

Tearing Down the ‘Buckskin Curtain’: Domestic Policy-Making and Indigenous Intellectuals in the Cold War United States and Canada

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North American Indigenous peoples remain overlooked in Cold War scholarship, despite being tangibly impacted by this global conflict. This article presents a study of four foundational texts, to argue that the Cold War shaped the introduction of new destructive Indian policies in the U.S. and Canada, which aimed to eradicate the special legal status of Indigenous peoples. Moreover, Indigenous activist intellectuals like Vine Deloria Jr. and Harold Cardinal successfully embedded their writing in the Cold War context of decolonization and anti-communism to challenge harmful federal policy and the image of the U.S. and Canada as upholding ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’.

Keywords: decolonization; Indigenous peoples; domestic policy; United States; Canada; settler colonialism.

Generations of Indians have grown up behind a *buckskin curtain* of indifference, ignorance and, all too often, plain bigotry. Now, at a time when our fellow Canadians consider the promise of the Just Society, once more the Indians of Canada are betrayed by a programme which offers nothing better than cultural genocide.¹

Harold Cardinal, *The Unjust Society*, 1969

Marginalized in both international and local histories, scholarship usually presents Indigenous communities as outside the sphere of international politics and detached from the domestic reverberations of global conflicts. Even scholarship regarding the Cold War as an extension of American imperialism largely fails to take into account the continued subjugation of Native peoples in the United States throughout the Cold War era.² Similarly, while Canada was not a central player in Cold War politics, First Nations, Métis and Inuit peoples were not only aware of but directly affected by Cold War tensions in the domestic sphere. Cree writer and activist Harold Cardinal's image of the 'buckskin curtain' makes this clear, drawing parallels between the treatment of Indigenous peoples in Canada and the image of the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe. Similarly, Lakota scholar Vine Deloria Jr. claimed: 'It would take Russia another century to make and break as many treaties as the United States has already violated.'³ Focusing on four foundational texts of Indian policy-making and Indigenous politics in the U.S. and Canada, this article will demonstrate how the Cold

¹ Emphasis added. Harold Cardinal, *The Unjust Society* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1969), 1.

² For instance, Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell (eds.), *Uncertain Empire: American History and the Idea of the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) does not mention Indigenous peoples.

³ Vine Deloria Jr., *Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto* (New York: Macmillan, 1969; reprint Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 28.

War both shaped domestic policy and was harnessed by Native intellectuals in asserting Indigenous sovereignty.

The Cold War era had tangible effects on Indigenous peoples in North America. In the name of supporting ‘equality’ for all, the U.S. and Canadian federal governments introduced new policies intended to eradicate the separate legal status of Native individuals and groups. In the U.S. this took the form of House Concurrent Resolution 108 (passed in August 1953) while the Canadian federal government introduced the remarkably similar Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy – commonly known as the White Paper – in June 1969.⁴ This article argues that these policies were born out of the specific Cold War context of each country, in which the prevailing values of uniformity and equality were deployed to justify the adoption of a new Indian policy to end all Indian policies – complete legal assimilation.

How did the Cold War, often considered a specifically U.S. conflict, shape North America more broadly? Was there a “Cold War North America”?⁵ The contours of the Cold War in North America were largely defined by U.S. priorities and foreign policy. Reginald Whitaker argues that Canada unevenly accepted and challenged U.S.

⁴ House Concurrent Resolution 108 (1 August 1953) in *Documents of United States Indian Policy*, ed. Francis Paul Prucha (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 234; Jean Chrétien, ‘Foundational Document: Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy, 1969 (The White Paper)’, *aboriginal policy studies*, 1:1 (2011), 192-215.

⁵ Mexico is not here considered due to the different position of Indigenous peoples within the country. However, Mexican Indigenous rights activism significantly expanded in this period, see: Maria L.O. Muñoz, *Stand up and Fight: Participatory Indigenismo, Populism, and Mobilization in Mexico, 1970-1984* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2016).

presumptions about the nature of the conflict, as well as how to manage it.⁶ The 1946 Gouzenko affair, in which Soviet spy Igor Gouzenko defected to Canada and exposed an extensive spy ring involving both the Soviet Embassy and the Communist Party of Canada, revealed that fears of Soviet infiltration resonated strongly across both the U.S. and Canada.⁷ But later, particularly after the election of Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in 1968, Canada questioned both nuclear armament and the Vietnam War. Despite these tensions and increasing Canadian willingness to challenge U.S. leadership in the 1960s and 1970s, Whitaker argues that a “North American Cold War consensus” and shared identity defined in opposition to a common enemy remained strong throughout the period.⁸ As this article will demonstrate, while the U.S. and Canadian governments clashed on the handling of foreign affairs, during the Cold War common values of ‘equality’ and ‘democracy’ were nevertheless shared. These shaped the adoption of strikingly similar Indian policies on the domestic front, in attempt to bolster national self-identities, despite conflicts between the two governments on international affairs.

Struggles for decolonization in Africa, Asia, and South America are inextricably linked to studies of the ‘global’ Cold War.⁹ However, this period also saw the development of explicit decolonial critiques *within* North America. With regard to Canada, scholarship has to date overlooked the entanglements between the Cold War

⁶ Reginald Whitaker, “‘We Know They’re There’: Canada and Its Others, with or without the Cold War”, in ed. Richard Cavell, *Love, Hate, and Fear in Canada’s Cold War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 37.

⁷ Reginald Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1994), 59-62.

⁸ Whitaker, “‘We Know They’re There’”, 37-8.

⁹ Heonik Kwon, *The Other Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 26.

and Indigenous affairs. Daniel Cobb and Paul Rosier have demonstrated the ways in which Native activists in the U.S. drew on the rhetoric of the Marshall Plan and Point Four Program, programmes geared toward economically supporting foreign countries in order to secure their loyalties to the U.S., to foster attention to the persistent problems facing their communities.¹⁰ By creating such parallels, organisations like the National Congress for American Indians (NCAI) adopted the language of post-colonialism, questioning U.S. claims to liberate former European colonies overseas. Nevertheless, this work has not been significantly recognised in Cold War historiography, despite its potential to shift understandings of North American involvement in decolonization to include developments not only overseas but *at home*.

Indigenous perspectives on Cold War North America demonstrate the ways in which the domestic and the international interacted in this period.¹¹ Moreover, considering the position of Indigenous nations demonstrates the necessity of viewing the Cold War era in conjunction with enduring processes of settler colonialism. Settler colonialism, as defined by the late Australian scholar Patrick Wolfe, refers to the process through which states work to ‘neutralise Indigenous externality’.¹² Nevertheless, Indigenous peoples in both the United States and Canada persist in asserting their sovereignty; in the United States there are currently 573 federally recognised Native American nations, and in

¹⁰ Daniel Cobb, *Native Activism in Cold War America: The Struggle for Sovereignty* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2008); Paul C. Rosier, *Serving Their Country: American Indian Politics and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: University of Harvard Press, 2009).

¹¹ In recent years, historians have called for bringing together diplomatic and American Indian histories for precisely this reason. See Brian Delay, Alexandra Harmon, and Paul Rosier’s ‘Native American Forum’ in *Diplomatic History* 39:5 (2015), 927-66.

¹² Patrick Wolfe, *Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race* (London: Verso, 2016), 37.

Canada more than 600 First Nations, as well as Métis and Inuit communities.¹³ In both countries, there are additionally many more groups without federal recognition. A settler-colonial state's power structures are so aligned as to facilitate the continuing dispossession of Indigenous lands and resources.¹⁴ As this article will show, both U.S. and Canadian mid-twentieth century Indian policies are textbook cases of settler colonialism. Placing Cold War North America within the context of settler colonialism offers a unique tool with which to question the parameters of the era, responding to Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell's call to 'generate new meanings and angles of vision'.¹⁵

Furthermore, Indigenous sovereignty challenges the boundaries between the domestic and international. Indigenous nations are constricted within and by settler-colonial nation-states, which have worked to erode – but have not successfully eliminated – their forms of citizenship, governance, and self-determination. Yet, as Mohawk scholar Audra Simpson asserts, Indigenous sovereignty may exist within nation-state sovereignty, through a realisation of the relationship established by treaties Indigenous nations signed with the Crown, and later Canada and the U.S.¹⁶ Deloria emphasised sovereignty in *Custer Died for Your Sins*: 'Why shouldn't tribes have total

¹³ 'Tribal Nations and the United States: An Introduction', <http://www.ncai.org/about-tribes> (accessed September 30, 2018); 'Aboriginal Peoples in Canada: First Nations People, Métis and Inuit', <https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/as-sa/99-011-x/99-011-x2011001-eng.cfm> (accessed September 30, 2018).

¹⁴ Glenn Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 7.

¹⁵ Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell, 'Introduction' in *Uncertain Empire: American History and the Idea of the Cold War*, ed. Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 8.

¹⁶ Audra Simpson, *Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), 10.

sovereignty? Originally they did. Treaties recognize this basic fact of legal existence.’¹⁷

While decolonization was underway overseas, Indigenous groups called attention to their position within North American nation-states that purported to advance global democracy and freedom.

This article will analyse four foundational texts – two Indian policy documents and two Indigenous manifestos – from the U.S. and Canada to demonstrate the similarities and differences in how the Cold War era shaped both Indian policy-making and Indigenous decolonial activism in both contexts. It thus serves a dual function: 1) to reveal how shared Cold War values aided the re-emergence of settler-colonial policy-making in North America and 2) to demonstrate how Indigenous intellectuals harnessed the rhetoric of the era in seeking decolonization within the nation-state, and that their writing had a tangible, transnational impact on federal policy-making. First, it will explore the strong similarities between termination in the U.S. and the White Paper in Canada, demonstrating that Canadian officials claimed they could learn from U.S. mistakes to create a truly ‘equal’ and ‘just’ Indian policy. Second, the article will examine two 1969 manifestos by Indigenous activist intellectuals, Vine Deloria Jr.’s *Custer Died for Your Sins* and Harold Cardinal’s *The Unjust Society*, exploring the similar ways in which the authors drew parallels between federal governments and Cold War adversaries, and positioned themselves within the discourse of decolonization. The authors’ engagement with the Cold War political context not only attracted mainstream readers, but tangibly influenced federal policy-makers. This comparative focus on Indigenous affairs in the Cold War era will provide unprecedented insight into the interconnected nature of domestic policy-making in the U.S. and Canada, as well as the

¹⁷ Deloria, *Custer Died for Your Sins*, 144.

both shared and diverging ways in which global tensions impacted on North American domestic contexts.

Cold War Indigenous Policy in North America

Little scholarship has compared the Cold War's impacts on the U.S. and Canadian domestic spheres. As Odd Arne Westad has highlighted, U.S.-centric literature on the Cold War predominantly focuses on foreign policy, to the 'detriment of our overall grasp of the interaction between the domestic and the international'.¹⁸ Canada in general remains marginal in Cold War scholarship, though the impact of this context on Canadian society and domestic policy is undeniable.¹⁹ Most scholarship on the domestic Cold War in both the U.S. and Canada centres on so-called 'Cold War culture', and the influence of the global conflict on conceptions of race, class, gender, and sexuality.²⁰ Notably, scholarship has explored the role of international political contexts in Civil Rights struggles, as well as the ways in which African American activists situated themselves within the global anti-colonial movement.²¹ As Mary Dudziak argues, civil rights reform was in part a product of the Cold War, with U.S.

¹⁸ Odd Arne Westad, 'Exploring the Histories of the Cold War: A Pluralist Approach', in *Uncertain Empire: American History and the Idea of the Cold War*, ed. Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 57.

¹⁹ Studies of Canada in the Cold War include: Whitaker and Marcuse, *Cold War Canada*; Sean Maloney, *Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970* (St. Catherine's: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2002).

²⁰ See for instance: Richard Cavell (ed.), *Love, Hate, and Fear in Canada's Cold War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004) and Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert (eds.) *Rethinking Cold War Culture*, (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001).

²¹ See for instance: Mary Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) and Penny von Eschen, *Race Against Empire: Black Americans and anticolonialism, 1937-1957* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

race relations undermining the country's image as a bastion of freedom overseas.²² More recently, Alyosha Goldstein and Megan Black have challenged the boundaries between global and domestic with studies of Cold War era poverty programmes and mineral resource management, respectively.²³ Both highlight Indigenous challenges to inclusion within the domestic sphere, though neither explicitly considers the ways in which the era shaped U.S. Indian policy.

While Canada was not a core player in the global conflict, U.S. Cold War foreign policies nevertheless impacted on Canada and created tensions between the two countries. While President John F. Kennedy and Conservative Canadian Prime Minister John Deifenbaker shared a propensity for strong anti-Soviet rhetoric, Diefenbaker called for a moratorium on nuclear missile testing throughout the 1960s.²⁴ Similarly, after 1968 Trudeau's administration opposed the U.S. Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missiles programme near the Canada-U.S. border, and imposed new media regulations in attempt to hinder the 'Americanization' of Canadian popular culture.²⁵

Despite these tensions, developments in Indigenous policy in the U.S. and Canada demonstrate a willingness to collaborate on Indigenous issues. A key shift in both U.S. and Canadian society occurred in the post-WWII era, reflecting an illusion of national unity and push for conformity, defining themselves in opposition to Cold War adversaries. While the United States has never, demographically speaking, been

²² Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights*, 12.

²³ See: Alyosha Goldstein, *Poverty in Common: The Politics of Community Action During the American Century* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012) and Megan Black, *The Global Interior: Mineral Frontiers and American Power* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2018).

²⁴ John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2008), 200-2.

²⁵ *Ibid*, 233 and 241.

uniform, in the 1950s and 1960s citizens generally believed there was a shared set of American values, including freedom and equality, resulting in part from post-war economic growth and sheltered life in growing suburban communities.²⁶ Canadian society shared both post-war prosperity and a propensity for anti-communism with the U.S.²⁷ However, in Canada, the contours of national unity took a different shape, needing to encompass both Anglo-Canadians and Quebecois. Trudeau – himself French Canadian – claimed the solution was not ‘special status’ for any group, but that everyone would find their natural place if treated ‘equally’ by the law.²⁸ In both countries, the federal government presented legal ‘equality’ as a key policy goal in the Cold War era, asserting that separate status was the cause of continuing poor living standards, life expectancy, and education among Native communities. Legal ‘equality’ for all would distinguish North American democracies from communist dictatorships. These views had a clear impact on the shifts within Indigenous policy on both sides of the border, resulting in U.S. termination policy (1953) and the Canadian White Paper (1969).

In the U.S., changes to federal Indian policy were discussed in Congress from the late 1940s onwards. The New Deal policy of enhancing tribal governments and protecting reservation lands was predominantly rejected by federal officials as hindering economic development or even as actively promoting communism within the country. In Congressional hearings held during the height of the Red Scare in 1947, the

²⁶ Alan Brinkley, ‘The Illusion of Unity in Cold War Culture’, in *Rethinking Cold War Culture*, ed. Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), 62-7.

²⁷ Whitaker and Marcuse, *Cold War Canada*, 13-5.

²⁸ Sally M. Weaver, *Making Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda, 1968-70* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 54–5.

possibility of shutting down the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) was discussed. Jed Johnson, Judge of the United States Customs Court and former Congressman from Oklahoma, accused the Interior Department and the BIA of having communistic tendencies: 'For years, the Interior Department was the catch-all, the dumping ground for Reds, pinks, pacifists, conscientious objectors, half-baked Communists and all-round crackpots.'²⁹ Such comments were common during planning for new federal Indian policy, demonstrating the significance of Cold War rhetoric in shaping termination.

Termination was officially announced in August 1953 through House Concurrent Resolution 108 (HCR 108). The resolution articulated the aim of making 'Indians ... subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United States.'³⁰ Only three paragraphs long, the resolution both emphasised 'equality' and strongly implied that this could only be achieved by removing separate legal provisions and services – the resolution called these 'disabilities and limitations' – which were specific to the Native population. Despite all Native Americans having been granted citizenship by the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act, Cold War anxieties surrounding the role of American democracy narrowed the scope of acceptable forms of citizenship, meaning Native peoples living under federal trust status were perceived as 'lesser' citizens.

In practice, several acts were passed by Congress between 1954 and 1962 removing the federal trust status of 109 tribes and bands, including the Menominee in Wisconsin,

²⁹ Interior Department Appropriation Bill for 1948. Congressional Hearings Digital Collection (CHDC), 28 February 1947.

³⁰ HCR 108, 234.

Klamath in Oregon, and the Nebraska Ponca.³¹ Trust protections over land sales were removed, and tribal members were no longer eligible for services – like health and education – which the BIA was obligated to provide. Though officials claimed it was voluntary, members of tribes like the Klamath were terminated despite vocal protest.³² The results were disastrous, leading to a loss of lands, escalating poverty and unemployment, and psychological trauma for members of terminated tribes. Additionally, the self-determination of tribes in six states – including California, Oregon, and Nebraska – was limited from August 1953 onward by Public Law 280, which transferred civil and criminal jurisdiction over reservation lands to states. The Voluntary Relocation Program further aimed to dismantle tribal nations, assisting thousands of Native individuals in moving from reservations to urban areas.³³

The U.S. government gradually shifted away from termination in the late 1960s, though it still loomed large over Indian Affairs. President Lyndon Johnson’s 1968 Message on Indian Affairs announced a new goal of ending ‘the old debate about “termination” of Indian programs’.³⁴ In practice, however, termination continued throughout the 1960s: the Nebraska Ponca Termination Act, passed in 1962, took effect in 1966 and the Oklahoma Choctaw Termination Act was repealed just one day before

³¹ Roberta Ulrich, *American Indian Nations from Termination to Restoration, 1953-2006* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2010), 15-20.

³² Reetta Humalajoki, ““What is it to Withdraw?”: Klamath and Navajo Tribal Councils’ Tactics in Negotiating Termination Policy, 1949-1964”, *Western Historical Quarterly* 48:4 (Winter 2017), 427.

³³ Ulrich, *American Indian Nations*, 19-20.

³⁴ Lyndon B. Johnson, “The Forgotten American”, 6 March 1968, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28709> (accessed May 24, 2018).

it was due to be implemented in 1970.³⁵ Only in July 1970 did President Richard Nixon denounce termination in his Special Message on Indian Affairs, unequivocally stating that ‘this policy of forced termination is wrong.’³⁶ The Menominee were the first tribe to have their trust status restored in 1973.³⁷ The undeniably disastrous results of termination, Red Power protests like the 1969-1970 Occupation of Alcatraz, and the broader context of race relations in the U.S. created an environment in which even the most staunch terminationists could no longer defend the policy.

While the U.S. moved *away from* termination, Canada announced its adoption of a strikingly similar approach. In Canada, rather than a federal trust system, who is legally an ‘Indian’ and what the government’s responsibilities toward them and their lands are is defined by the Indian Act, first passed in 1876.³⁸ On the 25 June 1969, Canadian Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Jean Chrétien introduced the Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy to parliament. Essentially, the White Paper announced the intention to repeal the Indian Act altogether. Whereas termination was carried out on a case-by-case basis, the White Paper proposed the blanket removal of any legal recognition of Indigenous peoples and their lands. The White Paper presented Indian status as debilitating, stating that the new policy would ‘recognise the simple reality that the separate legal status of Indians and the policies which have flowed from it have kept the Indian people apart from and behind other

³⁵ Ulrich, *American Indian Nations*, 135; Valerie Lambert, *Choctaw Nation: A Story of American Indian Resurgence* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 3.

³⁶ Richard Nixon, Special Message on Indian Affairs, 9 July 1970, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2573> (accessed May 24, 2018).

³⁷ Ulrich, *American Indian Nations*, 153.

³⁸ Weaver, *Making Canadian Indian Policy*, 19.

Canadians'.³⁹ Announced just months after their electoral victory, the White Paper set out the Trudeau government's Indian policy goals.

The twenty-five page White Paper reads like a fleshed-out version of HCR 108, adapted for a Canadian context. This was no coincidence. Plans to 'liquidate' the 'Indian problem' in Canada had been proposed by members of parliament from the late 1940s onwards, but had not attracted widespread support.⁴⁰ By the 1960s the consensus was nevertheless that a new direction was needed. The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) held several hearings across the country with representatives of various provincial Indigenous organisations and band councils. While these hearings continued, the Privy Council Office drafted the White Paper, and studies of U.S. termination policy were an integral part of that process.⁴¹ The BIA and DIAND had held at least one joint conference in Washington D.C. in the early 1960s, while termination was still ongoing. A report of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration stated the conference was initiated by the BIA and 'provided a unique opportunity to assess the merits of the respective programs and to benefit from an exchange of views and ideas'.⁴²

It is no surprise, then, that the language of HCR 108 and the White Paper was strikingly similar. In fact, the White Paper borrows phrases from HCR 108. The resolution opened with the statement that it was the policy of Congress: 'as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within the territorial limits of the United States subject to

³⁹ White Paper, 195.

⁴⁰ Weaver, *Making Canadian Indian Policy*, 4.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 120-1.

⁴² Appendix of letter by Acting Deputy Minister H.M. Jones, 16 October 1963, File of Indian Affairs Branch, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Canada's Centennial Headquarters Vol. 2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG10 8575.

the same laws and entitled to *the same privileges and responsibilities* as are applicable to other citizens of the United States...'⁴³ The White Paper's subsection 3, 'Programs and Services', employed the same terminology, declaring that it was unacceptable for Indians to be 'constitutionally excluded from the right to be treated within their province as full and equal citizens, with *all the responsibilities and all the privileges* that this might entail.'⁴⁴

While some of these similarities can be attributed to policy rhetoric, this does not explain why the idea that Indigenous people could only obtain 'full citizenship' through legal parity is central to both. HCR 108 called for Indians to 'assume their full responsibilities as American citizens', while the White Paper determined that 'the Indian people have not been full citizens of the communities and provinces in which they live.'⁴⁵ These sections emphasising the need for fulfilling the 'responsibilities' and 'privileges' of 'full citizenship' reflect the Cold War atmosphere of the era, in which a narrow individualist view of citizenship was adopted. Though the U.S. and Canadian governments did not always agree on foreign policy, these statements attest to the significance of the conformity of 'citizenship' in the era of Cold War tensions on both sides of the border.

The White Paper shocked Indigenous leaders, many of whom had participated in the hearings held prior to its announcement. The National Indian Brotherhood (NIB), a national organisation representing status Indians, had been founded just months before the White Paper was released. They convened an emergency meeting the following day,

⁴³ Emphasis mine. HCR 108, 234.

⁴⁴ White Paper, 205.

⁴⁵ HCR 108, 234; White Paper, 195.

rejecting the White Paper as leading to ‘the destruction of a Nation of People by legislation and cultural genocide.’⁴⁶

The similarities between HCR 108 and the White Paper did not go unnoticed; in October 1969 historian James Duran termed the White Paper a fatal replay of American termination policy.⁴⁷ While it is unclear how often U.S. and Canadian officials met in the 1960s, three months after the publication of the White Paper DIAND Planning Officer C.I. Fairholm visited the BIA in Washington, D.C. and began a comparative study of the two policies.⁴⁸ Despite recognising the failures of termination in the United States, Fairholm believed it could be adapted and improved upon to bring Native peoples into the Canadian mainstream. His report included a comparative chart, listing three similarities and six key differences between the policies. The similarities noted were the aim of securing ‘free’ participation of Native people in society, the transfer of service provision from the federal government to states/provinces, and shutting down Indian Affairs offices. Both policies sought ‘equality’ through the removal of any special services or status for Native peoples.

The report also highlighted the most criticised aspects of U.S. termination policy and claimed that the White Paper would avoid these. For instance, Fairholm acknowledged the lands lost by the Menominee and Klamath and stated that the White Paper would secure the ‘control of lands in Indian hands with protective devices to enable continuing

⁴⁶ Quoted in Weaver, *Making Canadian Indian Policy*, 174.

⁴⁷ Weaver, *Making Canadian Indian Policy*, 180.

⁴⁸ C.I. Fairholm, ‘United States Termination Policy’, 22 September 1969, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND), *United States Termination Policy. Reports and Documents*. http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/aanc-inac/R5-189-1969-eng.pdf (accessed April 15, 2018).

collective ownership.’⁴⁹ It also claimed that ‘those furthest behind’ would be helped to ‘catch up,’ presenting the policy as sensitive to Native needs.⁵⁰ In the late 1960s, Canadian media touted Canada as morally superior, more humane and tolerant, and unmilitary compared to the U.S., particularly criticizing the Vietnam War. Ideas of Canadian exceptionalism centred on the idea that Canada truly embodied North American democracy and equality, which the U.S. failed to deliver.⁵¹ That Fairholm went to such great lengths to find differences between the White Paper and U.S. termination reflects an attempt to reconcile these notions of Canadian exceptionalism with policy similarities.

In reality, the White Paper did not offer anything more than termination. Fairholm’s claim that all White Paper proposals would be openly discussed and negotiated with Native groups, was equally promised by U.S. proponents of termination.⁵² In Congressional hearings, federal representatives consistently made assurances that termination was voluntary. In a 1954 Congressional hearing on Klamath termination, Congressman Sam Coon (R-Oregon) stated: ‘These Indians themselves have been urging for a long time that they be freed from control and given the privilege of managing their own affairs.’⁵³ But in practice HCR 108 contained no provisions for informing tribal members of the implications of removing trust status, let alone securing

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ On Canadian exceptionalism, see: Maloney, *Canada and UN Peacekeeping*, 2; Thompson and Randall, *Canada and the United States*, 228-30.

⁵² Fairholm, ‘United States Termination Policy’.

⁵³ Termination of Federal Supervision Over Certain Tribes of Indians. Part 4: Klamath Indians, Oregon. 23-24 February 1954. Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Senate; Subcommittee on Indian Affairs; Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. House. CHDC.

their consent. It only became apparent several years after Congress passed the Klamath Withdrawal Act in 1954 that terminating trust status would require the sale of most of the tribe's timberlands.⁵⁴ Claims that termination was a policy of 'freedom', ridding Native communities of the 'socialistic' control of the BIA obscured the ultimately coercive nature of the policy.

First Nations leaders in Canada were unsurprisingly not convinced by government assurances that White Paper policies would be adapted according to negotiations with band delegates. After all, the White Paper did not reflect the hearings held with Native communities for months *before* it was introduced. Any negotiations with Native bands following the release of the White Paper could only conceivably impact minor details in implementation, not the policy of removing the Indian Act itself. In practice, Native voices were marginalized in the formation of both U.S. and Canadian policies, despite federal claims to the contrary, effectively precluding Indigenous self-determination.

Similarly, Fairholm's report claimed that U.S. termination policy contained 'no provisions' for protecting Indigenous cultures, promising that the White Paper did.⁵⁵ Indeed, the White Paper included a section titled 'The Indian Cultural Heritage', which affirmed that 'there must be positive recognition by everyone of the unique contribution of Indian culture to Canadian society.'⁵⁶ Notably, the section consistently referred to a homogenous, single 'Indian culture', revealing a lack of understanding of the linguistic and cultural multiplicity of Indigenous nations across Canada. It also presented the role of Indigenous cultures as supportive:

⁵⁴ Patrick Haynal, 'Termination and Tribal Survival: The Klamath Tribes of Oregon', *Oregon Historical Quarterly*, 101:3 (Fall, 2000), 281.

⁵⁵ Fairholm, 'United States Termination Policy'.

⁵⁶ White Paper, 203.

Rich in folklore, in art forms and in concepts of community life, the Indian cultural heritage can grow and expand further to enrich the general society. Such a development is essential if the Indian people are again to establish a meaningful sense of identity and purpose and if Canada is to realize its maximum potential.⁵⁷

As such, the White Paper emphasized what mainstream *Canadian society* sought to gain from integrating aspects of ‘Indian culture’, emphasising national unity rather than acknowledging the significance of these cultures in and of themselves. It only vaguely outlined the means of protecting Native cultures, noting that the government would ‘support associations and groups in developing a greater appreciation of their cultural heritage.’⁵⁸

Fairholm was – to an extent – correct in claiming that U.S. termination included no provisions for cultural protection. HCR 108 did not mention Native cultures whatsoever. However, in referring to Indigenous cultures as ‘heritage’, the White Paper mirrored language used by Congressional supporters of termination. Most notably, Senator Arthur Watkins in a 1957 essay claimed the new Indian policy would have no effect on Native cultures:

Now, doing away with restrictive federal supervision over Indians, as such, does *not* affect the retention of those cultural and racial qualities which people of Indian descent would wish to retain; many of us are proud of our ancestral heritage, but that does not nor should it alter our status as American citizens.⁵⁹

According to Watkins, being a Native American did not differ substantially from being an ethnic minority, respecting one’s heritage but identifying primarily as an American

⁵⁷ White Paper, 205.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Emphasis in original. Arthur V. Watkins, ‘Termination of Federal Supervision: The Removal of Restrictions over Indian Property and Person’, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 311 (May, 1957), 48.

citizen. Canadian and U.S. supporters of these policies conceived of Native peoples as needing integration to end discrimination, not understanding that Indigenous communities saw themselves as separate sovereign entities. Terminationists failed to understand that eradicating separate status would endanger the continued existence of Indigenous cultures. Instead, officials envisioned Native ‘heritage’ as secondary to citizenship within the nation-state, in line with Cold War conceptions of national unity.

In the Canadian context, the White Paper was in this sense consistent with the ideology of Trudeau’s Liberal Party. Trudeau declared himself a strong supporter of the liberal values of equality, individualism, and freedom.⁶⁰ Liberal ideology alone does not explain why eradicating separate legal ‘Indian’ status was adopted as official policy in *both* the U.S. and Canada in this period. Indeed, in both countries Indian policy was a predominantly non-partisan issue. While Conservative Prime Minister Diefenbaker (1957–1963) had personally supported maintaining treaty obligations to Indian bands, other members of his administration were wary of officially recognising any special rights.⁶¹ In the U.S. both Democrats and Republicans were supporters of termination. In addition to Senator Watkins (R-Utah), the strongest proponents of HCR 108 included Congressman E.Y. Berry (R-South Dakota) and Senators Henry M. Jackson (D-Washington) and Clinton P. Anderson (D-New Mexico). Comparing the White Paper to U.S. termination policy demonstrates that rather than being a partisan issue, eradicating separate status was part of a re-emergence of settler-colonial policy-making born out of the Cold War political atmosphere. The ultimate aim of both termination and the White

⁶⁰ Weaver, *Making Canadian Indian Policy*, 101.

⁶¹ John F. Leslie, *Assimilation, Integration or Termination? The Development of Canadian Indian Policy, 1943-1963* (PhD diss., Carleton University, 1999), 308.

Paper was, after all, to integrate Native peoples into the national population, making them ‘equal’ in the eyes of the law.

These policies were deeply influenced by the Cold War emphasis on national unity and criticisms of communism, particularly related to communal land holding.

According to Fairholm’s report, a major difference between U.S. termination policy and the White Paper was their approach to Native land. Through termination most tribal lands were either sold outright, transferred to corporate trusteeship, or later lost due to the inability of Native property owners to pay land taxes. In contrast, the report claimed that the White Paper would protect collective land ownership.⁶² Again, Fairholm failed to recognise that extracting land from Indigenous ownership was not a declared aim of U.S. federal policy. In a 1957 Congressional hearing BIA Commissioner Glenn Emmons even claimed to support the retention of Native land ownership:

[W]hen any tribe is terminated ever in the future ... I am opposed to the Secretary of the Interior being instructed to sell off that land ... the tribe has the right to organize a corporation or to have their own trustee so there will be some legal entity to turn those properties over to.⁶³

In fact, Section 6 of the White Paper, titled ‘Indian Lands’, resembled Emmons’ statement. This section criticised the state trust system for holding Native lands, calling it a ‘handicap’.⁶⁴ Instead, the White Paper proposed to transfer lands to the ‘full ownership’ of Native people and subject them to taxation. It also stated that a ‘proposed

⁶² Fairholm, ‘United States Termination Policy’.

⁶³ Statement of Glenn L. Emmons (14 May 1957), Senate Hearing on Area Redevelopment. Subcommittee on Production and Stabilization; Committee on Banking and Currency. CHDC.

⁶⁴ White Paper, 212.

Indian Lands Act' would give bands the choice of either managing their own lands or having individuals take title to their land without restrictions.

Neither policy explicitly aimed to split up Native land bases, instead shifting the onus onto Indian bands or communities to maintain them collectively. But they would have to conform to U.S. and Canadian land ownership systems, either by creating corporations or becoming counties or local municipalities. While investigating termination, Canadian officials identified that Native lands were de facto divided or lost through the policy, yet the White Paper did not offer substantially different suggestions for how 'full ownership' by bands would be secured. As Dene scholar Glenn Coulthard argues, conforming to settler-state systems requires Native nations to view land as capital, precluding the continuation of Indigenous perceptions of 'land as a mode of *reciprocal relationship*.'⁶⁵ Though supporters of both termination and the White Paper superficially claimed to respect Native ownership of their lands, they lacked understanding of Indigenous relations with the lived environment.

The reality faced by terminated tribes in the United States reveals the shortcomings of claims that mainstream ownership systems would protect Native lands. In the case of the Klamath Tribes of Oregon, most of the tribal homelands were lost through the process of termination; under the provisions of the Klamath Withdrawal Act, in 1959 the Department of Agriculture purchased 525,680 acres of Klamath ancestral lands and established Winema National Forest.⁶⁶ This loss of lands had profound implications for the ability of the Klamath to maintain and exercise their cultural practices, which are intimately tied to this area. Former Klamath Tribal Council Director of Culture Gordon Bettles calls termination a 'social bomb', stating that termination caused 'so much loss

⁶⁵ Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*, 60.

⁶⁶ Haynal, 'Termination and Tribal Survival', 280.

of life, so much loss of the economy, tribal government... the spiritual beliefs that the Klamath had, like they had in 1954 and before...'⁶⁷ While government officials in both the U.S. and Canada claimed that Native cultures would not be harmed by the eradication of separate status, in practice such sudden changes without the consent, consultation, and planning of the Native nations involved undoubtedly had devastating impacts on Indigenous communities. Both policies instead would advance the progress of settler colonialism and the uniformity of the nation-state by breaking down Indigenous externality.

Custer Died for Your Sins and The Unjust Society

As protests against termination and the White Paper demonstrate, Native people were aware of the threat that such policies posed toward their communities. These policies also motivated the writers of two Indigenous manifestos published just weeks apart in 1969: Vine Deloria Jr.'s *Custer Died for Your Sins* and Harold Cardinal's *The Unjust Society*. While many factors were at play in finally repudiating termination and halting the White Paper in 1970, these works played a tangible role in influencing not only mainstream readers, but policy-makers – especially in Canada. These 1969 books were Cardinal and Deloria's first published monographs, though both were already leading figures in the Indigenous sovereignty movement. Vine Deloria Jr., member of the Standing Rock Sioux tribe, had served as Executive Director of the NCAI from 1964 to 1967. Harold Cardinal, member of the Sucker Creek Indian Band in Treaty 8 territory, Alberta, had been president of the Canadian Indian Youth Council and helped found the Indian Association of Alberta.⁶⁸ Their active roles in these organisations on the national

⁶⁷ Gordon Bettles, interview with author, 29 October 2015, Eugene, Oregon.

⁶⁸ Deloria and Cardinal remained key figures throughout their lives, both passing away in 2005.

stage lent them the necessary experience and understanding of Indigenous-federal relations and the international political context to poignantly critique the actions of the U.S. and Canada.

Of course, the ideas presented in *Custer* and *Unjust Society* were not new, but rather highlighted long-standing structural and societal problems. By this point a variety of Native intellectuals had addressed ‘Native crises and other exigencies of modernity’ for generations.⁶⁹ But in 1969 publishers were finally willing to accept such work for publication. Deloria spoke openly about the struggle to get a book contract, stating in 1978 that he had to convince publishers of a Native book’s commercial value and tailor his writing to a white audience.⁷⁰ Both *Custer* and *Unjust Society* largely address mainstream readers, though much is specifically valuable to Indigenous audiences. Situating Native sovereignty within the Cold War context was a tactic used by both writers to appeal to a broader readership. In this manner, Cardinal and Deloria successfully critiqued Canadian and American self-conceptions as promoting ‘equality’ and ‘freedom’.

It is important to note that while termination and the White Paper were ill-advised, federal recognition is in itself a problematic and deeply colonial structure.⁷¹ Both Deloria and Cardinal were critical of state recognition, arguing that it robbed control from Native peoples and communities. In his chapter on termination in *Custer*, Deloria described the initial late 1940s plans of gradually eliminating trust status as ‘basically

⁶⁹ Robert Warrior, ‘The SAI and the End(s) of Intellectual History’, *American Indian Quarterly* 37, no. 3 (Summer 2013): 229.

⁷⁰ Deloria interview (1978), University of Arizona, http://parentseyes.arizona.edu/wordsandplace/deloria_transcript.html (accessed: May 3, 2018).

⁷¹ Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*, 3.

sound.’ As he put it: ‘If carried out according to the original design, the program would have created a maximum of self-government and a minimum of risk until the tribes had confidence and experience in the program.’⁷² Cardinal was even more explicit, describing the Indian Act as a ‘piece of colonial legislation’ that ‘enslaved and bound the Indian to a life under a tyranny often as cruel and harsh as that of any totalitarian state.’⁷³ Both acknowledged that state structures of recognition limited the sovereignty of Native nations.

Indeed, explaining the concept of Native sovereignty was a clear challenge for Deloria and Cardinal in communicating to wider audiences. In so doing, Cardinal drew on Cold War rhetoric to draw attention to the divide between Native peoples and Canadian society. Cardinal’s ‘buckskin curtain’ – as already mentioned – opened *Unjust Society* with an image of the government essentially gagging Native peoples and imposing ‘a programme which offers nothing better than cultural genocide’, despite claiming to advance ‘equality’.⁷⁴ He concluded the book with the same image, stating Indigenous people ‘will not be silenced again, left behind to be absorbed conveniently into the wretched fringes of a society that institutionalizes wretchedness. The Buckskin Curtain is coming down.’⁷⁵ This evocative image highlighted the irony of Canadian Cold War concerns with communism overseas, when deep divides and oppression went unrecognized at home. Moreover, he argued that only Native people rising to action could end such division, emphasising Indigenous self-determination.

⁷² Deloria, *Custer Died for Your Sins*, 59.

⁷³ Cardinal, *The Unjust Society*, 38.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid, 138.

Deloria similarly drew on images of communism embedded in U.S. Cold War rhetoric. Referring to treaties between the U.S. and Native nations, he wrote:

Some years back Richard Nixon warned the American people that Russia was bad because she had not kept any treaty or agreement signed with her. You can trust the Communists, the saying went, to be Communists. ... America has yet to keep one Indian treaty or agreement despite the fact that the United States government signed over four hundred such treaties and agreements with Indian tribes.⁷⁶

Comparing the U.S. unfavourably with its core Cold War adversary was undoubtedly a bold move in 1969 – and a wake-up call to citizens unaware of or unwilling to acknowledge the history of treaties with Native nations. Explicitly drawing parallels between U.S. government action and the betrayals of ‘Communists’, Deloria undermined the notion that capitalist nations like the U.S. were inherently more honest and righteous.

Later in the book, Deloria explicitly termed the U.S. a ‘militantly imperialistic world power eagerly grasping for economic control over weaker nations,’ appealing to readers critical of the Vietnam War.⁷⁷ Deloria placed wars against Native tribes including the Sioux, Apache, Utes, and Yakima in context alongside both historical and contemporary overseas combat like the Spanish-American War and Vietnam. Cold War conflicts were, in Deloria’s view, symptomatic of the long trajectory of U.S. aggression:

‘Vietnam is merely a symptom of the basic lack of integrity of the government ... American society and the policies of the government must realistically face the moral problems created by the roughshod treatment of various segments of that society.’⁷⁸

According to Deloria, the U.S. consistently exerted control over both overseas *and*

⁷⁶ Deloria, *Custer Died for Your Sins*, 28.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 50-3.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, 53.

domestic nations. Cold War imagery, then, was used by both Cardinal and Deloria to highlight the hypocrisy of federal governments claiming to represent ‘equality’ and ‘democracy’ on a world stage.

Cardinal similarly pointed out U.S. overseas and domestic aggression, but to challenge Canadian claims to moral superiority. In the very first pages of his book, Cardinal wrote that:

Indians have witnessed the growing concern of Canadians over racial strife in the United States. ... Television has brought into our homes the sad plight of the Vietnamese, has intensified the concern of Canadians about the role of our neighbour country in the brutal inhumanity of war. ... We do not question the concern of Canadians about such problems. We do question how sincere or deep such concern may be when Canadians ignore the plight of the Indian or Métis or Eskimo in their own country. ... To the native one fact is apparent – the average Canadian does not give a damn.⁷⁹

Cardinal highlighted how easy it was to criticize injustice south of the border, while ignoring it at home. Yet, it seems he did not think mainstream Canadian readers would be any more concerned about Native peoples in the U.S. In fact, *The Unjust Society* refers to African Americans and the civil rights movement more often than it does to American Indians. Cardinal only mentions U.S. Indian affairs once, noting briefly that the White Paper ‘bears a more than marked resemblance to the recent American policy of termination, which proved an utter failure.’⁸⁰ Highlighting these similarities between U.S. aggression and Canadian action toward the Native population, challenged Canadian mainstream readers to face the shortcomings of their own society.

⁷⁹ Cardinal, *The Unjust Society*, 2-3.

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, 112.

Cardinal instead recognised the struggles of African Americans and drew parallels to the discrimination of Native peoples in Canada. In contrast, in *Custer Deloria* actively distinguished between Native sovereignty and the civil rights movement, unpacking their differences in relation to white U.S. society in a chapter entitled ‘The Red and the Black’. Deloria explained that American society had forever sought to exclude black people, while Indians suffered from ‘the reverse treatment’, and that ‘law after law was passed requiring him to conform to white institutions.’⁸¹ Deloria found common ground between the groups only in their socio-economic marginalization: ‘Minority groups, denominated as such, have always been victim of economic forces rather than beneficiaries of the lofty ideals proclaimed in the Constitution and elsewhere.’⁸² Economic marginalisation was, in Deloria’s view, typically American.

While the strongest anti-communist wave of the Red Scare had passed a decade earlier, Deloria’s overt criticism of American capitalism – describing ‘humanity’ as having been ‘subject to the whims of the marketplace’ – was nevertheless bold. He not only highlighted inequities resulting from capitalism, but he critiqued the civil rights movement’s tools for challenging them. Deloria particularly lambasted the search for ‘equality’, stating that the simple term had grave implications: ‘Equality became sameness.’ Considering that fostering ‘equality’ was a key justification used by U.S. federal officials in supporting termination, Deloria certainly had a point. According to Deloria, efforts should be focused on land:

So-called power movements are primarily the urge of peoples to find their homeland and to channel their psychic energies through their land into social and economic reality. Without land and a homeland no movement can survive. And

⁸¹ Deloria, *Custer Died for Your Sins*, 8.

⁸² *Ibid*, 178.

any movement attempting to build without clarifying its goals usually ends in violence...⁸³

This reference to violence is a clear nod to the public image of the Black Power movement. Moreover, Deloria foreshadowed later militant Red Power activism, including the 1969-1970 occupation of Alcatraz and 1972 stand-off at Wounded Knee.⁸⁴

Cardinal similarly presented Black Power as a warning to Canadian society. In describing the significance of the newly founded NIB, Cardinal expressed concern that the federal government might try to shut down the organisation. This, Cardinal claimed, could force Native activists to adopt the tactics of Black Power or, as he put it, to take ‘the dangerous and explosive path travelled by the black militants of the United States.’⁸⁵ Deloria equally warned against the models of Black Power, not as a threat to mainstream white society but as potentially undermining Native activism: ‘Indians who copy blacks simply because they are attracted by the chance to make their names household words are embarking on a disastrous course of action.’⁸⁶

In both cases, references to African American rights movements were important for contextualizing Native struggles for sovereignty within a framework recognisable to mainstream readers. Though Deloria’s statements on African American movements were controversial, both he and Cardinal established parallels between Indigenous

⁸³ Ibid, 179.

⁸⁴ For information on Red Power, see: Paul Chaat Smith and Robert Allen Warrior, *Like a Hurricane: The Indian Movement from Alcatraz to Wounded Knee* (New York: New Press, 1996).

⁸⁵ Cardinal, *The Unjust Society*, p. 90. Notably, Cardinal’s book does not mention the civil rights struggles of Black Canadians, who were influenced by the U.S. Black Power movement. See: Agnes Calliste, ‘The Influence of the Civil Rights and Black Power Movement in Canada’, *Race, Gender & Class*, 2:3 (Spring 1995), 123-39.

⁸⁶ Deloria, *Custer Died for Your Sins*, 254.

peoples and other colonised and marginalised groups both within North American and overseas. The warnings against militant tactics both illustrated the strength of Native people's grievances and demonstrated a conservative approach – while Deloria and Cardinal may not have had links to civil rights groups, other Indigenous activists closely collaborated with black groups.⁸⁷

In the months following the publication of these books, Indian policy shifted in both countries. It is difficult to gauge what bearing *Custer Died for Your Sins* had on Nixon's 1970 denouncement of termination; as congressional support for explicit termination was already on the wane, Nixon's statement was not particularly surprising.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, Deloria's book found substantial readership and was well-received by the press.⁸⁹ The *New York Times* reviewed the book with the subtitle 'Americans should not only get out of Vietnam, they should get out of America'.⁹⁰ Evidently situating the Native struggle within a global Cold War context successfully attracted the attention of readers, and invited critiques of U.S. overseas and domestic colonialism.

Moreover, these works had a demonstrable impact on Canadian Indian policy, as Canadian government reports on U.S. termination demonstrate. Fairholm's comparison of termination and the White Paper was carried on by O.T. Fuller, another DIAND official. In his initial appraisal, dated 21 November 1969, Fuller largely agreed with

⁸⁷ Notably, Mel Thom (Paiute) and others were closely involved in the Poor People's Campaign, see Cobb, *Native Activism*, 148.

⁸⁸ Thomas Clarkin, *Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2001), 271.

⁸⁹ Herbert T. Hoover, 'Vine Deloria, Jr., in American Historiography', in Thomas Biolsi and Larry Zimmerman (eds.) *Indians & Anthropologists: Vine Deloria Jr. and the Critique of Anthropology* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997), 30.

⁹⁰ Edward Abbey, 'Review: Custer Died for Your Sins', 9 November 1969, *New York Times*, BR46.

Fairholm's recommendations for conducting further study among both terminated U.S. tribes and 'comparable' Native bands in Canada. As a first step, however, Fuller embarked on further bibliographic study into termination.⁹¹

In his next report, submitted with a letter dated 7 January 1970, Fuller listed three preliminary sources: Fairholm's earlier report, William A. Brophy and Sophie D. Aberle's *The Indians: America's Unfinished Business* (1966), and Deloria's *Custer Died for Your Sins*. Nine pages of extracts from Deloria's book were attached to the five-page report, though other sources were not quoted. Deloria's contextualisation of termination within a longer trajectory of U.S. elimination of Indigenous peoples caught Fuller's attention. The extracts predominantly included Deloria's comments on how termination was adopted, evidence that tribes accepted the policy under duress, and stark criticisms of HCR 108 as 'the first shot of the great twentieth century Indian war.'⁹² Deloria's book made an impression on Fuller, even leading him to question the extent to which termination and the White Paper differed. As he put it: 'I have read the Deloria book ... and have to some extent revised my judgement regarding the U.S. termination policy. It appears to me, now that there are few substantive differences between the two policies, U.S. and Canadian, *as each was originally stated*.'⁹³ Fuller

⁹¹ O.T. Fuller, 'Proposal for a Comparative Study of American and Canadian Indian Policies', 21 November 1969, DIAND, *United States Termination Policy. Reports and Documents*. http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/aanc-inac/R5-189-1969-eng.pdf (accessed April 15, 2018).

⁹² O.T. Fuller, 'Effects of the United States Policy of Indian Termination and its Bearing upon Implementation of the Canadian Indian Policy', undated, DIAND, *United States Termination Policy. Reports and Documents*. http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/aanc-inac/R5-189-1969-eng.pdf (accessed April 15, 2018).

⁹³ Emphasis in original. Ibid, 22.

maintained this view in subsequent updates which he submitted in Spring 1970.

However, Fuller did not advocate withdrawing the White Paper, instead continuing to argue that a detailed field study of termination's impacts on the Klamath and Menominee tribes was required in order to avoid making the same mistakes in Canada.

Though *The Unjust Society* was not mentioned in these reports, which were written around the time it was published, Cardinal's grassroots impact was tangible. His book received national attention; in December 1969 the *Toronto Daily Star* prominently printed excerpts of the book and the *Globe and Mail* reviewed it favourably.⁹⁴ Cardinal built on the ideas of his book for the Indian Chiefs of Alberta's Spring 1970 position paper, titled 'Citizens Plus' but more commonly known as the Red Paper.⁹⁵ While *The Unjust Society* had presented audiences with the history of Native-government relations and the implications of the White Paper, the Red Paper showcased a direct alternative to the proposed policy. Though the government's study of U.S. termination policy was not available to the writers of the Red Paper, it nevertheless undercut every point which Fairholm and Fuller had claimed differentiated the White Paper from its disastrous American predecessor: land management, consultations, and cultural preservation. Furthermore, it compared Canadian federal control over Indian affairs unfavourably with a global trend toward decolonization, stating: 'Such oppressive powers are

⁹⁴ Harold Cardinal, 'Why Indians Fear "Cultural Genocide"', 4 December 1969, *Toronto Daily Star*, 7; William Dunning, 'Reality sunders a stereotype', 6 December 1969, *Globe and Mail*, 21.

⁹⁵ In 1971 two more provincial Indigenous organisations compiled position papers: the Union of BC Chief's 'Brown Paper' and the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood's 'Wahbung: Our Tomorrows'.

probably without equal in the post-colonial era.⁹⁶ The implication stood that while European colonial powers were letting go of their African and East Asian colonies, the Canadian government persisted in asserting further control over Indigenous communities despite claiming to support ‘democracy’ in the Cold War world.

The Red Paper’s detailed counter-proposal called for maintaining Indian status and introducing economic and educational programmes designed to enforce Native identities: ‘We believe that to be a good useful Canadian we must first be a good, happy and productive Indian.’⁹⁷ The Red Paper called for the Indian Act to be reviewed, not repealed. Protecting treaty rights and securing long-term economic development on Native terms, as well as setting up a new education centre in Alberta were all key aspects of the plan. The Red Paper bore more than a passing resemblance to the ‘American Indian Point Four Program’ bills unsuccessfully backed by the NCAI in 1954 and 1957, which called for economic development programmes akin to the aid the U.S. provided to newly independent nations overseas.⁹⁸ Deloria described these plans in *Custer* as ‘aimed at creating self-determinative Indian communities.’⁹⁹ In the U.S. context labelling such plans with the ‘Point 4’ title highlighted the irony of providing assistance to ‘developing nations’ while Native communities experienced equally poor living conditions at home.

Canada had no such catchy term for foreign aid programmes, but some Native leaders drew these connections nonetheless. During a June 1970 meeting between the Prime Minister, Cabinet Officers and representatives of the NIB, David Courchene

⁹⁶ Indian Chiefs of Alberta, ‘Citizens Plus (June 1970)’, *aboriginal policy studies*, 1:2 (2011), 201.

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, 193.

⁹⁸ Cobb, *Native Activism in Cold War America*, 16-7.

⁹⁹ Deloria, Jr., *Custer Died for Your Sins*, 180.

(Sagkeeng First Nation) referred explicitly to Canadian action overseas: 'To us it's awful hard to believe that there is [sic] no resources for our people when we can give away funds to other countries. We will be glad to help those countries as well, but I think charity must begin at home.'¹⁰⁰ Canada's economic support for decolonization abroad was noted by Indigenous leaders, and contrasted to the government's lack of action on the issues of Native poverty and poor housing.

At that same meeting in June 1970, the National Indian Brotherhood presented the Red Paper to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. Different representatives of the varying regional Indian organizations declared their support for the Red Paper, with Chiefs Adam Solway (Blackfoot) and John Snow (Stoney Nakoda) presenting a point-by-point comparison of it and the White Paper.¹⁰¹ Though the meeting was intended only as a discussion, having heard comments from Native delegates, Trudeau publicly admitted to government failures:

We had perhaps the prejudices of small 'L' liberals and white men, at that, who thought that equality meant the same law for everybody, and that's why as a result of this we said, 'Well let's abolish the Indian Act and make Indians citizens of Canada like everyone else. And let's let Indians dispose of their lands just like every other Canadian...'¹⁰²

While Trudeau did not explicitly revoke the White Paper during this meeting, he effectively promised that no more action would be taken without consultation with Indigenous groups. Unlike in the case of termination in the U.S., in Canada the

¹⁰⁰ Associations, clubs and societies – Assembly of First Nations (previously National Indian Brotherhood), 1970-1976. LAC. RG #22, 1992-93/208. File B1070/A3.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

wholesale assimilative policies outlined in the White Paper were not enacted at this point.

Conclusion

As this study of foundational policy texts and Indigenous manifestos demonstrates, both the United States and Canada adopted policies aimed at assimilating Native people into the mainstream in the Cold War era. These were strongly influenced and shaped by the atmosphere of uniformity and the push for national loyalty. In the U.S., termination was ultimately destructive before eventually being rescinded in 1970. While Canadian officials claimed that the negative outcomes of the U.S. model could be overcome with their adjustments, the government heard Native responses and decided not to implement the policy as stated in the White Paper. But while Trudeau acknowledged that his administration may have been ignorant of Native needs and that their conception of ‘equality’ may have been faulty, he emphasised that convincing the government was not enough:

[T]he ultimate arbitration body, is not going to be some court or some commissioner.... It is going to be the Canadian people. And these are the people you’ve got to convince, and that we’ve got to convince. ... And the injustices which have been given to the Indians ... very often they are the result of distorted views in many of the Canadian people.¹⁰³

According to Trudeau, the White Paper was not adopted out of deceit or an attempt to mislead Native peoples, but as a response to the calls of Canadians to give Indigenous individuals ‘full citizenship’. Similarly, supporters of termination in the U.S. claimed to be providing such ‘equality’. Both responses are indicative of the pressure

¹⁰³ Ibid.

toward conformity created by the Cold war atmosphere in North America. It was this focus on creating uniform, capitalist, 'equal' nations that allowed for the re-emergence of settler-colonial policy-making in both the United States and Canada.

Equally it was an awareness of these inherent tensions and the roles their federal governments played on the world stage that allowed Native intellectual writers like Deloria and Cardinal to successfully attract the attention of national audiences and policy-makers. While the leaders of these countries certainly did not always agree on how transnational Cold War tensions should be resolved, both countries presented themselves as beacons of 'freedom'. Demonstrating the hypocrisy of U.S. and Canadian claims of being 'just' and 'democratic' states despite their involvement in military operations overseas and treatment of Native peoples at home, global Cold War affairs provided the appropriate context for Deloria and Cardinal to present their cases and provide evidence of long-term wrongdoings by the U.S. and Canada. It was this approach that some Native activists took in trying to convince the public. Considering that in 1970 both termination and the White Paper met their official ends, this tactic – as part of widespread Native protest – was successful.

Indigenous people in Canada and the U.S. have not, however, since 1969 achieved sovereignty free from outside interference. In each case, despite claims to support self-determination, the federal government has been slow or unwilling to implement policies in genuine cooperation with Native peoples. Furthermore, a return to eradicating legal status is a continuous risk under the current governments. Though Indigenous peoples on both sides of the border continue to strive for sovereignty, while both the general public and federal decision-makers remain unaware of Indigenous histories, cultures, and treaty rights, a definitive end to settler-colonial policy-making is not in sight.