Desired vis‐à‐vis required interim disclosures

Author(s):

Hannu J. Schadewitz (University of Tampere, P.O. Box 607, 33101 Tampere, Finland)

Antti J. Kanto (Professor of quantitative method in business at the Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration)

Hannu A. Kahra (Professor of Economics at the University of Oulu, Finland)

Dallas R. Blevins (Professor of finance at the University of Montevallo, Montevallo, Alabama)

Citation:

Hannu J. Schadewitz, Antti J. Kanto, Hannu A. Kahra, Dallas R. Blevins, (2000) "Desired vis‐à‐vis required interim disclosures", Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 8 Iss: 2, pp.170 - 179

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/eb025041

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Abstract:

This study compares those interim disclosures that managers desire to make with those they are required to make. Managers and regulators agree on the optimal degree of disclosure on growth potential and size. It appears that the less managers voluntarily disclose, the greater the firm's growth potential. This may be because managers feel that other evidence signals the good future prospects or the information indicating positive growth is too proprietary to reveal to competitors. Some differences are observed. Managers would pay more attention to the specific needs of their governance groups. Regulations would require more disclosure of variables indicating: business risk; capital structure; and growth. These differences in perceived need for disclosure highlight the importance of continued study of the optimal scope and scale of disclosure.

Type:

General review

Publisher:

MCB UP Ltd