side of Germany, had come out with a peace treaty that was essentially non-negotiable for the Finns: during the conference, the legation’s main role had been to accommodate various Finnish delegations visiting Paris in the vain hope that they could exert leverage on the proceedings.

Helo’s departure in 1956 came to coincide with a renewal in Franco-Finnish relations from the early 1960s to the late 1980s. In the early 1960s, the political environment changed, influencing the embassy’s work. Finland was now a socially and economically more open country, associated since 1961 with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Tourism and the opening of trade relations contributed to expanding and diversifying the foreign relations of the Finnish state and of Finnish society (Aunesluoma 2011). Neutrality had become a foreign political mantra, a convenient platform from which Finland could play a more active role in the Cold War, and a link with Charles de Gaulle’s France. Paris appeared as a driving force in European integration, and contacts

intensified in the years 1961-1963, then in the early 1970s as Finland lobbied intensely for the OSCE-conference (Badalassi 2014). In domestic politics, the role of the state expanded in Finnish society and the president Urho Kekkonen, elected in 1956, clamped into place a strongly centralized system of decision-making to deal with matters of foreign policy. This transformed the Foreign Ministry into the "president's ministry", an expression Timo Soikkanen used as the title for both of his books (2004; 2008) in order to express the strong involvement of the President in diplomatic affairs, from recruitment and nominations to the definition of broad foreign policy lines. Kekkonen's interest in Charles de Gaulle's policy also meant that Paris became more important, and the Finnish President had good contacts with Helo's successors: Gunnar Palmroth from 1958-1965, Richard Seppälä from 1965-1972, and Ralph Enckell from 1972-1976. In the 1980s, Paris was already less important politically but the embassy retained its interest as a listening post inside the borders of the Common Market. The city continued to act as the seat of important international organizations, an important trade promotion arena, and a stage for showcasing Finland's image, artefacts, goods, and culture.

Changing practices in a growing embassy

In the first years of Finland's existence, the pervasive image of the Finnish diplomatic service had been, not unlike the Swiss model and partly for the same reasons, a thrifty apparatus of glorified consuls (cf. Nevakivi 1988; Altermatt 1998). Finland however felt it needed to be recognized in the world as a real state equipped with real ambassadors, and during the interwar period the country's diplomatic network developed in Europe. Diplomacy was seen by its main Finnish practitioners as a continuous process of conversation with foreign elites, where diplomats had to represent their country as a worthy international partner, promote exports, gather information, and help citizens abroad. Representations had little means, and the Finnish legation in France comprised less than 15 people for the first 30 years of its existence. In 1952, an article presenting the embassy easily crammed the entire personnel and the small rooms of the legation in a few photographs (Suomen Kuvalehti 1952).

The first two generations of Finnish ambassadors had been scholars, intellectuals or businessmen, often foreign-educated or with experience of life abroad, and who branched into diplomacy as a continuation of their work on behalf of Finland's national movement. Technical and especially economic experts were rare, and they were generally kept in Helsinki to be sent out for specific negotiations: politics, contacts with foreign elites, information-gathering, and the representation of their young nation on the international stage were seen to be the main aspects of a diplomat's work. This was especially so in Paris, a prestigious legation dedicated less to actual negotiations than to general politics, representation, information gathering, and cultural relations.

Recruitment was until the 1970s informal but homogeneous, with personal relations, networking in the small confines of Helsinki's elite circles, and contacts with the president being the keys to entering the *carrière*, securing upward progression once there, and getting one's reports noted in the Ministry. From the 1920s on, diplomats were mostly recruited from the middle and upper classes: climbing the social ladder often at a personal financial cost, they acquired norms of conduct reminiscent of nineteenth century aristocratic and bourgeois diplomats. Generally, the image of the gentleman-diplomat continued well into the 1950s as the ideal-type of Finnish envoys abroad (Paasivirta & Mylly 1969). Old notions of diplomatic behaviour, a harsh, hierarchical administrative discipline, an ethos of unquestioning service to the state, and the norms of the high bourgeoisie dominated the "professional mystique" (Schulzinger 1975; Nevakivi 1988). Representing a small state also meant that Finnish diplomats tended to gravitate towards the most traditional practices: "Only great powers," the then Finnish ambassador to Berlin Harri Holma noted in a 1924 entry to his diary, "have the possibility to send ridiculous characters to their diplomatic representations. Small states cannot do that." (Clerc 2017) In the early period, Paris was seen as a prestigious but difficult and secondary post, where ambassadors were allowed to stay for longer periods of time (Carl Enckell from 1919 to 1927, Harri Holma from 1927 to 1943). They gained a measure of autonomy that resulted often in their estrangement from Finland and the expectations of their political leadership.

Recruitment and diplomatic ideals changed in the 1960s-1970s. The 1970 creation of a formalized selection process for entering the diplomatic career, reforms in the Finnish civil service, and the arrival in governmental power of the social democrats changed the make-up of the diplomatic corps. The change was less social- and more gender- and political-related. Diplomats were still mostly jurists or "political scientists", which in Finland pointed to expertise in 'science of the state' (*valtio-oppi*) as a preparation for public service. Swedish-speakers were over-represented compared to the population at large, and the candidates' family roots were overwhelmingly in public service and the Helsinki-based middle and upper classes. Changes happened however in the political makeshift and in the working culture: the social democrats arrived in a ministry that had since 1945 been dominated by the Centre party and conservative diplomats defining themselves as 'a-political'. By giving the possibility to representatives of political parties to give their opinion on candidates, the new selection process emphasized politicization. The change brought new figures but also new conceptions of the country's neutrality and diplomatic work, and women started to gain access to the corps through the system of entry exams. With the opening up of the country, the rise of tourism, and the increase in foreign trade and foreign cultural relations (what has been referred to as the "internationalization" of Finland), diplomats also lost their aura and became less central

in the foreign relations of their state and society. While Finnish tourists in 1950s France were still rare, Paris was already in the 1970s a normal destination for a variety of people, from businessmen to students, from tourists to photographic models trying to break through into an acting career. In the 1980s, the diplomatic echelon of Finland's embassy in France was but one actor, albeit an important one, in the bilateral relations between these two countries.

The Finnish diplomatic corps also became more professional and technocratic in its practices. The ideal image of the diplomat changed from that of the 19th century cosmopolitan aristocrat acting on his own to that of a civil servant retaining close links with the political leadership in Helsinki, a "service provider" both to his or her own government and to Finnish organizations and citizens abroad (Suomi 2001, 124-128). In the 1970s, the ideal of the Finnish diplomat was thus firmly rooted in what Iver B. Neumann described as the "bureaucracy script" (Neumann 2005): statistics were gathered, evaluations were conducted, annual reports became tightly scripted, and detailed instructions for representation and reporting were issued. The first embassy inspections were also conducted in the 1970s and became a regular feature of diplomatic life thereafter. Technological advances were uneven, although by the early 1980s there were rapid developments in the methods of communication: the introduction of teletext and radio, followed by the first computers, already prompted the Ministry to ask for shorter and less frequent reports.

Nevertheless, several archaic aspects remained. While Paris was not a central post of the Finnish diplomatic network (in the same way as Stockholm, Moscow or the representation at the UN in New York were), the post also felt in the 1970s the consequences of increasing centralization, nepotism around a powerful president, and political as well as personal quarrels. Nominations were politicized, ambassadors knew when they had to keep close relations to the president and reported often behind their Ministry's back, circles were small, and everybody toed the official policy line. Reporting as well as representation also continued for the most part according to older concepts. The ideal of Neumann's self-effacing bureaucrat dominated reporting, but a more 'heroic' script regularly resurfaced up to the 1980s: diplomats tried especially in their longer reports or in private correspondence to 'write well', cast themselves as central figure in their reporting, insist on the influence of their personal relations, and provide detailed depictions of their conversations and deeds. In terms of representation, the 1980s saw a combination of the technocratic approach (such as statistics on visitors and regular evaluations) with older norms and values concerning acceptable forms of conversation, judgements on interior decoration and apartments; especially in Paris, traditional notions about 'the Parisian taste' and local expectations continued to influence the way representation was considered in the French capital. One can still

read in reports from the 1980s warnings against modern interior decoration or unmarried diplomats and attachés.

France was long considered as a particularly thorny place where the smallest detail had to be considered. Instructions were given against the pitfalls of French small talk, and wit (especially cutting wit) and erudition were described as essential to assuage the cultural conservatism of France's elites. In general, however, Finnish ambassadors were by the 1980s more technocratic and professional than their predecessors, and the administrative patterns around them more systematic and established. Relations with the political leadership in Finland were also more bureaucratic, leaving behind the improvisations and reliance on personal contacts of the Kekkonen era. After Kekkonen resigned in 1981, the Ministry also regained a measure of autonomy, and communication became more standardized. In the 1980s, ambassadors changed more often and were more akin to professional, caretaker figures.

Between the 1960s and the 1980s, Finland's embassy in France grew and became a more diverse place, its resources largely secured in order to manage a varied brief of bilateral and multilateral, technical and political relations involving private and public organizations. If one compares the Finnish embassy's inspection report of 1990 with its 1960 annual report, the diplomatic post and its dependencies had almost doubled in size, from 25 to 40-50 employees. Considering the addition of representations to international organizations located in Paris (Finland entered UNESCO in 1954 and the OECD in 1969) and the growth of economic and political contacts, the embassy was already in the 1970s a more complex structure, suffering from problems of coordination between different sections and types of personnel. French-speaking locals were a necessity for linguistic reasons, as good written French was a rare commodity in the Finnish post-war diplomatic service. This introduced tensions between employees on local contracts and expatriates in an environment where salaries were generally low.

During the period under scrutiny, coordination with the permanent representations in Paris was particularly fluid, evolving from concentration on a single embassy in the 1960s to a system with two ambassador-level posts in Paris, one for the embassy and one for international organizations. The system changed often and was largely *ad hoc*, Ralph Enckell for example managing both posts during his mandate as ambassador (1972-1976). Despite numerous calls for centralization coming from the embassy, the natural tendency was for everyone to work his or her own brief with regular coordination achieved mostly through personal relations, planning being achieved in a largely informal manner. This was particularly true in the relations with the Consulate General. While the embassy retained its administrative hierarchies and identity, the Consulate was a more porous environment where public and private mingled easily around trade promotion activities. Up to the late 1980s, the Consulate General even

shared offices in Paris with a private export agency and some Finnish companies, the Consul General working in between the two structures. Generally, trade had by then become one of the major concerns of the embassy, which pushed diplomats to engage much more with technical and trade promotion structures and organizations.

Changes in working culture came dramatically to the fore in 1975-1976, when the embassy became the centre of a controversy mixing politics, personal relations, and administrative change. A star-diplomat of his time, the then ambassador Ralph Enckell was also a difficult character, fiercely hierarchical, convinced of his elite status, and distinctly uninterested in the routine management of his post. In his service-related correspondence with the Ministry, Enckell had already in the late 1960s started to criticize what he saw as unwanted changes in diplomatic practices: he denounced bad grammar and lack of sophistication in reports and instructions, but also the direct contacts of technical attachés with their ministries, Helsinki's lack of response to his reports and lack of knowledge concerning world affairs, and increasing difficulties to maintain contact with the top echelons of the Finnish political leadership. The Ministry was also experiencing a change in practices as it opened up to feminisation, better internal communication, and the introduction of a unionised workforce. The arrival of the social democrats also played out as a classical grab for power inside the Ministry by younger leftist diplomats eager for responsibility: Enckell, a 'heroic' ambassador who had been instrumental at several key moments of Finland's Cold War foreign policy (Mansala & Suomi 2003, 350-369), and was used to a degree of autonomy in his work and deference to his insights, rejected these developments wholesale. An anecdote in 1975 involving a row between him and his chauffeur was picked up by the press, and provided the Ministry with the reason for an inspection of the embassy. As a consequence, Enckell was moved to Warsaw in the autumn of 1976. Internal changes then started to be implemented in Paris, and by the 1980s the figure of the ambassador as a technocratic manager of his/her post had become dominant.

The function of diplomats in Paris also evolved due to changes in the way bilateral relations were managed. The practice of sending special delegations for negotiations (for example a cultural treaty in the early 1970s) had already contributed to sidestepping diplomats in important negotiating processes, and as state visits multiplied in the 1970s-1980s, they created channels through which important political and economic matters could be discussed. Kekkonen's official visit to France in 1962 was exceptional, but in the 1980s presidents Mauno Koivisto and François Mitterrand met each other four times in the span of eight years, while ministers and civil servants regularly interacted.

Securing access, coming into view

Paris was considered after 1945 as a specifically difficult place in which to represent Finland, with particular obstacles needing to be overcome. The French capital was seen mostly through its political, cultural and social elites as a centralized, state-driven, "high-context culture" (cf. Cogan 2003, 125-127): French peculiarities, codes, and cultural achievements had to be acknowledged and paid homage to before matters could be dealt with. France was also described as a closed society, hard to reach because of a self-centredness verging on arrogance, the complexity of a centralized bureaucracy, French doubts about Finland's geopolitical allegiance, and the problem of language. Reports and personal letters often reminisce both about the joyfulness of Parisian daily life and the difficulties to gain access to local elites, or the role of French as a barrier to entry into local networks.

One of the main questions for the Finnish representatives in Paris was thus how to gain access and maintain relevance in a specific context. One solution was to send people who would easily blend in: the diplomats sent to Paris tended to speak French or to have specific interests in France, the French language and culture. Considering Enckell's successor in 1976, Kekkonen rejected a candidate who he considered as "not cultural enough" (Soikkanen 2008, 389) to do service in France. After the early 1970s, when the prestigious *École Nationale d'Administration* started admitting Finnish students, early-career Finnish diplomats would study there in order to prepare for service in France.

Constant search for visibility and access in Paris pushed the embassy to also look for specific channels of communication with the French and for a physical place where the embassy would be sufficiently visible. Concretely, it meant finding a building near the banks of the Seine, preferably in the classical triangle of centralized power in the French capital, extending between the Invalides square, the Opera and the Louvre. Having the embassy in this part of town would serve to assert Finland's place in a symbolic hierarchy as a European and preferably a Nordic state (Rudolph 2016). In 1962, when the embassy decided to buy part of a building next to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the new chancellery was described as costly, too small for the employees, and with the advent of terrorism in the 1970s not secure enough. But it was also considered by the ambassador as a necessity, a prestigious building needed to assert Finland's position in the very centre of Paris, within reach and even within sight of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the adjacent Quai d'Orsay.

During contacts with the French, the Finnish diplomats also learned how to tailor their discourse: it was important to first feed into their interlocutors' broader interests, in order to be able then to talk about Finland. Most of the time it meant starting the conversation with Soviet matters: former diplomat Pertti Torstila summarized this by saying that Finland "wouldn't be interesting without Russia". The point was to use the French interest in Soviet affairs in order to talk about Finland. (Interview Torstila) During

his 1983 visit to Paris, Mauno Koivisto had even thought of proposing to the French a system where Finland would provide information about Russia in exchange for insights in European integration (Clerc 2017).

Another way was to recruit locals as translators and to use either diaspora networks or the network of friendship societies and 'friends of Finland' existing in France as relays for the embassy's outreach efforts. Diplomats' networks were mostly within the French elite (journalists, politicians, artists, sometimes businessmen) and representatives of the French state, and their information mostly came from these circles and pertained to their developments. Finnish diplomats in France also tried to use Finland's honorary consuls (about 30 posts in the 1980s) to be more widely informed about French society. They also tried to position themselves within local networks, the Parisian 'diplomatic freemasonry', and French elite networks that might help achieve specific aims. Memberships in Parisian clubs were an important part of this work, as well as contacts with Nordic diplomats, which were institutionalized especially around European issues. The Finns were kept out of any policy coordination due to their specific status (relations with the USSR, associated status with the EFTA, etc), but they were kept informed and received documents shared by their Nordic colleagues. Contacts with representatives from the USSR were of a different kind. They happened generally over drinks and food, in informal settings where Soviet diplomats would test the official line of Finnish neutrality or seek information. Despite close relations, trust was lacking for the most part in these contacts with Soviet diplomats – nonetheless, as a token of their peculiar status, the Finns were amongst the few nationalities admitted to the social occasions of both Eastern and Western block countries.

The embassy had always had strong links with friendship societies and the limited Finnish diaspora in France, and Finnish press correspondents in France for example were regular guests of the embassy. The inclusion of non-state actors in pursuing diplomatic activities, especially in terms of image policy and representation, was an obvious reflex for an organization lacking in resources. Finnish companies and other private actors were also often associated with official campaigns and activities. In 1962, during Kekkonen's official visit to France, private companies and diaspora networks were asked to contribute to the image and trade promotion campaign the embassy organized around the president's trip. Journalists were drafted to interview the president, Finnish handicraft shops in Paris were made part of the program while friendship societies and associations of 'friends of Finland' hosted or financed some receptions and ceremonies. State visits in the 1970s-1980s were also seen as a way to focus attention on Finland, to gain access and open channels with French society; public diplomacy on the cheap could be done on the wings of major state occasions like president Mauno Koivisto's 1983 official visit.

The Finns also worked hard to alleviate any misunderstandings about Finland's geopolitical position and generally spread a benign image of their nation. This highlights the essential role of image policy for the Finnish representatives, a function that was considered essential throughout the period under scrutiny and mobilized forces from both the public and the private sectors (Clerc, Glover & Jordan 2015). If Finnish public diplomacy in 1930s France can be described as a ritual of belonging, through which the Finns tried to appear as 'a real state', the 1960s-1980s were dominated by a feeling of being equal but relatively invisible, and a growing interest in the use of image for the benefits of trade promotion.

Technical attachés and the Consulate General tended to work autonomously from the embassy and gathered their own access networks. They had time on their side, as their longer postings gave them the opportunity to better acquaint themselves to the local field. The post of Consul General in Paris had only four successive holders from 1919 to 2003, and technical attachés (with the exception of military attachés) often stayed for up to ten years. Attachés and consuls were already in the 1950s recruited from outside the Foreign Ministry and the diplomatic career. Nils Lund, who worked for most of the 1950s as the post's press attaché, was a former journalist, and commercial attachés often had careers in between private and public service.

As Finland's foreign relations both expanded and diversified, and sectorial ministries (Ministry for Trade and Industry, Ministry for Culture) developed as corporatist poles mixing private and public organizations and managing independently entire aspects of the country's foreign relations (Niemi 1977), technical attachés in embassies tended to answer mostly to these ministries. At the same time, the development of economic relations in the frame of Finland's association first to EFTA and then in 1973 to the European Economic Community (EEC), demanded increasing amounts of technical expertise. As a result, there was already in the mid-1970s in Paris a press and a culture attaché as well as a commercial attaché with a small team. In the early 1980s an attaché for technical and industrial relations was added to this roster. At the same time, the embassy coordinated the work of the Consulate General and was responsible for overseeing a position of professor in Finnish language and culture at Sorbonne University. In 1990, the creation of the Finnish Institute in Paris added a new element to an extended network of technical poles that structured itself around two themes, Press-Culture and Economy-Trade-Industrial cooperation. The latter finally left the embassy in 1992, to be managed directly by a technical organization of trade promotion under the direct responsibility of the Ministry for Trade and Industry.

Quarrels for competence and resources between attachés and diplomats were rare, and mostly related to the use of public resources by private organizations or defaults of coordination between technical attachés and the diplomatic echelon. These issues were

dealt with on the basis of loose coordination through personal relations. While the corporatization of the diplomatic apparatus was criticized by some diplomats, the general feel in the 1980s in Paris can be summarized by the expression used by ambassador Ossi Sunell to describe his relations with the embassy's trade attaché: "Do your thing, boys…" (Interview Sunell) If specialization pushed technical agents away from the embassy's diplomatic core, relations between technical and diplomatic, private and public interests remained rather smooth in a small system where everybody knew both each other and the main lines of Finnish foreign policy.

If cooperation went generally smoothly, there were also problems. Friendship associations, the diaspora, cultural organizations, and small companies tended to naturally gravitate towards the embassy, where they got funding and valuable help, but the biggest export companies and investors to France were not always keen to reach out to the embassy. Jarkko Arra, who worked in 1972-1981 as the embassy's trade attaché, remembered how the biggest Finnish export companies and investors preferred to use their own networks rather than the embassy; they would contact the embassy mostly in case of political problems, or to make use of free services such as inquiries into the solvability of potential buyers (interview Arra). Recent criticism aimed at Team Finland (a forum created by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to stimulate cooperation abroad between private and public actors) by associations of export companies show how difficulties remain in the concrete organization of private-public relations (Vuoripuro 2015; Talouselämä 2016).

Conclusion

From a privileged gatekeeper of political access, the Finnish embassy in France thus increasingly became a 'service provider' in France, not only for various agencies of the Finnish state but also for private companies or organizations. Evidence suggests that in our case the drivers of these evolutions are to be looked at not only in global changes of diplomatic practices but in the characteristics of the diplomatic network under study, the changing environment of the sending country, as well as the specificities of the country of residence.

The Finnish embassy in Paris was only at times an essential place for politics or negotiations, and mostly aimed at gathering information, representing the country, and promoting commercial and cultural relations. For all these tasks, and confronted with the limitations of its resources, it learned early on after World War II to reach out to non-state actors and to work as a flexible organization. The role of the friendship societies, close relations with the Finnish diaspora and especially with some of its members (journalists, businessmen) give a good example of that outreach effort. These changes increased in the mid-1970s, and accompanied rather than originated from

global evolutions in diplomatic practices. The service became more bureaucratic and standardized as the aristocratic ideals of nineteenth century diplomacy gave way. Recruitment changed and the new procedures, while marked way into the 1980s by political meddling and social reproduction, expanded the recruitment pool. The diplomat also became a normalized figure, in competition with others for the incarnation of his or her country's foreign relations. The embassy became a coordinating pole, not anymore the only focal point of bilateral relations, and engaged with a broad range of matters, from high politics to cultural relations. Our case study thus suggests that already in the 1980s, to borrow Jazbec's words, "new players had taken up diplomatic activity, and new topics had entered the diplomatic agenda" (2010, 67). While diplomats often chaffed at this evolution, bridging the gap between private and public was comparatively easy in the confines of a small homogenous society where people knew each other, came from the same places and backgrounds, and by and large shared the same ideas and visions of the national self.

More importantly, as Archetti suggested, evolutions were coped with by the embassy through a combination of local idiosyncrasies, changes in Finland's diplomatic service, and global trends. Specific solutions on the ground were found for various real or perceived problems of resources, image, and access. The way the Finnish embassy in France worked was thus a matter of domesticating a series of changes in a local context: global trends in diplomatic practices, the advent of commercial and human globalization, the ebb and flow of the Cold War, but also changes in Finnish foreign and domestic policy mixed with local developments and circumstances. While the Finnish embassy in France was pushed forward by these trends, the direction and speed of changes in its work and organization depended mostly on the interplay between the local context and the specificities of Finland's foreign relations.

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